The political economy of South-South relations: The case of South Africa and Latin America. by Fig, David
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS: 
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA
David Fig
Ph D Thesis 
Department of International Relations 
London School of Economics and Political Science
1992
UMI Number: U062749
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U062749
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
p
6952.
xc3/ ; ^  6 ^ 7 ^
ABSTRACT
Many factors have inhibited the consolidation of 
relations between countries of the post-colonial world, 
the "South". This dissertation aims to explore some of 
these factors through focusing on a case study of the 
relations between South Africa and its neighbours across 
the South Atlantic.
Despite naval and commercial hegemony of the British 
Empire in the South Atlantic region during the nineteenth 
century, trade proved minimal and South Africa played a 
limited role in assisting the indictment of the 
transatlantic slave trade.
It was only during the Boer War (1899-1902) that South 
Africa became the destination of Argentine exports in 
large measure: frozen beef to meet the needs of British 
troops. With the end of the war, a significant Boer 
migration to Patagonia was encouraged by the Argentine 
government. This community served to cement relations 
with South Africa up to and including the time of its 
repatriation in the late 1930s.
Brazil's participation in World War Two alongside the 
Allies opened the way further for relations with South 
Africa and support for its position inside the new 
postwar United Nations Organisation. Growing links with 
the Afro-Asian world did not deter Brazil's military 
rulers - in power from 1964-85 - from encouraging trade 
and substantial South African investment.
As right-wing military rule swept the Latin American 
region in the 1960s and 70s, South Africa, by now
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extremely isolated diplomatically, found a number of 
friends. Moral and military collaboration from the 
regimes in the Southern Cone - especially Chile - proved 
very welcome in Pretoria. Its adversarial relationship 
with Cuba in the context of regional conflict in Southern 
Africa also proved important.
With redemocratisation in both regions the nature of the 
relationship will require re-examination. However, in the 
context of largely dormant South-South relationships, it 
is unlikely to expand massively under current global 
conditions of debt, trade competition, and commercial and 
cultural barriers.
Utilising methodological analysis drawn from disciplines 
of economic history, social history, foreign policy 
analysis and international political economy, this 
dissertation attempts to throw light on a rather 
neglected corner of international relations.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
The central question of this dissertation is why 
relations between countries located in the South have 
consistently failed to mature. Initially it will outline 
some of the theories of South-South economic and 
political relations. A detailed case study of the 
relations between South Africa and Latin American 
countries will attempt to illuminate our enquiries.
In this introductory chapter, some explanations will be 
offered for the rationale which motivated the case study. 
Unlike other trans-regional case studies, this one 
provided some grounds for speculating that this 
relationship stood some significant chance of success. In 
attempting to outline these grounds, the structure of the 
dissertation will be revealed.
The introduction will go on to explain how the 
dissertation attempts to grapple with questions of 
international political economy in relation to foreign 
policy formation. This has seldom been attempted in 
previous treatments of South African foreign policy 
analysis.
The final section of the introduction explain why the 
case study focuses on the states in the Southern Cone of
15
Latin America.
1. THE CASE STUDY: SOME GROUNDS FOR OPTIMISM?
As a case study I have chosen to focus on the links 
between South Africa on the one hand and the countries of 
Latin America on the other. Most studies of South-South 
links have tended to be concerned with intra-regional 
relations. This case study aims to explore the dynamics 
of relations across different regions. It also aims to 
deal with circumstances in which political and 
ideological factors are sometimes more salient than 
economic factors in determining a number of outcomes.
Since the central question is to investigate why the 
relationship failed to reach its potential, it is 
necessary to ask a number of subsidiary questions.
a. The context of South-South relations 
Firstly, we need to look at this relationship in the 
context of theorising about South-South relations in 
general. For this reason it is important to explore some 
of the writings on the theory of South-South trade and 
investment, as well as the writings of advocates of 
closer political and organisational ties in the South.
The record of South-South co-operation also needs 
examination in order to assess whether and how far the 
theory is helpful.
These explorations are contained in the second chapter.
In general, despite the enthusiasm of the advocates of 
South-South collaboration, both the theory and practice 
have, to date, been rather pessimistic. Even so, there
16
were good reasons why South Africa's links with Latin 
America seemed exceptional, and likely to expand. Let us 
examine the grounds for possible optimism.
The first group of reasons are broadly historical. What 
could be learnt from the early linkages that existed? In 
order to answer this, the initial focus of the 
dissertation is on the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
b. British hegemony over the South Atlantic 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, Britain 
established maritime hegemony over the South Atlantic. In 
chapter three this process will be examined, as well as 
some of its consequences for the development of the 
transatlantic relationship.
For example, Britain's main regional preoccupation was 
the ending of the transatlantic slave trade in the face 
of longstanding Portuguese and Brazilian intransigence. 
Ending the trade called for the exercise not only of 
diplomatic pressure, but also of naval power and legal 
processes on both sides of the Atlantic. How did this 
draw the regions together?
Britain's commercial interests on both sides of the 
Atlantic also led to the surmise that this would lead to 
an integration of the different markets, and the forging 
of regular economic links between them. One could 
reasonably expect the establishment of strong trade 
patterns based on early comparative advantage, especially 
in primary products. The Cape was a net exporter of wine, 
wool and wheat, whilst it imported live beasts and 
tropical commodities such as coffee, sugar and hardwoods. 
Latin America was both a market for Cape exports and in 
turn could furnish the necessary imports. Prior to the
17
steam age, the trade winds ensured that trading vessels 
operating between Europe and the Orient stopped both in 
Brazil and at the Cape. Hence there was almost a natural 
direct trade route linking the two regions. The 
likelihood of strong commercial ties seemed certain. We 
therefore need to examine the record of trade relations 
in order to see whether these promises were borne out.
Thus, chapter three explains the establishment of British 
hegemony in the South Atlantic and assesses the extent, 
whether through the indictment of the slave trade, or 
through the extension of commercial links, to which 
relations between South Africa and Latin America were 
enhanced.
c. An Argentine boom
Further grounds for optimism occurred at the turn of the 
twentieth century, when there were extensive flows of 
goods and people occasioned by the effects and after­
effects of the South African War (1898-1902).
With the onset of war, hundreds of thousands of imperial 
troops entered the country. The logistics of feeding the 
imperial army had altered with the utilisation of new 
technologies which could freeze meat and transport it for 
thousands of miles. In South Africa, the disease of 
rinderpest had decimated cattle herds, and Australia had 
been severely affected by drought. Chapter four looks at 
the role Argentina played in furnishing the imperial 
armies with meat, as well as with horses and mules for 
combat and transport purposes. This occasioned a major 
boom in Argentina.
Of all the commercial flows between the two regions in 
over a century, this was the most significant to date. 
Although stimulated by the needs of war, there were hopes
18
that the trade might continue into peacetime. Chapter 
four will show whether this proved to be the case.
d. An emigrant community
Diasporas have the capacity to establish cultural 
linkages between states, and often also to influence 
economic and political relations. It is therefore worth 
examining whether the South African migrants who entered 
Argentina after the end of the South African War 
exercised this sort of influence.
Ships that brought mules from Argentina to South Africa 
returned with new settlers in the aftermath of the war. 
Mostly drawn from dispossessed Afrikaans tenant farmers 
based in the depressed north-eastern Cape, the emigrants 
formed a colony in the Patagonian territory of Chubut. 
Chapter five describes some of their experiences, and 
explores the extent to which this community cemented ties 
between Argentina and South Africa. The significance of 
the history of this community was as a talismanic 
representation of these ties in the minds of many 
Afrikaners. The representation was to outlast the 
community's distinct coherence and identity, but became 
useful later to propagandists of closer ties with Latin 
America.
These examples from the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries demonstrated that any early optimism was 
misplaced. British imperial interests were never 
integrated on both sides of the Atlantic, the links 
established at the time of the indictment of the slave 
trade were not exploited, the modicum of trade remained 
largely insignificant, the post-war recession in South 
Africa in the early twentieth century did not permit an 
extension of the Argentine boom in trade, and the 
Afrikaner emigrants in Argentina failed to constitute a
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politically articulate interest group which could promote 
stronger relations.
The discrete and episodic nature of relations before 1945 
left only faint traces on which the next generation could 
build. Nevertheless there were some clear precedents for 
trade, and the ambiguous legacy of a small diaspora which 
served to remind later advocates of closer links that 
certain cultural ties, however limited, were already in 
place.
Finally, the post-war period also provided political 
grounds for renewed optimism. In the late 1940s and 
1950s, the Latin American republics were still largely 
untouched by the spirit of collaboration with emergent 
Asia and Africa. They provided diplomatic support for 
South Africa, under increasing attack at the United 
Nations for its racist policies and continued occupation 
of Namibia.
Particularly from the late 1960s, there seemed strong 
reasons to predict that political and economic relations 
between South Africa and the Latin American countries 
would expand.
e. Similar patterns of economic development 
Firstly, there were similar patterns of rapid 
industrialisation. South Africa, along with countries 
like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico experienced 
high rates of industrial expansion in the post-war 
period. The initial period of import-substitution 
industrialisation, in which non-durable goods were 
produced on a large scale locally from the 1930s, was 
extended in the post-war period to the production of 
durable consumer goods and intermediate goods. The move 
into these new areas of production was accomplished
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partly through the increased presence of transnational 
corporations from the mid-1950s. The steady direct 
foreign investment contributed to fairly stable growth of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). For example, in the 
case of South Africa there was a period of steady growth 
in GDP from 1946 to 1974 which averaged at 4.9% per year, 
peaking at 7.8% between the years 1971 and 1974.1 In the 
case of Brazil, growth in GDP - albeit aided by foreign 
loans - reached an average of 12.9% per annum between 
1967 and 1973.2
Close comparisons could also be made between South 
Africa's brand of racial capitalism, which reached its 
maturity in the mid-1960s, and Brazil's so-called 
"economic miracle", both of which relied on models of 
income concentration in a section of the population 
rather than more equitable redistributionist models.
Because of their similar stages of industrial 
development, they were in a position to extend trade 
beyond the traditional pattern of exchanging primary 
commodities. Both South Africa and the larger Latin 
American economies developed the capacity to export 
manufactures and processed or semi-processed raw 
materials. For example, South Africa exported irrigation 
systems for agriculture and supplied specialised 
packaging for Chile's deciduous fruit industry. Despite 
high levels of protectionism it provided Brazil with 
mining machinery, pulp and paper products as well as
1 Stephen Gelb, "South Africa's economic crisis: an 
overview" in Gelb (ed.), South Africa's economic crisis, 
Cape Town: David Philip, 1991, p. 4.
2 Fundagao Getulio Vargas, Conjuntura econdmica. 
Various issues. See also the discussion in Riordan Roett, 
Brazil: politics in a patrimonial society (3rd edn), New 
York: Praeger, 1984, pp. 167-8.
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organo-phosphates. Latin America supplied South Africa 
with motor components, canned fish, shoes and leather 
goods.
In the case of the less industrially advanced countries, 
such as Paraguay, Uruguay, the Andean group and Central 
America, South Africa sought to compete with the larger 
regional producers, like Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
The official interest shown by South Africa in export 
promotion, reflected in the report of the 1972 Reynders 
Commission, recommended that "South Africa should 
increase contact, assistance and marketing of its goods 
in respect of certain South American countries (...which) 
must be regarded as natural markets for South African 
exports".3 The state helped to promote the opening up of 
trans-Atlantic transport routes and the installation of 
undersea telecommunication cables (in the days prior to 
the general use of satellite technology). With the 
extension of a network of South African commercial 
attaches throughout Latin America, hopes grew that, aided 
by the improved infrastructure, trade between South 
Africa and Latin America would expand substantially in 
future.
Trade was not the only factor in developing economic 
ties; substantial South African investment took place in 
Latin American mining and fishing industries. Chapters 
six and seven focus on the important impact of these 
investments in Brazil and Chile in particular.
Chapter six explains the history of South African 
investment in Brazil in the mid-1970s, against the 
political background of Vorster's diplomatic drive into
3 Republic of South Africa, Reports of the commission 
of inquiry into the export trade, RP69/1972, Pretoria: 
Government Printer, 1972, p. 166.
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Latin America, and of the shifting Africa policies of the 
Brazilian foreign ministry, Itamaraty. There were 
naturally contradictions thrown up by recognising the 
MPLA government in Angola on the one hand, and acceptance 
of the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa as a 
mining transnational with an important new presence in 
Brazil on the other. Brazil was able to contain these 
contradictions, and satisfy contending lobbies, by 
employing the rhetorical concept of "responsible 
pragmatism" in its foreign policy praxis. While the Anglo 
presence was welcomed, Brazil hardened her stance against 
apartheid. The chapter explores these contradictions, and 
details the growth of the corporation's activities in 
Brazil. The rationale for this investment rests with the 
firm's endogenous needs for resources, for spreading 
political risk, and for establishing a more secure 
position for itself in the global marketplace. Although 
its investment coincided with and took advantage of the 
drive on the part of the South African state for 
cementing its links with Brazil, the firm had its own 
discrete agenda.
Chapter seven turns to South Africa's relationship with 
the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. It looks at the 
foreign policy discontinuities initiated by the 
dictatorship, creating the space for closer ideological 
ties between the two regimes. These ties deepened as 
South African politics became more militarised. The 
chapter analyses the subsequent growth of trade and 
investment, highlighting the arms and fishing industries. 
These flows were eased by the liberalisation of the 
Chilean economy on the one hand, and by the mutual 
ideological affinity of the two governments on the other.
f. Ideological affinity
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The nature of the regimes on either side of the Atlantic, 
and the ideological affinity between South Africa and the 
dictatorships, provided another factor encouraging the 
hope that relationships between them might thrive. From 
the mid-1960s, the apartheid state was at its most self- 
confident, having defeated all significant opposition 
through the use of increasingly exceptional legislative 
measures and arbitrary police powers. It was beginning to 
implement the Verwoerdian dream of the establishment of 
independent "Bantu homelands", to complete the manic 
logic of the forced removal programme and urban labour 
controls. Despite the self-confidence of the regime, it 
was becoming increasingly isolated due to international 
condemnation of apartheid, especially by Afro-Asian 
states. Latin America seemed to be less concerned with 
isolating South Africa.
At the same time, Latin America was experiencing a 
rolling wave of military interventions in politics. 
Starting with the Brazilian coup of 1 April 1964, which 
extinguished the prospect of popular social and agrarian 
reforms, rightist military states came into being in 
Bolivia (1968), Uruguay (1973), Chile (1973), and 
Argentina (1976). Paraguay had languished under a 
military dictatorship of the extreme right since 1954.
The regimes of Central America had experienced 
intermittent military governments and oligarchic rule by 
dynasties such as the Somozas in Nicaragua.
Not only were the new dictatorships prepared to turn a 
blind eye to apartheid, but in general they favoured 
closer links with South Africa. "We are the same kind of 
men", said Uruguayan president Bordaberry, fronting a 
military regime, to South Africa's prime minister B J 
Vorster in welcoming him on an official visit to 
Montevideo in 1974.
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q. The South Atlantic rim
A further reason for predicting a closer relationship was 
the geographical proximity to each other's markets. The 
relative distance was far shorter than to Europe or East 
Asia. Instead of being divided by the South Atlantic, the 
concept of being united by the South Atlantic could 
operate in a similar way to the notion of the Pacific 
rim, perceived as a zone of accelerated industrial 
growth. Could the South Atlantic rim emulate the Pacific 
rim?
Although there has been no consolidation of a South 
Atlantic economic community, much has been suggested 
about a military relationship. From the late 1960s there 
was also much speculation about the formation of a South 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, to defend the region from 
any Soviet incursions. The proposals that South Africa 
and the dictatorships of the southern cone should jointly 
militarise the South Atlantic are dealt with in chapter 
eight. The logic of ideological affinity was given scope 
for expression within a potential military alliance. The 
most responsive Latin American countries to the proposal 
were Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. This provided an 
opportunity to explore their respective relationships 
with South Africa more closely. In many respects the 
ideological dimension of the relationship is shown to be 
primary.
The proposal pointed to the potential for cementing a 
trans-regional identity and spawning institutions of 
collective security. Any institutional military links 
would have spin-offs for further trade and investment, 
expanding existing economic links.
h. Renewed possibilities for population migration
25
In 1977, the Banzer dictatorship in Bolivia offered land 
for colonisation to persons of German and Dutch descent 
in Southern Africa. The possibility of the establishment 
of a new community of such settlers in Latin America held 
out hopes for cementing existing political, economic and 
cultural ties and the initiation of new ones between 
their host and their native countries. There were echoes 
of the earlier settlement of Afrikaners in Patagonia. 
Chapter nine thus returns to the theme of population 
migration, and attempts to trace the history of Banzer's 
offer.
i. Evaluation
The failure to exploit the early linkages during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was re-echoed in 
the later period of expanded relations from the late 
1960s. The dissertation will show why, once again, the 
optimism was not borne out. A small number of powerful 
South African firms, based on extractive industries, and 
sensitive to global markets, were able to extend their 
direct investments in Latin America in a significant way 
during the 197 0s. The relationship between the 
increasingly militarised South African state and the 
Chilean dictatorship (1973-90) also flourished, largely 
for reasons of political and ideological affinity. But 
apart from these instances, few advances were made in 
developing transatlantic ties. Neither the proposed South 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation, nor the schemes to resettle 
white Southern Africans in eastern Bolivia, succeeded, 
and with their failure went hopes of cementing the links 
through alliance or physical settlement.
The dissertation ends with a concluding chapter which 
attempts to answer some of the questions posed about 
South-South relations, and about the exceptionality of 
the case study. It evaluates the evidence against the 
previously expressed optimism about the expansion of the
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relationship. It goes on to make some informed 
predictions about the development of the relationship 
between South Africa and Latin America in the transition 
to democracy and beyond.
2. POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
ANALYSIS
The ideological affinity at state-to-state level allowed 
the dictatorships of Latin America to welcome business 
with South Africa. This raised a question concerning the 
relative roles of the state and the private sector in 
developing the relationship. Whilst individual South 
African firms may not necessarily have endorsed the 
ideology of apartheid, or shown direct support for the 
National Party government, is there evidence that they 
appreciated the new opportunities which the state was
making possible for trade and investment in Latin
America? In the case of Brazil, which was under 
increasing domestic and international pressure to condemn 
apartheid, potential investors had to rely on more 
oblique strategies to obtain Brasilia's endorsement of 
their investments. By throwing some light on the nature 
of the relationship between South African business and 
the South African state, this case study may help to 
illuminate the more general question of the relative role
of state and market in trade relations.
This is particular so because this relationship has 
generally been ignored in the literature on South African 
foreign policy.
For example, James Barber, in his 1973 study, South 
Africa's foreign policy, 1945-70*, James Barber devotes
4 Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
27
five pages to the economic dimension and makes no mention 
of South African firms as actors in the determination of 
South Africa's role abroad. In an updated version, co­
authored with John Barrett5, three pages out of almost 
400 are devoted to an examination of "international 
economic relations", and a further three pages to 
consideration of South African economic interests in 
Africa.6
And in a study commissioned for the South African 
Institute of International Affairs7, Deon Geldenhuys 
identifies "the business community" as a "pressure group" 
in foreign policy-making, alongside churches, 
universities and political parties. Once again, only five 
pages (in a study almost 3 00 pages long) are devoted to 
their role, and the relationship of state and private 
capital is inadequately examined.8 Geldenhuys redeems 
himself to some extent in his four-country comparative 
study of international isolation, in which Chile, Israel 
and Taiwan are also analysed.9 Here he does give some 
coverage to South Africa's international trade, 
investment, loans, and technology transfer. Even so, 
these relations are seen merely as statistics. There is 
little on the international behaviour of South African 
firms or on the state-capital interface.
5 South Africa's foreign policy: the search for 
status and security, 1945-1988, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990.
6 pp. 154-7; 131-4.
7 The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign 
policy making, Johannesburg: Macmillan, 1984.
8 pp. 160-65.
9 Isolated states: a comparative analysis, 
Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1990; see pp. 330-353 and 
387-415.
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Gerrit Olivier, a former politics professor at the 
University of Pretoria, who entered the Department of 
Foreign Affairs as a senior desk official, wrote a study 
of South Africa's foreign policy. His book became a 
standard text in the training of diplomats, but ignored 
the economic dimension almost entirely. Trade is only 
acknowledged, however, as a general instrument of foreign 
policy; just over a page is devoted to this topic.10
Pretoria's international economic relations are 
marginally integrated into Gail-Maryse Cockram's somewhat 
adulatory study called Vorster's foreign policy. She 
devotes a chapter to gold, and the rest of the work 
consists almost entirely of case studies of bilateral 
relations, with a focus on the political dimension.11
When we look to the economists for studies of South 
Africa's international economic relations, their work 
also suffers serious limitations. The work of Matthews et 
al. adopts a neo-classical perspective, but does not 
really examine the international behaviour of key firms, 
or their relationship with the state.12 This is left to a 
mere handful of articles. Kaplan has explored the issue 
of the direct foreign investment by South African firms
10 Suid-Afrika se buitelandse beleid, Pretoria: 
Academica, 1977, p. 173-4.
11 Pretoria: Academica, 1970.
12 Jacqueline Matthews (et al.), South Africa in the 
world economy, Johannesburg: McGraw-Hill, 1983.
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abroad13, and Padayachee examines the politics of South 
Africa’s financial relations.14
Other writers have looked at the behaviour of individual 
firms such as the Anglo American Corporation of South 
Africa Limited in the international arena.15
This neglect is not surprising since the new 
institutional economics has only recently begun to 
explain the role of firms in market economies, and how 
rational choice and rational expectations may be affected 
by imperfect information. Hitherto, the analysis of the 
behaviour of specific firms in the real world had been 
left entirely to the business schools.
The Chinese wall between the foreign policy analysts, 
the economists, and corporate historians needs to be 
breached, and it is hoped that this dissertation will 
make a contribution to this process.
13 David Kaplan, "South Africa's changing place in 
the world economy", in Glenn Moss (ed.), South African 
Review One, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1983. See also his 
Crossed lines: technological change and the 
telecommunications sector in South Africa, Johannesburg: 
University of the Witwatersrand Press, 1990.
14 Vishnu Padayachee, "The politics of South Africa's 
international financial relations, 1970-1990", pp. 88-109 
in Stephen Gelb (ed.), South Africa's economic crisis, 
Cape Town: David Philip, 1991.
15 The best example of this is David Pallister (et 
al.), South Africa Inc.: the Oppenheimer empire, 
Braamfontein: Lowry, 1987, which deals with Anglo's 
foreign investments, esp. in pp. 80-101. Bill Jamieson's 
Goldstrike!: the Oppenheimer empire in crisis, London: 
Hutchinson, 1990, covers more recent abortive attempts by 
Anglo to extend its foreign holdings. Duncan Innes's 
Anglo: Anglo American and the rise of modern South 
Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984, devotes his conclusion 
to a very brief analysis of Anglo abroad (pp. 229-43) but 
analyses more adequately the firm's relationship with the 
South African state.
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3. DRAWING ON DIFFERENT DISCIPLINES
The interdisciplinary nature of this dissertation 
requires some defence. The explosion of historical 
scholarship on South and Southern Africa in the 1970s had 
a seminal impact on virtually all subsequent work in the 
social sciences. Simultaneously, there was a trend of 
scholarship which attempted a structural analysis of the 
South African economy. The intellectual climate of both 
these trends has made so strong a mark that it seemed 
important to utilise their respective strengths to trace 
both the historical antecedents and the more contemporary 
contours of the relationship between the apartheid state 
and the Latin American dictatorships. Drawing on the 
contribution of the social historians, the dissertation 
also acknowledges the value of examining the impact of 
actual and potential migrant communities on international 
relationships. Some of the material on military alliances 
drew upon the discipline of strategic studies. The 
overarching concerns are those of international political 
economy. The text attempts to see these disciplines as 
dynamic and interactive, applied flexibly in an effort to 
understand phenomena which are multidimensional.
4. FOCUS ON THE SOUTHERN CONE OF LATIN AMERICA
In some ways, whether as a result of the classic 
constraints on South-South relations, or as a result of a 
negative response to South Africa's domestic policies, 
the development of the relationship has experienced 
resistance, setbacks and outright failures. My belief is 
that there are lessons to be learnt from these instances 
as much as their converse.
Despite the attempt to be as comprehensive as possible in 
documenting the relationship, there has been a bias in
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the coverage of the southern cone of South America. Not 
only were the countries situated there the largest 
trading partners and sites of South African investment, 
but a number of them enjoyed military links and a mutual 
ideological affinity. Hence the dissertation concentrates 
on the countries with which South Africa was able to 
consolidate relations significantly. This means a focus 
on the countries which languished under military rule 
during the period 1964-89.
Attention to these links prevented a more thorough 
treatment of the relationship with the remaining nations 
of the region. But there were other good reasons for 
this. Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and most of the 
nations of the Caribbean instituted sanctions in the 
1970s, which meant that the relationships South Africa 
enjoyed with these countries were severely limited. 
Relations with Central America were, for a considerable 
time managed from the South African consulate-general in 
New Orleans. In the late 1970s, a resident ambassador 
took up his credentials in El Salvador, but was kidnapped 
by one of the factions that was later to form the 
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation. He died in 
their captivity. The junta that came to power in 1979 
decided to sever all links with South Africa. Honduras, 
Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Peru and Ecuador have 
at times had commercial and contract links, but none of 
these merited a great deal of attention.
The adversarial relationship with Cuba was not an example 
of commercial, financial, diplomatic consolidation on 
South Africa's part and hence was excluded from this 
study.
5. DOCUMENTING THE RELATIONSHIP
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Finally, while aiming to address important issues of 
general theory in international political economy, the 
thesis incidentally documents a process which has largely 
been ignored by academic writers. Apart from a short 
chapter in Cockram (1970), none of the analysts of South 
African foreign policy pay any substantial attention to 
the links with Latin America. Although this relationship 
was by no means central to South Africa's foreign policy, 
it provided a significant defence against increasing 
international isolation. The case study therefore not 
only provides theoretical insight on the political 
economy of South-South relations, but also provides a 
systematic analysis of a neglected area of South Africa's 
foreign relations.
The case study aims to throw light on the general 
question of why South-South relations have failed to 
mature. It is therefore appropriate to begin with an 
appraisal of theories of South-South relations.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORISING SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
This chapter explores theories of South-South relations. 
It begins with an appraisal of the concept of "South”
(section 1) and goes on to assess the nature of South- 
South relations, examining the questions of trade 
(section 2) and investment (section 3) in particular.
Some of the ideologies of closer South-South relations 
will also be examined (section 4).
Under certain circumstances, South-South relations have 
been extended over the past two decades. The examples of 
oil dependence, the arms trade, regional economic 
hegemony, and ideological affinity led to the formation 
of closer ties between countries of the South (section 
5) .
Despite the optimism of the many advocates of extended 
co-operation between countries of the South, it will be 
argued that the numerous constraints have seriously 
limited the expansion of relations (section 6).
The relationship between South Africa and Latin American 
countries passed through two historical phases. The first 
period straddles the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. It will be demonstrated that links forged
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during this early period were largely related to the 
circumstances of Britain's commercial or military needs 
on either side of the Atlantic. In the second period, 
dating from the mid-1960s, trade and investment expanded, 
but often as a result of ideological affinity between an 
increasingly militarised South Africa and the wave of 
military regimes established in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America.
During the latter period, South Africa's interest in 
Latin America began to take off autonomously and more 
seriously. The apartheid state was at the height of its 
economic growth, yet felt insecure about the negative 
effect international sanctions might exercise on its 
trade. The possibilities of new trading and investment 
partners arose from the political predilection of the 
Vorster government for the Latin American dictatorships, 
which were prepared, by and large, to overlook apartheid, 
and treat his government as normal, despite growing 
international condemnation. Growing trade and investment 
opportunities for South African firms became possible 
through prior establishment of amicable state-to-state 
relations.
The expansion of the relationship has, it will be 
demonstrated, always been hampered by constraints that 
have classically limited the development of South-South 
relations. It is for this reason that we need to examine 
first principles.
1. CONCEPTUALISING THE SOUTH
The use of the term "South" here refers to the sense 
adopted in the 1970s as a generic reference to those 
countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America
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and the Pacific which were not members of the OECD1 and 
which were formerly subjected to colonial rule or which 
were inserted into the world economy in a similar manner 
to the post-colonial countries2. The term "South" came to 
supplant the terms "underdeveloped", "less developed", 
"developing" and "Third World" countries, since it was a 
less perjorative or hierarchical term of reference.
It is a shorthand term which operates similarly to the 
concept of the "West", sharing its strengths and 
deficiencies. "West" has been a shorthand signifier for 
the Atlantic alliance and its supporters, which includes 
Japan, a country whose geographical and cultural 
attributes are quintessentially oriental. Likewise, the 
concept of the "South" strays geographically, at times as 
far north as Mexico and Mongolia, and simultaneously 
excludes significant parts of the Southern Hemisphere, 
like Australia and New Zealand. As a generic term it 
implies a greater degree of unity, coherence and co­
operation than in fact exists. It also implies a degree 
of homogeneity that cannot easily be substantiated. 
Countries of the South are extremely varied in terms of 
levels of physical and population sizes, income and 
income distribution, level of industrialisation, exports, 
debt, infant mortality, and all the major economic and 
social indicators.
1 The Paris-based Organisation for Economic Co­
operation and Development, comprised of the richest 25 
nations, including Turkey and Yugoslavia. At the time of 
writing, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico are in the 
process of applying for membership. If they succeed, this 
definition of "South" will have to be modified. This 
qualification is included because Australia and New 
Zealand belong to the OECD but not the "South"; whilst 
the former CMEA has not merited similar qualification 
because it included some countries of the "South", namely 
Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.
2 This qualification covers the cases of countries 
like China, Liberia and Ethiopia.
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Nevertheless analysts required such a term to 
differentiate these countries from those of the OECD and 
the original members of the former CMEA bloc. The 
development of the South was and remains the object of 
enquiry for various of the social sciences. Development 
economics, sociology of development, politics of the 
developing countries, and development studies in general 
aim to analyse and address the socio-economic and 
political problems faced by the countries of the South. 
International political economists have found it useful 
to have a generic concept covering the post-colonial 
world as part of their efforts to probe the changes in 
the international economic order since the demise of the 
Bretton Woods structures.
The focus of much academic investigation has been the 
question of unequal socio-economic development between 
North and South resulting from the impact of the colonial 
legacy and other factors. Professional specialists have 
sought to understand the obstacles to development, and to 
seek the means to overcome them.
Three major theoretical variants emerged as explanatory 
devices for the situation of "underdevelopment" in the 
South.
The first variant, known as "modernisation theory", 
ascribed the situation of underdevelopment to constraints 
on the development of capitalism in the South.3 Remnants 
of pre-capitalist economic, political and cultural 
relations acted to inhibit the development of the 
capitalist market, and were seen as breaks on progress. 
This variant saw modernisation, or the increased 
dominance of the capitalist mode of production, as the
3 Epitomised in the writings of Rostow (1960), but 
also see Clark (1957), McClelland (1961) and Hagen 
(1962) .
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path to development. The solution to the problem of the 
distribution of wealth would occur through a process of 
trickle-down from rich to poor.
A second variant emerged in the 1960s to challenge the 
first. It arose from a specific analysis of certain Latin 
American case studies, and analysed North-South relations 
in terms of "dependency theory". Championed by Prebisch, 
Frank and others4, dependency theory argued that the 
relationship was based on the exploitation by the centre 
of the periphery. "Underdevelopment" was not a passive 
condition, based entirely on endogenous defects, but an 
active one imposed on the South by the advanced 
capitalist countries. This took various forms at 
different levels. The colonial or neo-colonial powers 
exploited the colonies and former colonies, the domestic 
metropolis exploited the regions, the regional hub the 
countryside. Surplus was extracted by the centres at the 
expense of the peripheries. A new hierarchy of 
exploitation emerged, with local "comprador" classes 
acting as intermediaries on behalf of the ruling classes 
at the centre. The proponents of this theory, known as 
dependistas, argued for the breaking of the chain of 
dependency, regarded as an undifferentiated experience in 
the whole of the South, through the development of more 
self-reliance and for more economic protectionism.
By the 1970s, a critique of the dependistas emerged to 
form a third theoretical variant attempting to explain
4 See key texts by Raul Prebisch (1950), Andre Gunder 
Frank (1967), and Cardoso and Faletto (1969); Kay points 
out that "the identification outside Latin America of 
dependency theory with the work of Frank has led to a 
one-dimensional view of it" (1989, p. 157), and feels 
that Frank's work should be seen mainly as part of the 
world-systems theory propounded by Amin (1974, 1976) and 
Wallerstein (1979, 1984).
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the nature of North-South relations.5 Drawing more 
consistently on Marxist analysis, this variant regarded 
the solutions of the dependistas as empowering the 
bourgeois ruling classes of the South. The third variant 
claimed the deficiency of dependency theory was its 
failure to give sufficient weight to the nature of class 
exploitation at the periphery. For this reason it tended 
to focus on the "social formation"6 as a unit of 
analysis. It sought the increased empowerment of the 
exploited classes in the countries of the South and a 
break with capitalism as the solutions to the problem of 
development.
Despite the growing literature on development, and the 
vigorous debates amongst advocates of the different 
theorerical variants, the material conditions which had 
shaped the post-Second World War world were undergoing 
significant shifts from the end of the 1960s.
Faced with severe modifications of the Bretton Woods 
system, the temporary success of the oil producers* 
cartel, and the increasing internationalisation of 
production, the global political economy had entered a 
new phase. The shift became known as a "new international 
division of labour" which had a different impact on North 
and South, and on their mutual relationships.
5 See the Marxist critiques of dependency theory 
offered by Ernesto Laclau (1971); Ronald Chilcote (1974) ; 
Philip O'Brien (1975, 1985); Gabriel Palma (1978); and 
Colin Henfrey (1981).
6 The concept of social formation was extensively 
utilised by French structuralist-Marxist philosoher,
Louis Althusser. It coincided with the orthodox concept 
of "nation-state", but Althusser saw this term as too 
inaccurate. Following Engels he saw the social formation 
as a totality whose unity is comprised of interconnected 
spheres of politics, the economy and ideology, and 
therefore went beyond simply a notion of the state.
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The countries of the North during the 1970s had seen a 
sharp decline in industrial production and employment 
levels, accompanied by higher inflation. Industrial firms 
responded by seeking to build global markets for their 
products. Banks recycled petro-dollars and made it easier 
for borrowers in the South to obtain credit.
Under the new international division of labour, the 
impact on the South was profound. Perhaps the most 
significant trend was the extension of its internal 
differentiation, or what certain writers have referred to 
as hierarchisation7, implying the re-ordering of the sub­
groups constituting the South in new positions in the 
global economy. More than ever before, the divisions 
between three groupings - the oil exporters (PECs), the 
newly-industrialised countries (NICs), and the least 
developed or "Fourth World" countries (LLDCs) - became 
evident. This trifurcation was not an exhaustive 
taxonomy: countries like China, Chile or Botswana defy 
easy categorisation. Yet each of these main groupings had 
a different place in the new international division of 
labour, and this hampered a consolidated response to the 
new global conditions.
Analysts were forced to take into account the emergence 
of the NICs, or what are referred to more accurately as 
the semi-industrialised countries. Their economic growth 
was matched by the decline of the "Fourth World" 
countries, although in some cases periods of high growth 
have ended as certain NICs have been adversely affected 
by debt crises.
Nevertheless, the case of the Asian NICs in particular
7 See Jerker Carlsson, "The emergence of South-South 
relations in a changing world economy" in Jerker Carlsson 
(ed.), South-South relations in a changing world order, 
Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1982,
p. 10.
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has been cause for a rethink on the part of advocates of 
each of the three theoretical variants. The success 
stories of Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, for 
example, came about through initial phases of extensive 
state intervention, and cannot be ascribed to the free 
functioning of market forces. At the same time, despite a 
relative absence of political freedoms, standards of 
living have risen across the board. Capitalism also 
seemed much more durable than advocates of the dependista 
and Marxist schools had predicted.8
The NICs had shifted from being countries principally 
devoted to the export of primary products, and became 
large recipients of new investment and loan capital, and, 
increasingly, exporters of finished and semi-finished 
industrial goods.
The new international division of labour also had an 
impact on the development path of those countries of the 
South which had adopted import substitution strategies 
for industrialisation. The internationalisation of 
production posed huge challenges to those countries which 
had adopted strongly nationalist and protectionist 
policies since the 1930s. Pressure to liberalise came 
from a number of quarters: the International Monetary 
Fund's structural adjustment programmes, conditionality 
of World Bank loans, Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative, 
and so on. At the same time, advanced capitalist 
countries sought to maintain and extend protectionist 
trade barriers to avoid local industries having to 
compete with low-wage NICs. For example, the United 
States attempted to limit the import of textiles, shoes 
and apparel from countries like Brazil. Japan became 
notorious for its low levels of imports from North as 
well as South, whilst the consolidation of the European
8 See Albert 0 Hirschmann, The strategy of economic 
development, Boulder: Westview, 1988.
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Community - and especially its attempt to construct a 
single internal market - aimed to control its trade with 
the South very carefully through instruments like the 
Lome Conventions.
Despite growing structural divisions, the South had, as 
early as the middle 1950s, attempted to organise itself 
both politically and economically.
Politically, this took the form of the grouping called 
the Colombo Powers9, whose initial success stimulated the 
calling of a more broadly based conference to include 
other neutralist and newly sovereign states. This 
conference took place at Bandung, in Indonesia, in 1955.
The idea of closer political co-opeijtion was raised by a 
number of heads of government in the South who saw the 
benefits of treading a path independent of the two major 
blocs. Inspired by the independent line of Josip Broz 
Tito and Jawaharlal Nehru, they also included Kwame 
Nkrumah, Achmed Sukarno, Achmed Ben Bella and Gamal 'Abd 
el-Nasser.
Bandung was the first of many subsequent conferences, 
which by the 1970s had evolved into the Non-aligned 
Movement (NAM). Since its basis was neutralism, it 
included Yugoslavia - not conventionally regarded as part 
of the South - as a key member. However, for the most 
part, the organisation articulated the views of large 
parts of the South as a political bloc.
Economically, the South coalesced around the "Group of 
77" (G-77), named for its original membership size. G-77
9 This met in the Sri Lankan capital in April 1954, 
and consisted of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma and 
Indonesia. Pakistan left after it joined SEATO later that 
year, but Ghana, the United Arab Republic, and Cambodia 
became associated with the group.
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was formed in 1962 as a loose alliance to represent the 
interests of the South in the various rounds of 
international trade negotiations sponsored by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, principally 
aimed at the periodic revision of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).10 The alliance forged in the 
economic sphere was often extended to other arenas of 
international organisation. For example, in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, or in specialised 
organisations like UNESCO, the International Olympics 
Committee, and so on, the South, when it acted in 
concert, formed an increasingly powerful political lobby.
At the regional level, countries of the South combined 
for largely economic purposes. Organisations like the 
Association of South-east Asian Nations, the Andean Pact, 
Caricom, the Central American Common Market, the Southern 
African Development Co-ordinating Conference and many 
others emerged to rationalise regional development and 
political co-operation. Regional bargaining groups also 
emerged, such as the ACP countries, combining sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, to represent the 
least industrialised of the post-colonial countries in 
their dealings with the European Community.
In some cases, countries of the South producing the same 
commodity established common organisations charged with 
obtaining better terms of trade in the world market. The 
most successful commodity organisation, particularly 
during the 1970s, was the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, which succeeded in building an oil 
cartel, and establishing its own pricing structures. 
Despite early signs of promise, other attempts were
10 See for example the work of Gardner and Millikan 
(eds.)(1968), Diana Tussie (1987), and Mark Williams 
(1990).
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ultimately less successful, combining, for example, the 
copper, coffee, bauxite and the tin producers of the 
South.
Apart from the structures of collaboration and 
consultation, of policy co-ordination and joint lobbying, 
there is also a need to examine the extent to which 
South-South economic transactions have expanded.
Therefore the following sections aim to analyse South- 
South investment and trade patterns.
2. SOUTH-SOUTH TRADE: SOME THEORIES
Substantial debate has taken place about the costs and 
benefits of South-South trade. Different theoretical 
approaches to international trade have come into conflict 
about the conditions under which South-South trade might 
thrive.11
The neo-classical approach to international trade - 
drawing on the pioneering work of two Swedish economists, 
Heckscher and Ohlin - is based on the theory of 
comparative advantage. It predicts that trade is most 
likely to occur between unlike economies, and the 
relative gains will be greatest when conditions (factor 
endowments of labour and capital) are most dissimilar.
The greatest gains will therefore arise from trade 
between capital-intensive North and labour-intensive 
South. By extension, gains will also arise from trade 
between more and less industrialised countries of the 
South.
11 The most cogent outline is to be found in Vivianne 
Ventura-Dias, "The theoretical background for analysis of 
South-South trade", pp. 1-24 in Ventura-Dias (ed.),
(1989). Also see Adams (1983), Parsan (1992 forthcoming), 
Raipuria (1987). and Thomas (1988) .
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Many empirical studies on trade patterns have raised 
doubts about whether the rigorous simplicity of the 
static, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model could explain 
them accurately.
Stewart identifies two major flaws in the theory.12 
Firstly, trade flows are larger by far between countries 
of the North, which are reasonably equivalent in terms of 
industrial advance. This is evident in statistics 
provided in Table 2.1. The trade between developed 
countries (column N-N) has consistantly accounted for 
over half of world trade, and this proportion rises 
significantly when only manufactured goods are 
considered.
TABLE 2.1
DIRECTIONS OF TRADE: 1955-1985 
Percentage of world exports
YEAR S-S S-N Total iS N-S N-N Total N
1955 7.09 20.91 27.99 20.46 51.55 72.01
1960 5. 65 18. 34 23.99 20.21 55.80 76.01
1965 4.86 16.58 21.44 16.95 61.61 78.56
1970 4.11 15.03 19.14 15.64 65.22 80.86
1975 6. 66 20.09 26.74 18.72 54.54 73.26
1979 7.17 20.85 28.03 16.69 55.28 71.97
1980 8.07 22.85 30.92 17.07 52.01 69.08
1981 8.87 21.88 30.75 18.38 50.88 69.25
1982 9.28 19.95 29.23 18.70 52.07 70.77
1983
216
8.80 18.99 27.78 17.57 54.64 72.22
1984 8.24 18.97 27.22 16.62 56.16 72.78
1985 7.81 18.02 25.83 15.96 58.22 74.17
Range 4-10 15-23 19-31 15-21 50-66 69-81
Key: S = South; N = North (market <economies only).
Source: UNCTAD data bank; Vivianne Ventura-Dias, 
"Structure of South-South trade", p. 28.
12 Frances Stewart, "The direction of international 
trade", in Gerald K Helleiner (ed.), A world divided: the 
less developed countries in the international economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p.94-5.
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The second flaw in the neo-classical position was 
identified by Leontief, whose famous "paradox" 
demonstrated that exports from the United States were 
labour-intensive in relation to its imports. This weakens 
the argument that factor endowment is an independent 
explanation of trade. On the contrary, factor endowment, 
especially when non-natural resources like capital goods 
and educated manpower are concerned, may be a product of 
past trade developments. According to Myrdal, this 
cumulative causation can have an impact on efficiency: 
any initial competitive edge will result in further 
increases in efficiency, leading to a greater cumulative 
advantage. This may prevent the development of the less 
advanced economy, even if there had originally been an 
equal starting point.13
In challenging the neo-classical theorists' model of the 
direction of trade, Linder argues that the direction for 
manufactured exports is likely to be the opposite of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin predictions. His argument is that it is 
greatest between similar countries and least for 
dissimilar countries.14 Consumption varies with income 
level, and will be most similar for countries of 
equivalent development status. Innovations perfected in 
the domestic market, will later find consumers in similar 
export markets. This helps to account for the 
consistently high level of North-North trade. Yet Linder 
does not take into account questions of historical North- 
South linkages (colonial trade, restrictions on South- 
South trade), nor the technological and innovation gap 
which encourages transfers from North to South, nor the
13 Gunnar Myrdal, Economic theory and underdeveloped 
regions, London: Duckworth, 1957.
14 Stefan Burenstam Linder, An essay on trade and 
transformation, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961. Also 
see Harmon C Thomas, A study of trade among developing 
countries, 1950-80: an appraisal of the emerging pattern, 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1988, pp. 57-9; 67-70.
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question of income distribution.
The "product cycle" theory advanced by Raymond Vernon 
shows that technology transfer has complex consequences 
for the direction of trade.15 Vernon demonstrates a 
sequential national entry into production of certain 
manufactured goods, with early adaptation of new goods 
conferring an export advantage, on the basis, say, of 
lower wages or raw material costs in the South. The new 
products will flow from North to South in the first 
instance, but after adaptation in the South, the flow 
will be reversed for "mature" products. A good example of 
this product cycle is the export to advanced countries of 
Taiwanese clones of IBM-style personal computers. The 
conclusion drawn from this theory is that, of all the 
flows, South-South trade is least advantageous. The 
reasoning is that since there is little innovation in the 
South, and, since wage costs are similar and 
protectionism more likely, countries of the South do not 
benefit from importing low cost products from each other. 
The concentration of innovation in the North is one of 
the main reasons for refuting Linder's claim that trade 
is greatest among similar countries, especially when they 
are poor.
The Linder thesis also ignores differences in income 
distribution, which in many countries of the South are 
very wide. Consumption patterns in the South may be 
distorted somewhat by the importation of products from 
the North designed for higher income levels than are 
typical.
The issue of technological linkages accounts for the 
dominance of North products in many South markets.
15 His seminal article is "International investment 
and international trade in the product cycle", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 80, May 1966, pp. 190-207.
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Importation of a single product from the North may 
require the consumption of a string of other related or 
complementary products. For example, in order to raise 
productivity, a country of the South may import tractors. 
It simultaneously needs skilled drivers and mechanics, 
petrol and lubricants; the tractor will enable the owners 
to make use of new types of seeds and fertilisers as 
complementary goods. Each new product from the North may 
carry further linkages.
Thus, for various reasons, but particularly because of 
the North's dominance of innovation and substantial 
technological linkages, the tendency for South-South 
trade to supplant or challenge North-South trade is a 
very limited one. Neo-classical critics of South-South 
trade as a panacea to development have pointed to the 
inefficiencies and featherbedding of protected industries 
in the South.
In turn, supporters of South-South trade have seen it as 
one element of the redirection of the economies of the 
South, and a necessary precondition for more appropriate 
patterns of development. It would undo somewhat the 
process of cumulative causation which has largely 
benefited the North. It would give the South a margin of 
independence from the wilder oscillations of Northern 
markets, and raise the South's bargaining strength.
The redirection of the South's trade is fraught with 
constraints and complications, some of which will be 
dealt with below. Nevertheless, although the theoretical 
foundations for explaining why South-South trade remains 
small have become something of an orthodoxy, growing 
interest in its promotion has spawned theoretical 
strategies for how it can be extended.
Leaving aside post-Fordist solutions, rare in the South,
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strategies for boosting South-South trade have often been 
rooted in an industrial base which originated through 
import-substitution industrialisation.16 Export goods 
need to be competitive in price, design and quality, and 
therefore are likely to be adaptations of technologies 
and production processes of the North. These goods are 
"last-phase product cycle" goods, manufactured in the 
NICs, and traded for primary products from the LLDCs. In 
a sense this trading pattern conforms with that predicted 
by the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the exchange of 
manufactures for primary products. Yet since they are 
"last-phase product cycle" goods, the neo-classical model 
is not really equipped to analyse them.17
In the case of NICs producing both primary and "last- 
phase product cycle" goods18, trade may consist of a mix 
of both types of product. The case of South Africa and 
Latin America is one in which trade in the nineteenth 
century consisted entirely of primary products; after 
import-substitution industrialisation had taken place, 
countries were in a position to trade in "last-phase
16 See Chenery (H) , Robinson (S) and Syrquin (M) , 
Industrialisation and growth: a comparative study,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Yet Pazos feels 
that in the long run, the route of import substitution is 
costly and problematic. See "Have import-substituting 
policies either precipitated or aggravated the debt 
crisis?", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World 
Affairs 27, 4, Winter 1985, pp. 57-72.
17 Jerker Carlsson, "The Brazilian penetration of 
Nigeria through trade", in Carlsson and Shaw (eds), Newly 
industrialising countries and the political economy of 
South-South relations, Basingstoke: Macmillian, 1988, pp. 
192-3.
18 Of Brazil's 1989-90 exports, for example, 37.7% 
were comprised of manufactured goods, including iron and 
steel products. See Gazeta Mercantil, 6 August 1990. 
Brazil produces "last-phase product cycle" goods such as 
civilian and military vehicles and components, as well as 
intermediate technology consumer durables adapted for 
"tropical" markets.
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product cycle" goods, in addition to primary and 
intermediate goods. As will be shown, trade is sporadic, 
and often linked to investment.
3. SOUTH-SOUTH INVESTMENT FLOWS
Although notoriously difficult to measure and collate, 
South-South capital flows are a growing feature of the 
relationship. To understand these flows we need to 
disaggregate national statistics and look more closely at 
the calculations of individual firms in their decisions 
to invest abroad. With the emergence of the NICs, came 
the rise of South-based transnational corporations 
(STNCs), ranging from private firms like South Korea's 
Daewoo to state-owned firms like Brazil's Companhia Vale 
do Rio Doce.
Various factors led to the larger South-based firms' 
decisions to go transnational through participation in 
direct foreign investments. In his analysis of the 
internationalisation of South-based firms, Wells 
identifies five motives:
1. Because of foreign exchange restrictions (e.g. India), 
governments may insist that local firms find their own 
sources of foreign exchange to finance imports. This 
drives them to invest abroad.
2. Anti-trust laws at home may force expansion abroad to 
ensure further growth.
3. Size limitations of the domestic market may curb 
growth.
4. The application of established technologies abroad may 
be more profitable than developing new ones at home.
5. Foreign investment may be a general risk-spreading
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strategy.19
There are, of course, other motives, and some of these 
will be highlighted in the case studies presented later.
For example, investment may occur in order to gain access 
to raw materials. The drive for raw materials is 
motivated by various considerations. Firstly, it may 
result when home countries lack strategic resources. 
Examples of this abound: Brazil's need for petroleum has 
governed its relationship with Nigeria20; the Philippines 
and South Korea have bought into timber plantations in 
Indonesia21. Secondly, a firm may make an investment 
solely to maintain a monopolistic or monopsonistic 
control over a commodity; here, the classic example is De 
Beers Consolidated, the South African based diamond 
producer22. Thirdly, where resources are depleted in one 
host country, investments may shift to a third country. 
Later we shall examine the case of the South African 
fishing industry shifting its Namibian holdings to Chile 
after the depletion of the Namibian fish stock.
The emergence of money markets in the South, and the 
transfer of innovation of technology have led to the 
maturation of STNCs. Access these and Northern money 
markets enabled the STNCs to finance expansion, exports
19 Louis T Wells jr, "The internationalisation of 
firms from developing countries", in T Agmon and Charles 
P Kindleberger (eds), Multinationals from small 
countries, Cambridge, 1977, pp. 135-6.
20 Jerker Carlsson, "The Brazilian penetration of 
Nigeria through trade", p. 194.
21 Louis T Wells jr, "Firms from developing 
countries", pp. 148-149.
22 Duncan Innes, Anglo: Anglo American and the rise 
of modern South Africa, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1984, chs 1 
and 4; David Pallister, Sarah Stewart and Ian Lepper, 
South Africa Inc.: the Oppenheimer empire, Johannesburg: 
Media House/Lowry, 1987, pp. 102-121.
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and investments abroad.
Another set of motives rests on technological advantages 
enjoyed by the STNCs, by virtue of their position in 
relation to the product cycle. This may occur through the 
STNCs having adapted originally foreign technology, 
usually based on large-scale technology for a mass 
market, to what Diaz Alejandro calls "a small scale of 
operation".23 Often technological innovations may be 
originated by STNCs to meet the needs of a domestic 
market. These adaptations and innovations have also been 
termed "intermediate" or "tropical" technology, and 
exported by the NICs to each other or to the LLDCs. Cost 
advantages ensure they retain a niche in the markets of 
the South.
Strong trade barriers may encourage firms to set up 
branches in host countries in order not to lose potential 
markets. This may extend to STNCs whose home countries 
are restricted from exporting to third countries. This 
could be because of sanctions (e.g. relabelling of South 
African products in Swaziland and Mauritius), tariff 
barriers (e.g. non-EC producers locating plants in ACP 
countries to ensure entry to EC markets under the Lome 
Convention); or voluntary trade restrictions (e.g. Hong 
Kong garment producers moving to Singapore to escape 
voluntary export controls preventing access to the US 
market).
The welcome accorded by the host country is also a 
factor. A favourable tax regime, the repatriability of 
profits, the availability of low-wage local labour 
(sometimes with the additional feature of being 
compulsorily non-unionised), all contribute towards the
23 Carlos F Diaz Alejandro, "Foreign direct 
investment by Latin Americans", in Agmon and Kindleberger 
(eds), Multinationals from small countries, pp. 171-3.
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decision of STNCs to choose host countries.
In considering what sort of Southern firm might invest 
internationally, there are a number of pertinent 
criteria. In line with product cycle theory, it is the 
STNCs which operate in industries which have mature 
technologies which have the competitive edge. Many of the 
STNCs gained their initial advantage through the 
development of large-scale technologies of the North to 
smaller-scale domestic needs. In mastering this skill 
efficiently, the STNCs may export to other countries in 
the South with similarly small markets.
This niche is retained, especially in price-sensitive 
markets, because Northern TNCs are more interested in 
operating where their position is oligopolistic. The STNC 
retains its competitivity partly through the lower costs 
of management and engineering, partly through lower wages 
to administrators and technicians who may not have 
expectations of being rewarded like their Northern 
counterparts.
In the examination of our case studies, we will discover 
that the investment flows exclusively from South Africa 
to Latin America and not the other way around. Secondly, 
the nature of the investment is in the extractive 
industries (especially mining and fishing) where the 
STNCs introduce capital goods at a level of technology 
appropriate to the exploitation of the local resource. 
Thirdly, the motive for the investment is the acquisition 
of raw materials, but not necessarily for the domestic 
market. The South African STNCs in both cases cultivated 
world markets for their output, and needed to expand 
internationally in order to maintain or extend their 
global market share. The Latin American countries, Brazil 
and Chile in particular, sought to take advantage of the 
global marketing capabilities of the South African
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companies in order to raise export volumes.24
The investments of the South African-based TNCs are 
therefore atypical of the general trends in South-South 
investments.
The relationship between the interests of STNCs and their 
home nations is one that needs to be examined.
In the case of public or nationalised firms, there is 
inevitably some overlap between the priorities of the 
firm and the national interest. Petrobras will always be 
concerned to secure Brazil's petroleum supply, no matter 
what the profit structures may be. For most private 
firms, however, the bottom line reigns supreme, not a 
specific national interest. This does not mean that the 
national interest of the home country cannot be invoked 
to secure or retain markets or profits. Private firms 
have been able to mobilise governments into acting in the 
interests of their firms, under the guise of defending a 
national interest. The US telecommunications firm ITT, 
for example, had "dealt regularly with the CIA to try to 
create chaos in Chile and to encourage a military coup" 
against Allende.25 The CIA plotting escalated into the 
Track 2 policy of the Nixon-Kissinger Committee of Forty, 
established by the National Security Council to destroy 
the Allende government.26
24 A useful model for state-firm relations is that 
proposed by John Stopford and Susan Strange in Rival 
states, rival firms: competition for world market shares, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 24-9.
25 Anthony Sampson, Sovereign state: the secret 
history of ITT, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973, p. 230; 
Sampson is discussing revelations made by Jack Anderson 
in the Washington Post, 21 and 22 March 1972.
26 Confirmed in the US Senate hearings begun on 20 
March 1973. See evidence in United States of America, 
Senate, Select committee to study governmental operations 
in respect to intelligence activities, Covert action in
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However, in our case studies, decisions about investment 
were autonomous intra-firm calculations, rather than 
responses to newly-articulated national interest, 
although supportive infrastructures and benign political 
climates were laid in advance by the state authorities 
concerned. The investors were not straightforward 
representatives of the apartheid state, and in the case 
of the Anglo American Corporation, had even financed 
opposition parties and activities, although ones which 
failed to constitute a fundamental challenge to the 
system. Nevertheless, the corporations had, it could be 
argued, benefited substantially over a long period of 
time from employment and other legislation peculiar to 
the exigencies of apartheid. In the case of investment in 
Brazil, South African firms emphasised their autonomy and 
their skills, whilst playing down their nationality, in a 
country whose official rhetoric condemned apartheid. In 
Chile, South African firms took advantage of close state- 
to-state relations in their calculation to make initial 
investments. The complexities and dynamics of the 
relationship between the TNC and the home state need 
careful analysis in any theorising of motives for 
investment.
It is to the state as unit of analysis that we return in 
order to examine the obstacles placed in the way of 
developing more thorough-going South-South links.
4. IDEOLOGIES OF A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP
a. Revolutionary internationalism
The period of the Cold War between the major superpowers, 
1945-89, saw the simultaneous emergence of the formerly 
colonial territories in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and
Chile, 1963-73: staff report, 94th Congress, 1st 
sesssion, 18 December 1975, pp. 12-13, 21.
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the Pacific as politically independent nation-states. The 
superpowers vied for their loyalty, but some had seen the 
value of non-alignment and remained independent of the 
superpower conflict.
The emergence of a group of neutralist countries had a 
strong impact on China, whose participation in the 
Bandung Conference was decisive in consolidating the 
unity of the Afro-Asian countries. China began to 
distance itself from the former view of neutralism as 
reactionary, and began to recognise the po^tive role 
played by the "national bourgeois leaders" of the South 
in the anti-imperialist movement.
After China broke with the Soviet Union ideologically in 
1961, it began to see its international role in terms of 
the leadership of the "Third" of the three worlds in the 
Maoist global trinity. Mao's concept of the "Third World" 
coincided with that of everyone else. China placed great 
emphasis on its relationship with the Third World, 
identifying itself as being an integral member of this 
grouping.27
Whereas Western scholars had seen the "First" and 
"Second" Worlds" as the West and East respectively, Mao's 
concept of "First World" consisted of only the two 
superpowers, and his "Second World" of Europe (East and 
West), Canada, Japan and Australasia. China's diplomatic 
strategy, particularly during her years of isolation by 
both superpowers, aimed not only at consolidating its 
position as the leading state in the Third World, but 
also at building alliances with countries of the Second 
World against the supposed mutually detested impact of
27 Lilian Craig Harris and Robert L Worden, "China's 
Third World role", in Harris and Worden (eds.), China and 
the Third World: champion or challenger?, Beckenham:
Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 2-3.
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superpower hegemony.28 After the Nixon rapprochement,
China declared that, of the two superpowers, the Soviet
Union was the principal enemy.
In the same way that, according to Maoist theory, the 
revolutionary peasantry based in the countryside were
urged to surround the city in order to smash the power of
the urban bourgeoisie, so in turn would the revolutionary 
peoples of the Third World overturn hegemony by the 
superpowers and their agents by smashing the weak links 
in the imperialist chain. Revolution in the Third World 
was seen as a far more likely prospect than in the 
industrialised capitalist countries.
In practice, China's solidarity with the South extended 
to support for national liberation movements in Indo­
china, South Arabia (Oman and South Yemen), Southern 
Africa, and Palestine. Regimes that received support for 
certain periods included Albania, North Korea, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, and Kampuchea. It spread the notion of Third 
World solidarity through its influence on many pro- 
Beijing communist parties around the world.
Ultimately China's own policies belied the political 
sentiments which had been disseminated. The subjugation 
of Tibet, the war with India in 1962, the backing of 
anti-Soviet liberation movements in Angola (FNLA and 
UNITA), the invasion of Vietnam in 1979, all tended to 
discredit doctrines of international Third World 
solidarity which China had earlier espoused.
In answer to the isolation experienced by Cuba as a 
result of the US and OAS embargos, Fidel Castro
28 Lilian Craig Harris, China's foreign policy 
towards the Third World, Washington: Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985, 
p. 3.
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encouraged the establishment of OSPAAAL, the Organisation 
of Solidarity between Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America. Also called the Tricontinental, Castro endowed 
the organisation with a secretariat based in Havana. The 
Tricontinental arranged conferences, published journals 
and agitated strongly in favour of a vigorous response by 
the South toward US imperialism. Che Guevara played a 
prominent role in building Cuba's internationalist 
foreign policy, with visits to the United Arab Republic 
and the Soviet Union in 1959. Although he retired from 
the Cuban government to develop the Bolivian revolution, 
based on theories of guerrilla warfare which he had 
elaborated, Guevara's martyrdom and internationalist 
spirit was subsequently utilised in Cuban propaganda as a 
model for emulation. In practice Cuban internationalism 
extended beyond simple armed support for other countries: 
the whole nation became involved in the campaign to 
assist the survival of the MPLA government in Angola. 
Other countries which received Cuban support included 
Allende's Chile, Ethiopia under the Dergue, Grenada under 
the NJM, and Nicaragua under the FSLN.
b. "Third Worldism" and developmentalism 
"Third Worldism" is a semi-derogatory term which 
encapsulates the notion that South-South relations have 
less to do with revolutionary internationalism and more 
to do with the recognition by the new bourgeoisies of the 
the South of advantages to be gained from their mutual 
collaboration.
Since the early 1960s, governments and their 
representatives, academics and journalists have called 
for South-South co-operation, pointing especially to the 
commonalities of a colonial past and a continued position 
of subservience in the international division of labour.
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The influence of academic theorists like Andre Gunder 
Frank, Samir Amin, and others, had a seminal effect on 
the thinking of many decision makers in the South. Amin 
advocated practical steps which the South could take in 
order to enhance co-operation:
1. direct trade, excluding the transnationals of the
North
2. mutual tariff reductions
3. evolving a new direct payments system, avoiding
existing international monetary institutions
4. commodity cartels which raise world market prices
should make price concessions to consumers in the 
South
5. free transfer of technology in the South
6. preferential status for South-based transnationals
7. development fund through taxing imports and exports29
The ferment coalesced in the mid-1970s into the proposals 
for a New International Economic Order, put forward in 
the Brandt Reports30 and elsewhere. For a time, the 
notion dominated the thinking of many policy-makers in 
the South, seduced by the possibilities of a neo- 
Keynesian solution to international inequality. 
Unfortunately for them, the international trend was 
against any revival of Keynesian economic thinking. 
Opposing orthodoxies spread like wildfire, drawing on the 
neo-liberal examples of Hong Kong, Chile under the 
Chicago boys, France under Raymond Barre, Britain under 
Thatcher, and "Reaganomics" in the United States. Periods 
of global recession and slumps in commodity prices also 
put paid to the possibility of any implementation of the
29 Samir Amin, "Sept propositions pour le Tiers 
Monde", Jeune Afrique, 14 May 1976.
# 30 North-South: a programme for survival, London:
Pan, 1980; Common crisis, London: Pan, 1983; and Global 
challenge: from crisis to co-operation, London: Pan, 
1985.
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NIEO.
Nevertheless, there were those who continued to advocate 
it, and to promote one of its tenets: economic co­
operation among developing countries, often shortened to 
ECDC in UN documents.
The following quote, by Gamani Corea, exemplifies this 
position:
Today, the process of economic co-operation among 
developing countries occupies an important place 
in the economic strategies and policies of 
developing countries, and, in recent years, with 
the marked deterioration in the world economic 
situation and the weakening of international co­
operation for development, it has acquired even 
greater importance and urgency. Indeed, in view 
of the prospects for the world economy for the 
coming years, it has become an imperative if the 
developing countries are going to be able to 
envisage the transformation of their economies 
and the growth rates they need.31
With the oil shocks and the rise of the STNCs, a new
layer of South-based politicians, policy makers and 
entrepreneurs began to assert their new-found power. The 
burgeoning bourgeoisies of some of the OPEC countries and 
the NICs recognised and promoted the mutual benefits of
closer ties. One of the manifestations of this was the
establishment in the mid-1970s of the London-based Third 
World Foundation, which sponsored publications such as 
South magazine and Third World Quarterly, high-level 
conferences involving heads of state, and big media and 
advertising conventions drawing together practitioners 
from North and South. The Foundation was heavily 
bankrolled by the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, which had based some of its financial 
success on its vigorous self-promotion as an assertive
31 Gamani Corea, "Foreword", in B Pavlid (et al.) , 
The challenges of South-South co-operation, Boulder: 
Westview, 1983, p. ix.
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Third World institution.32 But, at the end of the 1980s, 
just as the revelations about the bank's criminality were 
beginning to mount, the Foundation fell apart.
During its heyday the Third World Foundation co-sponsored 
a conference with the University of Zimbabwe on South- 
South co-operation. Bernard Chidzero, Zimbabwe's finance 
minister, articulated the call for co-operation, saying 
that it was "more than a desirable object; it is a 
necessity". After listing the solemn declarations on co­
operation (Guyana 1972; Manila 1976; Mexico City 1976; 
Arusha 1979; and Caracas 1981), Chidzero bemoaned the 
fact that little progress had been made
due to the complexity of the issues involved,
the lack of financing mechanisms, conflicts 
between national and regional interests, the 
colonial legacies and hegemonic interests of 
the North, but "above all, (to) a noticeable 
dearth of practical political will".33
Echoing Amin, Chidzero advocated practical proposals:
1. the establishment of a Third World bank
2. collective research for social transformation
3. collaboration on development
4. collaboration on the application of science and
technology
5. a role for South-based NGOs in fostering South-South 
co- operation
6. creation of a South Commission to investigate further
possibilities for co-operation34
32 "BCCI: behind closed doors", Financial Times, 11 
November 1991, p. 7.
33 Bernard Chidzero and Altaf Gauhar (eds), Linking 
the South: the route to economic co-operation, London: 
Third World Foundation, 1986, pp. ix-x.
34 Linking the South, p. xi.
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Chidzero's concerns, as articulated here, are with the 
enhancement of programmes for popular development rather 
than the enhancement of the economic power of a South- 
based bourgeoisie. The flexibility of the ideology of 
South-South co-operation may enable shrewd development- 
oriented policy makers to mobilise the bourgeoisies of 
the South to go along with their projects, instead of the 
converse.
c. From Luso-tropicalism to Afro-Latinitv 
Brazil's special contribution to the ideology of South- 
South collaboration has emphasised a common colonial past 
under Portuguese rule with five other African countries, 
Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao 
Tome e Principe.
The demise of Portuguese colonialism in Africa 
effectively put an end to Brazil's close relationship 
with Portugal, enshrined in the Treaty of Friendship and 
Consultation signed in Rio de Janeiro in November 1953. 
Brazil utilised the provisions of this treaty to gain 
access to markets, especially in Angola and Mozambique. 
Brazil sponsored Portugal's entry into the United Nations 
in 1955, and during the presidencies of Cafe Filho (1954- 
5) and Kubitschek (1956-61) voted with Portugal in 
international organisations. Despite its growing Third 
World profile, Brazil continued to moderate resolutions 
condemning Portuguese colonialism. From 1961-64 there was 
a period of anti-colonialism in Itamaraty, the Brazilian 
foreign ministry, during which Brazil's foreign policy 
supported Afro-Asian liberation, but with the military 
coup of 1964, virtually up until the coup in Lisbon ten 
years later, Brazil reverted to its international support 
for the Portuguese dictatorship and its colonial policy.
The treaty with Portugal set up a fictive Luso-Brazilian 
Community, which was comprised of Portugal, its colonies
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in Africa and Asia, and Brazil. It had a legal framework 
but no institutional existence. Scholars like Gilberto 
Freyre referred to the axis as "Lusotropicalism". By this 
was meant the "interpenetration of race, language and 
culture which is supposedly peculiar to Portuguese 
colonisation, and finds its highest expression in 
Brazilian racial democracy." 35 Freyre argued that of 
all the colonising nations of Europe, Portugal was 
uniquely able to adapt its values to the tropical regions 
in a "harmonious process of gradual fusion". This was in 
contrast to the other colonising nations, who tried to 
foist their own cultures onto unwilling tropical 
subjects, or segregated their subjects from full access 
to their culture. As the most evolved exemplar of this 
fusion, Brazil had a responsibility to promote the union 
of Lusotropical peoples to defend their unique form of 
civilisation. To oppose Portugal's colonial role would be 
tantamount to a rejection of the valuable heritage which 
Brazil shared with the other Lusotropical countries.36
The notion of Lusotropicalism was deeply conservative, 
and aimed to justify Brazilian endorsement of Portugal's 
"civilising mission" in Africa. It mythologised race 
relations in Brazil as being relatively conflict free, 
despite the harshness of slavery and subsequent period of 
racial discrimination, holding Brazil up as a model for 
the future, especially in Angola and Mozambique. The 
strength of the pro-Portuguese lobby in Brazil meant that 
the ideology of Lusotropicalism was reproduced not only 
in these circles, but also in Brazilian diplomatic 
practice for some years.
35 Wayne Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension of 
Brazilian foreign policy, Gainesville: University Presses 
of Florida, 1974, p. 62.
36 Gilberto Freyre, Uma polltica transnacional de 
cultura para o Brasil de hoje, Belo Horizonte: 
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais Faculdade de 
Direito, 1960, pp. 45-60 passim.
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From 1972, though, Brazil began to take its relationships 
with African countries more seriously. Itamaraty began 
once again to build on the advances made during the 
period of 1961-4. Foreign minister Mario Gibson Barbosa 
toured six African countries. Some of these countries had 
participated with Brazil in the International Coffee 
Organisation or the Cocoa Producers' Alliance. Yet it 
was only after the presidential inauguration of Ernesto 
Geisel, the general who had run Petrobras and was aware 
of Brazil's strategic need for African petroleum, that a 
concerted effort was made to re-establish stonger links 
with other African countries. The prompt and 
controversial recognition of the independence of Angola 
set the seal on Brazil's new relationship with Africa. 
Nigeria and Angola became major suppliers of Brazil's 
oil.
Thus, by the mid-1970s, "Lusotropicality" was dead. In 
its place came the new concept of "Afro-Latinity", 
drawing on the affinity, invented or otherwise, between 
the countries of Africa and Latin America. Brazil still 
placed a strong emphasis on linguistic, cultural and 
historical links with Portugal's ex-colonies, but seen 
within the context of South-South collaboration.
In August 1983, the first Meeting of Afro-Latinity took 
place in the Candido Mendes University in Rio de 
Janeiro.37 Sponsored partly by the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation, it brought together Brazilian 
academics, industrialists, and politicians with their 
African counterparts. The Meeting had, as a central part 
of its agenda, the promotion of Brazilian appropriate 
("last-phase product cycle") technology among African 
decision makers.
37 This university also houses the Brazilian 
Institute of Afro-Asian Studies.
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The ideology of Afro-Latinity has enjoyed a limited 
existence, and its use still seems confined to a small 
academic and business lobby keen to improve Afro- 
Brazilian trade and investment.
(d)
Thus, the multiple ideologies of South-South relations 
have been motivated by contrasting and inconsistant 
ambitions. They range from revolutionary internationalism 
and anti-imperialism, to mobilisation by NICs of broader 
support for their new position in the global hierarchy, 
to serious developmentalism. In order to evaluate the 
nature of the relationship, it is instructive to examine 
the agenda of its proponents.
5. AREAS OF GROWTH IN SOUTH-SOUTH RELATIONS
Despite the generally negative record, there have 
nevertheless been some advances in the forging of deeper 
South-South relations. The dynamic areas of South-South 
relations have included the meaningful expansion of 
regional economic organisations dedicated to ending 
protectionism, the expansion of trade in strategic 
commodities like petroleum and armaments, the burgeoning 
of NIC "proto-imperialism", and the closer links between 
the more isolated states. Let us examine these factors a 
little more closely.
One key area is the expansion of the importance of 
already mentioned regional organisations. The increasing 
consolidation of the European Community has served as a 
model for other regions, including other relatively 
developed regions like North America. In certain regions 
of the South, there are attempts by neighbouring states 
to do away with protectionism. A clear example to emerge 
in the 1980s is the Preferential Trade Agreement
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operating in the frontline states of Southern Africa, as 
part of SADCC. Another is the Mercosur, a free trade area 
in the southern cone of Latin America, combining 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Perhaps 
it is too early to measure the success of these 
arrangements, but they certainly aim to allow markets to 
transcend narrow national boundaries with ease. Whether 
their achievements will meet these aims remains to be 
seen.
Since the mid-1970s, the trade in petroleum has been one 
of the major features of South-South exchange. The 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries is wholly 
comprised of countries of the South, extending beyond the 
Middle East and North Africa to countries of West Africa 
(Nigeria and Gabon), Latin America (Ecuador and 
Venezuela) and South-east Asia (Indonesia). Flows of oil 
from OPEC and other PECs to consuming countries of the 
South account for the largest element in South-South 
trade and counter-trade. Whilst these flows connect the 
countries of the South, and make for further 
interdependence, they also have the potential to divide 
the South in terms of the interests of the oil producers 
and the consumers.
Another industry that figures high in South-South 
exchanges is armaments. Brazil, Chile, South Africa, 
India, Singapore, Taiwan and Israel are all arms 
manufacturers of significance. Brazil, one of the most 
successful, is involved in oil-for-arms swops in a number 
of counter-trade deals. During the Iran-Iraq war, Brazil 
refurbished damaged Iraqi tanks, as well as providing 
Iraq with other weapons. The list of countries which have 
bought Chilean-manufactured arms includes Iraq, Egypt,
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Jordan, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.38 South 
Africa has exported arms to countries like Morocco, Sri 
Lanka, Iran, Iraq, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Guatemala, 
Taiwan and Israel.39
Apart from oil and arms, a growth area in South-South 
relations has also been the relationships between the 
NICs and the LLDCs. Part of this has been explained in 
terms of trade theory, whereby countries higher up in the 
technological "pecking order" export to those countries 
that have advanced less rapidly. The NICs constitute 
sources of investment as well as trade: the rise of the 
STNC in the post-1970 period is a growing phenomenon in 
the new international division of labour. As the NICs 
mature from a position of "associated dependent" 
development to capitalist powers in their own right, they 
begin to take on the characteristics of countries whose 
capitalism matured in an earlier historical phase.
Certain NICs may carve out particular spheres of 
influence for themselves, for example Mexico in relation 
to Central America, or Korea in relation to the Gulf 
area. India has asserted itself in a similar way in 
relation to Bangla Desh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, and so on.40 In some ways these relationships seem 
to replicate the traditional North-South relationship; 
they have even been referred to by Sorensen as "proto­
38 Heraldo Munoz, Las relaciones exteriores del 
gobierno militar Chileno, Santiago de Chile: Prospel- 
Cerc, 1986, pp. 169-71; Latin American Weekly Report, 31 
March 1988.
39 See reports in Cape Times, 10 June 1983; Daily 
News, 16 November 1983; SIPRI Yearbook 1986, p. 340; The 
Star, 18 May 1988.
40 Srikant Dutt, India and the Third World: altruism 
or hegemony?, London: Zed, 1984.
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imperialism".41 Thus, although a growth area in terms of 
South-South relations, the peripheral LLDCs may regard 
the new hegemony of the NICs as problematic and 
exploitative rather than the benign manifestation of 
South-South solidarity.
Another way in which some countries of the South have 
found themselves in closer contact was as a consequence 
of diplomatic or economic isolation. Outcast or pariah 
states have emerged at different times and in different 
contexts in the postwar period, becoming the object of 
sanctions, boycotts, moral opprobrium or political non­
recognition. Amongst the foremost we can list South 
Africa (apartheid and Namibian occupation), Rhodesia 
(illegal independence from Britain, 1965-80), pre­
revolutionary Portugal (colonialism in Africa and Asia), 
Cuba (trade sanctions implemented by USA and most OAS 
countries), Israel (occupation of Palestinian land), 
Chile (military overthrow of longstanding democratic 
state) and Taiwan (non-recognition due to UN one-China 
policy). Apart from Cuba, which turned to the CMEA 
countries, Mexico and non-aligned countries for support, 
the other countries tended to find much in common. 
Israel, South Africa, Taiwan and Chile formed 
particularly strong friendships, extending to mutual 
military support, strong economic ties, diplomatic 
recognition at a time when this was globally unpopular, 
and ideological affinities in relation to perceptions of
41 Georg Sorensen, "Brazil" in Carlsson and Shaw 
(eds), Newly industrialising countries and the political 
economy of South-South relations, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1988, p. 113. He distinguishes it from Marini's concept 
of sub-imperialism, in which the sub-imperialist power 
located in the South acts as a direct agent of a 
traditional imperialist power of the North. Proto­
imperialist powers act in their own right, consistent 
with their own needs.
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national security, human rights, communism and 
terrorism.42
My contention in explaining South Africa's relations with 
Latin America, particularly during the period of military 
dictatorship (1964-89), is that this ideological 
affinity, and shared need for mutual support in the face 
of isolation, were strong factors in the predisposition 
to extend and enhance links. Whilst international trade 
theory points some of the way, for example in determining 
the range of trade and investment that was possible, 
political factors were often more important in framing 
many of the decisions made by firms. The freedom of firms 
to act openly within bounds secured through the existence 
of ideological affinity at the level of state-state 
relations, was an immense stimulant to the expansion of 
economic relations.
The end of the phase of dictatorship in Latin America, 
the prospects of a post-apartheid South Africa, and moves 
toward the resolution of the status of Palestine and 
Taiwan, point to the progressive de-isolation of the 
pariah states. Yet with the shifts in international 
power, new pariahs like Iraq have entered the spotlight. 
Arms dealers have not been slow to utilise the services 
of the traditional pariah countries to secure Baghdad's 
supply of offensive weapons, as will be shown in chapter 
seven.
42 The isolation of these four states has been 
analysed meticulously by Deon Geldenhuys in Isolated 
states: a comparative analysis, Johannesburg: Jonathan 
Ball, 1990.
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6. CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH-SOUTH 
RELATIONS
Despite all the attempts at co-operation and collective 
action, the countries of the South have, in general, been 
curiously unable to assert themselves at global level in 
order to challenge and reverse their subordinate economic 
and political status.
There are a number of reasons for this, but here the 
focus will be on three factors: the legacy of colonialism 
and the continued strength of the North; the debt 
problem; and the competition amongst countries of the 
South.
Firstly, and most obviously, there is the formidable 
countervailing pressure of international capital and the 
advanced capitalist countries. The sophisticated armoury 
of economic and political mechanisms for extracting 
surplus from the South have evolved over more than five 
centuries. The North continues to profit from the South, 
draw upon its produce and its labour, control its 
resources, limit its competition and drench its markets. 
Defiance of the established order, through countries of 
the South choosing an independent or socialist path, has 
often met with concerted destabilisation. At times the 
North has sought to divide the South and thwart the 
prospect of establishing its potential strength and 
unity.
Taking advantage of cumulative causation, the North has 
usually been able to innovate and beat competition from 
Southern rivals.43 Significant transfers of technology, 
knowledge and resources are few. The North still
43 There are, of course, important exceptions to this 
generalisation, such as Taiwanese production of container 
ships and Korean sports shoes.
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monopolises information science, communications, and the 
sophisticated financial markets. Levels of development 
aid are derisory.
South-South relations begin their balance sheet with 
historical liabilities. Traditionally even lines of 
communication, established during the epQch of colonial 
hegemony, have followed longditudinal North-South paths. 
To telephone Yaounde from Harare, one still has to be 
linked through Paris and London. The long established 
trade routes seldom favour South-South intercourse. The 
infrastructure for South-South trade is weak, and 
impressive only when a stronger regional power in the 
South has been something of an entrepot in relation to 
its weaker neighbours.
The legacy of colonialism also determined the division of 
the South into a specific configuration of nation-states, 
which only in a minority of cases conform to territory 
associated with a particular ethnic group. In most cases 
sovereign territory transcends ethnic boundaries and 
conforms to lines drawn and agreed upon in the chanceries 
of Europe during past centuries. The new polities have 
developed new nationhoods, with new national loyalties.
The new nationalisms have inhibited trans-South 
collaboration, and rivalries often impede greater 
regional unity. Politicians have tended to seek national 
rather than regional solutions to problems, thus 
preventing the development of economies of scale, and of 
greater bargaining power in relation to international 
capital. The case of Chile's decision to withdraw from 
the Andean Pact in 1976 is one such example. Another is 
the difficulty which each of the Caribbean micro-states 
has had in putting aside strictly local interests in 
favour of ensuring the success of Caricom or any of the 
federal political arrangements which have been mooted as
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the answer to regional development.
The form of state in the South has entrenched the power 
of local ruling classes who have no interest in ceding 
this power for a wider good. The secession of Singapore 
from Malaysia in 1965 was due to the perception of the 
Singaporean leadership of its exclusion from exercising 
power as part of a Malaysian ruling class. Taiwan's 
Kuomintang leadership also has little desire to effect 
reunification with China, for fear of losing all its 
power. Egypt and Syria were unable to sustain the United 
Arab Republic. Korea remains the only country divided by 
the effects of World War Two. More recently, regional 
divisions have led to the breakup of Somalia into tWb 
states conforming to the old colonial boundaries set by 
Britain and Italy.44 The form of state in the South also 
exacerbates regional rivalries, regional arms races, and 
sometimes open armed conflicts.
Where unity has made advances it is limited. The member 
nations in ASEAN pay lip service to eliminating 
protectionism and to encouraging preferential trade 
between members. But when trade patterns are analysed, 
trade amongst ASEAN members has grown at a far slower 
rate compared with the growth in extra-ASEAN trade (See 
Tables 2.2 and 2.3).
Where members of the Group of 77 have had the chance to 
develop a common front, back one another up, and develop 
a united bargaining position, they often failed. In 
relation to the post-1987 Uruguay Round of international 
trade negotiations within the GATT, it would have made 
sense for countries like Brazil and India to combine 
forces and act in a joint leadership capacity in G-77. In 
fact Brazil had steadily succumbed to US, IMF and World
44 A rare exception was the unification of the two 
Yemens.
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TABLE 2.2
EXPORTS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES (in million ECUs*)
1970 1975 1980 1984
To other ASEAN 1053 . 4 2756.5 8357.7 8881.8
To industrialised 
countries
3007.3 11372.9 31268.9 22063.2
To all non-ASEAN 4023.9 14579.4 41423.7 34772.6
Source: Eurostat, EC-ASEAN trade: a statistical analysis, 
1970-84, Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles 
des Communautes Europeennes, 1987, Table 2.2.2.2.e, p.
48.
a. 1 ECU (1984 average) = US$1.0752
TABLE 2.3
IMPORTS OF ASEAN COUNTRIES (in million ECUs*)
1970 1975 1980 1984
From other ASEAN 959.6 2013.0 6325.5 9101.1
From industrialised 
countries 4291.1 11979.7 25488.5 25841.6
From all
non-ASEAN 5488.4 16916.3 38591.6 41265.1
Source: Eurostat, EC-ASEAN trade: a statistical analysis, 
1970-84, Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles 
des Communautes Europeennes, 1987, Table 2.2.2.1.e, p.
42.
a. 1 ECU (1984 average) = US$1.0752
Bank pressures on debt rescheduling, and abandoned its 
stance on developing stronger South-South ties within the 
GATT framework. A prominent Brazilian economist admitted 
that Brazil had, during the course of the Uruguay Round, 
come to regard the South-South dimension of its trade 
policy as "unsustainable, and furthermore was detrimental
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to its best interests'1.45 As a result, the prospective 
alliance collapsed and the G-77 was left much weaker.
This introduces the second key factor, that of the high 
levels of international indebtedness experienced by 
countries of the South, which accelerated significantly 
from the early 1980s. A large part of the weakness of the 
G-77 was related to the crippling international debt 
faced by nations like Brazil with the potential to lead 
the moves to invigorate South-South trade. The key Latin 
American and African countries, in their efforts to meet 
or postpone their obligations, are caught up in financial 
flows between North and South. Apart from two exceptions, 
the oil trade and the arms trade, South-South exchanges 
still cannot compare with the volumes of North-South or 
North-North exchanges.
The disabling impact of debt has divided the indebted 
countries rather than fostering common positions on 
renegotiations and waivers in their relations to the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, regional 
development banks and the Club of Paris.46 When Peru, 
under the leadership of former president Alain G&rcia, 
decided to declare a moratorium on the repayment of 
Peru's international debt, he did so without backing from 
fellow Latin American countries in a similarly desperate
45 Interview with Winston Fritsch of the Department 
of Economics, Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de 
Janeiro, 20 November 1991. See his paper "Brazil's trade 
strategy for the 1990s", prepared for the International 
Forum on Latin American Perspectives, IDB/OECD, Paris, 
21-22 November 1991.
46 The ad hoc treatment of debtors by creditors has 
its origins in the special circumstances of the 1950s. 
See Christopher Prout, ""Finance for developing 
countries", pp. 360-404 in Andrew Shonfield (ed.), 
International economic relations of the Western world, 
1959-71, vol. 2: international monetary relations, 
London: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1976.
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position. Strategic disunity weakened Peru's position, 
and simultaneously that of the other indebted Latin 
American states who might have improved their collective 
bargaining power by going along with Garcia's position. 
But this would have been at the expense of the individual 
interests of debtors who had just successfully 
rescheduled.47
Apart from the debt, weakened currencies and economic 
immobility inhibit the development of new trade patterns, 
new investment and technological innovation. Instead of 
seeking to build trans-South unity, countries with some 
advantages are seeking closer alliances with the North. 
The option to join the North American free trade area was 
enthusiastically accepted by Mexico, and Chile is also 
keen to associate with this grouping.
A third reason for the low level of South-South economic 
solidarity is that the countries of the South are, to a 
large extent, producing similar goods which are competing 
with one another for international markets. This may not 
be a barrier to intra-South trade, since if markets are 
reasonably open, there could be mutual trade in similar 
goods. For example, when one examines the trade patterns 
within the OECD countries, one finds that the majority of 
their trade is in similar manufactured goods. Countries 
of the South have, however, tended to erect barriers 
against foreign manufactures competing with local 
production, and discouraged the import of similar 
manufactures from other countries, whether located in the 
North or South. This may be a contributory factor in 
explaining the low volumes of intra-South trade.
47 See Anatole Kaletsky, The costs of default, New 
York: Priority Press, 1985; and Stephany Griffiths-Jones 
(ed.), Managing world debt, Hemel Hempstead: Wheatsheaf, 
1988.
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In addition to the protectionist commercial policies of 
certain countries, Thomas identifies a further three 
structural obstacles to South-South trade: the lack of 
relevant market information, the lack of sophisticated 
marketing channels, and transport problems.48 The last is 
an important factor in trade: regular sailing schedules 
may not exist between certain countries of the South; 
transshipment of goods via distant centres is costly in 
money and time; and oligopolistic North-based conferences 
have traditionally set routes and prices.49
Thus, for a complex of reasons, ranging from the heritage 
of colonialism, to nationalism, to the form of state, to 
protectionism and to the disabling impact of mounting 
international debt, unity of the South seems illusory. At 
rare times it has spoken with a common political voice. 
Perhaps the apogee of its political singlemindedness was 
the General Assembly's resolution in 1975 equating 
Zionism with racism, but this also needs to be seen in 
the context of securing oil supplies. Since then, 
alliances have loosened, and the fissures deepened. A 
series of wars and interventions provided the evidence: 
Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, Vietnam's invasion 
of Kampuchea, China's invasion of Vietnam, the Moroccan- 
Mauritanian carve up of the Western Sahara, the Iran-Iraq 
war, Libya's intervention in Chad, Nigeria's expulsion of 
nationals of other ECOWAS states, OECS token 
participation in the US invasion of Grenada, and so on. 
The 1991 Gulf war demonstrated grave divisions in the 
unity of the South and especially in pan-Arabism. The 
collapse, under substantial Northern pressure, of a 
common G-77 front within the Uruguay Round of the GATT,
48 Harmon C Thomas, "A study of trade among 
developing countries'', pp. 72-3.
49 Although prices may have eased over the past 
decade and a half, the other problems still remain 
pertinent.
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is evidence that individual countries in the South have 
begun to abandon any former emphasis on improving South- 
South relations as a strong foreign policy priority. The 
effective collapse of the Soviet Union has forced more 
nations in the South to bargain with the United States 
over future outcomes, rather than seek deals or alliances 
with one another.
In some cases, the rhetoric survives, but other 
pressures, usually emanating from the North, have had the 
effect of ensuring the increasing participation by 
countries of the South in regional economic structures or 
aspiring to setting up free trade arrangements with 
countries of the North. The diminishing returns reaped 
from the rest of the South are causing regional 
consolidation, but this fragments the South as a whole. 
The countries of the South are increasingly less likely 
to develop South-South relations as a central priority.
Despite these pessimistic general conclusions, South 
Africa's links with Latin America seemed exceptional. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, there were grounds, 
from the mid-1960s onwards, for believing that these 
relationships might expand. Some of the historical 
evidence for this will be evaluated in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
BRITAIN, THE CAPE AND LATIN AMERICA, 1806-1910
Our case study is divisible into two historic periods, 
each consistent with the dominant mode of production at 
the time. The first period covers the nineteenth century 
and the first decade of the twentieth century, when both 
South Africa and Latin America were producing raw 
materials. During this time, Britain succeeds in 
displacing the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal, still 
recovering from the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, 
from their position as the pre-eminent maritime and 
commercial powers in the South Atlantic. The first 
section of this chapter is devoted to an explanation of 
how Britain came to be so dominant in the region.
It would be logical to predict that, with the 
establishment of British hegemony, links across the 
Atlantic might have been strengthened. In gathering 
evidence for this, it becomes clear that there are only 
limited instances of the expansion of these links. One 
example is the use to which the Cape of Good Hope, along 
with other areas, is put in the interdiction of the 
continued and illegal Brazilian slave trade. This example 
forms the basis for the second section of the chapter.
Trade between the Cape and Latin America is analysed in 
section three. It will be shown that, despite the 
proximity of markets, despite the possibility of 
exchanges of tropical for temperate commodities, and
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despite the absence of any political obstacles, 
transatlantic trade was nevertheless very limited.
1. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH HEGEMONY IN THE ATLANTIC 
REGION, 1806-1825
From the turn of the sixteenth century, both Latin 
America and Africa began to be integrated into the 
European economy. Latin America was drawn in at first 
through its mining enclaves and then through its 
systematic export of tropical produce. The site of 
production of these tropical commodities was generally 
the slave plantation. It was through the slave trade 
that Africa's links with Latin America, including the 
Caribbean, were indelibly wrought.1 It was also 
principally through the slave trade that Africa was 
integrated into the European market.2
The international slave trade linked three regions in a 
reciprocal economic network, stereotyped as the 
"triangular trade" [see map 1]. From the late fifteenth 
century, European traders disgorged their wares on the 
African coastline. Iron, copper, textiles, glass and 
weapons were exchanged for captured slaves. The slaves 
were loaded into the holds of the vessels and transported 
across the Atlantic. The inhuman conditions of the
1 Robin Blackburn claims that by 1810, 40% of the population 
of Brazil and Cuba was comprised of slaves of African origin. See 
his The overthrow of colonial slavery, 1776 - 1848, London:
Verso, 1988, pg. 383. This figure for Brazil is at odds with the 
statistics for 182 3 in Stanley J Stein, Vassouras: a Brazilian 
coffee county, 1850 - 1900, Harvard University Press, 1960, pg. 
295, which show that of Brazil's 4 million inhabitants, between 
25% and 33% were enslaved.
2 E J Hobsbawm, The age of revolution: Europe, 1789- 
1848, I^Dndon: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962, pg. 26.
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journey meant that, on average, just under one-fifth of 
the captives perished before arrival. In the Americas 
the slave auctions yielded sufficient capital to finance 
the loading of tropical produce for Europe. The 
triangular trade yielded a huge surplus: profits were 
made at each destination, and a percentage of the total 
profits on each journey was retained by the crew as 
commission.
The great engine of the triangular trade was the 
persistence of forced plantation labour in the tropical 
areas designed to meet the expanding European demand for 
commodities such as sugar, cocoa, coffee, rum, tobacco, 
cotton, and indigo.3
Although slavery bound Africa to the Americas, the 
relationship between Latin America and South Africa did 
not adhere to the norm. South Africa did not export 
slaves; its colonial economy relied on a mix of coerced 
and free indigenous labour, and imported slave and 
indentured labour. Since slaves were the most important 
traded commodity between the two continents, South Africa 
figured little in the transatlantic trade. Latin America 
and South Africa were both net importers of slaves and 
manufactures, and hence their mutual trade relations were 
minimal. Instead, they were virtually insulated from each 
other because of their early ties with separate colonial 
systems.
In Latin America, Iberian royal monopolies secured the 
colonial trade and placed a 20% tax (the "royal fifth", 
or quinto) on the primary accumulation processes, 
especially the mining of silver in Mexico and Peru, and 
of gold in Brazil. Foreign merchants were disqualified
3 See Equipe Cehila-Popular, A histdria dos Africanos 
na America Latina (Colegao Negros em Libertagao 3), 
Petropolis: Editora Vozes, 1987, pp. 10-11.
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from operating in Spanish and Portuguese America, 
although some managed to do so in a clandestine fashion, 
a process which increased especially once metropolitan 
power had begun to wane in the early nineteenth 
century.4
Similarly, at the Cape of Good Hope, the United 
Netherlands Chartered East India Company (VOC) enjoyed a 
monopoly of external trade until midway through the last 
decade of the eighteenth century. Unlike the Iberians in 
Latin America, "the Dutch", according to one study, "did 
not found the Cape Colony in order to produce a supply of 
cash crops to be sold on the world market." 5 Instead the 
settlement was established in order to replenish company 
ships on the Javanese and other oriental trade routes.
As in the case of Latin America, though, some individual 
merchants attempted to circumvent monopolistic 
restrictions. Their persistence eventually compelled the 
VOC to cede some rights to local colonists to provision 
passing ships on condition that the Company take a share 
of the harvests.
The continued control exercised by the Company explains 
why even when a surplus of produce began to be produced 
from the mid-eighteenth century, exports to the 
Netherlands were limited, since the Cape produced few
4 For further details of the monopoly and taxation 
system in Spanish America, see John Lynch, "The origins of 
Spanish American independence", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), 
The independence of Latin America, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987, pp. 10-11. On the application of the quinto 
in Brazil see A J R Russell-Wood, "The gold cycle, 
1690-1750", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), Colonial Brazil, 
Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 227-231.
5 Pieter van Duin and Robert Ross, The economy of the 
Cape Colony in the eighteenth century, Leiden: Centre for 
the History of European Expansion (Intercontinental Series 
7), 1987, pg. 15.
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commodities - apart from ivory and Constantia wines - 
that were in demand in Europe. It served rather to supply 
Dutch enclaves to the east with the type of produce to 
which the company's employees and other expatriates had 
been accustomed to consume in Europe, such as wheat, 
wine, wax, butter and bacon. Latin America was not yet a 
destination for Cape exports.6
Thus, in each region, exports - significantly more 
crucial in the economies of Latin America - were largely 
directed at the needs of the respective colonial power.
In the case of Latin America, the destination of the 
exports was usually the metropolis, whence they were 
locally consumed or re-exported. In the case of the Cape 
of Good Hope, production for the home market was 
paramount, and most exports were destined for the 
intra-colonial trade. Local produce replenished Dutch 
ships and reached other Dutch colonial and mercantile 
entrepots in Mauritius, India and the East Indies.
The conquest by forces of the Netherlands West India 
Company of Portuguese territories in the north-eastern 
Brazilian province of Pernambuco between 1630 and 1654 
overlapped with the occupation of the Cape in 1652 by the 
United Netherlands East India Company, and brought these 
areas into a common colonial nexus for a brief period.7
6 ibid., p. 16 and 128-132.
7 For a full account of the West India Company's 
occupation see Charles Ralph Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, 
1624-1654, Oxford: Clarendon, 1957, and the same author's 
The Dutch seaborne empire, 1600-1800, London: Hutchinson, 
1965, pp. 98-99, 274 ff. Also see Pedro Ramos de Almeida, 
Historia do colonialismo portugues em Africa: cronologia, 
seculo XV-XVIII, Lisbon: Editorial Estampa, 1978, pp.
285-299, and Mctrio de Souza Clington, Angola libre?, Paris: 
Editions Gallimard, 1973, p. 52- 3, for more detail on the 
West India Company's conquest of Luanda and Benguela 
between 1641 and 1648, whereafter a joint Luso-Brazilian 
force retook Angola for the Portuguese crown.
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In addition, owing to maritime conditions on the sea 
route to the East, the trade winds drew ships towards the 
Brazilian coast before they crossed the South Atlantic 
and rounded the Cape of Good Hope. This led to a regular 
pattern of direct links between the Brazilian ports and 
Cape Town during the pre-steam era.
The Middle Passage - the crossing of the Atlantic by 
slave ships - had one of its strands originating from 
Mozambique and Madagascar. The slave ships destined for 
the Americas often called in at the Cape for provisioning 
on their way.
For these various reasons, therefore, a modicum of 
cultural and material exchanges between Brazil and the 
Cape existed, but these were extremely marginal to each 
other's economic needs and cannot be regarded as having 
any major significance.
What first drew the two regions into a common mercantile 
system was the rise of Britain as the predominant power 
in the Atlantic.
The uneasy birth of the Latin American republics, which 
culminated in the decade of the 1820s, marked the first 
phase of the self-emancipation of the South. For most of 
the new republics, however, the acquisition of political 
sovereignty was accompanied by new forms of economic 
submission. Spain and Portugal had merely ceded their 
title as regional powers to Britain.
Britain had become the world's foremost sea power, 
possessor of the most advanced industrial base, and 
weaver of the most entangling commercial webs in Latin 
America. During the course of the nineteenth century, 
these webs came increasingly to be rivalled by those of 
the United States and an emergent Germany. For the most
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part, however, the economic preponderance of British 
interests in the region were assured for the century 
leading to the outbreak of the Great War.
Britain's pre-eminence in the Atlantic was due to a 
number of factors.
Firstly, its domination of the slave, cotton and spice 
trades had necessitated the establishment of entrepots in 
the Caribbean, West Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. The 
loss of the thirteen North American colonies had 
curtailed British sovereignty but not jeopardised 
Britain's continued domination of the Atlantic trade. The 
fortification and colonisation of the remaining 
entrepots, although an uneven and precarious process, 
helped to guarantee British geo-political hegemony in the 
Atlantic region. We shall shortly see how control of the 
Cape in particular had an impact upon Britain's 
relationship with Latin America.
The Cape was of little commercial importance; its value 
lay in its strategic command of the South Atlantic and of 
the route to India, Britain's most lucrative imperial 
possession. From 1652 to 1795, the Cape had been a 
possession of the United Netherlands Chartered East India 
Company. By the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Netherlands had fallen under French control, and Britain, 
engaged in counter-revolutionary wars against France, 
feared that France might gain the imperial edge through 
assuming control of Dutch colonial possessions.
To pre-empt this, the British occupied the Cape in 1795, 
briefly returned it to the Dutch authorities in 1803 
under the provisions of the short-lived Treaty of Amiens, 
but reconquered it in 1806 in the context of ongoing war 
with France. British sovereignty over the Cape was 
finally confirmed in the convention signed on 13 August
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1814.
Sir Home Popham, a commodore of the Royal Navy, had led 
the convoy of British troops sent to seize Cape Town in 
1806. In the wake of the decisive defeat of the 
Franco-Spanish navy at Trafalgar the year before, there 
seemed less of an imperative for the British fleet to 
remain concentrated in European waters.
As the fleet dispersed to other theatres of operation, 
lines of communication became more tenuous, and this gave 
a degree of autonomy to those commanders outside the 
European theatre.8 Britain had no official designs on 
territorial acquisition in Latin America. Nevertheless, 
acting without orders, Sir Home Popham, having secured 
the Cape for Britain, set sail in April 1806 for 
Argentina, with a view to overthrowing Spanish power in 
the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata. He saw that there 
would be extensive financial and commercial advantages to 
Britain in such a conquest, and sought to take advantage 
of local discontent and military weakness. It was only 
once his squadron had reached St Helena that the 
Admiralty was informed of his plans and reinforcements 
were commandeered.
Popham was a colourful character, the twenty-first son of 
a British consul in Morocco, university trained as a 
naval surveyor, astronomer and navigator. He had worked 
in Africa, India, Arabia, Malaya and China, where he made 
his fortune in trading. He survived a court martial for 
corrupt dealings in the navy, because a select committee 
of the House of Commons decided that he had been a victim 
of trumped up charges. He had also been knighted by the
8 H s Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth 
century, Oxford University Press, 1960, pg. 21 ff.
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Czar after a diplomatic mission to St Petersburg.9
Referred to as the "enfant terrible of the Spanish 
American lobby", Popham had pressed the British secretary 
of war, Henry Dundas, to mount an expeditionary force 
from the Cape of Good Hope to conquer Buenos Aires as 
early as 1797. This had been shelved, but in February 
1801 Popham attempted to revive the plan. In a dispatch 
from the Cape (where he was stationed briefly before 
joining a naval expedition to the Red Sea), he argued the 
case for conquest on the grounds that the Cape was short 
of grain and that essential supplies from Buenos Aires 
could be interrupted in the event of war. But the 
expedition was not sanctioned by the time that the Pitt 
cabinet fell in the same month, and the new 
administration became preoccupied with a settlement with 
France, so any plans for an expedition were placed in 
abeyance.10
Having discounted the idea of colonising the whole of 
South America, the conquest of its key points (seen as 
Venezuela and the Rio de la Plata) became an obsession 
for Popham, if only to keep out the French. His 
entreaties to the Admiralty demanding action against 
Spanish America, joined with those of numerous others, 
including the pro-independence Venezuelan General 
Miranda, then resident in Britain. They fell on deaf ears 
at the Admiralty. In view of such indifference, Popham 
and Miranda sought to initiate their own separate 
unauthorised schemes. In 1806 Miranda led an expedition 
to the Venezuelan coast, but failed to raise revolution 
amongst the population, despite some naval support from
9 Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pp. 17-19.
10 John Lynch, "British policy and Spanish America, 
1783-1808", Journal of Latin American Studies 1,1, 1969, 
pp. 14-15.
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the British authorities in the Caribbean.11
The British acquisition of the Cape of Good Hope made it 
possible for Popham's singular strategy of obtaining key 
entrepots in South America to be realised. Cape Town thus 
became a convenient staging post for the unofficial 
British conquest of the Argentine.12
Despite the initial success of the expeditionary force, 
the British faced increasing resistance on the part of 
the populace of the Viceroyalty. The Spanish forces were 
outgunned and badly trained, but the locally born 
criollos constituted a force which attacked the British 
and gave Spain the breathing space to dispatch more 
disciplined troops. Popham, too, received more 
reinforcements from the Cape, but the British occupation 
of Buenos Aires was mishandled by the newly appointed 
commander-in-chief of the River Plate, Lieutenant-General 
John Whitelocke.
Instead of turning the British expeditionary force into a 
prop for the independence movement, Whitelocke sought to 
press home the British occupation as a permanent 
initiative. After experiencing increased local 
resistance, and making numerous strategic mistakes, 
Whitelocke ordered the evacuation of the River Plate by 
the British forces under his command. Both he and Popham 
were later court martialled. Popham once again survived, 
this time going on to become a rear-admiral, but 
Whitelocke was cashiered and held up to the navy as an 
example of ignominious cowardice.
11 Lynch, "British policy", pp. 16-19.
12 Amongst his forces, records show, there was a 
runaway Cape slave who was present at the capture of 
Montevideo and Buenos Aires. See Robert Ross, Cape of 
Torments: slavery and resistance in South Africa, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, pp. 78-79.
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The expedition had proved a failure. British foreign 
policy, as managed by Castlereagh at the time, sought to 
undo the harm of the continental system of embargos 
imposed by Napoleon. Castlereagh1s main consideration 
was to avoid alienating any trading partners on the 
European mainland, with a view to re-establishing 
commerce with them. A second, though lesser, 
consideration was the notion that long-run trade and 
political advantages lay in British collaboration with 
the independence movements of Latin America, as 
"auxiliaries and protectors", to use Castereagh's own 
parlance.13 Popham's expedition had driven home the 
lesson that in the case of Latin America neo-colonial 
control would be a far more appropriate strategy than 
outright conquest.
The abortive conquest of the River Plate was not the only 
occasion on which the Cape of Good Hope was utilised as a 
strategic staging-post, as we shall see later when we 
come to examine the British struggle against the 
Brazilian slave trade.
ii. Maritime superiority
Secondly, British dominance of the region arose through 
having defeated the threat of French and Spanish global 
sea rivalry. Spain's maritime power was decisively 
weakened by the Napoleonic invasion and the Peninsular 
wars. The Spanish Bourbon monarchy, once implacably set 
against Britain, turned to it for support against French 
expansionism. The wars of monarchical succession, often 
called the Carlist wars, preoccupied the Spanish ruling 
class for long periods in the early part of the 
nineteenth century.14
13 Ferns, Britain and Argentina, pg. 47-48.
14 Pierre Vilar, Historia de Espaha, Barcelona: Editora 
Critica, 1978, pp. 85-95.
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France's own territorial presence in the New World was 
drastically curbed after the loss of Canada, the 
revolution in Haiti and the sale of Louisiana. Yet 
territorial and trade ambitions persisted. Maritime 
rivalry with the British was only one component of the 
series of Anglo-French wars from 1793-1814; its prize was 
domination of world trade.
At this time, Britain and France were the foremost 
economic powers, but the war between them had a differing 
impact upon their economies. For Britain, the war slowed 
its rapidly expanding economic production only 
marginally, whereas for France, a decade of revolution 
and financial disruption had weakened its industrial 
output substantially.15
Although many Latin American patriots looked to French 
revolutionary principles for inspiration during their 
independence struggles, this had not led to the cementing 
of alliances with Jacobin or Napoleonic France. Miranda, 
Bolivar and Belgrano had been influenced by the ideas of 
the French encyclo-paedists and philosophes, especially 
those of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. But they 
were also impressed with other political thinkers of the 
Enlightenment, such as Hobbes and Locke, and by the 
political order in England.16 The restoration of the 
Bourbon monarchy in France did much to alienate the Latin 
American independence movements from the French.
The post-Napoleonic dispensation in continental Europe 
had turned France into a political vassal of the 
reactionary neo-Holy Alliance, led by the absolutist 
monarchies of Austria, Russia and Prussia. These
15 Hobsbawm, The age of revolution, pp. 123-4.
16 Lynch, "The origins of Latin American independence", 
pp. 41-42.
absolutist powers prompted the French monarchy to 
suppress constitutionalist uprisings in Naples and in 
Spain. Furthermore the reactionary Alliance viewed with 
horror the possibility of the de facto independence 
movement in Latin America adopting a democratic 
republican form of government. Under neo-Holy tutelage, 
France was encouraged to press for the formation of a 
series of Latin American monarchies - whose thrones would 
be filled with Bourbon progeny - to ensure absolutist 
control over the continent despite the abrogation of 
Spanish power.
Yet in order to realise these plans, the neo-Holy 
Alliance would have to neutralise or challenge British 
power, ambitions and diplomacy in the region. In this, it 
failed. As Foreign Secretary, George Canning resisted 
British incorporation into a European congressional 
system set up by the neo-Holy powers.17 Britain's 
superior sea power in the Atlantic acted as a deterrent 
against France and Russia being able to expand their 
interests in the region. Pressure from Canning on his 
French counterpart, the Due de Polignac, eventually 
extracted French guarantees of non-intervention in the 
region. These guarantees were embodied in the Polignac 
Memorandum issued in semi-secrecy in October 1823.18 The 
Memorandum prevented France from rekindling any of its 
interests in Latin America with one notable but abortive 
exception. For a brief period in the 1860s, the French 
were able to place their candidate, Maximilian, a member
17 H W V Temper ley, Life of Canning, London: James 
Finch, 1905, pp. 135-151.
18 For the text of this memorandum see Harold 
Temperley, The foreign policy of Canning, 1822-1827: 
England, the neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World, London: 
Bell, 1925, pp. 115-118, especially the phase where 
Polignac disclaims "any intention or desire" on the part of 
France "to appropriate to Herself any part of the Spanish 
Possessions in America, or to obtain for herself any 
exclusive advantages."
90
of the Hapsburg dynasty, on the short-lived imperial 
Mexican throne.
Having ensured that French interests could not challenge 
its own, British policy centred around how best to 
eclipse the traditional Iberian hold over the region.
During the Peninsular Wars, it was Britain which had 
benefited most from the disruption of trade between Spain 
and Portugal on the one hand, and their colonies on the 
other. Britain had long engaged in a clandestine trade 
with the Spanish American colonies and Brazil. The 
breaking of the Iberian royal trade monopolies was 
accelerated during the War, and in some cases local 
temporary exemptions and concessions to "neutral" 
intermediaries were granted to the satisfaction of both 
the British and local merchants.19
The advantages which accrued to British mercantile 
interests were considerable, especially in view of the 
disruption of trade with Europe due to the Napoleonic 
embargo. "In some of the war years," states Waddell, 
"Latin America was accounting for over a third of 
Britain's exports, and was thus offsetting to some extent 
the loss of markets in Europe and the United States."20
This swiftly growing new market was too tempting for 
Britain to allow the reimposition of the royal monopoly 
at the end of the war in 1814. Spain had already conceded
19 For a full account of the trade in the 
pre-independence period, see the seminal article by Dorothy 
Burne Goebel, "British trade to the Spanish colonies, 
1796-1823", American Historical Review XLIII, 2, January 
1938, pp. 288-320.
20 D A G Waddell, 'International politics and Latin 
American independence1, pp. 195-226 in Leslie Bethell (ed) , 
The independence of Latin America, Cambridge University 
Press, 1987, pg. 198.
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that it was in no position to continue to enforce its 
commercial monopoly.21 Yet Britain was keen to 
legitimate its clandestine trade with Spanish America. 
Over the ensuing decade, pressures arose from the City 
upon the British government to support the independence 
movements in Spanish America, and to act as a mediator in 
securing the recognition of their sovereignty by Spain.
During 1819 and the early 1820s, Mexico, Gran Colombia 
and Buenos Aires declared their independence.22 Britain 
was at first reluctant to grant de jure recognition 
without Spanish and wider European concurrence, which did 
not seem to be forthcoming. In the interim, a form of de 
facto recognition of the new republics occurred when 
Britain acknowledged their flags and shipping for trading 
purposes, and established a string of consulates in Latin 
American ports. It was only in 1825, partly prompted by 
the lead of the United States, a potential trade rival, 
that Britain gave de jure recognition to the new states.
Brazil had severed its link with Portugal in 1822, but 
this was regarded in Europe with more tolerance, since 
the former colony was still in the acceptable hands of 
the Portuguese royal house of Braganga.
Britain, a traditional ally of the Portuguese crown, had 
been instrumental in securing the transfer of the
21 Charles K Webster (ed.), Britain and the 
independence of Latin America, 1812-1830: Select documents 
from the Foreign Office Archives, Vol. 1, Oxford University 
Press, 1938, pg. 10.
22 Gran Colombia consisted of the present day Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panama until 1830, when the first 
three of these obtained separate sovereignty. Panama 
declared its independence from Colombia in 1906. See 
Anthony McFarlane, "The transition from colonialism in 
Colombia, 1819-1875", in Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis 
(eds), Latin America, economic imperialism and the state, 
London: The Athlone Press, 1984, p. 121, n. 1.
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Portuguese court to Rio immediately prior to the 
Napoleonic invasion in November 1807.23 This ensured that 
the Brazilian trade would be opened to British merchants, 
who enjoyed favourable treatment (including 
extra-territoriality) under the protection of an 
advantageous commercial treaty. Sixty firms of British 
merchants were established in Brazil, far outnumbering 
any other foreign rivals.24
Although the Portuguese court returned to Lisbon in 1821, 
Dorn Pedro, the heir to the throne, remained in Brazil as 
prince regent, and soon fell under the influence of local 
interests who were determined that Brazil should not 
resubmit to its former colonial status. Persuaded to 
declare Brazil independent, Dom Pedro retained power as 
its first constitutional emperor. Since this 
non-revolutionary transition to independence was less 
complicated in terms of European diplomacy, Britain 
assisted in the process of securing Portugal's 
recognition, and in obtaining a renegotiated commercial 
treaty with Brazil, through which she became Brazil's 
most significant trading partner and source of capital.25
Thus, by the 182 0s, Britain had completed the process of 
establishing itself as the pre-eminent power on both 
sides of the Atlantic. It had done so without 
establishing settler colonies, except on a small scale in 
the Eastern Cape, where a series of frontier wars were 
destabilising continued political control over the area.
23 Documented in Alan K Manchester, British preeminence 
in Brazil: its rise and decline, Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1933, pp. 54-68.
24 Judith Blow Williams, British commercial policy and 
trade expansion, 1750-1850, Oxford University Press, 1972, 
pg. 2 65.
25 Leslie Bethell, "The independence of Brazil" in 
Bethell (ed.), The independence of Latin America, Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, pg. 194.
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Britain had achieved this position due to factors largely 
related to the outcome of political and military 
struggles in Europe, rather than to any local 
imperatives.
The next sections of this chapter will gauge the impact 
of British hegemony on the two regions, in order to 
assess whether it became a factor in fostering closer 
economic ties.
2. THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE 
BRAZILIAN SLAVE TRADE, 1810-1860
In this section of the chapter, evidence will be 
presented describing the role played by the Cape of Good 
Hope in helping to suppress the remnants of the 
transatlantic slave trade. This will show how Britain*s 
occupation of the Cape helped it to maintain the hegemony 
it had developed in the South Atlantic in the early part 
of the nineteenth century. The Cape was thus drawn into a 
relationship with Latin America through British 
involvement in the ending of the slave trade.
a. Slavery and the Brazilian economy
At the time of Brazilian independence in 1822, Britain 
had interceded with its former colonial power, Portugal, 
to persuade Lisbon to recognise the new state and 
normalise relations. The price Brazil was expected to pay 
for Britain's intercession and for continued British 
commercial involvement was the abandonment of the slave 
trade.
Having put an end to the trade from 180826 in its own 
empire, Britain regarded Brazil, which had no plans to do
26 On the basis of legislation passed the previous
year.
so, as taking unfair advantage of unfree labour in the 
production of tropical goods for the world market. In 
British eyes, the maintenance of the Brazilian slave 
trade replenished the supply of slave labour at a time 
when, owing to the end of the trade elsewhere, labour 
supply had become scarcer and more costly. Hence Brazil 
was able to undercut production costs of the areas under 
British sway in the West Indies.
Although desirous of a permanent end to the transatlantic 
slave trade, British policy had to balance humanitarian 
motives against the problem of reproducing labour in the 
colonies. Despite the end of the traffic in slaves, the 
institution of British colonial slavery was not abolished 
until 1834, after which, in some instances, other forms 
of unfree labour persisted. The policy of gradual 
emancipation coincided with the growing triumph of 
capitalist relations of production across the globe.27 
Yet, the process was an uneven one, and in some areas, it 
suited capital to continue to employ earlier forms of 
exploitation.
British abolitionist aims were in serious contradiction 
with the powerful economic interests of Brazil*s agrarian 
ruling class. After the opening of the ports of Brazil to 
international trade in 1808, the exports of tropical 
produce - sugar, cotton, tobacco and coffee - received a 
new stimulus. As Brazil became more and more integrated 
into the world economy, the demand for plantation labour 
intensified significantly. The landowning class saw this 
demand in terms of an imperative to acquire more slaves 
rather than free labour. Brazil remained the principal 
destination of captive Africans, and it was Portuguese 
ships which conducted the bulk of the trade in the years 
immediately following Brazilian independence.
27 A thesis powerfully argued by Williams (1944) and 
Eltis (1987).
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For some years Portugal had ceased trading in slaves 
north of the equator. Pressure from Canning had resulted 
in the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1810. According to the 
British interpretation, this trade had been outlawed 
under the treaty. By confirming in January 1815 that the 
northern trade was no longer legal, Portugal resolved any 
ambiguities in the treaty: Lisbon was, simultaneously, 
confirming that trade between its colonies south of the 
line (including most of Brazil) was still permitted to 
Portuguese subjects. In extra provisions added two years 
later, Portugal conceded to Britain the right to search 
and detain its vessels, and their adjudication before 
bilateral tribunals.
A number of these tribunals, known as Mixed Commissions, 
had been set up by the British with judicial 
commissioners drawn from nationals both of Britain and 
the relevant second country.
The task of the Mixed Commissions was to adjudicate 
international disputes about slaving vessels captured by 
the Royal Navy patrols or, what was more unlikely, by 
their treaty counterparts. Most of the Mixed Commissions 
operated in a half-hearted fashion, at best being 
conciliatory in their approach, and at worst rather lax 
at deterring any further slaving.
With Brazilian independence, the British argued that the 
successor state still ought to honour Portuguese treaty 
obligations. Since none of these obligations covered the 
trade with any of the Brazilian ports, efforts were made 
to convince the Brazilians of the need for a new treaty 
with Britain.
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b. British recognition and abolition
Abolition was not on the immediate agenda of the newly 
independent Brazilian empire. Yet Britain had demanded 
that this be one of the preconditions for recognition of 
Brazilian sovereignty. Later Britain also demanded 
abolition as a precondition for the renewal of a 
commercial treaty originally in force between itself and 
Portugal. British foreign minister George Canning 
declared:
no state in the New World will be recognised by 
Great Britain which has not frankly and 
completely abolished the trade in slaves.28
and reiterated that he could not recognise a state
distinguished from all other states in the vast 
extent of the New World by its solitary 
adherence to the slave trade.29
He held that Brazilian renunciation of the trade would 
smooth the recognition process.
Recognition by Britain was desirable, since Britain held 
political sway over Portugal and could influence the 
latter not to resort to any forms of revanchism in the 
New World. Moreover, Britain had become the principal 
economic power in the Atlantic, and Brazil's independence 
could not fully be secured without ensuring a solid 
trading relationship with the British.
It was only with the utmost reluctance that, in November
28 In an 1822 letter to the Duke of Wellington, then 
ambassador to the Congress of Verona, cited in J F King, 
"The Latin American republics and the suppression of the 
slave trade", Hispanic American Historic Review XXIV, 1944, 
p. 391, and Webster, Britain and the independence of Latin 
America, vol. ii, p. 74.
29 Canning to Chamberlain (British charge d'affairs in 
Rio), no. 5, 15 February 1823, Secret, printed in Webster, 
Britain and the independence of Latin America, vol. i, pp. 
220- 1 .
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182 6, reacting to considerable pressure exercised by the 
British and the pro-abolitionist emperor Dom Pedro I, the 
Brazilian chamber of deputies agreed to the future 
abolition of the slave trade south of the equator in 
exchange for recognition of Brazilian sovereignty by 
Britain. This was to be enshrined in an Anglo-Brazilian 
treaty.
c. The demand for slaves
Although the 1826 Anglo-Brazilian treaty allowed for a 
period of three years' grace from the time of 
ratification before abolition was legally instituted, a 
political backlash occurred in the congress and amongst 
the landowning classes. Accused of accepting too high a 
price for recognition of independence, the emperor found 
himself the object of intense criticism and chose to 
abdicate in 1831. His son and heir, Dom Pedro II, was 
then six years old, so power passed into the hands of 
regents drawn from political notables in the court-based 
aristocracy.
During the period of grace before abolition was finally 
written into Brazilian law on 7 November 1831, the slave 
trade actually intensified, in order that sufficient 
slaves be procured before the traffic became 
criminalised.
TABLE 3.1
SLAVES IMPORTED INTO BRAZIL, 1822-1830
Port of entry Rio de Janeiro Bahia Pernambuco
1822--1 (average) 25,000 p.a. 3-4,000 p. a.
1828 45,000 3-4,000
1829 45,000 17,000 5,000
1830 (Jan-June) 30,000
Source: Bethell, The abolition of the Brazilian slave 
trade, p. 71.
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By the time of abolition, the slave trade had diminished 
almost entirely. This was due to the relative over-supply 
of slaves which had occurred in the previous few years. 
Yet the sugar and coffee booms of the following decade 
soon led to a revival in the demand for slaves and the 
trade began to intensify systematically on a clandestine 
basis.
TABLE 3.2
COFFEE EXPORTS FROM RIO DE JANEIRO, 1792-1841
(measured in tonnes)
1792 2
1817 4,573
1820 7,751
1826 18,758
1830 27,499,389
1835 46,550,792
1840-1 71,644,338
Source: Stein, Vassouras, p. 53, Table 4, gives figures 
in their original units of arrobas (each equivalent to 
14.38kg or 31.71b).
The growth in the trade alarmed the British, who realised 
that the new state and its successive weak central 
governments were too ill-equipped financially and 
politically to police the abolished trade. Brazil*s naval 
attention was diverted from patrolling the slave trade to 
dealing with provincial secession movements in Para and 
Rio Grande do Sul at opposite ends of the empire. The 
judicial authorities were linked at local level to the 
plantation owners, and where not corruptible, generally 
turned a blind eye to the illegal landings of slaves. In 
all, Bethell estimates that 500,000 slaves were illegally 
imported to Brazil after 1830.30
30 Leslie Bethell, The abolition of the Brazilian slave 
trade, Appendix, pg. 395.
99
d. Palmerston laws
Despite such clear and continuous infringement of 
Brazilian domestic legislation, it was still illegal for 
Britain to interfere with Portuguese or stateless ships 
south of the equator. Treaty law had only allowed for 
direct British intervention in the North Atlantic.
The clandestine nature of the trade and the potential 
forfeiture of the illegal cargoes of Brazilian vessels to 
the naval patrols drove slave prices upward. Various 
subterfuges were employed by the shipowners to disguise 
the real nature of their vessels' cargoes if challenged 
by the British. At this time, the expression para ingles 
ver (loosely meaning "to bamboozle the British") entered 
the Brazilian Portuguese language and came to be used for 
any instance of concealment of real intentions.31
Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, 
campaigned at length to put an end to this leakage in the 
patrolling of the illegal trade. In 1839 he persuaded 
the British parliament to legislate in favour of naval 
searches of Portuguese or stateless vessels south of the 
equator.
If Portuguese or stateless slave ships were apprehended, 
they would henceforth be tried by courts of the relevant 
vice-admiralty of the Royal Navy rather than by the Mixed 
Commissions. Slaves landed in British territories would 
be set free under certain conditions, and the ships' 
crews would be handed over to their own countries. The 
ships themselves would be broken up and sold for scrap, 
or ownership would pass to the British navy.
31 See the explication of this term by social 
anthropologist Peter Fry in his volume of the same name, 
Para ingles ver: identidade e polltica na cultura 
brasileira, Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Editores, 1982.
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e. Patrolling the seas
These harsh measures caused numerous traders to revert to 
using the Brazilian flag. Captured Brazilian vessels were 
still subject to the jurisdiction of the Anglo-Brazilian 
Mixed Commissions. Normally this might have been less 
satisfactory to the British because the Brazilian 
commissioners had a reputation for leniency. However, at 
the African seats of the Mixed Commissions - in Sierra 
Leone, on the island of St Helena, and at the Cape of 
Good Hope - the Brazilians seldom had a resident 
commissioner. Hence the captures off the African coast 
were not often challenged in the commissioners' courts.
During the 1840s, however, the clandestine trade 
increased. The earlier treaties with Britain lapsed and 
Brazil refused to negotiate a new one on terms 
satisfactory to Britain. Not only was there resistance to 
abolition but also to British high-handedness. Britain's 
demands were interpreted by some politicians as being 
incompatible with Brazilian sovereignty.
Brazil's continued intransigence swayed the hand of the 
British foreign secretary, Lord Aberdeen, to draft new 
and stricter legislation declaring the Brazilian slave 
trade tantamount to piracy. The legislation received 
royal assent in August 1845. Known popularly as the 
Aberdeen Act, the Slave Trade (Brazil) Act 
allowed for the right to search Brazilian vessels, the 
unilateral jurisdiction in vice-admiralty courts, the 
payment of bounties for liberated slaves, and the breakup 
of captured slave vessels.
British vessels also patrolled the Brazilian coastline. 
Many slave ships were captured here against the will of a 
much affronted Brazilian government. Friction between the 
governments intensified despite the lowering of duties on 
Brazilian sugar, because there still seemed no intention
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on Brazil's part of renewing all the lapsed provisions of 
the 1827 abolition treaty.
Despite Brazilian protests, about half the ships captured 
after 184 5 were condemned in St Helena, and the rest in 
Freetown or Cape Town. The protests were formally 
conveyed by Brazilian consuls or vice-consuls in these 
ports. Yet with the world boom in tropical commodities 
like coffee and sugar, plantations had never been busier, 
with a consequent demand for more slave labour. This was 
underlined by the failure of free migration schemes to 
provide paid European labour to the plantation owners.
Despite the increased risks of capture, the clandestine 
trade expanded beyond the capacity of the British navy to 
prevent it.
It was only when the Brazilian regime itself resolved to 
end the trade that more practical measures were adopted 
to ensure an effective abolition. In 1850 the Brazilian 
congress passed legislation going beyond all previous 
provisions in a determined bid to outlaw all forms of the 
trade. By this date the central government had 
consolidated its powers relative to the constituent 
provinces, and the measures to put an end to the trade 
proved successful: by the late 1850s it had ceased 
entirely.
f. The Cape and the trade
The Cape of Good Hope was useful to Britain as a 
strategic point on the route to India and the East. It 
was far less important to world markets than independent 
Brazil. Nevertheless its strategic location helped the 
Cape play a part in the abolition of the transatlantic 
slave trade. This became one of the few elements of 
contact between South Africa and Latin America in the
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mid-nineteenth century.
Although the relationship was clearly mediated by the 
role of the British in securing a position of naval and 
geo-political dominance in the South Atlantic, 
nevertheless there were certain domestic advantages 
derived from the British use of the Cape in the 
suppression of the trade.
The territory of the Cape of Good Hope, straddling two 
oceans, was a good vantage point from which to patrol 
both the east and west coasts of Africa. This was 
especially necessary for most of the first half of the 
century, because of the role which Portugal and its 
colonies of Angola and Mozambique played in the 
transatlantic trade. The port of Cape Town together with 
the nearby naval facilities at Simon's Town became the 
base for a new British naval patrol, a fitting location 
for a vice-admiralty court, and, after 1842, a seat of 
the Anglo-Portuguese Mixed Commission.
Although these judicial institutions never attained the 
importance of their counterparts in Sierra Leone, where 
528 cases were judged between 1819-4532, the courts and 
mixed commissions at the Cape of Good Hope formed part of 
a network stretching to the Caribbean.
The mixed or joint commissions were established by 
treaties signed with Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, 
the United States, and later with Brazil and some Spanish 
American republics. In each case, Britain and its 
counterpart, say Portugal, would jointly preside over the 
courts which sat in judgement of sea crews caught trading
32 Leslie Bethell, "The mixed commissions for the 
suppression of the transatlantic slave trade in the 
nineteenth century", Journal of African History, VII, 1966, 
p. 84.
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in slaves. Apart from the Cape of Good Hope and Sierra 
Leone, these mixed commissions were also seated at 
Luanda, St Helena, Boa Vista in the Cape Verde islands, 
Rio de Janeiro, Paramaribo (Suriname), Spanish Town 
(Jamaica), Havana and New York [see map 2].
Despite the joint jurisdiction, it was the Royal Navy 
which carried out almost all the business of suppressing 
the trade.33 Its naval station at the Cape thus formed 
one of the strategic points around the Atlantic basin.
In practice, as Christopher Saunders has shown34, the 
work of, for example, the Anglo-Portuguese Mixed 
Commission at the Cape of Good Hope was not at all 
rigorous. Adjudication proved extremely difficult, 
especially when little proof of a vessel's Portuguese 
nationality was available. The belated institution of 
this Mixed Commission at the Cape of Good Hope hampered 
its effectivity, since at this time the trade began to be 
dominated by Brazilian and US vessels. The cumbersome 
workings of the commission meant that only three ships 
were condemned during the first twenty years of its 
working life.
The main instrument of justice to which the British 
submitted captured slaving vessels for adjudication at 
the Cape of Good Hope was the local vice-admiralty court. 
This court was under the ultimate jurisdiction of the 
Chief Justice of the colony.
Since the end of the colonial slave trade in 1807, one of 
the few sources of additional labour was the landing of 
the so-called Prize Negroes, those slaves who had been
33 Bethell, "The Mixed Commissions", p 83.
34 "A 19th century farce: the Anglo-Portuguese Mixed 
Commission", Quarterly Bulletin of the South African 
Library, July 1983, pp. 298-302.
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captured by the British and liberated from the Portuguese 
and other slave vessels by the various local courts 
during the Napoleonic wars.
The colonists at the Cape of Good Hope thus developed a 
stake in the freeing of Prize Negroes. Under Cape law, 
they were released into "apprenticeship" for a 
fourteen-year period, during which they were treated 
little better than slaves in Cape Town and on the 
vineyards and wheat farms of the interior.
After the end of slavery at the Cape of Good Hope, which 
occurred with formal emancipation on 1 December 1834, all 
ex-slaves were "apprenticed" to their former masters for 
a four-year period.
Once this period was over, a number of former slaves left 
the employ of their masters.35 The resultant labour 
shortage at the Cape meant that colonists were in favour 
of securing supplies of liberated slaves, even from those 
freed in Sierra Leone or St Helena if necessary, despite 
opposition from the Colonial Office. However, transport 
costs ruled out such importations, and the colonists 
continued to hope that the efficacy of the naval patrols 
might benefit their supplies of labour.
The passage of the Palmerston Act in 1839 had given the 
navy the right to search and detain Portuguese slave 
vessels south of the equator. This coincided with the end 
of the four-year "apprenticeship" period. It was from 
this time that the Cape of Good Hope began to receive a 
new supply of Prize Negroes.
35 Although this was by no means a majority. See Nigel 
Worden, "Adjusting to emancipation: freed slaves and
farmers in the mid-nineteenth-century South-Western Cape", 
in Mary Simons and Winston James (eds), The angry divide: 
social and economic history of the Western Cape, Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1989, pp. 33-4.
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Numerous slave ships were captured off the coast of 
south-east Africa, and brought to the vice-admiralty 
court in Cape Town for adjudication. The slaves were 
released as Prize Negroes to local residents. Although 
numbering nearly four thousand36, there were never 
sufficient Prize Negroes to redress the labour shortfall. 
Despite the efforts of the colonists to finance imports 
from St Helena and further appeals to the government of 
the Cape, few Prize Negroes were landed after 1846.
Slave vessels captured on the east coast were landed in 
the new colony of Natal or, from 1861, in the Seychelles.
The fate of the Prize Negroes was not far removed from 
the shackles of slavery from which they had, with great 
effort, been liberated. Once freed by mixed commission or 
vice-admiralty courts, they were assigned to colonists as 
"apprentices". In practice, this did not mean any form of 
induction into a skilled profession. Instead, they were 
given household tasks or unskilled farm labour or 
municipal maintenance work for the duration of the 
apprenticeship contract of fourteen years. No longer 
slaves, they were indentured to a single employer and 
hence remained unfree. There were many desertions, but 
few attempts to return to their countries of origin.
The added dimension of colonial race relations placed 
them in a position of permanent subservience: after the 
expiry of their fourteen years of indenture, they were 
subjected to the provisions of the Master and Servants 
Ordinance of 1841, which governed their working lives and 
ensured their assimilation into the servile underclass of 
colonial Cape society.37
36 Cf. the figure of 3 6,000 slaves formally emancipated 
in 1834.
37 For insights on the Prize Negroes at the Cape, I 
have drawn extensively on the work of Christopher Saunders, 
especially his articles entitled "Between slavery and
106
The British attempts to end the transatlantic slave trade
- primarily aimed at curbing supplies to Brazil and Cuba
- therefore had some unintended consequences at the Cape. 
Unlike the liberated slaves in Sierra Leone, many of whom 
set up free rural communities, and who became a dominant 
element in the society over time, at the Cape of Good 
Hope the freed captives were integrated into the labour 
force as indentured workers. Ironically they remained 
unfree labour. This helped solve some of the problems of 
the colonial labour shortage, but was an outcome not 
freely chosen by the captives. The dominant agrarian and 
mercantile interests at the Cape thus benefited directly 
from the conflicts between Britain and Brazil over the 
continuance of the slave trade.
Through its attempts to sever the transatlantic trade in 
Africans, Britain also managed to ensure that Brazil*s 
material interests in the African continent were 
terminated. Britain vigorously opposed any aspirations on 
the part of the newly independent Brazilian empire to 
colonise Angola or Mozambique. Britain had its own 
aspirations in the continent, and preferred a weak 
Portuguese rival to a potentially more vigorous Brazilian 
one.
Thus Britain's occupation of the.Cape of Good Hope not 
only served its principal function as a strategic 
way-station on the route to India, but also became 
indispensible to the establishment and maintenance of 
British hegemony within the region of the South Atlantic. 
The Cape served as a useful naval station for the wider 
policy of terminating the transatlantic slave trade. In 
this sense Britain's first Southern African colony was 
drawn into the nexus of its relations with the 
independent Latin American republics and the colonial
freedom", .pp. 37-40, and "Liberated Africans at the Cape", 
pp. 220 ff.
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remnants in the Caribbean.
3. SOUTH AFRICA'S TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA BEFORE 1910
Trade between Latin America and South Africa was not 
especially significant in the nineteenth century.
There were a number of reasons for this. One overriding 
factor was the North-South axis in trade relations and 
trade routes. The principal sea route linking Europe with 
the Orient and the Antipodes - prior to the opening of 
the Suez canal in 1868 - passed around the Cape of Good 
Hope. Before the advent of steam, vessels would generally 
be drawn across the Atlantic by the trade winds. This 
meant that they would stop in Salvador or Rio de Janeiro 
before recrossing the south Atlantic and rounding the 
Cape. Trade served to enrich the mercantile interests 
based in the northern metropoles.
Where there was south-south trade between Africa and 
Latin America, it was dominated by the one-way trade in 
slaves. This trade did not involve exports of slaves from 
the South African territories, since these areas 
perennially experienced scarcities of labour and were 
also net importers of slaves until the trade ceased 
within two years of permanent British occupation of the 
Cape in 1806.
Another factor was the fact that both regional economies 
were devoted to agrarian production. Although there was 
some complementarity, since the Cape did not produce 
tropical commodities, for the most part the produce of 
the two regions competed on world markets. Where there 
were shortages of commodities at the Cape, usually due to 
droughts or diseases, preference was granted to imports 
from Britain and its overseas possessions, or to the East
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India Company which held the monopoly on British trade 
with China. Neither Latin America nor South Africa 
produced any manufactured goods for export at this time.
Regular trade routes across the South Atlantic were not 
developed until the twentieth century, nor were there 
transatlantic cable links. This lack of infrastructure 
impaired the growth of significant and systematic trade 
relations. This was compounded by the fact that in the 
trade between the Australasian colonies and the Latin 
American republics, goods tended to be shipped across the 
Pacific route rather than the Atlantic and Indian 
oceans.38 This meant that there was less opportunity for 
a passing trade with the Cape.
A further factor which inhibited the growth of trade was 
the small size of the money or exchange economy in South 
Africa prior to the mineral revolutions which occurred in 
the last third of the nineteenth century. Communications 
networks were slow and arduous, with poor roads and steep 
mountain passes. Settlements were few, and most settlers 
in the interior lived fairly isolated farming existences. 
Although their consumption of commodities obtained on 
world markets structured their lives on the colonial 
frontier in important ways, the volume of these imports 
was limited and erratic.39
38 T W Keeble, Commercial relations between British 
overseas territories and South America, 1806-1914: an
introductory essay, London: The Athlone Press, 1970, pp. 
92-3.
39 Susan Newton-King, "Commerce and material culture on 
the Eastern Cape frontier, 1784-1812", Collected seminar 
papers 37: Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 
20th centuries, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 
University of London, vol. 14, 1988, pp. 1-32. Also see 
Leonard Guelke, "Freehold farms and frontier settlers, 
1652-1780", in Elphick and Giliomee (eds), The shaping of 
South African society, 1652-1840, Cape Town: Maskew Miller 
Longman, 2nd edition, 1989. p.88.
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i The primitive and exposed nature of the harbours at the
Cape did not facilitate the growth of trade. Serious 
development of the harbour at Table Bay only began to 
occur from the 18 50s, and the Eastern Cape ports lagged 
behind in construction until the 1890s.40
The Cape had a precarious position in world markets 
before the 1860s. The chief export of the colony, wine, 
began to decline after 1830. Slowly its predominance 
waned in favour of wool, which by 1850 was the colony*s 
principal export. Even so, the export of wool provided an 
insubstantial part of the colony's total revenues.41
TABLE 3.3
EXPORTS FROM THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE 1822 - 1850
year 1822 1830 1840 1850
wine 47 % 43 % 7 % 5.6%
wool 0.65% 0.7% 4.1% 44.8%
rest 52.35% 56.3% 89.9% 49.6%
total 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %
value £240,853 £224,392 £1,095,809 £637,353
Source: Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book, 1822- 1850
In the context of the growing British dominance of world 
trade, South Africa was of marginal importance before the 
mineral revolution. Not only was commodity production 
rather limited, but there was also no local merchant 
marine. Most of Brazil's export trade across the South 
Atlantic was dominated by British export houses in Rio de 
Janeiro.
The trade that was generated was therefore dependent upon
40 See David William Rush, Aspects of the growth of 
trade and the development of ports in the Cape Colony, 
1795-1882, MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1972, p. 6 
and 8 3 ff.
41 Rush, Aspects of the growth of trade, p. 35.
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British imperial monetary and financial requirements, 
rather than being generated by autonomous local interests 
seeking to expand markets for domestically produced 
commodities.
This meant that such trade was largely incidental to the 
fact that most of the sea traffic between Britain and her 
possessions in the East was routed via Brazil and the 
Cape of Good Hope.
The only significant exception was the trade undertaken 
by the British merchants based in Rio de Janeiro. The 
records show that they dispatched their own vessels on 
round trips to the Cape prior to 1820.42
During the second half of the century, when more trade 
records were kept, there was evidence of some importing 
from the River Plate countries and from Chile. However 
the value of these imports remained relatively modest 
until the turn of the century, and there were no 
significant amounts of South African exports.
TABLE 3.4
RECORDS OF IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA TO 
HOPE, 1853-1899 (in £'000s)
THE CAPE OF GOOD
Year: 1853 1860 1870 1880 1889 1899
Source
Brazil 66.0 135.6 115.8 217.0 341.1
Uruguay 5.5 3.0
Chile 7.5 9.7 19.0
Argentina 19.6 76.7
Sources: Cape of Good Hope, Blue 
Register for the relevant years.
Book or Statistical
42 See Keeble, Commercial relations, p. 65, n.l
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a. Exports to Latin America
The Cape's records of exports to Latin America for the 
same period consisted of two entries only, both recording 
amounts destined for Brazil. In 1853, exports reached the 
value of £12,000, but much of this comprised goods from 
the East which were being re-exported, and there was only 
£2,000 worth of local produce. In 1870, an amount of £800 
worth of horses and mules were sold to Brazil, and an 
unspecified quantity of Cape wine.
These figures indicate that imports from Latin America 
were far in excess of Cape exports, and that therefore 
the balance of trade which evolved during the last 
century was to the advantage of Latin America; that the 
Cape exports were occasional or verged on the 
insignificant; that the entrepot nature of the Cape had 
meant a more significant role for oriental re-exports; 
and that any conclusions about the trade are expressed on 
the basis of incomplete data collected in decennial 
intervals.
b. The entrepot trade
That the Cape should be a centre for re-exports within 
the British trading network is an unsurprising function 
of her geographical situation.
The Cape was a way station for British trade with the 
East. The traffic generally flowed between Europe and 
India, the East Indies or China. In cases where British 
merchants wished to dispose of oriental produce in the 
Americas or Europe, without their fleets performing the 
entire journey each time, the goods were often warehoused 
or bonded at the ports of the Cape peninsula for 
subsequent transshipment to more westerly or northerly 
destinations.
The Report of the Commissioners of Inquiry upon the trade
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of the Cape of Good Hope of 1829 noted that
the largest portion of this trade has consisted 
of the re-exportation of cotton goods, of 
Indian manufactures, spices and drugs to Great 
Britain and South America, and in smaller 
proportion to the Netherlands, and of articles 
of British manufacture to the East Indies and 
the colonies of Mauritius and New South Wales.
and recommended that obstacles in the way of this transit 
trade be diminished.
TABLE 3.5
EXTENT OF THE TRANSIT TRADE FROM THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE
1820-1826
In Rixdollars (Rds.)43 (Rd. 1 = £0.075)
Year Value of Re-exports as %
re-exports of total exports
1820 Rds. 349,968 16.33
1821 Rds. 369,782 16.88
1822 Rds. 725,649 23.24
1823 Rds. 234,112 8.20
1824 Rds. 231,055 7.65
1825 Rds. 336,907 10.52
1826 Rds. 195,746 8.48
Source: Cape of Good Hope, Report...upon the trade of the 
Cape of Good Hope, 2 June 1829, Appendix 3, pp. 38-39. 
Figures furnished by Collectors of Customs at Cape Town 
and Simon's Town, except for 1825-6 when exports from 
Simon's Town were not recorded. Figures for 1825 not 
disaggregated by destination.
Re-exports thus oscillated in the area between 8%-25% of 
total exports in the 1820s, and the Commission was keen
43 Rixdollars, the currency introduced by the United 
East India Company of the Netherlands, were legal tender at 
the Cape until demonetised in 1841. Originally equivalent 
to a value of 4s., by 1821 it had been devalued to the 
equivalent of Is 6d or the decimal 7.5p. I am grateful to 
Lalou Meltzer, former numismatic curator at the South 
African Cultural History Museum, for this information. 
Further details are available in Brian Kantor (1970); 
Robert Ross (1989); and Vivien Solomon, whose chapter on 
"Money and banking" in Coleman (ed.), 1983, includes a 
history of the rixdollar.
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to ensure that this portion of the Cape's trade be 
stimulated. It recommended the improvement of harbours 
and the removal of customs duties on commodities whose 
ultimate destination was not the Cape itself. It also 
argued that despite earlier British legislation, foreign 
ships should be admitted to Cape harbours "without 
reference to the performance of the condition of 
reciprocity"
The spirit of free trade was very much in the minds of
the commissioners when they wrote
A (profitable) intercourse may be expected to 
take place with Brazil and other States of 
South America....we see no just ground for 
jealousy or apprehension in the free admission 
and the exportation of articles of its produce 
to and from the Cape.
TABLE 3.6
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 
1820-1826 (in Rixdollars)
Year A
Exports of 
local produce 
to Latin Am 
(Rds.)
B
Re-exports
to
Latin Am 
(Rds.)
A+B 
Total 
exports 
to Latin 
(Rds.)
B/A+B
Am
(%)
B as % 
of total 
re-exports
(%)
1820 95,880 40,020 135,900 29.4 6.5
1821 67,540 39,440 106,980 36.9 10.7
1822 119,162 16,762 135,924 12.3 2.3
1823 99,794 2, 120 101,914 2.1 0.9
1824 222,445 36,395 258,840 14.1 15.8
1825 ------- ------ ------- — — ----
1826 95,467 2,666 98,133 2.7 1.4
Source: As Table 3.5. 1825 figures do not reflect destination
of exports and 182 6 figures do not include returns from 
Simon's Town.
44 Cape of Good Hope, Report...upon the trade of the 
Cape of Good Hope, 2 June 1829, p. 11.
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Whilst in the 182 0s, re-exports were a varied but not 
dominant component of total exports to the various Latin 
American countries, by the mid-1850s, re-exports became a 
significant (83.3%) part of the Cape's total exports to 
Brazil. This indicates the reinforced role of ^ntrepdt 
which the Cape of Good Hope played in the context of 
British imperial trading interests.
c. Nature of the trade commodities
Apart from the re-exports of oriental products to Latin 
America, the rest of the trade consisted of 
non-complementary commodities in relatively small 
quantities, with some exceptions.
The 1829 Commission of Inquiry into the trade of the Cape 
of Good Hope reported in 1829 that imports from Latin 
America consisted mainly of tropical produce such as 
coffee, sugar, and tobacco, and recognised that the Cape 
was exporting wine, wheat, wool, horses, hides, ostrich 
feathers, salted meat, corn, preserved fruit, medicinal 
herbs and aloes, ivory and gum.
The trade of the latter half of the century consisted 
more or less of the same commodities, with two 
innovations: the import of wheat, barley and flour from 
Chile; and that of horses, mules and fodder from Uruguay 
and Argentina.
It is worth looking more closely at a number of the more 
staple commodities involved in the trade.
c. 1. Coffee
Unlike the tea trade at the Cape, which was dominated by 
the monopolistic East India Company with its exclusive 
investments at Canton, the structure of the coffee trade 
was not only more important, but also less controlled. 
There were multiple suppliers, and no price controls. By
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the 1820s, the main supplier was the Indonesian island of 
Java, still under Dutch rule. Yet the market relied on 
supplies from other sources, principally from Brazil and 
the Yemen. The sporadic nature of supplies led to wide 
price fluctuations, depending on gluts or shortages and 
the attendant speculation on the part of local merchants.
One indication of the levels of fluctuation can be seen
in this extract from the South African Commercial
Advertiser of 13 July 1831:
The panic in the coffee market is tremendous at 
the present moment. Good Brazil coffee, only 14 
days ago, was sold readily for 35-40 rixdollars 
[£2.62-£3 per bag]: for coffee of the same 
quality more than 2 0 rixdollars cannot now be 
obtained. Rumour attributes the fall to the 
large holders of that article having brought 
their stock into the market, and also to an 
unexpected quantity of about 1000 bags being 
for sale from a vessel now lying at Simon's 
Bay. This state of things strikingly 
exemplifies the fluctuating nature of this 
market.45
The growing importance of this commodity in the local 
market was only part of the reason for the trade. British 
merchants in the Brazilian empire were aware of the 
advantages of using the Cape for the re-export of coffee 
to Britain. By doing so, the goods qualified for lighter 
colonial import duties. Keeble claims that this 
triangular trade reached its apex during the 1830s. As 
the ideology of free trade made inroads into the 
commercial policy of the British empire, colonial 
preferences were diminished in the ensuing decade. Thus 
the triangular element of the coffee trade fell away, and 
merchants at the Cape concentrated on expanding the 
domestic market.46
45 Quoted from Marcus Arkin, Storm in a teacup: the 
later years of John Company at the Cape, 1815-36, Cape 
Town: Struik, 1973, pg. 124. Own parentheses.
46 Keeble, Commercial relations, p. 66.
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In the latter half of the century, as evident in the 
figures in Table 3.4 above, the Cape's imports from 
Brazil rose fivefold, from £66,000 to £342,000. The vast 
bulk of these imports consisted of coffee, indicating not 
only the extent to which this beverage had become a 
staple with sections of the local population, but 
primarily also the practice of re-exporting the coffee to 
Britain until 1841.
The Cape Town Chamber of Commerce in its 1841 Annual 
Report explained that the fall in exports for that year 
was due
to the discontinuance of the practice of the 
bonding of foreign coffee, for transshipment to 
England for entry at a reduced duty.47
After the end of this practice, little coffee was brought 
to the Cape for re-export.
c.2. Wine
This commodity was regarded as likely to be the most 
important export of the Cape, based on the assessment 
that in the first two decades of the second British 
occupation, a "very considerable increase" took place in 
production and export. This optimism rose, especially 
after 1811, the year in which the colonial government 
intervened in the industry in order to raise standards of 
cultivation.48 The exports of Cape wine increased from 
236,720 gallons in 1816 to 662,860 gallons in 1826. The 
Cape Town Custom-house reported in 1827 that in the
47 Cape Town Chamber of Commerce, Annual Report, Cape 
Town, 1841. See Cape Archives Depot CC3. The duty had been 
"4d upon British coffee coming directly from our 
possessions within the limits of the East India Company's 
charter; 8d on all coffee of foreign countries." Great 
Britain, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd series, vol. 43, 1843, 
p. 521.
48 Cape of Good Hope, Report, 1829, p. 17/265.
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previous year a quantity of 99,055 gallons of Cape wine 
had been exported to Rio de Janeiro by seven shippers on 
four vessels. This amounted to 15% of wine exported from 
the Cape in that year.49
Cape wines were protected in the British market until 
1831, but from 1825, when Britain lowered duties on 
continental wines, the importance of wine as an export 
diminished.50 Cape wines lost their protection more 
easily because for the most part they were considered 
inferior to the wines of Europe.
Their inferiority and cheapness worked to the advantage 
of the Cape wine industry in the Brazilian market, where 
the considerable underclass of slaves was not especially 
discriminating in its tastes.
According to the trade commissioners:
the quality of the ordinary wine is such as to 
confine its consumption to the lowest orders of 
the (Brazilian) population; and we accordingly 
find that a demand for it has arisen at Rio de 
Janeiro, where it is consumed by the slaves 
from being cheaper than the wines of 
Portugal.
They went on to predict that improvement in the quality 
of Cape wines would not necessarily cause a change in 
brand loyalties or consumption patterns:
In South America and the Brazils52 any future
49 ibid.: Appendices 6 and 8, pp. 42-3; 290-1.
50 Rush, Aspects of the growth of trade, Table VI, p.
26.
51 Cape of Good Hope, Report, 1829, p. 19/267.
52 Up to the nineteenth century, the country was often 
referred to in the plural.
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demand will be limited to the consumption of 
the lowest classes of the population, and it is 
not probable that even the Cape wine of better 
quality will supersede the habitual preference 
which the wines of Spain and Portugal have 
obtained there, and some of which are sold at 
lower prices even than the wines of the Cape.33
Although records are not consistent, small amounts of 
wine continued to be exported from the Cape to Brazil.
The 1870 figures specifically record an unspecified 
amount of Constantia wine consigned to Brazil.54
4. THE IMPACT OF BRITISH HEGEMONY
The inhabitants of South Africa and Latin America were 
affected by the assertion of British power in different 
ways. In Latin America, the established settler societies 
were able to turn the shift in global power to assert 
their own claims to independence from Spain and Portugal. 
Britain had assisted the independence movements 
financially and reaped the reward through ousting Spain, 
Portugal and France as important trading powers in the 
region. It established its predominance as the Latin 
American region's most powerful trading partner and 
provider of capital.
At the Cape, colonial settler society was, despite the 
limited establishment of "patriotic" movements, too weak 
and dependent to assert itself against the colonising 
power. Resistance to British rule took the form of 
northward migration by a section of the settler 
community, in search of new sovereign territory in the 
interior. Ultimately the terms on which settler society 
was granted independence was the unification, on British 
terms, of the four settler colonies in South Africa,
53 Cape of Good Hope, Report, 1829, p. 20/268.
54 Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book, 1870: p. ***
119
after two independent Boer republics had been defeated in 
a bitter war at the end of the century.
In an age where political considerations were no 
obstacle, it is important to analyse what inhibited 
trade.
In the early part of the century, sailing ships on the 
way to the east tended to stop both in Brazil and at the 
Cape, so there was no shortage of opportunity for 
commerce. In the later steam era, one might have imagined 
it to be easier for the two sides of the Atlantic to have 
more economic contacts, especially since steam reduced 
the comparative advantage in transport. This suggests 
that technology was not the dominant factor in the 
relationship, and, of itself, could not be inhibiting 
trade.
The assertion of British power on both sides of the 
Atlantic did little to integrate the respective 
components. Latin America and Africa were treated 
separately by different sections of the British 
government bureaucracy. The main commodity flows between 
the continents consisted of the slave trade, which, over 
time, Britain did its best to suppress in order to stamp 
out what it regarded as unfair competition with its West 
Indian colonies. Very little was done to stimulate other 
forms of commerce between Africa and Latin America. The 
British failed to see any benefits in developing such 
links, and as a result, made no attempts to establish any 
financial or commercial infrastucture which might service 
them. Raw materials produced on either side of the 
Atlantic continued, for the most part, to flow northward. 
The nature of the international political economy, 
dominated by Europe at this time, was reflected in the 
radial links to other continents. The triangular links 
had become obsolete with the end of slavery.
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Any trade that took place did so despite the dominant 
trend. Apart from small quantities of local produce, 
principally wine, the Cape had little of value to offer 
Latin America. The balance of trade which evolved during 
the last century was to the advantage of Latin America, 
with Brazil being the major beneficiary. However, as we 
are about to see in more detail, the turn of the century 
saw the rise to prominence of an unprecedented wave of 
Argentine imports to South Africa.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE MEAT OF WAR: ARGENTINA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONFLICT, 1899-1907
It is important to recall that the ostensible motive for 
Sir Home Popham's assault on Buenos Aires in 1806 was his 
perception of the value of the Platine basin as a source 
of supply for the British at the Cape of Good Hope. The 
unauthorised invasion, initially successful, was soon 
defeated, and the notion of Argentina as a source of 
supply did not materialise for the rest of the century, 
until, as Ferns states it, "the abundant opportunities of 
the Boer War" made it a feasible one.1
What were these "abundant opportunities" and how did they 
arise?
1. THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA
The war arose principally over the control of the gold 
mining areas in the Transvaal (then under the 
Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek) which fell outside the 
political sovereignty of the British.
Contending theories exist to explain the role of the
1 H S Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth 
century, Oxford: Clarendon, 1960, p. 23.
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mineowners in stimulating the war. On the one hand, the 
argument of historians like Blainey and Denoon is that 
the mines were, in general, owned by British subjects, 
who, in alliance with Rhodes at the Cape, preferred to 
engineer a situation of British control. The mining 
magnates believed that British rule would be more in 
harmony with the interests of mining capital than would 
the Kruger government with its traditional agrarian 
orientation. They were confident that "through the unkind 
economic environment which Kruger's policies had created, 
the high profits which their bold investment would 
normally have won were being converted into losses".2 
This view has been challenged by Kubicek, amongst others, 
who argues that the "capitalist mechanisms most engaged 
in the industry were continental, that is French and 
German. The last thing the capitalists wanted or needed 
in 1899 was a war, certainly not one instigated and won 
by the British (whose) presence Europe's financiers found 
distinctly unwelcome."3
Consensus exists, though, on the fact that the war was 
stimulated by the imperialist aims of the British High 
Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of the Cape, 
Alfred Milner, whose vision was a united South Africa 
under British rule. The mining camps had attracted a 
large community of uitlanders (aliens), largely British 
subjects, to whom the Boer authorities had resisted 
granting the franchise and other rights of citizenship. 
This gave the British what they regarded as sufficient 
cause to issue ultimata to president Paul Kruger. When 
the humiliating British conditions went unmet, 
hostilities broke out on 10 October 1899.
2 G Blainey, "Lost causes of the Jameson raid", Economic 
History Review 18, 2, August 1965, p. 359.
3 Robert V Kubicek, Economic imperialism in theory and 
practice: the case of South African gold mining finance, 1886- 
1914, Durham: Duke University Press, 1979, p. 204.
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The British fought the war largely by conventional 
European military means, while the Boer republics made 
extensive use of mounted guerrilla bands (commandos). The 
British despatched large armed columns into the interior, 
and, despite some serious defeats and reverses, they were 
able to capture the Boer capitals of Bloemfontein and 
Pretoria by June 1900, and to end the Boer sieges of 
Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith. From then onward a 
policy of attrition against the recalcitrant Boer forces 
was mounted. Farms were burnt in a scorched earth policy, 
crops and livestock were destroyed or confiscated, women 
and children were herded into abysmally unsanitary 
concentration camps, and large numbers of ex-combatant 
captives were exiled to remote British colonies. By 
mid-1902 the Boer forces were exhausted and ready to sue 
for peace.4
PROVISIONING
The British and Imperial armies in South Africa amounted 
to a total of 4 50,000 troops during the war.5 Their 
columns travelled large distances into the interior. They 
required constant remounts and replenishment of food 
supplies. In addition, the British army was responsible 
for provisioning the many concentration camps, whose 
inmates numbered a further 200,000 at the war's end,
80,000 of whom were Africans.
To add to the problems of provisioning, there was a 
severe wartime shortage of local livestock due to the 
rinderpest, which had swept southwards across the Zambezi
4 For more detailed accounts, see Thomas Pakenham, The Boer 
War, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979, and Peter Warwick 
(ed.), The South African War, London, 1980.
5 256,000 British regulars, 109,000 British volunteers,
53,000 South African colonists, and 31,000 from Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. Enumerated in E Holt, The Boer War, London, 
1958, p. 293.
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from 1896.
According to the prime minister of the colony, stock 
losses between 1 June 1897 and 31 May 1898 amounted to
410,000 cattle and 1,895,000 sheep, with considerably 
more lost in the rest of the sub-continent.6
During the first part of the war, contractors had to 
resort to imports of Australian beef and New Zealand 
lamb. But, as the war progressed, so did a series of 
droughts in the antipodes, and the costs of importing 
Australasian meat became prohibitive.
The fear of the rinderpest and the potential of further 
livestock disease and human contagion also meant that the 
army columns preferred not to travel accompanied by herds 
of cattle ready for the slaughter. For provisioning the 
War Office turned to private companies who had invested 
in the new technology of meat freezing and could contract 
to provide supplies on a regular basis within reasonable 
access from any railhead.7
Provision of frozen meat was seen to obviate a number of 
problems. There was an absence of the filth and disease 
associated with large live herds, no disease-breeding 
offal in the makeshift battlefield slaughterhouses, no 
need for feed, water, herders and butchers, and the 
likelihood that the frozen beef would taste better than 
that produced from scrawny cattle exhausted from 
following the armies and from insufficient grazing.
6 S P Cronwright-Schreiner, speech, Cape of Good Hope, 
Debates in the House of Assembly, 1st session, 10th parliament, 
28 November 1898, p. 322.
7 This section owes much to the work of Simon G Hanson, 
historiographer of the Argentine meat industry, and especially 
ch. V of his Argentine meat and the British market: chapters in 
the history of the Argentine meat industry, Stanford University 
Press, 1938.
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Cold storage facilities were pioneered by Combrinck & 
Company, one of the oldest supply houses in South Africa, 
only a few years before the outbreak of war.
Founded by J A Combrinck, a prominent Cape Town butcher, 
the firm took on David de Villiers Graaff, Combrinck*s 
11-year-old nephew, in 1870. As he matured, Graaff 
developed a technical and economic interest in the meat 
trade and became Combrink's trusted associate. Together 
with his brother Jacobus, who had joined the firm in 
1875, Graaff took over Combrincks after his uncle's 
retirement.
Changes in technology meant that from 1873, chilling 
processes were employed to help meat survive long 
journeys. It is no accident that the technology was first 
implemented in Australia, enabling it to develop the UK 
as its principal market. Realising the potential of using 
this technology in South Africa, Graaff paid 
inspirational visits to Smithfield market, abbatoirs in 
Britain and meat packing plants in Chicago.
On his return he set up links with the Union and Castle 
shipping lines to establish the first cold storage 
company in South Africa. Union and Castle introduced 
shipping services which included cold storage holds for 
the use of Combrincks.8
Cold storage depots were established by the firm in Cape 
Town, Durban and Johannesburg. In May 1899, the South 
African Supply and Cold Storage Company was founded to 
take over the interests of Combrinck and Company.
It was the South African Company which successfully
8 Basil Leverton, "David P de Villiers Graaff", Dictionary 
of South African biography, vol. 2, Pretoria: Human Sciences 
Research Council, 1972, p. 267-8.
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tendered in October for the contract to provide the War 
Office with meat at the rate of lid per pound (4.6p/lb). 
At the War Office, Colonel W D Richardson had taken 
charge of supplies and transport for the army. It was he 
who had been persuaded of the advantages of the Company 
providing frozen meat in place of cattle on the hoof.
Richardson had discovered that on the outbreak of the war 
local supplies were being rapidly consumed by the civil 
population so that everything was at a famine price; 
merchants in the ports had let their stocks run down; 
rinderpest had eliminated 50 to 75 percent of the herds; 
thousands of trek oxen would be needed for transportation 
and thus would be unavailable for food; the Dutch farmers 
were not inclined to help feed hostile soldiers; and 
meat, both locally killed and frozen, was selling at Is. 
per pound (5p/lb).9
The South African Company was initially able to land 
frozen meat from Australasia at a wholesale price of 3 to 
3%d (1.25-1.45p). It risked being able to cover its 
distribution costs within the framework of lid. No army 
in the field had ever before been supplied with frozen 
meat. The infrastructure for delivery would have to be 
improved: storage facilities at Cape Town enlarged, a 
network of inland depots established, and refrigerator 
wagons hired from the railways. Even so, the Company 
calculated that 8d was an excessive premium for delivery, 
and in a patriotic gesture lowered its price on frozen 
meat to 9d per pound (3.75p/lb).
The contract system was highly profitable to the Company, 
which successfully tendered for the provision of meat 
until 31 March 1902. The chairman announced that "the 
results were unique in the history of industrial
9 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Papers 1903, Cd 1790, 
Questions 3367-3403.
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companies" - the shareholders had received more than 
their original investments within a period of 18 months 
and the Company had accumulated over £1 million in 
reserves.10
RENEWAL OF THE CONTRACT
These huge profits persuaded the War Office to call for 
new tenders in the hope that other companies might be 
able to offer a more competitive deal. Companies were 
canvassed as widely afield as England, Australia and New 
Zealand. In South Africa there were several new 
possibilities, including registered subsidiaries of the 
South African Company, as well as some independent firms.
One of the latter was De Beers, the diamond monopoly 
controlled by former Cape prime minister, Cecil John 
Rhodes. In the Kimberley mines, De Beers had pioneered 
the labour compound, a series of enclosed hostels in 
which migrant workers subsisted at the company*s behest. 
The company took on the task of feeding its 10,000 
workers in the hostels. Pre-war meat prices had been 
extremely high, partly due to herds being decimated by 
rinderpest. Rhodes also pinned blame for the high prices 
on the South African Company's exercise of a monopoly in 
the provision of chilled beef. In a debate in the 
Legislative Assembly, Rhodes urged the government to 
provide grants to municipalities for the setting up of 
cold storage depots in the interior and increasing the 
capacity of the storage available at the ports. He urged 
that "the question of spending (only) £50,000 in dealing 
with the growing evil of the monopoly in frozen meat was 
not too much." 11
10 The Financial News, 31 October 1901.
11 C J Rhodes, speech in Cape of Good Hope, Debates in the 
House of Assembly, 1st session, 10th parliament, 1898, p. 328.
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Realising that the government planned no action against 
the monopoly, Rhodes assessed that it would be in De . 
Beers' interests to establish its own cold storage depots 
in Cape Town and Kimberley.12 The monopoly offered 
imported Australian frozen meat at lOd and lid/lb, yet 
Rhodes knew that he could trade directly with the 
Australian suppliers and buy frozen carcasses at 
2.62 5d/lb. With added duty of 2d, the price would amount 
to 4.625d/lb, a saving of at least 53.75%.
Rhodes's competitors must have relished the irony of the 
colony's most unashamed monopolist fulminating against 
the monopoly power of the South African Company and its 
government support. Rhodes gave orders at the end of 1898 
for De Beers to enter the cold storage business.13
With its captive market on the diamond mines, the 
Kimberley plant of De Beers Cold Storage soon proved 
profitable, with the Cape Town plant breaking even only 
in 1900. Some business was won away from the Graaff 
brothers, and gradually local sources of meat replaced 
Australian imports.
Disgraced, and forced out of prime ministerial office in 
the aftermath of the Jameson raid, Rhodes retained his 
substantial business interests during the war. These 
included the De Beers company, which had amalgamated many 
of the Kimberley diamond claims and had become one of the 
colony's wealthiest firms.14 Rhodes had become impressed
12 Debates, 1898, p. 386.
13 Robert I Rotberg with Miles F Shore, The founder: Cecil 
Rhodes and the pursuit of power, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988, pg. 643.
14 See Robert Vicat Turrell, Capital and labour on the 
Kimberley diamond fields, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987, and William Hewlett Worger, South Africa's city of 
diamonds: mine workers and monopoly capital in Kimberley, New
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by the huge profits which the South African Company had 
made from the army meat contract.
The key directors of the Company, the Graaffs, were 
prominent supporters of the largely loyalist Afrikaner 
Bond, the opposition party in the Cape legislature. They 
were pillars of civic respectability: David de Villiers 
Graaff had been mayor of Cape Town in the period 1891-2, 
coterminous with Rhodes's premiership. Yet Rhodes felt 
cynical about their loyalty and accused them of being 
"pocket patriots" with pro-Boer sympathies.15 This type 
of pronouncement may have been part of a ploy to ensure 
that the South African Company lose its military 
contract.
Rhodes's anger, tempered with some admiration, was based 
less on blind jingoism than on resentment of the 
Company's monopoly position in the industry. Given his 
assessment of the depletion of the herds as the result of 
disease and war, he predicted that the demand for frozen 
meat would remain substantial for some time after the 
war's end. He urged De Beers to expand its frozen meat 
business in order to be able to offer meat to the market 
at reasonable prices.
The result of Rhodes's vision was the formation in 
February 1902 of the Imperial Cold Storage Company.
Having sold its cold storage installations to Imperial,
De Beers became the principal shareholder in the new 
firm. Imperial made a successful bid for the new army 
contract in February 1902, defeating an Australian 
competitor, M Bergl, as well as the South African 
Company, with which it merged six months later.
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.
15 See Rhodes, South Africa, 23 February 1901, p. 432.
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Until this time, Australia had been the principal 
supplier of meat (to the value of over £50 million in 
1901). The problem of drought on that continent was 
beginning to raise stock prices. Since 1892 Australia had 
experienced increasingly bad years, with major herd 
losses of sheep (25%) and cattle (19%) in the worst year, 
1902, alone. Australia could no longer serve its three 
major markets, Britain, South Africa and the Philippines, 
as before. Its British market was particularly badly 
eroded for most of the first decade of the twentieth 
century.
It was for these reasons that the "abundant 
opportunities" provided by Argentina came into play.
ARGENTINA'S ROLE
The meat industry in Argentina was well established, 
accepting substantial British investment from the 1890s. 
It was abreast of the new technology and could provide 
frozen meat on a reasonably large scale for the world 
market. Its produce was cheap, and, for South Africa, 
arrivals were speedier, and freight costs significantly 
lower than those from the Commonwealth Pacific.
Records of imports originating from Argentina reflect 
the degree to which that country profited during the boom 
years of the Anglo-Boer War. Argentina was well placed to 
fulfil these requirements and supplied large quantities 
of cavalry and pack horses, cattle and sheep, frozen 
meat, fodder and dairy produce.
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TABLE 4.1
IMPORTS TO THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE (*) FROM ARGENTINA
(IN E'OOOS)
1880 19.6
1899 76.7
1900 257.4
1901 350.8
1902 1,347.8
1903 1,814.8
1908 148.9
1910-14 76.0 average p.a.
Sources: Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book, 1880; 
Statistical Register, 1890, 1900, 1903, 1908;
Union of South Africa, Official Year Book 7, 1910-14.
(*) From 1910 the statistics are for the whole of the 
Union of South Africa.
Despite strong pro-Boer sentiment prevailing in 
Argentina, the substantial British investment and the 
presence of a large British merchant class in that 
country facilitated the development of trade.16
From early on in the war Argentina provided large numbers 
of horses and mules. A British Remount Commission 
remained for some time in the republic with the object of 
purchasing horses for South Africa. During the first ten 
months 24,008 horses were sold to the British for a sum 
of £6 each.17
In South Africa, the mounted soldiers found most of these 
horses of unacceptable quality. In response to one 
report by the 'Special Commissioner' in South Africa of 
The Sportsman, who had written that " (w)e are now 
remounted on Argentines, and as most of them have never 
had a saddle on their backs before, we have had some
16 Roger Gravill, The Anglo-Argentine connection, 1900-1939, 
Boulder: Westview, 1985, esp. ch. 3.
17 The South American Journal, 29 September 1900, p. 342.
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rough work breaking them," an Anglo-Argentine breeder W H
Langley retorted:
I was in the Argentine Republic when most of 
those horses were purchased; 500 of them were 
selected at my estancia in my presence. The 
remount officers were most particular in seeing 
each horse ridden, and if he was not quiet, or 
did not obey the rein, he was rejected... the 
Argentine horse is noted for being surefooted, 
and for his capacity of doing work in what he 
can pick up for himself.18
Other breeders concurred that the animals were of 
inferior quality, but placed the blame on the Remount 
Commission which had been reluctant to pay the prices of 
the better animals.
Nevertheless, of half a million horses used during the 
war, 25,000 originated from Argentina. The mules served 
to increase the stock of draft animals in South Africa, 
and forage imports were also considerable.
The boom experienced by Argentine producers was reflected
in the remarks of a patriotic British merchant in
Rosario, a major port on the Parana river:
The war in South Africa has affected many 
interests, and opened up many new markets, and 
here in Rosario it has been the means of 
developing an extensive and lucrative 
business... If you take a walk along the 
Central Railway line here you will see on the 
edge of the barranca or cliff, from which they 
are shot down into the steamers in the River 
Parana below, thousands of bales of compressed 
alfalfa (lucerne) in endless stacks covered 
with tarpaulins, each stack being bigger than 
an average English haystack, while countless 
trucks are waiting in the sidings to be 
unloaded. This is what our cavalry horses in 
the Transvaal live on. One steamer left 
yesterday for Durban, with a full cargo of this 
alfalfa, and three others are expected 
immediately to load, and one firm alone will 
ship 50,000 bales during the next month. The 
sight is one to stir the imagination of an
18 The South American Journal, 24 November 1900, p. 569-70.
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Englishman, and to gladden the heart of a 
Central Argentine Railway shareholder.19
It was not only Englishmen whose hearts were gladdened as 
a result of the boom. The trade with South Africa had 
taken up the slack created when Britain closed its ports 
to Argentine cattle on 30 April 1900 after a 
foot-and-mouth scare. The three Argentine meat-packing 
houses or frigorificos were in a oligopsonistic position 
vis-a-vis the meat farmers and fatteners. All three of 
these companies made large profits during the boom, 
despite the temporary loss of the traditional British 
market. Consistently high prices received by the 
Argentine trade prompted the British meat industry to 
press for the reopening of British ports to Argentine 
meat, but it was not until February 1903 that this was 
finally realised.
Argentine officials expressed great optimism that meat
exports to South Africa might continue well after the
war. In a newspaper interview for El Tiempo in Buenos
Aires in 1902, the Argentine consul-general in Cape
Town20 predicted good market possibilities for frozen
meat, livestock and grains. Senor Storni also referred to
the necessity of chartering entire vessels, which "added
to the responsibility to be incurred", and went on to
declare that
There will always remain the lost journey one 
way, since, as regards vessels returning to 
Argentina, South Africa can send nothing the 
Argentines do not export themselves.
When South Africa has recovered her trade and 
is able to export to England, she will no 
longer require our produce. For the moment she 
wants everything, pretty well, and Argentina 
can supply her more cheaply than, and 
efficiently as, the Australian colonies.
19 The South American Journal XLVII, 27 October 1900, p. 458.
20 Argentina had established a consulate in Cape Town in the 
mid-1880s. See Great Britain, Colonial Office List, 1885-6.
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Consequently there can be no doubt that 
Argentina will, practically, have the South 
African business in her own hands for some 
years to come. All that is wanted is the 
conclusion of the war to set about the new 
trade in earnest; till that happy consummation 
be a fact, all that can be done is to organise 
preliminaries and prepare for the business in 
prospect.21
Indeed, the key years, as reflected in Table 4.1 above, 
were 1902-3, when the peak of the live animal trade was 
reached. In figures, 172,085 sheep, 12,683 cattle, 63,243 
mules, and 12,733 horses were shipped from Argentina to 
South Africa. Between 1902 and 1906, 132,888 tons of 
frozen meat were also imported.22
The profitability of the meat trade, and the optimistic 
predictions that it would continue after the end of 
hostilities, prompted the Imperial Cold Storage company 
to set up a plant inside Argentina, situated at the port 
of La Plata.23 It was not until 1904 that the La Plata 
plant began to export to South Africa.
Soon after the end of the war, the Argentine Minister of 
Agriculture made arrangements for a regular monthly cargo 
service to South African ports. Although livestock and 
cereals were shipped at market freight rates, the 
Minister sought to diversify the articles exported by 
offering free passage for goods "for which the Minister 
thinks it is desirable to create a market in South 
Africa". The government decided to employ the Pampa and 
another national ship or merchant steamer for the 
service. To resolve the problem identified by Sr Storni, 
that of the empty return passage, the Argentine
21 The South American Journal, LII, 26 April 1902, p. 465.
22 Republica Argentina, Anuario de la direccion general de 
estadlstica, Buenos Aires, 1896-1913.
23 Review of the River Plate, 22 November 1902, p. 897.
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government sought to offer cheap passages to prospective 
Afrikaner immigrants.24 We shall soon examine the 
context and consequences of this migration.
DECLINE OF THE MEAT TRADE
Despite the unprecedented boom, there was a rapid decline 
in the imports of frozen meat after 1903. With the end of 
the war in May 1902, the bulk of the fighting forces were 
repatriated. The economic recession which followed was 
accompanied by a fall in the demand for imported frozen 
beef and mutton. Gradually, with the agrarian 
reconstruction which was initiated under Milner, the 
local herds were rebuilt. From 1906, the application of 
import duties, with preference of a farthing (^d or
0.104p) given to Australian meat, put a severe break on 
the Argentine frozen meat trade.
TABLE 4.2
POST-WAR IMPORTS OF FROZEN MEAT TO SOUTH AFRICA
(metric tons) (£m)
1903 80,695 177.9
1906 35,290 77.8
1910 2,585 5.7
Source: Simon G Hanson, Argentine meat, p. 128-9, volume
figures converted from imperial measures.
Given the decline of the recently booming South African 
market and the reopening of the steady, but less 
profitable, British market, the La Plata company 
gradually switched the destination of its exports. With 
this shift there was little point to Imperial Cold 
Storage retaining its interests in Argentina. In 1907 the 
company realised the assets of the La Plata packing
24 The South American Journal LII, 21 June 1902, p. 697.
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company from their sale to a major Chicago meat firm, 
Swift and Co.25 United States capital was beginning to 
move into the lucrative Argentine beef industry after 
many years of British domination.26
South African capital in the industry found it difficult 
to compete on world markets, but was increasingly able to 
dominate the local market. Imperial Cold Storage not only 
grew into the most prominent company in its sector, but 
also managed to win major contracts on the Witwatersrand 
gold mines once these had reopened after the war.27 The 
expansion of the local cold storage industry was remarked 
upon in the Cape Argus, which indicated that a hundred 
freezing machines had been installed in South Africa at 
the time of the Cape Town Industrial Exhibition of 
1904-5.28
Another index of the end of the boom was the crash of the 
Sansinena Distributing Syndicate. The Syndicate had been 
formed in 1906 as a South African subsidiary of the 
Compania Sansinena de Carnes Congeladas (Sansinena Frozen 
Meat Co.), one of the three original frigorlficos. But 
the £50,000 investment was ill conceived, because the 
depth of the post-war recession had been underestimated. 
Critchell and Raymond describe how "this concern ran 
shops in the chief centres of South Africa, but the 
depression which hung over these colonies must have set
25 United Kingdom, Report of the Departmental Committee on 
combinations in the meat trade, Parliamentary Papers, 1909 (XV) , 
p. 15.
26 Gravill, The Anglo-Argentine connection, pp. 70-77.
27 See Robert Morrell, "Farmers, Randlords and the South 
African state", Journal of African History 27, 1986, pp. 517-9 
et seqq,, for an analysis of the growth of and challenges to 
Imperial Cold Storage in the Witwatersrand market of the early 
1920s.
28 Cape Argus, 11 January 1905.
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the distributing company a heavy task."29 Indeed within 
two years the syndicate had failed, and in 1908 the 
investment was "written off as a dead loss".30 Thus an 
early example of the export of South African capital 
failed. It was not yet the era in which the South was 
developing its own successful transnational corporations.
Storni's prediction had proved correct. The war had not 
led to enduring trade relations. The boom had been 
occasioned largely by metropolitan and not South African 
requirements. Rhodes and the Combrinck company before him 
had certainly reaped benefits from the industry, yet 
without the military contract, the local market in the 
post-war era of recession proved too weak to support an 
elaborate meat importation policy. Imperial Cold Storage 
was also too weak to compete on world markets with the 
growing number of vertically integrated United States 
entrants into the frozen and chilled beef industry in 
Argentina.
The boom had therefore collapsed in the aftermath of the 
war, and yearly imports from Argentina between the World 
Wars "seldom approached £500,000 and were generally much 
lower, while exports from South Africa in return remained 
minimal.31
The relationship between war and trade is one that bears 
some exploration. Wars create new patterns of mass 
consumption and hence production, along with new patterns 
of scarcity. Opportunities are created for the 
centralision and concentration of capital, through the 
issuing of state contracts, the formation of new
29 Critchell and Raymond, A history of the frozen meat trade, 
London: Constable, 1912, pp. 82-3.
30 Hanson, Argentine meat and the British market, p. 129 n.
31 Keeble, Commercial relations, p. 74.
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syndicates and the emphasis on war production. Financial 
activities are dedicated to the more centralised war 
economy. Government contracts are able to provide a 
platform on which the successful tendering company can 
build economies of scale and obtain finance. Trade has to 
be minimised, and conserved for goods essential to the 
war effort.
Capital needs to be extremely flexible to survive the 
ending of the war economy. Argentina was unable to secure 
any advantages for itself in the depressed post-war 
market in South Africa. Instead it looked longingly to 
the reopening of the British market to its beef.
The waning trade with South Africa seemed of little 
importance to Argentina. Having fuelled the bellies of 
the armies which had attacked Afrikaner sovereignty, now 
it was found convenient to succour the vanquished by 
providing them with new land in the wastes of Patagonia.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE AFRIKANER MIGRATION TO ARGENTINA, 1902-6
1. EXAMINING THE MYTHS
In the aftermath of the South African War, a few hundred 
Afrikaner families abandoned their homeland and chose to 
settle abroad. Many of these emigrants settled in nearby 
African countries such as the Rhodesias, Kenya, German 
East Africa, and Angola, where there had been a Boer 
colony since 1880. A minority was attracted to settle in 
Argentina. Almost all of those destined for Argentina 
settled in the Territory of Chubut [see map 3] in the 
heart of Patagonia, in and around the port of Comodoro 
Rivadavia.
The Afrikaner colony in Chubut was to form the most 
enduring cultural link between South Africa and Argentina 
in the twentieth century, and one which framed the 
disposition towards mutual economic, diplomatic and 
cultural ties. In the popular mind of many white South 
Africans, and especially the Afrikaner community, the 
country’s relations with Latin America are still 
associated with the historical existence of this colony.
National minorities have often played a part in 
strengthening or complicating relations between nation­
states. Their culture links them to their country of
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origin; their political power may be mobilised to lobby 
for better relations, more aid, military support, or the 
protection of their own rights as a minority. Politicians 
in the country of origin may, in turn, use the existence 
of the community in the country of destination to effect 
concessions, cultural exchanges, economic agreements or 
particular political settlements. Some examples include 
the US Jewish community, the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka 
appealing to the Indian government, Sudeten Germans in 
1938-9, and the Protestant community in Ireland.
In examining the Afrikaner colony in Chubut we need to 
ask not only how it came about, but also to what extent 
it was able to cement closer bonds between South Africa 
and Argentina.
Myths and ideological preconceptions about the foundation 
of the colony abound. Conventional explanations that the 
emigrants were seeking to evade British rule will be 
challenged. Undoubtedly, harsh experiences of martial law 
and of British policy during the war of 1899-1902 led to 
considerable disaffection. Yet the evidence shows that 
the overwhelming bulk of the emigrants had lived under 
British rule for a century and were longstanding 
residents of the Cape of Good Hope rather than the Boer 
republics.1
In this chapter it will be argued that the reasons for 
their emigration were only partly related to political 
disaffection with British rule and the outcome of the 
war. Rather, the reasons are to be found in communal 
strategies of resistance to likely land loss, 
urbanisation and ultimate proletarianisation in the
1 In this chapter the terms Boer and Afrikaner have 
been used interchangeably without pejorative intent.
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aftermath of the war.
Before putting forward this proposition, it is first 
necessary to examine the attractions of their 
destination, Patagonia. The chapter will go on to examine 
the extent of the emigration wave, and the social and 
economic conditions which engendered it. Finally it will 
assess the extent to which the existence of the community 
was able to strengthen ties between South Africa and 
Argentina.
2. PATAGONIA
Afrikaner settlement in Patagonia was the result of two 
intersecting sets of choices: that of the Argentine 
government seeking to populate Patagonia on the one hand, 
and that of the immigrants seeking new economic 
opportunities on the other.
Let us turn first to the motives of the Argentine 
government in extending its southern frontier south of 
the pampas, to cover the wilderness stretching across the 
three territories - Rio Negro, Chubut and Santa Cruz - 
which make up Patagonia.
Patagonia itself is named for the indigenous inhabitants 
whose collective nickname in Spanish, reputedly coined by 
Ferdinand Magellan in 152 0, was patagones - the people 
with big feet.2
The original Patagonians were the physically tall 
Tehuelche people who inhabited the southernmost third of 
what came to be Argentina, and relied on hunting and
2 Although see Chatwin's theory about the word 
deriving from Greek, in Bruce Chatwin, In Patagonia, 
London: Jonathan Cape, 1977, p.92.
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gathering for their economic survival. By the nineteenth 
century the region also contained Araucanians, an 
agrarian people of Chilean origin who expanded across the 
Andean cordillera into the pampas and then south into 
Patagonia. The Araucanians in Patagonia restricted their 
agrarian activities to horse-rearing, but in other 
respects became as nomadic as the Tehuelche people. In 
some areas there was intermarriage, and the blurring of 
ethnic and cultural boundaries.3
Patagonia was a wild and inhospitable region. Its winds
are legendary. The writer and Nobel laureate, Gabriel
Garcia Marquez, recalls their fierceness:
In Comodoro Rivadavia, in the extreme south of 
Argentina, winds from the south pole swept a 
whole circus away and the next day fishermen 
caught the bodies of lions and giraffes in 
their nets.
Is this an apocryphal tale? No, the author is explaining 
the origins of his magical realist style. He cites the 
example of the Patagonian winds to show that "everyday 
life in Latin America proves that reality is full of the 
most extraordinary things." 4
Extraordinary things also drew the attention of Charles
Darwin to the natural landscape of Patagonia.
In calling up the images of the past, I find 
the plains of Patagonia frequently cross before 
my eyes: yet these plains are pronounced by all 
most wretched and useless. They are 
characterised only by negative possessions; 
without habitations, without water, without 
trees, they support only a few dwarf plants.
Why then...have these arid wastes taken so firm 
a possession of my memory? Why have not the
3 Pierre Denis, La repuhlique Argentine: la mise en 
valeur du pays, Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1920, p. 
128.
4 Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza in conversation with Gabriel 
Garcia Marquez, The fragrance of guava, London: Verso, 
1982, pp.35-36.
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still more level, the greener and more fertile 
Pampas, which are serviceable to mankind, 
produced an equal impression? I can scarcely 
analyse these feelings: but it must be partly 
owing to the free scope of the imagination. The 
plains of Patagonia are boundless, for they are 
scarcely practicable, and hence unknown: they 
bear the stamp of having lasted for ages, and 
there appears no limit to their duration 
through future time.5
Darwin's portrait of Patagonia's transcendental bleakness 
was overstated. Despite the notion that settlement was 
"scarcely practicable", within 25 years of his visit to 
the Patagonian coastline, the region began to be 
incorporated into the national economy of Argentina.
To understand why and how this integration occurred 
requires a brief analysis of Argentina's place in the 
world economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
In the previous chapter we saw the increasing centrality 
of meat exports in the Argentine economy, particularly 
stimulated by the development of technologies of 
refrigeration. Grains and wool were also major export 
commodities.
The export orientation of the economy was largely due to 
the second industrial revolution in Europe in the late 
nineteenth century. The formation of a massive 
proletariat around the burgeoning urban areas of the 
North led to demands for food, beverages and textiles in 
unprecedented quantities. Europe looked to the New World 
- the Americas and Australasia - as a source of raw 
materials to enable it to fulfil its requirements for 
mass consumption.
It was in this context that Argentina became a major
5 Charles Darwin, Journal and remarks, p. 605.
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producer of beef, mutton, wool and grains. Its exports 
increased dramatically after the 1870s, doubling between 
1880 and 1889. The area under grain cultivation 
increased eightfold during the same period.6
Grain and animal production meant that the Argentine 
economy came to be reliant on extensive agriculture. 
Landholdings, offered as rewards for military or 
political loyalty to the state, were extremely large, and 
this ensured substantial wealth for the owners.7 As 
more and more land in the province of Buenos Aires and on 
the outlying pampas was brought under cultivation, it 
grew in value. New and marginal producers were forced 
towards the periphery of the arable zones.
Parallel to the expansion of agricultural production was 
the admission to Argentina of large numbers of European 
immigrants. Originally intended to fill the country*s 
growing rural labour requirements, immigration soon began 
also to boost the booming urban economy of Buenos Aires.8
Official policy favoured immigration to Argentina, and 
the Law of Immigration, N2 817 of 1876, facilitated it in 
a number of ways. The Law provided for the humane 
transport of potential immigrants, free temporary lodging 
in an immigrant's hostel in the capital, and free 
transport to the area of settlement after a few days in
6 James R Scobie, Revolution on the pampas: a social 
history of Argentine wheat: 1860-1910, Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1964.
7 Juan E Corradi, The fitful republic: economy, 
society and politics in Argentina, Boulder: Westview, 
1985, pp. 21-2 3; Jacinto Oddone, La burguesia 
terrateniente argentina, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 
1967 (first ed. 1930), chs. V and VI.
8 Scobie, Argentina: a city and a nation, pp.
160-188; Buenos Aires: plaza to suburb, 1870-1910, p. 11; 
Munck, Argentina, pp. 24-32.
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the hostel. Clothing, domestic effects, tools of the 
trade and a "sporting gun for each adult" could be 
brought in free of duty.9
TABLE 5.1
IMMIGRATION TO ARGENTINA, 1854-1900
Year No of immigrants Emigrants Net
mid-1854 -59 27,452 n/a n/a
1860-69 134,325 n/a n/a
1870-79 264,869 155,386 109,483
1880-89 1,020,907 173,554 847,353
890-99 928,000 552,172 375,828
1900-04 601,682 384,000 217,182
1905-07 781,796 324,687 457,108
Source: Albert B Martinez and M Lewandowski, The
Argentine in the twentieth century, London: Unwin, 1911, 
pp. 118-9; The Times Book on Argentina, p. 2 69.
The sharp net downturn in immigration in the 1890s can be 
ascribed to the recession resulting from the Baring Bros 
banking crash and the consequent loss of public credit. 
The further dwindling during the first half of the next 
decade has a more complex rationale. During this period 
there were bad harvests, high inflation of land, rent and 
commodity prices, a continued credit squeeze and the 
suspension of many important public and private projects. 
There was a general fear of frontier war breaking out, 
and insecurity due to neglect by authorities who had no 
plan to correct these problems.
With the arrival and settlement of the immigrants, 
agricultural land prices in Buenos Aires province and the 
remaining pampas region were driven up even further. The 
rapid expansion of the rail system assisted the boom in 
land prices. Gradually the pampas region to the north of 
Patagonia was settled, a process accompanied by military
9 The Times Book on Argentina, London: The Times, 
1927, pp. 265-72.
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TABLE 5.2
ARGENTINA: POPULATION GROWTH, 1869-1895
Census year Total Foreign born
1869 1 830 000 219 600 (=12%)
1895 4 044 911 1 014 500 (=25%)
Source: Second National Census, 1895 as quoted in Munck, 
Argentina: from anarchism to Peronism: workers, unions 
and politics, 1855-1985, London: Zed, 1987, p. 26.
defeat for the indigenous inhabitants. Once this had 
occurred, it was only a matter of time before the land 
boom necessitated further southward expansion. The 
Argentine government began to regard Patagonia, with its 
low population density, as a promising new site for 
European settlement.
This perspective was not one automatically arrived at, 
since the rudeness of the climate and fear of the 
indigenous people had made such settlement unthinkable. 
However, when a colony of Welsh settlers made a success 
of their Chubut sheep farms in the 1860s, this seemed 
proof to the authorities that European settlement in 
Patagonia was indeed feasible.10
Settlement of the almost unoccupied region became a 
political priority for the Argentine government when it 
was realised that Chile might preempt Argentina's claim 
to sovereignty over the region by populating Patagonia 
with Chilean nationals.
With the encroachment from the north of Europeans during 
the last third of the nineteenth century, the economic 
resources available to the indigenous people of Patagonia 
diminished. Fertile lands were alienated, and the guanaco
10 See Glyn Williams' definitive analysis, The Welsh 
in Patagonia: the state and the ethnic community, 
Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1991.
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- a member of the llama family and a major source of 
protein for indigenous people - was shot out by the 
colonists. Driven by growing poverty and land hunger, the 
Patagonians began a series of devastating military raids 
on the settlements of the European colonists. In one case 
during 1876, over 500 colonists and 300,000 cattle were 
captured by the Patagonians within 60 leagues of Buenos 
Aires.11
Constant raids led the governments of several European 
countries to place pressure on the government of 
Argentina to protect,their nationals. As shown in Table 
5.2, foreign nationals formed a growing proportion of the 
Argentine population. Many of them were placed in 
frontier settlements. For example, the British government 
demanded protection for its nationals after the raids on 
the Bahia Blanca settlement as well as those on the 
property of the Central Argentine Land Company at the end 
of 1872.12
Patagonia was thus a frontier region in two respects: 
firstly in that control on the ground was being contested 
by the indigenous peoples, and secondly, that it was an 
area adjacent to and sought after by the neighbouring and 
land-hungry Chilean republic.
The growing local and international pressures led the 
Argentine government to seek a military solution to the 
problem. Through a policy of aggression it hoped to 
eradicate the threat of the indigenous peoples to 
encroaching European settlement and to forestall any
11 David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982: from Spanish 
colonialism to the Falklands war, London: I B Taurus, 
1986, p. 154.
12 See Andrew Graham-Yooll, The forgotten colony: a 
history of the English-speaking communities of Argentina, 
London: Hutchinson, 1981, p. 185.
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Chilean occupation of the region.
Perpetuating the Darwinian notion of the empty terrain of 
Patagonia's "arid wastes", the destruction of the 
indigenous people by the federal Argentine army was 
subsequently and euphemistically entitled "The Conquest 
of the Desert".
Led by war minister General Julio A Roca, the campaign 
was marked by its brutality and resulted in genocide.
Five columns of troops converged on the Rio Negro in 
1879. Indigenous camps were raided, their inhabitants 
slaughtered, and survivors arrested and enslaved.
Bounties were placed on the heads of the Patagonians: for 
each male killed, a federal soldier received a prize of 
£1 awarded by estancieros (landowners). As proof, the 
troops had to display the bows of their adversaries.
Later on, more gruesome proof was demanded: the severed 
ears of the slaughtered Patagonian warriors.13
Roca's expedition had been financed by prior land sales 
in the newly conquered wilderness. These sales ensured 
that the traditional Argentine landholding patterns would 
be perpetuated in its southernmost territories. Through 
the sales, 8.5 million hectares passed into the ownership 
of 381 persons. In the share out of the spoils after the 
expedition was over, 541 officers and soldiers were 
granted a further 4.5 million hectares in 1885.14 Social 
relations in Patagonia would henceforth reflect the
13 Reginald Lloyd et al,, Twentieth century 
impressions of Argentina: its history, people, commerce, 
industries and resources, London: Greater Britain, 1911, 
quoted in Andrew Gra,ham-Yooll, The forgotten colony, p. 
185.
14 David Rock, Argentina 1516-1982, pp. 154, 179; 
Guillermo Gasio and Maria C San Romcin, La conquista del 
progreso, 1874-1880, Buenos Aires: La Bastilla, 1977, pp. 
120-129.
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overriding interests of the possessors of large 
landholdings and the sporadic resistance of the 
dispossessed.
Roca's expedition sealed off the passes across the Andes 
to prevent any future Chilean incursions into Patagonia. 
Reservations were created for the surviving indigenous 
people. Roca himself translated the glory achieved in his 
campaign into political currency: he ran successfully for 
president of the republic in 1880. His initial term of 
office lasted for six years, and he returned to the 
presidency for a further term in 1898.
Thus a key co-incidence fell into place. The man who had 
masterminded the conquest of the desert, and who saw the 
need to stimulate settlement in Patagonia, found himself 
exercising presidential power during the South African 
War. Not only did the war provide Argentina with a minor 
economic boom, but it also generated a group of 
dispossessed Afrikaners, who were used to sheepfarming 
under arid conditions in isolated regions, and who Roca 
and his ministers recognised as potential recruits for 
taming the wilderness of Patagonia.
3. ATTRACTING BOER SETTLERS
Stripped of its native inhabitants, the Territory of 
Chubut was sparsely populated by the turn of the century. 
In Buenos Aires, General Roca, the scourge of Patagonia, 
was again the incumbent in the presidential palace, the 
Casa Rosada. His second term of office ran from 1898 to 
1904. Acutely aware of the need to populate the 
southernmost parts of the country for fear of any Chilean 
incursions, Roca began to pay serious attention to the 
advice of his Minister of Agriculture, Wenceslao 
Escalante, who drew up laws to accelerate the
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colonisation of Patagonia.
Since the epoch of Bernardino Rivadavia, who created the 
National Immigration Commission in 1824, Argentina had 
attempted to attract a stable labour force for its 
agrarian-based economy. The Law of Immigration was 
eventually codified in 1876 (as Law N2 817), and with 
small modifications, still applied thirty years later to 
the arriving Afrikaners.
Escalante looked to the successes of the Welsh colony in 
the northern part of Chubut as a model of colonisation 
and settlement. He sought to attract similar 
self-contained communities to the area, assuming that, 
like the Welsh, their strong community ties would 
compensate for the lack of an adequate socio-economic 
infrastructure.
Some international sympathies existed for the plight of 
the republican Afrikaners who had stood up to British 
imperialism and became symbolic victims of British greed 
and duplicity.
The connections were made in Europe, where, after the 
conclusion of the war in South Africa, a number of Boer 
exiles had sought refuge. An Argentine delegation, 
visiting Portugal with a view to recruit settlers, was 
referred to the small Boer community in Lisbon.15
In turn, the delegation was persuaded to visit South 
Africa as part of a trade mission. It was comprised of a 
Senor Viedma and a Senor Green, both empowered to offer 
farmland to immigrants. Green, an Argentine of British 
extraction, and son of a former Minister of Agriculture,
15 For detail see G W J Ormonde, The Boers in Europe: 
a sidelight on history, London: Adam & Charles Black, 
1903.
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knew English, which assisted with communications. Once in 
South Africa, Viedma and Green were able to insert 
advertisements into local newspapers in Bloemfontein, 
Philipstown and Burgersdorp, and made contact with a 
number of rural clerics and politicians.16
In addition to the normal provisions of the Immigration 
Law of 1876, prospective Afrikaner settlers were further 
enticed by President Roca's offer of land in Patagonia. 
The new incentives were contained in a decree of April 
1902 which specified that one legua or league (2,500 
hectares of land, equivalent to 6,177.5 acres) be 
allocated to each family unit in an area along the coast 
north of the port of Comodoro Rivadavia, where 60 leagues 
had been reserved for the exclusive use of the South 
African settlers. The extensive size of the individual 
holdings was determined "so that the favourable and 
unfavourable accidents of the ground may be equitably 
distributed." 17
A quarter of the property would be granted free of charge 
to settlers agreeing to accept Argentine nationality at 
the end of two years' residence. The remaining land would 
be sold to the settlers at the price of one peso (Is 8d) 
per hectare plus a surveying fee of six centavos (Os 
1.2d). Alternatively the remaining land could be rented 
for renewable five-year leases at 150 pesos (£12.10.0) 
per annum.
Colonists were also required to fulfil the provisions of 
the Homestead Law. These included the personal settlement
16 Menendez, "La colonizacion Boer en la Patagonia", 
Boletin de la Academica Nacional de la Historia XLIII, 
1970, p. 5.
17 South American Journal, 31 May 1902, p. 611; Capt 
Mario Raul Chingotto, "Boer emigration to Argentina", 
Paratus, November 1971, pp. 29, 31.
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of the property, payment of the purchase price or lease 
in five annual installments, the planting of 100 trees 
and the introduction of 4 00 sheep or goats and 80 cattle 
to the property within the first two years. For its 
part, the government would arrange free transport not 
only for the settlers and their goods, but also limited 
amounts of livestock from Buenos Aires to their farms in 
Chubut. It would also exempt the Afrikaners from military 
duties.18
These generous terms were designed to attract a viable 
number of settlers to Patagonia. Let us now see what 
response they elicited.
4. THE FIRST TREK
Starting in 1902, four groups of settlers made their way 
to Patagonia. Group migration (the trek) had been a 
common phenomenon in Afrikaner settlement patterns. In 
the eighteenth century large extended family groups had 
moved from the vicinity of Cape Town into the interior of 
the colony of the Cape of Good Hope. In the late 1830s a 
number of parties of largely frontier settlers abandoned 
British jurisdiction at the Cape of Good Hope and 
ventured across the Orange and Vaal rivers and the 
Drakensberg range to found new states in those regions.
In the 1870s small groups had migrated across the 
Kalahari and Namibia and settled in Angola. Thus it was 
not unusual to find that decisions to migrate were taken 
by significant parts of a community rather than on the 
basis of individual family units.
18 A J Jacobs (pseud, ' n Domine) , Reisavonture onder 
die Boere in Argentinie, Pretoria: van Schaik, 2nd edn. 
1934, p. 173- 4; South American Journal, 31 May 1902, p. 
611; ibid., 15 November 1902, p. 542.
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The pioneering group reaching Patagonia did not, however, 
fit the classic pattern of a communal trek. It comprised 
in the main of ex-combatants who had fought for the Boer 
republics in the South African War, some with the 
commando under the leadership of General Christiaan de 
Wet. Not all were Afrikaners, and the majority spoke 
English, although Afrikaans was their lingua franca.
There were individuals of British, French, German, Irish, 
Italian and United States extraction, as well as a number 
of black servants. There were some family groups, but 
most of the seventy settlers were young men seeking 
fortune and adventure.
Louis Baumann, a Bloemfontein farmer, was the first 
settler to make his home in Patagonia, and was soon 
joined by others. He became something of a mouthpiece for 
the first group, which took up the allocated land 
situated north of Comodoro Rivadavia, as had been 
outlined in Roca1s offer. At this time the port itself 
consisted only of "65 buildings and 215 inhabitants”.19 
The Afrikaner settlement was therefore a significant 
addition to the area's population. In due course, local 
people referred to the settlers' land as Colonia Boera, 
the Boer colony.
One of the settlers later described his first impression
of the land as
painfully discouraging: bare ridges, with huge 
limestone rocks scattered around, threatening 
to tumble down. Yes, the coast was so 
unattractive that one might think that this 
part of the creation was still incomplete, and 
the bare mountains were heaps of sand which 
were left over when the Creator - with respect 
- had completed His task.20
19 Chingotto, "Boer emigration to Argentina", p. 31.
20 A J Jacobs ("'n Domine"), Reisavonture, p. 174. 
Own translation.
Despite the daunting landscape and stormy weather, the 
settlers established farms and built a road from their 
"model colony" to the port at Comodoro Rivadavia. Much of 
the road work was built by the women.
5. THE SECOND TREK
On a reconnaisance trip, Coenraad J N Visser, a rich 
farmer from Barkly East, was so impressed with the land 
allocated and the hospitality received in Chubut, that he 
returned to South Africa to stimulate further settlement. 
Drawing on personal networks in his native region in the 
north-eastern Cape, he was able to lead a group of thirty 
families (amounting to over 100 people) to Patagonia on 
the SS Cornwall in September-October 1903. Visser has 
been immortalised in that the coastal settlement within 
the new colony was officially named Puerto Visser, a name 
which still appears on Argentine maps.
Among the 1903 settlers was the family of Stoffel 
Myburgh, who had been a commandant of the Cape rebels 
during the war. Another participant was the Rev. Louis 
Petrus Vorster, predikant of the Gereformeerde Kerk in 
Burgersdorp in the north-eastern Cape between 1893 and 
1915. Vorster had been delegated to survey the prospects 
of settlement on behalf of interested parties in the 
Burgersdorp area.21
The original sixty farms were too small to cater to the 
needs of the new wave of settlers. Visser made approaches
21 See "Reisrapport van Ds L P Vorster, Ons Land, 26 
January, 6 February and 3 March 1904; G C P van der 
Vyfer, "Vorster, Louis Petrus", pp. 826-7 in Dictionary 
of South African Biography, Pretoria: Human Sciences 
Research Council, vol. Ill, 1977; P J T de Wet, 
Eeufees-gedenkboek Burgersdorp, 1846-1946, Burgersdorp: 
Stadsraad, 1946, pp. 228-30.
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to the Argentine government for a further allocation of 
land. In 1904, after he had held an interview with 
President Roca on the question of developing the 
Patagonian wool industry, four hundred farms were added 
to the already existing colony. In gratitude to the 
Argentine authorities the colony was renamed Colonia 
Escalante, after Roca's minister of agriculture, who had 
taken a special interest in the settlement. The 
additional land made it possible to recruit more 
immigrants from South Africa.
A popular Buenos Aires magazine, Caras y caretas,
commented on the arrival of the second group of settlers,
giving some insight into its own preoccupations with the
question of class composition:
The ships recently arrived from Cape Town and 
Durban brought many immigrants who have 
departed for Chubut to join the 3 0 odd families 
of compatriots living in Colonia Escalante.
This immigration is even more important as it 
is not limited to workers, including as it does 
persons so necessary for integration with our 
emerging population, persons like Dr Rudolph 
Krieger, a devoted physician and deserving 
patriot.22
Dr Krieger was a relative by marriage of President S P 
Kruger of the South African Republic. During the war in 
South Africa, he had fought at the battles of Spioenkop 
and Platrand against General Buller, and was taken 
prisoner in January 1902 despite having advanced under a 
white flag to seek medicine for the troops of General 
Louis Botha. He had subsequently been placed in a 
concentration camp, and after the war decided to 
emigrate. The enthusiasm of the writer in Caras y Caretas 
is misplaced: for the most part, immigrants were from the 
dispossessed tenant farmer class, and there were hardly 
any members of the liberal professions.
22 Caras y Caretas (Buenos Aires), 31 January 1904.
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6. THE THIRD TREK
At the end of 1905, by far the biggest group of settlers 
arrived. Its members had been prompted by further 
recruitment initiatives on the part of C J N Visser, who 
had made several return trips to South Africa for this 
purpose. Visser jointly led this expedition with Matthys 
Marthinus ("Martiens") Venter, who at the time was member 
of the Cape parliament for the Colesberg constituency, on 
the arid north-eastern edge of the colony bordering on 
the Orange Free State.
Venter's motives for making the move were different from 
those of the majority of the emigrants, who had been 
soldiers, disposessed farmers or tenant-farmers. The 
exceptional nature of his case is, nevertheless 
illuminating. It reveals the fissure between rhetorical 
and real reasons for emigration, which are often 
conflated by both writers and the trekkers themselves.
In the Legislative Assembly of the Cape of Good Hope, 
Martiens Venter had previously represented the Albert 
constituency, of which Burgersdorp was the administrative 
centre. In 1888 he left for Colesberg and soon became its 
parliamentary representative. He bought a trading store 
in nearby Philipstown. Politically he supported the 
Afrikaner Bond and its alliance with Rhodes, with whom he 
developed a deep political friendship. It was alleged 
that during parliamentary sessions Venter was more at 
home in Rhodes's mansion Groote Schuur than in his own 
lodgings.23 In 1894 he had even accompanied Rhodes on an 
expedition to newly-conquered Matabeleland, which lay 
north of the Limpopo. Infused with enthusiasm, Venter 
returned to the Cape and held a series of public meetings 
which were aimed to attract farmers to settle in the 
territory chartered to Rhodes's British South Africa
23 See biography in the London-based journal South 
Africa 74, 15 June 1907, p. 751.
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Company.
Having been exposed for engineering an abortive coup 
against Kruger, known as the Jameson raid, in 1895,
Rhodes lost the confidence of his allies in the Afrikaner 
Bond, and had to forfeit the premiership of the Cape. 
Despite misgivings about the raid, Venter remained loyal 
to Rhodes. He represented the interests of the British 
South Africa Company in London in giving evidence the 
parliamentary Select Committee on British South Africa.24 
This public alignment with Rhodes proved highly unpopular 
with Venter's political colleagues in the Afrikaner Bond. 
At its Malmesbury congress it denounced him as 
unrepresentative of the Dutch point of view and voted £10 
on a cable to the Select Committee in London. His support 
for Rhodes also alienated his constituents and cost him 
the Colesberg seat in the 1898 elections.25
Venter's anti-Kruger sentiments did not prevent him, once 
the war had broken out, from assisting former 
constituents who held republican sympathies. Those who 
took up arms were treated as traitors to the crown under 
Martial Law. At times Venter attempted to intercede with 
the Martial Law administrators, and for his pains was 
banished from Philipstown as undesirable, detained, and 
placed on trial for high treason in Kimberley. Defended 
by advocate Henry Burton, who was later to become a 
cabinet minister, he was set free after an exhausting 
trial.
His wartime record reconciled him to his former
24 See Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. 
Select Committee on British South Africa. Proceedings of 
the committee and minutes of evidence, London: HMSO, 13 
July 1897, pp. 123-4; 128-134.
25 T R H Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond: the history 
of a South African political party, 1880-1911, Cape Town: 
Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 171.
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constituents, who returned him to parliament in 1903.
In a sense Venter embodied the dilemmas of those 
Afrikaners who had supported British imperialism, on the 
one hand sharing and participating in Rhodes's dreams of 
imperial conquest, on the other hand disgusted at the 
realisation that the conquest encompassed his own people, 
who had formerly been in partnership with the conquerors. 
Even after Rhodes's death in 1902, Venter remained 
embittered. Contemporary biographers saw this as the 
reason for his departure for Argentina. More recently it 
has been suggested that the contradictions of his own 
position and a desire to distance himself from past 
collaboration with imperial interests were the underlying 
causes.26
Given the deep roots of both Venter and Visser in the
communities of the north-eastern Cape, as well as the
active recruitment by Viedma and Green in the local
press, it was no surprise that the bulk of the 320
emigrants in the 1905 group originated from the
Burgersdorp and Philipstown areas. In addition there was
the influence of Rev L P Vorster after his return to
Burgersdorp from Patagonia in 1903. One of his
parishioners later recalled Vorster's descriptions of
Chubut and the province of Neuquen in which he spoke
of a rich land to the west of Comodoro 
Rivadavia. He painted for us a verbal picture 
of a land with rivers, wonderful forests, 
beautiful and attractive. At Neuquen the apples 
grow wild, he said. He strongly advised us to 
trek, but not to live in the vicinity of 
Comodoro Rivadavia.27
26 See Venter's obituary in Ons Land, 14 May 1907; L 
J Coetsee, "M M Venter - zijn loopbaan", Ons Land, 23 May 
1907; De Bruyn, Die kerklike lewe, 1974, pp. 20-23; and 
Rotberg, The founder, p. 423.
27 P H Henning, 'n Boer in Argentinie, p. 3. Own 
translation.
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These descriptions of a rural idyll contributed to the 
decision of many Burgersdorp families to make the 
commitment to a new life in Latin America. They ignored 
the advice of Advocate Burton that Rhodesia would be a 
better bet as a destination. Burton claimed that 
"Argentina is a foreign country with a foreign language 
and a foreign religion, because it is a Roman Catholic 
country and the people there have customs different to 
your own." 28 His approaches to the prospective 
emigrants proved to be in vain. Over one hundred citizens 
of the district travelled together on the ship Highland 
Fling, along with over two hundred from other areas. In 
the following year another forty immigrants joined the 
earlier groupings in Chubut.
Yet the favourable depictions of the agricultural 
potential of cheap and plentiful land in Argentina could 
not on their own have motivated all these migrations.
7. REJECTION OF BRITISH RULE
What were the underlying reasons which prompted hundreds 
of Afrikaner families to leave for Argentina in the first 
decade of the twentieth century?
Numerous writers held that these families were refusing
to submit to British rule after the defeat of the Boer
republics in May 1902. For example, a key minister of
the NG Kerk, Rev A D Luckhoff, who came to know the
community intimately, held the view that
The emigration of the Boer colonists from South 
Africa to Patagonia should be regarded as a 
direct result of the Boer War of 1899-1902. 
Disappointment at the outcome of the war, 
coupled with the suffering of bitter losses and 
heavy fines, affected the hearts of the
28 ibid. , p. 9.
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Afrikaners so deeply that it generated a 
feeling of antipathy towards the fatherland and 
reawakened their innate wanderlust 
("trekgees") .29
Lest it be felt that these views were cherished 
exclusively by the Afrikaner community, a British 
exponent of this position made the following comment in 
1910:
At the South of the [Chubut] territory, on the 
Atlantic coast, is Commodore Rivadavia. Here, 
there is a Colony of Boers, who, declining to 
recognise the annexation of the African States 
to the British Empire, have established 
themselves as an agricultural colony.30
At roughly the same time a Dutch observer, Dr J van
Lonkhuijzen, also commented:
The origin of this Boer colony is well known.
At the end of the war, which was so unhappy for 
South Africa, in 1902 there were a number of 
Boers who would not subject themselves to the 
British government. The Argentine government 
offered them land and around 250 families 
migrated there, most of them men, and these 
included former members of the Transvaal and 
Cape parliaments.31
The emigrants themselves listed "dissatisfaction” as a
major motive, based on examples of maltreatment by the
British army and legal system during the war. In the
response to Burton's arguments that Argentina would
afford them no protection, an older emigrant said
I was jailed on the false evidence of a meid 
(black woman servant) and fined £500. And you
29 Rev Augustus D Luckhoff, Die Afrikaners in 
Argentinie, Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 192 6, reproduced 
in P J Nienaber, "Afrikaans in Argentinie", Die 
Huisgenoot, 31 July 193 6, p. 41. Own translation.
30 A Stuart Pennington, The Argentine Republic: its 
physical features, history, fauna, flora, geology, 
literature and commerce, London: Stanley Paul & Co., 
1910. Own emphasis.
31 J Van Lonkhuijzen, Argentinie: Een belangrijk 
land, ook voor Nederlanders, Wageningen: Vada, 1908. Own 
translation; own emphasis.
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still talk of protection? And what of our women 
and children who died in the concentration 
camps? 32
Various other writers attribute the motives for the 
settlement in Patagonia to political objections to the 
post-war settlement. This settlement was embodied in the 
Peace of Vereeniging signed on 31 May 1902. It entailed 
the Boer forces' acknowledgment of British sovereignty 
over the formerly independent republics in the Transvaal 
and Orange Free State.
The argument that the emigrants left South Africa rather 
than accept the settlement implies that the bulk of the 
emigrants were resident in the Boer republics prior to 
the war.
Yet, in analysing the geographical origins of the four 
waves of emigrants (see Table 5.3), it is evident that 
the overwhelming majority came not from the former Boer 
republics but rather from various districts of the Cape 
Colony, which had been under British rule for almost all 
of the previous century.
Therefore it is necessary to scrutinise the conventional 
wisdom more intensely, and to consider other possible 
factors in the decision of the emigrant families to 
leave.
It is clear from the information in Table 5.3 that the 
majority of the emigrants originated from districts of 
the North-Eastern Cape, and other areas of the Cape 
Colony, like Philipstown, which bordered on the Orange 
Free State.
32 Henning, 1n Boer in Argentinie, p. 9.
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TABLE 5.3
PLACES OF ORIGIN OF THE FAMILIES WHO EMIGRATED FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA TO ARGENTINA, 1902-06
1902 GROUP
Consisted of about 7 0 people, mostly young ex-combatants 
who fought in the De Wet commando, with very few family 
groups. Amongst them were citizens of Britain, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, and the USA. The South African 
citizens originated from Ladybrand and Bloemfontein 
(OFS), Oudtshoorn and Beaufort West (Cape).
1903 GROUP (VISSER TREK)
Consisted of 102 people, of whom 40 were adults. Apart 
from two adult citizens from Vredefort in the Orange Free 
State, who returned to South Africa soon after arriving, 
their districts of origin were all located in the Cape 
Colony: Barkly East (9), Cedarville (10), Ugie (6), Lady 
Grey (6), Rhodes (6) and Piketberg (1).
1905 GROUP (VISSER-VENTER TREK)
32 0 persons, of whom 315 survived the journey. Mostly 
from Cape districts of Burgersdorp (c 100 people) and 
Philipstown, as well as those of Barkly East, Dordrecht, 
Maclear, Middelburg, Port Elizabeth, Rhodes, Uitenhage 
and Venterstad; small numbers from Orange Free State 
districts of Bethulie, Bloemfontein, Edenburg,
Fauresmith, Philippolis, and Winburg; and one family from 
Potchefstroom in the Transvaal. Eleven African and 
San-descent servants were also included in this group.
1906 GROUP
Consisted of 40 persons whose districts of origin are not 
comprehensively recorded. Some were from the Malmesbury 
area, others from Bushmanland and Namaqualand (all in the 
Cape). On reaching Argentina, all members of the group 
made certain to register as British subjects at the 
British Consulate-General in Buenos Aires. It was also 
reported to include "Engelsche Afrikaners", 
English-speaking South Africans.
Sources: De Bruyn, Kerklike lewe, pp. 5-28; A J Jacobs 
('n Domine), Reisavonture, p. 187; Henning, 'n Boer in 
Argentinie, p. 6; Luckhoff, Afrikaners, p. 3; NGKA, 
Notulen Boek Gemeente Chubut 13,9,03, G,80/1/1, pp. 3-4; 
NGKA, Lidmaatregister, Chubut 1902-38, G.80, 3/2; NGKA,
F C Conradie, "Wat is ons toestand hier?", G.80/10, pp. 
54-56; Ons Land, 26.1.1904; South American Journal, 15 
November 1902, p. 542; De Kerkbode 23, 29, 27 September 
1906, pp. 469-70.
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The course of the South African War in these areas cannot 
therefore be disregarded. Were there any significant 
trends in the conduct of the war in these areas which 
determined the rate of emigration?
During the war the loyalties of Cape Afrikaners were 
divided between those who supported the crown and those 
who rebelled against it in offering armed support to the 
forces of the republics.
Loyal colonists frequently expressed sympathy and moral 
support for the sovereignty of the republics; in vain 
they attempted to mediate a settlement of the disputes on 
the eve of the war. Nevertheless they drew the line at 
open rebellion. They tended to be part of the 
conservative settler bourgeoisie, those who remained at 
the Cape when the dissenting Voortrekkers made their way 
into the interior in the 1830s, and whose political 
support went to the Afrikaner Bond which, prior to the 
1895 Jameson Raid, had at times collaborated with the 
arch-imperialist Rhodes.
The Moderator of the majority Afrikaans Calvinist church 
in the Cape, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), 
appealed at the outbreak of the war to church ministers 
(predikante) and committees to remain loyal to the Queen 
and to ensure that their congregants did nothing which 
might be interpreted as disloyal.33
In practice, however, as bearers of a developing 
Afrikaner nationalist consciousness, the predikante 
mostly supported Afrikaner unity and the cause of the 
republics. Overtly or tacitly they encouraged young men
33 J H Snyman, Die Afrikaner in Kaapland, 1899-1902, 
p. 296, citing the church press De Kerkbode of 11 October 
1899.
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in their parishes to join the republican forces. In this 
they were backed by nationalist politicians, teachers, 
farmers and small business interests in the rural towns, 
particularly those which bordered on the Orange Free 
State. The role of the clergy in stimulating this process 
was identified by Leo Amery who stated that "For weeks 
and months past the clergymen of the Dutch Reform Church 
had been preaching rebellion from its pulpits." 34
Patterns of patriarchy within rural Afrikaner families 
also acted as transmission belts of nationalism, and sons 
were encouraged to flee to the republican commandos.
This was made easier in certain frontier towns which, at 
different times during the war, were invaded and 
temporarily occupied by OFS forces.
8. THE NORTH-EASTERN CAPE AND THE WAR
A case in point was that of Burgersdorp, which has been 
shown to be one of the key places of origin of the Chubut 
Afrikaners.
Seasonally settled by migrating Afrikaner cattle farmers 
from around 1815, the district in which Burgersdorp came 
to be founded was part of the country under the control 
of the Tambookie people, a related but dissident section 
of the Tembu, who only used the district to graze cattle 
in the summer months "but they did not live there on
34 Leo Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in 
South Africa, 1899-1902, London: Sampson Low, Marston, 
1907, vol. Ill, p. 293, also see vol. II, p. 85; Johannes 
Meintjies, Stormberg - a lost opportunity: the Anglo-Boer 
war in the north-eastern Cape Colony, 1899-1902, Cape 
Town: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1969, p. 47.
165
account of the cold and lack of firewood".35 The 
mountainous terrain was also utilised by Khoisan refugees 
who lived as hunters, gatherers and cattle raiders until 
their final extermination in the 1860s.
Afrikaner migration from the western part of the colony 
was intensified in the 1820s after the decline of the 
wine trade and the recession which followed the 
devaluation of the rixdollar in 1825. By the year 1834 
there were around 200 Afrikaner families in the district, 
a fair proportion of whom were semi-nomadic or working 
for earlier settlers as stocktenders in exchange for a 
share in the increase.36
By 1848, after much agitation by Boer farmers who desired 
the extension of British sovereignty over their area of 
settlement, it was officially proclaimed part of the Cape 
Colony and given the name of the Albert District. The 
population of Dutch farmers numbered just under 4000, 
while no census of indigenous people was undertaken.
In due course the titles to 330 farms which had been 
carved out previously were largely recognised by the 
government's Albert Land Commission. Farms averaged at 
5200 acres (2104 hectares), and it was not uncommon for 
established farmers to invite poor relatives or district 
itinerants to avail themselves of grazing or watering 
rights on the land.37 In exchange, these bywoners
35 W. Mackay, Landdrost of Somerset East to Secretary of 
Cape Government, in Records of the Cape Colony, vol.
XXIV, p. 464.
36 Basil Leverton, "Government finance and political 
development in the Cape, 1806-1834", Archives Year Book 
for South African History, 1961, p. 340.
37 See R W Wilcocks, The poor white (Psychological 
Report of the Carnegie Commission of Investigation on the 
Poor White Question), Stellenbosch: Pro-Ecclesia, 1932, 
vol. 2, pp. 7-22.
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(literally "those who lived alongside") would provide 
added protection during frontier wars waged against 
alliances of the Tambookie and the Khoisan.
Proclaimed in 1846, the town of Burgersdorp became the 
seat of the Albert District.38 It also became the 
theological centre of the Gereformeerde Kerk (GK), a 
breakaway section of the established Calvinist church, 
the Nederduitsche Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK). The GK was 
marked by its fundamentalism, orthodoxy and doctrinal 
conservatism. It upheld the canon law of the 1618/19 
Synod of Dordrecht, which condemned hymn-singing as 
unbiblical. A minority church, it flourished in the 
isolated frontier districts where contact with new 
intellectual currents was extremely limited and held in 
great suspicion by many frontier farmers.39
The Gereformeerde theological seminary was established in 
Burgersdorp in 1869. On the whole, members of the 
denomination were said to be loyal to British, although 
more out of a doctrinal resistance to changing the status 
quo - rendering unto Caesar - than out of a strong 
political allegiance. The district consistently returned 
members of the loyalist Afrikaner Bond as their 
legislators in Cape Town. It was the Afrikaner Bond which 
had entered a pro-British alliance with Rhodes until the 
time of the Jameson raid.40
38 The details are given in E J C Wagenaar, A 
forgotten frontier zone, pp. 99-105.
39 J P Jooste lists these districts as Middelburg, 
Philipstown, Colesberg, Steynsburg and Burgersdorp. See 
his Die geskiedenis van die Gereformeerde Kerk in 
Suid-Afrika, 1859-1959, Potchefstroom: Pro-rege-pers, 
1959, pp. 28-9.
40 See T R H Davenport, The Afrikaner Bond: the 
history of a South African political party, 1880-1911, 
Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1966.
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With the raid and increasing tension between the British 
high commissioner Sir Alfred Milner and President Kruger, 
a new wave of Afrikaner nationalism developed.
Burgersdorp was seen as a seat of this nationalism, and a 
contemporary Fleet Street journalist was informed that 
the dreaded rising of Cape Afrikaners in sympathy with 
the republics could be anticipated in the town.41
After the invasion of the town by Boer troops on 15 
November 1899, a telegram was dispatched to Bloemfontein 
by the commander of the invading force. It read: "The 
town has been taken by us to the acclamation of the 
Afrikaners, and the citizens of the Colony were happy to 
welcome us." 42 The theological seminary closed down 
"owing to a volunteering of so many students" for the 
republican cause." 43
Loyalist farmers were permitted by the occupying Boer 
forces to remain in the district on condition that they 
agreed to take an oath of neutrality; those who refused 
had to leave the district and cross British lines.
Under British martial law it was an act of high treason 
to join the republican forces. Even so, over 700 men 
volunteered from the Burgersdorp area, participating in 
the commando activities led by OFS Commandants Du Plooy 
and Olivier.44 The district was annexed to the Orange
41 William Steevens, From Cape Town to Ladysmith: an 
unfinished record of the South African War, Edinburgh: 
Blackwoods, 1900, p. 22.
42 C J Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede 
Vryheidsoorlog, Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1937, p. 102. 
Own translation.
43 Johannes Meintjies, Stormberg - a lost 
opportunity, pp. 43-56.
44 N A J van Rensberg, Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in 
en om Colesberg, Colesberg: Rapportryerskorps, n.d., p. 
2.
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Free State, and republican magistrates were installed 
whilst the commando travelled southward.
At Stormberg Junction an advancing British column under 
General Gatacre was routed on 10 December 1899. The Boer 
forces captured 600 prisoners of war, contributing to the 
series of defeats of the British which were known as the
Black Week. The majority of those who were killed on the
Boer side were from the Burgersdorp area, where they were 
sent for reburial.45
Within a few weeks, however, Gatacre*s forces defeated 
the Boer forces.and reoccupied the Stormberg and 
Burgersdorp areas. The British troops set about applying 
martial law46, defending the area from further incursions 
from the Orange Free State, and commandeering horses, 
crops, clothing and livestock from the local farmers.
Key figures, including the Rev. Louis Vorster who would 
later visit Patagonia, were arrested for high treason. 
Citizens were summoned to the town's market square in 
order to witness the execution of young men, accused of
being rebels. Not all of them had been. The famed
Burgersdorp language monument, first erected in 1893 as a 
symbol of "the freedom of the Dutch language under 
English rule", was desecrated and dismantled by drunken 
British troops, and only found forty years later buried 
in a garden in King William's Town 300 km (180 miles) to 
the south.47
45 Meintjies, Stormberg, p. 106.
46 "By April 1901 almost the whole of the Cape Colony 
was under Martial Law and jurisdiction was handed over to 
the military." Meintjies, Stormberg, p. 186.
47 Meintjies, Stormberg, pp. 47, 177-8. The monument 
was re-erected by the British and the recovered 
decapitated original was placed by its side in the 
Burgerplein in Burgersdorp in October 1957.
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Communities like Burgersdorp were divided: a minority of 
Afrikaners continued to remain actively loyal to the 
British. An enthusiastic Midland News, commenting on a 
second invasion of the Cape by Free State forces, 
gleefully spoke of the "cool reception that the invaders 
are everywhere receiving... From Burgersdorp we learn that 
farmers, so far from welcoming the invaders, are actually 
giving information to the military that will help to 
follow them up." 48
However, the predominant allegiance of the Dutch-speaking 
inhabitants of Burgersdorp was not one of loyalty to the 
crown. There were boycotts of loyal storekeepers as well 
as attacks on the property of persons associated with the 
loyalist militia, the Town Guard.
Nevertheless, for republican supporters, the British 
reoccupation was experienced differently. "On the whole," 
Meintjies comments, "the occupation of Burgersdorp was a 
most unpleasant experience, and the savagery of the 
British displayed there must be ascribed to the deep 
feelings of hostility on both sides." 49
Philipstown, too, was not immune from the war. The 
district was invaded by General J B M Hertzog, a future 
prime minister of the Union of South Africa, on 17 
December 1900, with a commando numbering 350 citizens of 
the Orange Free State. A number of rebels joined them, 
but the commando had no interest in occupying the town, 
instead making its way westward to the sea.
During the course of the war there were a number of 
skirmishes in the area, rebels were caught and executed,
48 Midland News, 2 January 1901. Cited in C J 
Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, 
Cape Town: Nasionale Pers, 1937, p. 148.
49 Meintjies, Stormberg, p. 147.
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blockhouses were constructed, Boer incursions resisted, 
and their ammunition dumps exploded by the British 
forces. Prisoners of war were placed in the Philipstown 
jail. However the levels of nationalism, rebellion and 
British retribution never reached the levels of 
Burgersdorp.50
Therefore, whilst the particularly bitter wartime 
experiences of many of the people of Burgersdorp may have 
been a factor in their decision to emigrate, the same 
cannot be said for Philipstown and many of the other 
small towns in the Cape Colony whose levels of loyalty to 
the crown were the rule rather than the exception.
9. ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR MIGRATION
The consciousness of the bittereinders, those Boers who 
would rather continue to fight than to submit to British 
rule, certainly extended to those inhabitants of the Cape 
who had backed the republics during the war. The growing 
Afrikaner national sentiment fed on a contempt for 
certain war measures imposed by the British: the 
scorched-earth policy in the Orange Free State; the exile 
of prisoners of war to St Helena, Sri Lanka and Bermuda; 
and, most of all, the placing of women and children in 
concentration camps, in which 2 6,000 died from epidemic 
diseases. Such sentiments formed building blocks for the 
decision to emigrate. But if this is so, why were there 
so few emigrants from the areas in which the 
farm-burnings and the mass arrests of prisoners of war 
had taken place?
50 See "Philipstown tydens die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 
(1899-1902)" in Eugene van Heerden, 'n Beeld van 
Philipstown oor 100 jaar, 1863-1963, [Philipstown, 1963,] 
pp. 45-49.
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It is therefore important to examine more closely the 
economic motives for the departure of the emigrants.
This requires an assessment of the plight of the 
emigrants against the economic conditions pertaining to 
the north-eastern Cape immediately after the war years.
In general the boom years of the war were tempered by a 
post-war recession, a result of departing armies and the 
devastation of agriculture in the republics. It was felt 
most acutely from 1903 onwards, and especially during the 
crisis of 1906-8.
From the limited evidence it is possible to gather that 
the Afrikaner emigrants to Patagonia, apart from a few 
notables like Visser, Venter, and Krieger, were of 
slender means.
Writing in 1940, Henning claims that the 1905 trekkers 
had amassed a total amount of £23,000 or 278,000 pesos. 
This averaged out at £73 per capita. However, 
distribution was not all that equal. According to 
Henning, "Some of the Afrikaners brought huge sums with 
them. One who arrived later [than the main 1905 group] 
had £30,000. Two others, already there, had £7,000 each. 
Altogether the Boers who arrived in Argentina prior to 
1907 changed a total of £80,000 at the foreign exchange 
houses in Buenos Aires." 51 If one ignores the three 
exceptional amounts cited by Henning, the average per 
capita drops to £63. However, because of the legal 
requirements to settle land with a certain amount of 
stock, seed, and construction materials, the immigrants 
were left with very little disposable income.
In a 19 31 census of the community conducted by the Rev. 
Wasserfall, the community's financial standing was
51 p. 19, own translation.
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summarised. Of 138 households interviewed, 114 claimed 
that they arrived in Chubut with no money, and 24 with 
£4 0 or more.52
Apart from the ex-soldiers, who were often men of 
fortune, the vast majority of the emigrants were 
comprised of dispossessed landowners and the bywoners, or 
tenant farmers.
Van Onselen has shown how those Afrikaners in the 
Transvaal countryside - especially bywoners - who were 
dispossessed through "a plague of locusts, intermittent 
drought, cattle diseases, the upheavals occasioned by the 
war and the extension of capitalist agriculture", tended 
to resolve their economic problems by moving into an 
urban setting on the Witwatersrand goldfields ,53
The influx into the Witwatersrand was not confined to the 
displaced farmers of the Transvaal. In his research into 
the question, Macmillan concludes from his examination of 
the files of the Johannesburg Public Relief Board that of 
those receiving assistance from the Board, "There is a 
quite remarkably high proportion of these men said to 
come from the North-Eastern districts of the Cape...".
In a sample of white unskilled municipal workers, he also 
finds that all but one originated in the north-eastern 
Cape and adjoining areas. "I gather that the Southern 
Orange Free State and the North-Eastern Cape really offer 
few opportunities to their own people and send more than
52 Statistiek en informasie vir repatriasie na 
Suid-Afrika van die Boere Kolonie Chubut Argentina, 31 
March 1931, summary, col. E.
53 See Charles van Onselen, "The Main Reef Road into 
the working class: proletarianisation, unemployment and 
class consciousness amongst Johannesburg's Afrikaner 
poor, 1890-1914", pp. 111-170 in his Studies in the 
social and economic history of the Witwatersrand, 
1886-1914: Volume 2, New Nineveh, Johannesburg: Ravan, 
1982. Quote taken from p. 114.
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their share to the Rand." 54
Yet the gradual proletarianisation option was not one 
preferred by the doughty burghers of the north-eatern 
Cape. Their choice to emigrate to Patagonia was one of 
resistence to the path of proletarianisation. The 
possibilities of cheap land, a familiar farming routine, 
and easy wealth in Argentina, beckoned far more than did 
the probabilities of political and economic 
marginalisation in the rough mining towns of the 
Transvaal.
The plight of the rural dispossessed class of Afrikaners, 
particularly the bywoners, was a problem which Bundy 
traces as far back as the 1860s in the areas immediately 
to the south of those which concern us here.55 Although 
this phenomenon is a longstanding one, linked to cycles 
of boom and recession in the Cape economy, the concept of 
"poor whitism" only emerges in the 1890s.
From the 1890s onwards, recession, mechanisation, and 
fencing of farms were contributory factors in driving 
people off the land. It was not only the landless 
bywoners who were affected. In recessionary times, credit 
became very difficult and many proprietors lost their 
landholdings.
On losing land, the options were to drift into the nearby 
rural towns, where jobs were scarce and the chance of 
entering the condition of vagrancy and "poor whitism"
54 W M Macmillan, The South African agrarian problem 
and its historical development: lectures, Johannesburg: 
CNA for Council of Education, Witwatersrand, 1919, p. 51.
55 See his "Vagabond Hollanders and runaway 
Englishmen: white poverty in the Cape before Poor 
Whiteism", pp. 101-128 in Beinart et al. (eds.), Putting
a plough to the ground: accumulation and dispossession in 
rural South Africa, 1850-1930, Johannesburg: Ravan, 1986.
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quite high. Most poor whites had no trade skills and 
extremely limited education. This hampered prospects of 
a good job. At the same time, South Africa's racially 
segmented job market meant that unskilled work was 
largely undertaken by black people at extremely low wage 
levels. Poor whites declined to accept such "kaffir 
work". Sociologists declared that this was based on their 
"false pride". In order to save their dignity, the state 
responded to pressure from the churches to offer some 
rural whites unskilled work in white labour colonies, on 
the railways, in smallholdings on irrigation schemes in 
arid areas, and in government administration.56
Another option was migration to the diamond and gold 
fields. Alluvial diamond digging required no skills and 
was open to all, but earnings were erratic, and the 
overwhelming number of diggers were impoverished. In the 
gold fields of the Witwatersrand, there was little room 
in the formal economy for unskilled farmers. Many of the 
arriving bywoners entered the economy as petty commodity 
producers or providers of services for a few years before 
larger-scale capitalism could proletarianise them. 
According to van Onselen, "capital had to conquer many 
Afrikaners not once, but twice, before they succumbed to 
the position of wage labour - first in the countryside 
and then in the towns." 57
In the absence of credit and state aid to farmers and 
bywoners during this period, the option of emigration and 
a new start subsidised by the Argentine republic must 
have had a salutory appeal to many of those who 
ultimately left for Patagonia. This option, it was felt, 
would enable them to retain or even improve their status
56 For a fuller examinarion of this process, see 
Wilcocks, The poor white, 193 2.
57 Van Onselen, "The Main Reef Road into the working 
class", p. 112.
and economic position as small independent landholders. 
Although on the surface there were many dissatisfactions 
with the political outcome of the war, these cannot have 
been the exclusive motives for emigration. The postwar 
economic crisis in the marginal farming areas of the
north-eastern Cape and adjoining areas, the dispossession
and heightened social differentiation of white 
agriculturalists, the dread of proletarianisation of a 
traditionalist and obscurantist agrarian community, all 
acted as underlying factors motivating the emigration.
The move to Patagonia was less an exercise in nationalist 
resistance than one embarked upon in order to obviate the 
beckoning options of rural destitution or an urban 
Babylon.
10. THE BOER COMMUNITY IN PATAGONIA
The fate of the emigrants was largely a sorry one.
Only 28 titles to land were ever granted. The rest of the
community laboured as tenants on the farms of well to do
Afrikaners, like Venter, or on state land. The town of 
Comodoro Rivadavia lacked water, and the emigrants 
nicknamed it "Vrek van dors11 (death from thirst) . When 
state hydrologists arrived to dig boreholes in 1907, they 
accidentally discovered that the area was rich in 
petroleum. Under Argentine law, mineral bearing land is 
state property. Thus much of the land initially promised 
to the Afrikaner settlers reverted to the state. Rents 
were collected at random dates, usually in recessionary 
years when the state needed all the revenues due to it. 
This had a deletarious effect on the tenants, 
impoverishing through sudden, unanticipated demands.
The harshness of the climate also took its toll. In the
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winter of 1925, snowstorms decimated the herds of sheep 
owned by the Afrikaner tenants and landowners. Their 
black retainers also died as a result of the extremely 
cold conditions, begging questions about how they were 
housed and treated.
The level of poverty in Chubut did not help to sustain 
strong community institutions. Although the emigrants 
supported a small NG church, much of it was run on 
subsidies received from the Cape and Orange Free State NG 
Kerk. The community was too poor and too scattered to 
sponsor its own educational institutions, and appeals to 
the Christian National education movement among Afrikaner 
nationalists in South Africa bore little fruit. At the 
same time, the emigrants were wary of sending their 
children to the state schools, where alien Catholic 
values would be inculcated and the Afrikaans language 
ignored. The result was a community with almost no formal 
education, and hence not much upward mobility. One or two 
exceptional individuals became clerks for Lahusen & Cia, 
the dominant wool company. But most young men led the 
life of poor gauchos, herding and shearing sheep, 
hunting, or breaking in horses. The young women remained 
in domestic settings. Their potential skills in literacy, 
numeracy, and the sciences were never developed.
Neither did they develop any political experience. 
Although endowed with the franchise in the Cape, in 
Argentina they had none, so played no part in national 
politics. This was not because they were aliens, but 
because Chubut was a "territorio" and not a province. The 
territorios were administered directly by the central 
government, and the inhabitants considered too few to 
constitute a viable political unit. The Afrikaner 
community, despite its early access to President Roca, 
failed to develop the ability to pursue political demands 
for schools, for land, or for relief from debt.
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The depression dating from 1929, exacerbated by the fall 
in wool prices, finally broke the back of the community. 
Large sections of it descended into destitution. A 
movement was launched for the repatriation of the 
emigrants. At first the appeals to the state for 
assistance with passages and jobs went unheeded. Prime 
Minister General Barry Hertzog and Agriculture Minister 
Piet Grobler turned down a series of requests, referring 
them to the NG Kerk's poverty commission for resolution. 
The state was under pressure to deal with domestic white 
poverty, and claimed it was not in a position to support 
those who had once deserted for foreign fleshpots.
To confirm that the community was indeed destitute, the 
church conducted in 1931 a census complete with financial 
status reports. The overwhelming majority of families 
proved to be below the bread line, and of these almost 
all wished to return to South Africa. The pleas to the 
state continued to fall on deaf ears. Even the personal 
visit of Senator F S Malan in 193 5 to the community did 
not effect the necessary change in the state's policy.
But with the resurgence of right-wing nationalism amongst 
the Afrikaners in South Africa came renewed ideological 
pressure. The appeal for a gathering in of the Afrikaner 
diaspora in time for the 100th anniversary of the Great 
Trek in 1938, and the dedication of the Voortrekker 
Volksmonument outside Pretoria, began to bear fruit. The 
church put aside funds for the repatriation, on the 
understanding that the state and the parastatal 
corporations would also foot some of the bill.
It was largely through the work of NG dominee A D 
Luckhoff that the repatriation took place. Liickhoff was 
the secretary of the NG Kerk's Armesorgskommissie 
(poverty commission). In this capacity he took a personal 
interest for many years in the fate of the repatriated
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Argentine Afrikaners, helping them to assimilate - often 
as an alien Spanish-speaking generation - into their new 
host culture in Africa.
Since the majority of the returnees were destitute, 
Liickhoff arranged for them to receive food and clothing 
parcels. He also helped to place them in modest positions 
of employment on the railways, in the labour camps and on 
the irrigation schemes in the Vaal-Harts area. The school 
age students were placed with foster families or in 
school hostels. The begging letters from the returnees - 
desperately requesting a pair of shoes, £5, or a sack of 
dried mealies - continued to reach Liickhoff well after 
his retirement in the mid-1940s.
The circle was complete. Those who left the Cape soon 
after the turn of the century, largely to improve their 
economic circumstances through migration, and to avoid 
being marginalised and emiserated in industrial areas, 
were now back in their country of origin at the bottom of 
the white pile. Their search for status and economic 
improvement had been a failure: they were reduced to 
accepting handouts, to begging from the coffers of the 
church poverty commission, and subjected to its 
enlightened paternalism. Most had lost access to the 
land.
Of the few who stayed in Patagonia, cultural assimilation 
has largely erased their real links with South Africa. In 
the 1950s, their only self-founded institution, the 
church, became absorbed into Argentine protestant 
churches. The liturgy, gradually hispanicised since the 
193 0s, became exclusively Spanish. The older 
Afrikaans-speaking generations failed, because they had 
never founded any formal educational institutions, to 
reproduce their language or their culture. Learning 
Afrikaans became a hobby of some of the descendents, a
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curiosity, something unusual.
Was it the innate essence of the "wretched and useless 
plains" identified by Darwin as "scarcely practicable" 
for human habitation which defeated the Afrikaners in 
Chubut? Or was it the vain attempt to export their 
culture in numbers and in a context where it was 
impossible to sustain?
Instead of apportioning blame to the harsh environment or 
the community as a whole, perhaps we should look to the 
motives of the Vissers and Venters, and their compliant 
supporters like dominee Vorster, who encouraged migration 
knowing that their personal fortunes were almost 
guaranteed, and that those without land would be there to 
perform the role of transplanted bywoners in a region 
where fortunes could be made from extensive sheep 
farming. For it was this group which stayed, which 
prospered, which assimilated.
Of those who returned to South Africa little remains on 
record. The returnees were scattered, and retained little 
of their integrity as a community. The poverty commission 
of the church continued to help individuals in need. The 
memoirs of Piet Henning were published, but presented an 
exotic, overromanticised version of the community's 
history.
The community had never been in a position to influence 
the South African government about their fate, let alone 
to build bridges between it and the Argentine government. 
Nevertheless, the romantic view of this doughty community 
was perpetuated in the Afrikaans press which portrayed it 
as keeping cultural symbols of Afrikanerdom alive in this 
remote part of South America. Notables of Afrikaner stock 
were flown to South Africa when air routes were 
established to Argentina in the 1970s. The myth of a
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flourishing outpost of the Afrikaner diaspora was 
emphasised at the expense of the truth about the hardship 
and misery which the overwhelming part of the community 
had experienced.
In the Vorster era, and that of the dictatorships in the 
Southern Cone, the myth of the community was promoted as 
a talismanic symbol of the brotherhood between apartheid 
and exotic Latin America, which had once opened its arms 
to the refugees of an oppressed Volk and, if need be, 
would do so again to businessmen, arms merchants and 
settlers in the hour of South Africa's isolation.
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CHAPTER SIX
SOUTH AFRICA'S PENETRATION OF THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY
1. OVERVIEW
Up to the 193 0s, the nature of the relationship between 
South Africa and the Latin American countries was 
tenuous, marginal, and largely dependent on the needs of 
Britain, the major metropolitan power in the South 
Atlantic in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
The only community of South African settlers in Latin 
America was too poor, uninfluential and remote to make 
much difference to the development of deeper relations.
Prior to this, it cannot be said that the Union of South 
Africa possessed its own distinct foreign policy.
The Union, although constituted in 1910, only achieved 
full sovereignty 21 years later, when the Statute of 
Westminster created free Dominions in the British Empire. 
Although South Africa participated in the conference at 
Versailles, had a small corps of its own diplomats, and 
had a seat in the League of Nations from its inception, 
it was only felt necessary to create a foreign office in 
1926. The foreign affairs portfolio was initially held by 
whoever was the serving prime minister.
The 193 0s also saw the growth of a more independent South
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African manufacturing economy. Like the principal 
countries of Latin America at this time, policies of 
import-substitution industrialisation were adopted. The 
infant industries were nurtured through a system of 
tariffs, which, in some cases survived through to the 
1990s. Because this situation was mirrored in the 
industrialising states of Latin America, trade in many 
manufactured items was therefore limited, although Brazil 
began to eye the African market during World War Two.
South Africa's inward-looking economic structure 
attempted to attract large amounts of foreign investment, 
and to prevent an outflow of local capital through 
strict exchange control mechanisms. These made it 
extremely difficult for South African firms to export 
capital outside the area of the South African Customs 
Union.
From the late 1940s, South Africa's racial laws and its 
continued illegal occupation of Namibia led to increasing 
isolation. Initially it received some support from the 
Latin American delegations at the United Nations, which 
helped ward off the condemnation of the Warsaw Pact and 
Afro-Asian countries. Brazil, then in support of 
Portuguese colonialism, helped to organise Latin American 
votes for the South African position in the UN. It also 
served, along with Britain and the United States, on the 
Good Offices Committee, designed to win South Africa back 
into the General Assembly after the condemnation received 
on the Namibian question had led to a boycott.
With the intensification of isolation in the 1960s, South 
Africa began to develop strategies for counteracting 
economic and political sanctions. One of the key moves in 
this campaign was the process of "dialogue" undertaken by 
prime minister B J Vorster and aimed at detente with 
other African countries. This achieved small success, and
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became known as the "outward policy". It was during the 
development of this policy that Vorster and his more 
urbane foreign minister, Hilgard Muller, began to look to 
Latin American countries to help break South Africa’s 
isolation. A series of official visits and exchanges 
stimulated the South African state to provide a new 
infrastructure for developing closer relations with Latin 
America.
By the time this was happening, the South African economy 
had expanded substantially. High rates of growth were 
achieved, whilst black workers' wages were held static. 
Nevertheless the local market grew, and drew substantial 
amounts of foreign direct investment. The size and 
sophistication of the economy enabled the creation of a 
local money market. Liberalisation measures began to 
allow for controlled export of capital by South African 
firms, as well as the offshore private borrowing of 
finance. Often the controls were linked to the propensity 
of the firm concerned to foil sanctions.
Of the South African firms which had developed the 
capacity to invest abroad, in the 1970s the mining 
finance houses and the large life assurance groups began 
in earnest to diversify internationally. Some had, early 
in their histories, developed foreign associates or 
subsidiaries. For example, the Anglo American Corporation 
held its foreign investments mainly through Charter 
Consolidated Limited, once Rhodes's British South Africa 
Company.
The drive for extending global market share, for gaining 
access to key raw materials, for spreading political risk 
by diversifying out of South Africa, and for taking 
advantage of any competitive edge (for example, in deep- 
level mining technology), caused the South African firms 
to seek investments in resource-rich areas of the world.
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They experienced difficulties breaking into European, 
North American, East Asian and Australian markets, where 
there were propensities to sanctions, strict anti-trust 
legislation, and where the competitive edge was reduced. 
One region where these factors were not operating was 
Latin America. Firms like Anglo American began to 
calculate that this option was increasingly attractive, 
and would receive support from the government of South 
Africa because such investments fitted in with the new 
outward policy. The principal destination for such South 
African capital investment was Brazil.
This may be surprising in view of the diplomatic distance 
which Brazil tried to establish in the early 1970s with 
respect to the apartheid republic. The distance has, 
amongst other things, put paid to any dreams of a South 
Atlantic alliance, favoured at times by other states in 
the Southern Cone, but never by Brazil. Instead, Brazil 
sought to play on its historical ties with other African 
states, especially those which shared its common colonial 
master, Portugal.
Its aim was to establish new markets for Brazilian- 
produced manufactured goods and services, some of which 
originated from the Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign 
transnationals. Yet in the name of a policy of 
"responsible pragmatism", the Brazilian generals and 
their diplomatic corps maintained an open door with 
respect to South Africa.
This chapter therefore aims to contextualise the South 
African penetration of the Brazilian economy by reviewing 
the relationship with Brazil during World War Two 
(section 2) and its aftermath (section 3). It goes on to 
discuss South Africa's increasing diplomatic and economic 
isolation (section 4) and the initiatives taken by the 
South African state to cultivate new links with Latin
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America in the late 1960 (section 5). It then 
contextualises Brazil's shifting Africa policy (section 
6), examining in some detail the case of the recognition 
of Angola (section 7), which set the seal on the policy 
of "responsible pragmatism" (pragmatismo responsavel). 
This policy sought to resolve the contradiction of Brazil 
building markets in sub-Saharan Africa whilst continuing 
to maintain links with South Africa.
Once the context is in place, section 8 will document in 
detail the process whereby the Anglo American 
Coporation's investment occurred. This example 
contributes towards a closer understanding of an 
important dimension of South-South relations: that of 
capitalist linkages at the semi-periphery.
2. WARTIME DIPLOMACY
When Brazil declared war on the Third Reich in August 
1942,1 it found itself in alliance with the Union of 
South Africa. Brazilian representation had existed in 
Cape Town since 192 5, yet it was not until just before 
the Union's September 1939 declaration of war that Julio 
Vieira Diogo arrived in Pretoria to take up his position 
as commercial counsellor, Brazil's highest rank in the 
Union. During his period there, Vieira Diogo maintained a 
personal correspondence with Oswaldo Aranha, Brazil's 
pro-Allied foreign minister. Aranha and Vieira Diogo both 
hailed from the same state in Brazil: Rio Grande do Sul.
1 Brazil's abandonment of evenhanded diplomacy 
between the Allies and the Axis has been examined in 
Gerson Moura, Autonomia na depend&ncia: a polltica 
externa brasileira de 1935 a 1942, Rio de Janeiro: 
Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980; see also Frank D McCann, 
The Brazilian-American alliance, 1937-1945, Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973.
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Vieira Diogo was extremely keen to stimulate imports of
Brazilian goods into South Africa, taking advantage of
the wartime interruption of imports from Europe. Brazil's
manufacturing industry - particularly in the fields of
textiles and chemicals - had evolved more rapidly than
that of South Africa. Witness his enthusiasm:
Today (March 1943) it is easy for us to sell 
everything we are able to, even at unlikely 
prices at times, when we have the transport at 
our disposal. Yet we should remember that this 
ephemeral phase shouldn't be regarded as 
typical in future dealings with this country.
So, when the war ends, they will assist in 
re-establishing the prosperity and wealth of 
the African market, whose exports have 
stagnated owing to the present world conflict.
The countries are eager for our goods, 
depending on easy, cheap and speedy transport, 
and on competitive prices... Therefore we have 
to begin to construct the commercial offensive 
of the post-war period right now, preparing 
adequate rapid shipping facilities with 
convenient freight rates... and adjusting our 
prices to undercut our competitors. Control 
should be placed in the hands of an official 
institute run by technocrats, to regulate the 
quality of our exports, and to back up our 
exporters. Only in this way will we be able to 
advance and protect our real interests in this 
country.2
In the same year, Vieira Diogo persuaded the South 
African prime minister, Jan Smuts, to install a 
consulate-general in Rio de Janeiro.3 His personal 
contact with Smuts and with the South African Secretary 
of Foreign Affairs, D D Forsyth, proved effective, and in
2 Fundagao Getulio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa e 
Documentagao de Historia Contemporanea do Brasil 
(FGV/CPDOC), Arquivo Oswaldo Aranha (OA), documento 
OA4 3.03.23. Own emphasis.
3 The first such representative in Latin America 
since the appointment of a consul-general in Buenos Aires 
in 1938. See Marie Eloise Muller, Suid-Afrika se 
buitelandse verteenwoordiging, 1910-1972, Pretoria: J L 
van Schaik, Muller 1976, p. 65.In 1948 a third mission 
was opened in Chile, but only staffed intermittently, 
since the representative in Argentina was also accredited 
to Chile.
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November the new resident consul-general, Frans du 
Plessis, took up his position.4
3. LATIN AMERICA, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED NATIONS
In the ensuing two decades the commercial link became the 
core of Brazil's relations with South Africa. Political 
considerations seldom obstructed this. Indeed, because of 
Brazil's close historical and diplomatic ties with 
Portugal, it was not disposed towards criticising racism 
and colonialism on the African continent. Brazil 
continued to provide Portugal with diplomatic support in 
the UN and to vote on the side of South Africa's 
supporters when the Union government was attacked, 
principally by India, for its racist policies and 
continued administration of Namibia.
With the assistance of the Brazilian delegation, South 
Africa's UN representative, Harry Lawrence, mobilised 
eleven other Latin American delegations to oppose the 
first major anti-apartheid resolution in the General 
Assembly in 1947. Proposed by India, in an attempt to 
safeguard the rights of South African Indians, the 
resolution failed to obtain the necessary support, and a 
further move to pass a milder resolution was blocked by 
Oswaldo Aranha in his capacity as President of the 1947 
session.5
Brazil's pro-colonial policy endured through the 1950s. 
When South Africa ceased participation in the workings of 
the General Assembly, affronted by attacks on its 
continued occupation of Namibia, a Good Offices Committee
4 FGV/CPDOC, OA43.11.09, OA44.02.01/1.
5 Jeremy Lawrence, Harry Lawrence( Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1978, pp. 210-11.
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was set up to attempt to reconcile Pretoria to UN 
interests in the region.
The tripartite Committee consisted of representatives of 
three countries which enjoyed Pretoria's trust: the US, 
Britain and Brazil.
Feted by the Strijdom government, the Committee was most 
reluctant to challenge Pretoria, and when its plan to 
partition the territory (one part would be permanently 
incorporated into South Africa) was leaked, its work was 
aborted.
Brazil's representative had consistently gone along with 
the British and Americans in conciliating Pretoria, 
rather than championing the interests of the Namibian 
people, a fellow Third World nation.
With the assumption by Jdnio Quadros of the Brazilian 
presidency in 1961, a new "independent” foreign policy 
was promoted.6 Brazil attempted to distance itself from 
previous Cold War alignments and to look to Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, which together made up an emergent 
force in post- war international politics. After 
Quadros's brief and erratic administration7, the 
independent stance was continued by incoming president 
Joao Goulart, and lasted until military dictatorship was 
instituted in April 1964.
Despite many innovative gestures in the direction of the
6 On the "independent" phase see: A Bezerra de 
Menezes, Asia, Africa e a polltica independente do 
Brasil, Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1961; and Wayne Selcher, 
The Afro-Asian dimension of Brazilian foreign policy, 
1956-1972, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1974.
7 M Vitoria Mesquita Benevides, O governo J&nio 
Quadros, Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1982.
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Third World, Brazil’s powerful Portuguese lobby was able 
to exert a countervailing influence: the Luso-Brazilian 
Treaty of Friendship and Consultation of 1953 remained 
intact, obliging Brazil to continue its diplomatic 
backing for Lisbon's colonial adventures.8
The 1964 coup enabled the generals to purge Itamaraty 
(the Brazilian foreign office) of those officials who had 
promoted closer relations with Afro-Asian states.9 Brazil 
assumed an aligned posture again, assisting in the US 
operation to occupy the Dominican Republic in 1965. 
Despite the formal denunciation of apartheid in 
international organisations, declarations and 
conferences10, Brazil opposed the institution of 
sanctions, the ejection of South Africa from 
international organisations, and international support 
for the liberation movements. Whilst theoretically 
favouring peaceful change through international pressure, 
Brazil sought to maintain diplomatic and commercial links 
with South Africa. The latter continued to be viewed as a 
potentially lucrative market at a time when trade with 
the rest of Africa was insignificant.
4. SOUTH AFRICA'S ISOLATION: THE FRUIT OF APARTHEID
Until the 1960s, Pretoria's preoccupation with domestic 
affairs had meant a devolution of major foreign decisions 
to fit the needs of London and Washington. This was 
evident in South Africa's entry into the Second World War 
and the Korean War, its ready co-operation with post-war 
Anglo-American uranium procurement programmes, and its
8 Brazil, Ministerio das Relagoes Exteriores, Brasil 
Portugal: Tratado de amizade e consulta, November 1953.
9 Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension, p. 165.
10 ibid. , pp. 188-90.
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provision of facilities to the Royal Navy at Simon's 
Town. These policies symbolised the Union's compliance 
and integration with the strategic needs of the former 
colonial power and its NATO partners. They also enabled 
the Union to demonstrate its practical usefulness to and 
ideological affinity with the Western bloc. Foreign 
capital investment was encouraged, and South Africa 
enjoyed a privileged trading position and wide diplomatic 
links within the context of the Commonwealth. Its role as 
an important source of gold helped underpin the 
international economic system devised at the Bretton 
Woods conference in 1944.
Yet this role as an integral member of the Commonwealth 
gradually collapsed owing to internal and external 
contradictions. The Afrikaner nationalist regime, which 
had always resented and opposed the Union's 
constitutional link with the British crown, used the 
inclusion of the new Afro-Asian states within the 
Commonwealth, and their stance against apartheid, as an 
excuse to declare the Union a Republic outside the 
Commonwealth in 1961.
Further diplomatic isolation had resulted from the 
intransigence of the South African government with 
respect to the political demands of its own majority and 
the continued occupation of Namibia, later outlawed by 
the United Nations General Assembly and the International 
Court of Justice. The massacre at Sharpeville (21 March 
1960) had flung the regime's excessive cruelty into 
international headlines, scaring off enormous quantities 
of foreign capital, and ascribing a pariah role for South 
Africa in international politics.
The resulting expulsion from many international 
organisations and ostracism within the UN sharply reduced 
the horizons of South Africa's foreign policy, confining
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this primarily to regional preoccupations. Support for 
Ian Smith's illegal UDI in Southern Rhodesia and for 
Portugal's colonial wars aimed to maintain white 
domination in Southern Africa in order to provide a 
strategic perimeter around South Africa and to secure 
markets for agricultural and manufactured products.
Despite the consolidation of its political projects, the 
South African state found itself, in the final years of 
the 1960s, drifting into crisis. The costs to the economy 
of a high growth rate between 1963-70 (6.3% on average, 
second only to Japan) were related to the policy of 
import substitution industrialisation as recommended by 
the Viljoen Commission in 1958.11
To manufacture consumer goods at home it had been 
necessary to import vast amounts of capital goods, whose 
share of all imports grew from 30% in 1957 to 45% in 
1970.12 This gave rise to acute balance of payment 
problems. In addition, uneven income distribution meant 
that the domestic market could not absorb the potential 
output of manufactured goods. South Africa needed new 
export markets.
Its natural hinterland, Africa, might have provided a way 
out. Yet in the 1970s, because of political changes and 
other factors, there was a sharp decline in the share of 
South African exports entering other African countries. 
Official statistics indicate that this decline was from 
around 16% of all exports in the late 1960s to less than
11 Union of South Africa, Report of the commission of 
enquiry into policy relating to the protection of 
industries, UG36/1958, Pretoria: Government Printer,
1958.
12 Official statistics. Compare with Table 12.10 in 
Martin Fransman, "Capital accumulation in South Africa", 
in Martin Fransman (ed), Industry and accumulation in 
Africa, London: Heinemann, 1982, pg. 249.
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9% by 1977. These figures presumably included sanctions- 
busting re-exports to Southern Rhodesia, so exaggerating 
the percentage of exports reaching independent Africa.13 
In any event the bulk of South Africa's exports to the 
rest of Africa comprised of primary products and not 
manufactured goods. This indicates the failure of the 
economic underpinning of what was variously known as 
Vorster's "outward movement", "dialogue" and "detente".
The Reynders Commission on the export trade, which
reported in 1972, preferred a policy of export-led
growth. It advised that
from the point of view of export potential,
South Africa should increase contact, 
assistance and marketing of its goods in 
respect of certain South American countries ... 
the empty economies of Latin America must be 
regarded as natural markets for South- African 
exports.14
Other problems faced South African exporters. As Britain 
gradually integrated into the European Community, South 
Africa's old Commonwealth trading preferences fell away, 
closing off significant portions of a traditional export 
market. Increased protectionism on an international level 
and the limits which apartheid imposed on the expansion 
of internal demand added to local manufacturer's 
headaches.
The South African state realised this situation and took 
steps to develop closer ties with other unpopular regimes 
sympathetic to its position. These included Israel, 
Taiwan, the Shah's Iran, and the military dictatorships
13 South Africa, Department of Customs and Excise, 
Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics, Pretoria: 
Government Printer, 1966-1977.
14 Republic of South Africa, Reports of the 
commission of inquiry into the export trade, 2 volumes, 
RP69/1972, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1972, pg. 166.
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in the southern cone of Latin America.15 One of its major 
preoccupations in doing so was to secure sources of 
supply for its growing armaments needs and demand for its 
arms manufacturing capabilities. The young nuclear 
industries of Israel, Argentina and Brazil were seen as 
potentially collaborative, especially in view of South 
Africa's vast access to uranium supplies.
Numerous overtures were made to Latin American states in 
the mid-1960s, but Pretoria invested most of its efforts 
in Brazil, which it saw as the key to South Africa's 
expansion into Latin America. Not only did Brazil play a 
major role in the affairs of the continent, but its links 
with Portugal implied a built-in endorsement for 
colonialism and racism in Southern Africa, so reinforcing 
South Africa's regional role in relation to Angola and 
Mozambique.
5. NEW SOUTH AFRICAN INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Thus the first major diplomatic initiative from South 
Africa since the end of the Second World War received a 
positive response from Brazil.
In July 1966, Foreign Minister Hilgard Muller and the 
Secretary for Commerce Hendrik Kotzenberg, visited El 
Salvador, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil.16 In Rio they
15 Rightist military regimes took power in Paraguay 
in 1954, Brazil in 1964, Chile and Uruguay in 1973, and 
Argentina between 1966-72 and 1976-83. All reverted to 
democracy during the 1980s, except Paraguay, which 
remains the only South American country awaiting a 
democratic transition, despite the overthrow of Alfredo 
Stroessner in 1989.
16 G J J F Steyn, "Address by the Secretary for 
Commerce at a luncheon given by the South African Foreign 
Trade Organisation on the occasion of a seminar on the 
Latin American market, Johannesburg, 25 November 1968", 
Pretoria: Department of Information, 1968 (mimeo.), pp. 
18-19.
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discussed trade expansion with Itamaraty officials, and 
arranged for a Brazilian trade delegation to make a 
fact-finding tour of South Africa in September of the 
same year.17 On its return from Southern Africa - Angola 
and Mozambique had also been included in the journey - 
the delegation's report echoed the optimism about 
prospects for commercial expansion which underlay the 
Castelo Branco government's thinking.18
Brazil's ambivalent stance was highlighted by the fact 
that it hosted the UN Human Rights Seminar on Apartheid 
in Brasilia barely a month after Muller's visit.19 Yet 
despite this and despite voting in favour of General 
Assembly resolution 2202A (XXI) the following December, 
which called on all states to "discourage immediately the 
establishment of closer economic and financial relations 
with South Africa", Brazil's growing trade began to 
outweigh anti-colonial considerations as a criterion for 
developing relations with South Africa. Itamaraty's 
schizophrenia was to last well into the next decade.20
Brazilian exports to South Africa had increased by 25 per 
cent in the first two years of military rule, exceeding 
the combined total of its closest Latin American rivals, 
Argentina and Mexico, by 62%. In 1967, on the 
recommendation of the trade delegation, Brazil
17 Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension of Brazilian 
foreign policy, pp. 170, 191.
18 Brazil, Ministerio das Relagoes Exteriores, 
Relatorio, Brasilia, 1968, pp. 70-1.
19 Lewis Nkosi, "Encounter with Brazil", New African 
5, 9, November 1968, pp. 183-5; Leslie Rubin, "For the 
record", ibid., pp. 186-7. These are participants' 
subjective accounts of the seminar.
20 Roy Glasgow, "Recent observations on the 
developing southern strategy of Brazil, Portugal and 
Africa", Issue 2, 3, Fall 1972, pp. 3-8. Selcher, The 
Afro-Asian dimension, pp. 191, 194.
195
participated in South Africa's premier trade exhibition, 
the Rand Easter Show, obtaining orders for over US$3 
million, mostly for manufactured goods such as lathes.
The 1968 Show saw Brazilian firms taking orders totalling 
US$3 million in three days for lathes alone, and 40 
Brazilian enterprises from seven states displayed their 
products in 1970.21
Trade commissioners were exchanged, and Lloyd Brasileiro 
initiated a shipping service. In order to redress the 
trade balance, which was highly favourable to Brazil, 
South Africa sought to provide incentives for the latter 
to purchase capital goods and services in addition to the 
small amounts of gold and asbestos which accounted for 
most of the bilateral imports. To this end, a US$5 
million revolving credit fund in the Brazilian National 
Bank for Economic Development (BNDE) was established by 
the South African government.22 This facility, it was 
expected, would place commercial emphasis on growth in 
primary and capital exports to Brazil, and included the 
extension of technological co-operation in mining and 
mineral prospecting.
The Costa e Silva military government, which had 
succeeded that of Castelo Branco in March 1967, initially 
sought to play down recent initiatives by Portugal which 
aimed at extending the Treaty of Friendship and 
Consultation. There was some short-lived resistance by 
those opposed to the notion of a community of states 
comprised of Brazil, Portugal and Portuguese Africa. 
Nonetheless in March 1968 a new set of treaties, signed
21 Ibid., pp. 191-2, based on an interview with J N 
van Schalkwyk, commercial secretary of the South African 
legation, Rio de Janeiro, 29 August 1968.
22 Steyn, "SAFTO seminar on the Latin American 
market", pp. 15-16.
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on 7 September 1966, was finally ratified by Brazil.23 
This gave it free commercial access to all the Portuguese 
colonies. Angola and Mozambique became markets for 
Brazilian manufactured goods, sources of raw materials, 
new areas of investment, and staging-posts for Brazil's 
entry into the neighbouring South African market. South 
Africa absorbed nearly twice the amount of Brazil's 
exports to Portugal in 1966 and 1967.24
In its efforts to justify the growing links with South 
Africa, Brazil sought to separate misgivings about 
institutionalised racism from strictly pragmatic economic 
benefits to be derived from further contacts. In turn, 
South Africa was to make use of Brazil's enthusiasm for 
the expansion of trade in manufactured goods in order to 
gain penetration of the Latin American market.
Although the South African state recognised the 
imperatives behind the need to export, the exporters 
themselves were slow to respond. Cargo transport to Latin 
America was underdeveloped, and the financial services 
available to exporters were limited. Thus the state had 
to attend to these problems in order to smooth the way 
for the private sector.
In November 1968, the South African minister of economic 
affairs, Jan Haak, announced that the South African 
Reserve Bank was to purchase 1.8 million rands worth of 
bonds issued by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB), the World Bank's specialised Latin American arm. 
The purchase allowed South African contractors and
23 An early call for ratification was issued by 
Lisbon on 27 September 1966. See Franco Nogueira, 
Portuguese foreign policy: extracts from statements made 
by the Portuguese minister for foreign affairs,
1965-1967, Lisbon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1968, pp. 
79-80.
24 Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension, pp. 173-4.
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exporters to tender for participation in any development 
project financed by IDB in its member countries.25 Yet 
by mid-1974, not a single South African concern had taken 
advantage of these financial arrangements, according to 
the general manager of the parastatal Credit Guarantee 
Insurance Corporation of Africa Limited (CGIC), who 
attended the annual governors' meetings of the IDB.26
A few weeks after the purchase of the IDB bonds, the
Secretary of Commerce, G J J F Steyn, had cause in
November 1968 to admonish a group of exporters at a
seminar organised by the South African Foreign Trade
Organisation (SAFTO) to promote Latin America as an
export market:
I think you will all agree that the efforts of 
the government to foster the development of 
expanded trade exchanges between South Africa 
and the Latin American countries will be 
fruitless unless the private sector is prepared 
to avail itself of all possible trade 
opportunities in those countries created as a 
result of the government's recent initiatives 
in this area. If our exporters are prepared to 
play their part, and, in particular, to employ 
more aggressive marketing methods in their 
attempts to increase their share of the supply 
of goods and services to Latin American 
countries, I am convinced that our excport 
trade with the Latin American world will expand 
appreciably in years to come.27
The South African state was thus already active in 
creating incentives to the stimulation of expanded 
economic links. Private exporters were notoriously 
unadventurous in breaking new ground, having little 
knowledge of markets outside the traditional ones. The 
state's own Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) had 
pointed out that South Africa's industrialists were
25 Pretoria News, 1 November 1968.
26 Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg), 6 June 1974.
27 Steyn, "SAFTO seminar on the Latin American 
market", pp. 18- 19.
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estimated to have exported 34 per cent of their total net 
output. But of this, two-thirds was exported to the 
industrialised market economies.
Since little information existed in Latin America about 
South African products, the state undertook certain 
initiatives in this area. There was wide participation in 
trade fairs, and in 1966, the Finance Minister, Dr Nico 
Diederichs announced that the government would make a 
line of credit available to Latin American states. By 
late 1968, Brazil and Ecuador had availed themselves of 
this facility, to a total of R1.07 million.28 The three 
parastatal organisations concerned with export 
stimulation - SAFTO, CGIC and IDC - sent a joint mission 
to several Latin American states to discuss the supply of 
capital goods and associated services. SAFTO published a 
survey on Brazil and Argentina which found that although 
opportunities did exist for the profitable supply by 
South African manufacturers, such market opportunities 
could not be identified "unless manufacturers take the 
time and trouble to visit the two countries and see for 
themselves what openings exist for their products."29
After considerable preparations, South African Airways 
inaugurated a weekly flight from Johannesburg to New York 
via Rio de Janeiro, on 2 3 March 1969, the first route to 
link South Africa with Latin America. Foreign Minister 
Muller travelled on the first flight and paid a three-day 
unofficial visit to his Brazilian counterpart, Jose de 
Magalhaes Pinto. Brazil had resisted UN Special Committee 
on Apartheid requests not to authorise landing rights for 
the new service, replying to U Thant that although the 
Brazilian government opposed apartheid, "we do not 
consider it a good policy to apply sanctions against the
28 Ibid., p. 17.
29 The Star (Johannesburg) , 4 February 1971.
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South African government. We have always abstained from 
voting in the UN on the sanctions issue and we are not 
committed to apply them."30
In fact, Brazil sent on the return flight a high-level 
delegation, including the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry and the Minister of Planning31, to discuss trade 
with South African officials and business leaders likely 
to make use of the new route. Along with the Brazilians 
came ministerial delegations from Argentina and Colombia, 
who, together with diplomats from Uruguay, Bolivia, and 
Paraguay already stationed there, held a dinner for 
Muller on his return to Cape Town.
Muller said: "I believe there is no need for any 
unnatural or hasty attempts to force the pace in our 
relations with each other. What I envisage is a joint 
search for common ground or areas in which co-operation 
between South Africa and her neighbours across the 
Atlantic will seem logical and mutually beneficial." 32 
Such co-operation was evidenced later in that year in the 
Security Council, where Bolivia and Paraguay refused to 
condemn apartheid.33
The new air route soon became important to Brazil, since 
nearly 60% of the traffic was disembarking in Rio.34 This
30 The Argus (Cape Town), 27 March 1969.
31 Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension, p. 193.
32 The Argus, 19 April 1969; Republic of South 
Africa, Parliament, House of Assembly Debates, 1 May
1969, col. 5451.
33 Antoine J Bullier, "La Republique Sud-africaine et 
l'Amerique Latine", Revue Frangaise d 1Etudes Politiques 
Africaines, 116, August 1975, pp. 84-5; Gail-Maryse 
Cockram, Vorster's foreign policy, Pretoria: Academica,
1970, p. 87.
34 Rand Daily Mail, 16 April 1970.
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prompted the Brazilian airline VARIG to set up a 
reciprocal flight from July 1970; the rapid growth in 
traffic in both directions saw an increase in the 
frequency of flights to four a week in 1972. VARIG*s 
South African manager estimated that 60% of passengers on 
both airlines were businessmen.35 The introduction of a 
service between Cape Town and Buenos Aires was delayed 
until April 1973, by which time, Argentina, sensitive to 
potential international criticism, had vacated her seat 
on the Security Council.36
Communications were also enhanced by the completion of a 
submarine telephone cable between Brazil and the Canary 
Islands in May 1973, which links up with the Lisbon-Cape 
Town cable.37 Formerly South Africa had to rely on a 
limited number of links with Brazil by communications 
satellite.
The South African state utilised the increased levels of 
contact to step up diplomatic relations with Latin 
American governments. Numerous officials crossed the 
Atlantic. Several new South African embassies were built 
in Latin America, and representation upgraded to 
residential ambassadors. The high point of this policy 
was the visit by the Paraguayan head of state to South 
Africa in 1974, a visit which the South African prime 
minister reciprocated the following year. There was also 
a setback to Pretoria: the kidnapping and assassination
35 The Star, 3 0 October 1972, p. 31.
36 Sunday Tribune (Durban), 24 September 1972; The 
Star, 14 February 1973, p. 13; Die Burger (Cape Town), 3 
April 1973. The reason for the delay was never officially 
disclosed. The service was scheduled to begin in November 
1972, and its postponement required SAA to cancel 
bookings and Aerolineas Argentinas to withdraw all its 
publicity material about the route, until the following 
year.
,-7 437 The Star, 16 Ma^ 1973, p. 31; South African 
Financial Gazette, 26 March 1970, 25 September 1970, and 
30 April 1971.
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of South Africa's envoy to El Salvador in 1979; that 
country, which at the time was experiencing a short 
period of coalition government, broke off all relations 
with South Africa. The subsequent installation of 
Lieutenant-General Dutton, one of the country's highest 
ranking army officers, as the first resident ambassador 
in Chile, indicated the close relationship between the 
security forces of both states.38
From 1978, the possibilities of South African trade and 
investment were increased by a liberalisation of the 
regulations instituted by the South African Reserve Bank. 
For the first time in many years, access to foreign 
exchange for the purposes of direct foreign investment 
was eased through the creation of the financial rand.
The pro-active role of South African economic diplomacy 
can be understood in terms of the of the state's 
self-perception as the guarantor of the reproduction of 
monopoly capital. Aware of a looming crisis of 
accumulation, the state had a clear conception of the 
overall economic interests of the dominant class. 
Individual enterpreneurs were slow to realise their 
potential to resolve the crisis of markets through a 
program of trade with Latin America. Thus it was the 
initiatives taken by the state - in offering finance and 
credit guarantees, easier access to foreign exchange for 
investment purposes, a better infrastructure for trade, 
and improved diplomatic relations - that offered 
incentives for the stimulation of expanded economic 
links.
Once these infrastructural developments had taken place, 
the path was smoothed for South African exporters of 
goods and capital to consider Latin America as an
38 This relationship will be explored further in the 
following chapter.
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appropriate destination.
6. BRAZIL'S AFRICA POLICIES
Despite the establishment and expansion of direct air, 
sea and telecommunications links with South Africa from 
1967 onwards, there was a simultaneous shift emerging in 
Brazil's Africa policy.
Foreseeing the imminent collapse of the Portuguese empire 
under the pressure of liberation wars, and perceiving 
Brazil's need for Africa's markets and resources, 
Itamaraty stepped up trade initiatives with West African 
states and began to distance Brazil discreetly from its 
former position of support for Portugal.
In January 1974, the Brazilian military regime publicly 
condemned Portuguese colonialism for the first time. The 
occasion was a joint declaration signed in Rio by the 
foreign ministers of Brazil and Nigeria. This agreed on 
the right of self-determination and independence of the 
colonies, and repudiated "apartheid, colonialism, and all 
forms of ... discrimination." 39
This stand earned oil-hungry Brazil promises of 
co-operation and association with the Nigerian National 
Oil Company. It also facilitated a more rapid penetration 
into West Africa by Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign 
transnational corporations.40 Trade with West Africa 
assumed a new prominence and has been well documented.41
39 New York Times, 27 January 1971.
40 See Business Week (New York), 2456, 1 November 
1976, pp. 39-40; 2512, 5 December 1977, pp. 72ff, 138.
41 Afrochamber (Sao Paulo), information bulletin of 
the Afro-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, all editions; 
Brasil, Ministerio das Relagoes Exteriores, Como
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The policy tilt was reinforced by General Ernesto Geisel, 
who was inaugurated as president only ten days before the 
Portuguese revolution of April 1974. Geisel had formerly 
headed the state-owned oil corporation, Petrobras, and 
well understood the need for Brazil to ensure its energy 
supply. Brazil's new Africa policy, characterised as 
pragmatismo responsavel (responsible pragmatism) to 
placate the substantial pro-Portuguese lobby, entailed 
the rapid recognition of the new People's Republics of 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Angola, Cape Verde, and Sao 
Tome-Pr incipe.42
In a speech given in London in October 1975, Geisel's
foreign minister, Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, stated:
The African contribution to Brazilian culture 
has been remarkable...it is only too natural, 
therefore, that we should try to develop the 
warmest and closest relations with the African 
countries. Of course, a special place in those 
relations is reserved for the 
Portuguese-speaking nations whose life as 
independent states is now beginning. Our 
willingness to co-operate with them, on the 
basis of mutual respect and reciprocal 
advantage, is total, as is the frankness and 
openness of our intentions.43
These intentions soon became clear. Azeredo da Silveira 
admitted in an interview with Le Monde that recognition
exportar, 1976; "As portas da Nigeria abrem-se para o 
Brasil", Comercio Exterior 33, November-December 1976, 
pp. 12-27; Federagao do Comercio do Estado de Sao Paulo, 
O mundo arabe e o mercado africano, 1978, pp. 173-9; and 
articles by Jacques d'Adesky (1980), Williams Hieronymus 
(1980), Tom Forrest (1982), Helga Hoffman (1982), Wayne 
Selcher (1984/5), and Jerker Carlsson (1988).
42 New York Times, 19 July 1974. Brazil also 
recognised SWAPO. See Prensa Latina release, Caracas, 14 
August 1976.
43 Antonio Azeredo da Silveira, Brazil's foreign 
policy: address to the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London: Brazilian Embassy, 1975.
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of the MPLA government in Angola had perhaps been too 
hasty, but after consultation with the US and EC 
countries about whether to rescind recognition, the 
response had been that Brazil should proceed to maintain 
relations and represent Western interests in Angola.
Brazil soon offered aid to the oil industry of Angola and 
the coal industry of Mozambique, assistance in marketing 
the Angolan coffee crop, and credit of US$50 million to 
both states. Petrobras became the first foreign concern 
invited by Angola's first President Agostinho Neto to 
explore for oil in his country.44 Brazil's exports to 
Africa rose from US$70 million in 1971 to US$400 million 
in 1977, when South Africa accounted for a mere 9 per 
cent of Brazil's African market, despite being its 
largest non-OPEC trading partner on the continent.45
During this period, South Africa generally enjoyed a 
trade surplus in relation to Brazil (see Appendix 1, 
"South Africa's trade with the Americas", for figures). 
The rapid decline in Brazil's imports from 1980 is due to 
the stringencies of the country's foreign debt crisis and 
is not specific to its trade with South Africa. The 
decline has little political rationale, reflecting mainly 
the fall in demand for imported phosphoric acid, South 
Africa's main export to Brazil in the late 1970s.
Brazil's fertiliser industry is now producing its own 
phosphoric acid in sufficient quantities to offset major 
demands for imports, and spare capacity in the fertiliser 
industry is another factor in the decline.
At the same time, Brazil's trade with the rest of Africa 
decreased rather sharply in view of the recessions
44 See coverage if Brazil's mission to Angola in The 
Argus, 8 and 15 April 1976, 17 June 1976.
45 Patrick Knight, "Brazil looks to Africa for 
expansion of its trade", The Times, 25 January 1978.
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affecting most African countries, including the oil 
producers whose revenues dropped substantially as oil 
production glutted the world market from the early 
1980s.46 Although arms exports have flourished, 
especially with Algeria and Libya, the sub-Saharan states 
have not responded in the same way. On the other hand, 
because South Africa tends to provide Brazil with more 
sophisticated products and strategic raw materials, 
Pretoria maintain its relative position as a trading 
partner despite selective sanctions.
Brazil began to term its relationship with South Africa 
as "correct, not cordial", and, in keeping with this, 
announced the cancellation of the 1979 Cape-to-Rio yacht 
race, much to the chagrin of the Rio Yacht Club.47
South Africa hoped to capitalise on Brazil's new role in 
Africa. The incoming ambassador to Brasilia, Johan 
Pretorius, described the normalisation of both Brazil's 
and South Africa's relations with Africa in an interview 
in January 1976, saying that "this mutual interest in 
black Africa might provide further points of contact".48
The "correctness" of Brazil's attitude to South Africa 
included an enthusiastic welcome for South African 
private investment. With a diplomatic base established, 
the political framework for an expansion of South African 
capital into Brazil had been provided. Following the 
policy of denationalising private industries, implemented 
by Brazil's top technocrats during the Medici presidency, 
Finance Minister Mario Henrique Simonsen and Planning 
Minister Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso provided the
46 See conclusions drawn by Selcher, "Brazil-Black 
Africa economic relations".
47 The Star, 11 July 1977.
48 The Argus, 13 January 1976.
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monopoly sections of South African industry with a useful 
chance to penetrate the Brazilian economy.49
7. THE RECOGNITION OF ANGOLA
The watershed in Brazil's Africa policy was its decision 
to recognise the government of Agostinho Neto, the 
president of one of the three contending Angolan 
liberation movements.
By this single act, Brazil was creating a profile for 
itself in Africa as a supporter of progressive anti­
racist politics. The MPLA was actively opposed by the 
United States, which gave lavish support to its rivals, 
and by South Africa, which later staged an invasion of 
the country aimed at the destruction of the MPLA.
Although initial attempts proved unsuccessful, in the 
ensuing thirteen years, South Africa engaged in a war 
against the MPLA. It was only through severe domestic 
sacrifices, the intervention of Cuba and countries of the 
Warsaw Pact, as well as the intermittent technical 
assistance of Brazil and some Western European countries 
that the MPLA survived.
Traditionally a supporter of Portugal's colonial 
presence, Brazil was amongst the first to accept the 
reality of the MPLA in power. How did this shift occur, 
and how did Brazil manage the contradiction of support 
for the MPLA and the simultaneous acceptance of closer 
economic ties with South Africa?
The Portuguese withdrawal from Angola went ahead as 
scheduled on 11 November 1975. An embattled MPLA, which 
controlled Luanda, part of the hinterland, and the
49 Rand Daily Mail, 14 July 1976; Business Week,
2512, 5 December 1977.
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Cabinda enclave, was able to declare the independence of 
the People's Republic of Angola. The opposition guerrilla 
movements, UNITA and FNLA, in their turn combined in a 
joint declaration establishing their own provisional 
government. From Huambo, formerly Nova Lisboa, they 
announced the formation of the People's Democratic 
Republic of Angola.
The issue of international recognition of Angola's 
independence was one of the most complex legacies of 
Portugal's decolonisation process in Africa. In each of 
the other former African colonies, political power passed 
into the hands of a single liberation movement, and 
recognition of the new states and their governments 
remained an unproblematic formality for the international 
community.
In the case of Angola, however, there was substantial 
international division around the question of which 
government constituted the legitimate and sovereign 
authority. These divisions extended to the membership of 
the Organisation of African Unity, which found itself 
split in half on the issue (22 votes in favour of 
recognising the Luanda government to 22 votes against).
The motivations of those who supported the Huambo 
government were largely based on the desire to exclude 
the influence of the Soviet Union and its allies from the 
region. At the time of independence the most active 
proponents of this position were South Africa and Zaire 
(whose invasion forces in support of the two movements 
had reached a point 20 kilometres south of Luanda) and 
the United States which maintained an active clandestine 
presence in Angola. China had withdrawn its active 
support on 24 October.
On independence day, the beleagured Luanda government was
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at its most vulnerable point in the war. The Portuguese 
High Commissioner had departed with minimum ceremony and 
independence celebrations were severely restrained. Only 
the Quifandongo valley separated the invasion forces from 
control over Luanda. At its Langley, Virginia 
headquarters, the CIA Angolan Task Force held a 
cheese-and-wine party, replete with crepe paper 
decorations, to celebrate independence day and its 
programme's success.50 The MPLA was not expected to 
remain in power for very much longer.
It was in this context that Itamaraty's diplomatic note, 
which recognised "the government installed in Luanda", 
came as an unexpected shock. The phrasing of this note 
was interpreted as an effective recognition of the MPLA's 
authority.
Although Brazil's posture marked a sudden break with its 
previous official policy of equidistcLncia or neutrality 
as between the three guerrilla movements, there had been 
prior indications of an impending shift in position. 
Itamaraty had maintained a special representative in 
Luanda since the establishment of the tripartite 
provisional government on 31 January 1975. The post had 
been occupied by a career diplomat, Ovidio de Andrade 
Melo. The tripartite arrangement broke down within months 
and the MPLA retained control of the capital at the 
expense of the other movements.
It was at this point that Brazil's equidist&acia was put 
to the test. The MPLA's control of Luanda, achieved with 
overwhelming local popular support, became a symbol of 
the movement's legitimacy. In view of this, Itamaraty's 
decision to maintain its representation had been 
tantamount to the expression of a preference for the
50 John Stockwell, In search of enemies, London: 
Andr£ Deutsch, 1978, p. 224.
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MPLA.
Yet the rhetoric of equidist£ncia was retained for the 
purposes of satisfying a certain amount of disquiet 
within Itamaraty, and in order to avoid alienating 
Washington or the right-wing domestic press which 
continued to articulate strong anti-MPLA sentiment. 
Therefore the act of official recognition of the MPLA 
government was interpreted as the point at which the 
break with the equidistancia policy formally occurred. 
Thus Itamaraty ensured that any right-wing backlash could 
only materialise once the policy of preference for the 
MPLA had become a fait accomplit.
Brazil's recognition of the government of Dr Agostinho 
Neto came within two hours of the MPLA's declaration of 
independence. It did not carry with it the support of the 
Brazilian armed forces. On the contrary the strongest 
misgivings emanated not only from expected quarters, the 
officers of the linha dura (ultraconservative "hard 
line"), but also from the faction which had been the 
political backbone of the military regime, the Sorbonne 
group (a relatively more reformist faction), of which 
President Geisel was an active member.
Both groups were horrified at the prospects for a
Soviet-Cuban base on the Angolan coast within a 4,500
kilometre range of the eastern cities of Brazil. Many
officers had been exposed to the geopolitical
strategising of General Carlos de Meira Mattos, and
agreed with the latter's view that:
the moment that a military power hostile to 
Brazil occupies the Atlantic coast of Africa, 
at any point from Morocco to South Africa, we 
will begin to feel a climate of uneasiness and 
of warlike pressure in our country without 
precedent in our history. This is because, 
today, even a base of intermediate-range 
rockets installed on the West African salient 
could easily threaten a long strip of our
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Northeast bulge.51
The linha dura officers went as far as to plot Geisel's 
overthrow. The wily president forestalled this by making 
secret information, supplied by the SNI (National 
Intelligence Service), available to these officers. The 
information outlined contingency plans whereby the CIA 
would fund joint US-Brazilian military intervention on 
the side of UNITA and furnishing the latter with black 
Portuguese-speaking soldiers indistinguishable from 
Angolans. This information pacified the Brazilian senior 
officers, but the plan was aborted after the US Congress 
outlawed all US intervention in Angola.52
The pressures on Geisel grew. They spread from the 
military to include sections of the press53, public 
opinion, intellectual circles and the Congress. The 
reaction, according to Selcher, had "few, if any, 
precedents in recent national diplomatic history".54 
In order to redress the conservative outcry against the 
act of recognition, Geisel withdrew the Brazilian
51 Carlos de Meira Mattos, Brasil: geopolitica e 
destino, Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1975, p. 75.
52 William Darrel Rogers, Brazilian foreign policy 
since 1964: from close alignment with the West to 
assertive independence, University of Virginia PhD 
thesis, 1984, pp. 152-3, n. 47, quoting from Veja, June 
1979, and subsequently confirmed in interviews with 
military officers in Rio de Janeiro in June 1982. 
Stockwell claims that the CIA had approached the 
Brazilians for permission to recruit mercenaries for FNLA 
and UNITA, but that the authorities "politiely declined 
to permit recruitment." In search of enemies, p. 190.
53 O Estado de Sao Paulo, Jornal do Brasil (typical 
of which is the leader "A ameaga ao Brasil que o 
Itamaraty nao ve", 18 December 1975), and O Globo were 
responsible for a concerted attack on the foreign policy 
of Azeredo da Silveira, accusing Itamaraty of deserting 
its alignment with the West in favour of a utopian 
pro-third world stance.
54 Brazil's multilateral relations: between first and 
third worlds, Boulder: Westview, 1978, p. 116.
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ambassador from Luanda and left the country's interests 
in the hands of a charge d'affaires, Alfonso Celso Ouro 
Preto.55 The ostensible reason offered for this shift 
was the inaccuracy of the ambassador's account of the 
nature of the Neto government and the extent of the 
influence upon it of Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 
practice, however, both the president and the foreign 
ministry remained silent over the issue in the face of 
mounting public pressure from the conservatives.
The scaling down of the Luanda embassy flew in the face
of Itamaraty's strategy. Awkwardly the foreign minister
was left to berate the conservative position on his
return from the Paris Energy Conference in December 1975.
His attack cast the conservative forces as lackeys of
Washington:
Brazil is no longer anyone's servant...
Diplomatic relations are not social relations.
Our relationship with Angola is governement-to- 
government, and we maintained this relationship 
during the transitional government. When the 
transitional government broke up into different 
groups we continued relations with Angola, and 
none of these groups has asked us to leave the 
country. Angola was recognised by all 
Portuguese-speaking countries and there was no 
reason for Brazil not to do so.56
The foreign minister's observations did not mollify the
campaign against Itamaraty in the conservative press.
The blame for the continued survival of the Neto
government, evidence of "Soviet expansionism", was placed
on Washington, and analogies made with a late-thirties
Europe vaccilating in the face of continued provocation:
(US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's policy 
of) detente represents to us what Munich 
represented to the preparation of the Second 
World War. The inability of the United States 
to react in accordance with the gravity of the 
Angolan situation has resulted in a further
55 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 23 December 1975
56 Jornal do Brasil, 21 December 1975.
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loss of confidence.57
However, in Washington the advice of the Brazilian press 
was ignored. Instead a post-Vietnam climate prevailed in 
the US Congress, and all official and unofficial 
intervention was forestalled by legislative means. 
Although Washington denied recognition to the MPLA 
government in Luanda, a modus vivendi was established 
whereby the US-owned oil major, Gulf, could continue to 
extract the mineral from its wells in the Angolan 
province of Cabinda.
Washington's failure to intervene helped pull the carpet 
from under the South African military invasion of Angola. 
Watched from Brasilia, this debacle seemed to provide 
proof of the intention of the United States not to enter 
the civil war. Most other Western countries followed 
Portugal in recognising the MPLA government. This 
indicated to the Brazilian foreign ministry that its 
decision on recognition was fully in line with the 
international diplomatic climate.
Azeredo da Silveira ultimately prevailed over the 
conservative forces, claiming that the national interest 
demanded that Brazil develop dynamic new links with 
Lusophone Africa. Given Brazil's new international 
profile as an "emergent power", it was incumbent upon 
Itamaraty to extend diplomatic relations with Angola.
The criterion of ideology was legitimately cast aside as 
a principal factor in the recognition of new governments. 
He reserved special criticism for "those stereotyped 
notions which attribute to African liberation movements 
precise ideologies and clear preferences in the sphere of 
international politics", and went on to explain that 
ethnic difference far outweighed ideology as the decisive
57 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 14 December 1976.
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factor in African politics.58
By sweeping aside the criterion of ideology, Azeredo da 
Silveira was able to sustain Itamaraty's position of the 
promotion of Brazilian economic interests as having 
primacy of place in the determination of foreign policy. 
Apart from taking advantage of the oil and other mineral 
wealth of Angola, Brazil hoped that its industry might 
benefit from the country's attempts to reconstruct after 
a devastating period of colonial and civil war.
Once the atmosphere in the media had calmed down, Brazil 
resumed its earlier relationship with Luanda by 
appointing Rodolpho Godoy de Souza Dantas as its new 
ambassador in May 1976. Brazil's move was officially 
welcomed by President Agostinho Neto, who spoke warmly of 
cultural links between the two countries, and the many 
opportunities for economic co-operation despite political 
differences.59
Since then, the two countries have maintained ''correct” 
relations, while co-operating in the spheres of culture, 
technology transfer and economic exchange.60 Brazil and 
Angola have collaborated in the marketing of coffee, and 
Petrobras has obtained oil exploration rights in Cabinda 
province. Brazil has purchased Angolan oil and assisted 
road building, telecommunications and agricultural
58 Jornal do Brasil, 12 August 1976, quoting his 
speech in the federal Chamber of Deputies to its 
Committee on Foreign Relations.
59 "Angola reafirma a uniao com o Brasil", 0 Estado 
de Sao Paulo, 27 June 1976.
60 Brasil, Ministerio das Relagoes Exteriores, 
Resenha de polltica exterior do Brasil, ano 111, vol 9, 
April-June 1976, pp. 97-98.
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projects.61 These exchanges highlighted the triumph of 
the policy of pragmatismo responsavel initiated by the 
Azeredo da Silveira chancellorship.
Furthermore, a new business lobby developed to endorse 
the stand taken by the government and to counterbalance 
the pressure to retain links with South Africa. The 
strongest argument in the lobby's favour was the changing 
reality of Brazil's trade with Southern Africa. As 
customers of Brazil, Angola and Mozambique began to 
outstrip South Africa's importance.62 This shift has led 
to a realignment of Brazilian business opinion. Laerte 
Setubal, president of the AEB (Brazilian Exporters' 
Association), condemned South Africa's 1981 invasion of 
Angola, claiming that Brazil ought end the schizophrenia 
of pragmatismo responsavel: "No-one can serve two masters 
at the same time." 63 The president of the Afro-Brazilian 
Chamber of Commerce, and federal deputy in the pro­
military ARENA party, Adalberto Camargo also condemned 
continued relations with South Africa.64
Despite the initial reluctance of Brazilian military 
support for the diplomatic policy of the foreign 
ministry, in the medium term the opening provided by the 
recognition of the Luanda government has had an important 
impact on the image of Brazil in the eyes of the 
developing countries.
61 "Angola: a boa tagada comercial brasileira", 
Negocios em Exame, 28 April 1976, p. 15.
62 At independence, Angola and Mozambique absorbed 
less than 2 0% of Brazil's exports to Southern Africa.
This increased to 36,6% in 1978, and further to 61,7% in 
1980. Simultaneously South Africa dropped from 78,8% to 
33,3% in the same period. Source: Cacex, Banco do Brasil; 
Secret&rio da Receita Federal, Ministerio da Fazenda.
63 Folha de S. Paulo, 11 September 1981.
64 Afrochamber 8, April-June 1981, p. 30.
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In the intervening years, Brazil's military-controlled 
arms industry has received substantial orders from 
countries like Iraq and Libya, and Brazilian exporters 
have made further inroads into other parts of Africa, 
aside from the substantial technological transfers to 
Angola and Mozambique. Brazil's stature in the 
Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa was borne out by 
the Angolan acceptance of a Brazilian general at the head 
of the United Nations Joint Monitoring Commission to 
supervise the demilitarisation of its southern provinces 
in late 1988.
Thus the gains Brazil made by recognising the MPLA were 
significant. It raised the profile of Brazil as a country 
in support of African liberation, and revived its status 
as a co-operative and industrially more advanced 
Lusophonic partner. Brazil gained access to markets in 
Africa and the Middle East, as well as a guaranteed 
supply of petroleum, at a time of increased oil 
insecurity. Despite this new profile, it continued to 
deepen its economic ties with South Africa, and as shall 
be shown, was simultaneously agreeing to accept large 
amounts of South African private direct investment. 
Itamaraty tried to maintain an evenhanded, non- 
ideological stance - and called it responsible 
pragmatism, managing to chart a difficult course between 
military critics and the pro-African lobby at the same 
time.
8. SOUTH AFRICAN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL
Despite the relative increase in trade with the 
independent Portuguese-speaking countries of Africa, 
Brazil's link with South Africa was consolidated through 
substantial imports of South African-based capital. Most 
of the new direct investment occurred after 1975, when
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the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Limited 
and its stable-mate De Beers Consolidated began to expand 
their holdings in the region.
Prior to the enormous diversification of the Anglo 
American Corporation's empire in the 1970s, it was 
essentially a mining finance house based on Southern 
African gold, diamonds and copper. Yet its global 
entanglements had been present from the start of its 
operations in 1917. Not only was it founded on the basis 
of foreign capital investment - as reflected in its very 
name - but it was to develop a monopoly position in the 
worldwide marketing of diamonds.
Wherever diamonds are discovered, the interests of the 
Anglo empire were aroused. The Oppenheimer family took an 
almost proprietorial interest in diamonds. The founder of 
Anglo, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, had started his career on 
the Kimberley diamond fields, had risen to the 
chairmanship of De Beers Consolidated, had acquired major 
holdings in southern Namibia after the South African 
conquest, and had set up the Central Selling Organisation 
(CSO) as the marketing arm of De Beers in particular and 
the world diamond industry as a whole. Anglo executives 
have frequent contact with the Soviet Union whose 
diamonds are also marketed by the CSO.
One of the strategies of the Corporation was to seek to 
diversify geographically, particularly into areas where 
costs were substantially lower than those in South 
Africa. A further consideration was the potentially 
volatile political situation in the Corporation's base 
country and the long term uncertainty over South Africa's 
future. The chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, had long been 
associated with liberalism and advocated the need for 
social transformation as the best guarantor of t he 
survival of monopoly capital in South Africa. Yet because
217
the pace of domestic change was negligible, the 
Corporation reasoned that the further the risks could be 
spread, the better.
A number of factors were instrumental in Anglo's serious 
consideration of a Brazilian investment. The need to 
maintain a global monopoly in controlling the diamond 
market was one. Through its cross-ownership of De Beers, 
Anglo had an automatic interest in securing control over 
any significant new diamond finds. In the case of Brazil, 
Oppenheimer expressed interest in diamond mining as early 
as 1958 .65 Prospecting, revived in the late 1960s, was 
beginning to bear fruit by the early 1970s. Kimberlite 
deposits had been discovered in the interior state of 
Minas Gerais, the prime world source of diamonds during 
the eighteenth century. The military regime which took 
over the country in 1964 was also keen to stimulate 
foreign investment in the minerals sector.
To maintain the support of the indigenous bourgeoisie, 
the military government was loath to allow majority 
ownership by foreign-based companies. But in many cases 
local capitalists were unable to raise sufficient finance 
to expand operations; in other cases external 
participation was seen as a useful way of acquiring 
advanced technology.
The main catalyst for Anglo's entry into Brazil was a 
clear approach made by a Brazilian industrialist for 
participation in a diamond prospecting company. By the 
time of the diamond discoveries in South Africa in 1866, 
Brazilian production had all but ceased. But by the late 
twentieth century, changes in mining technology supported 
new possibilities for the commercial viability of the
65 Personal communication from Ted Eustace, South 
African foreign service officer in Rio de Janeiro, who 
received Oppenheimer's enquiry, 26 October 1990.
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Brazilian diamond fields.
To sustain the De Beers monopoly on the world market, the 
Brazilian offer was one which could not be refused. It 
came from Agosto Azevedo Antunes, Brazil's leading 
private mining financier. Dr Antunes, trained as a mining 
engineer, had previously been engaged in joint ventures 
with large US metals and mining corporations such as 
Bethlehem Steel and Hanna Mining. His approach to Anglo 
was of great interest to the corporation, since it 
reasoned that the deal would give it a foothold in Brazil 
and access to local expertise in the legal, financial and 
fiscal spheres.
Further, Brazil seemed an attractive destination for new 
investment compared to some of the other possibilities 
under consideration at the time. Restrictive measures in 
the US, Australia (then under the Whitlam government), 
and Canada, coupled with difficulties in Africa, caused 
Anglo to regard Brazil with relative optimism. Wages were 
low, taxes moderate, after-tax profits repatriable, and, 
unlike Africa, there was a pool of labour with the 
requisite mining skills. An Anglo executive also pointed 
to the relative political stability in Brazil after 1964, 
expressing the view that 1973 marked the "peak of the 
Revolution (i.e. military rule) in terms of control of 
inflation".66 Yet the major factor which clinched 
Anglo's entry into Brazil was ultimately the opportunity 
it afforded to purchase existing and potential gold 
mines.
A major constraint under which the gold mining industry 
operated in the middle third of the century (1934-69) was 
the constant price of gold, established at US$35 an ounce
66 Interview with Abel Gower, head of new mining 
business, Anglo American Corporation, Johannesburg, 1 
February 1984.
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on the world market. With the rise in fixed costs and the 
rapid inflation of the latter half of the 1960s, South 
Africa's gold mining industry was flung into crisis. 
Forecasters anticipated that the industry might collapse 
entirely during the 1970s, if the world price for gold 
remained intact.
As one of the principal mining finance houses and as the 
owner and operator of numerous gold mines in South 
Africa, many of which were low-grade producers and hence 
under risk, Anglo felt an imperative to diversify its 
holdings geographically. Given the fiscal restrictions 
operating elsewhere, and the welcome provided to 
transnationals on the part of the government, Brazil 
could no longer be ignored. Interesting investment 
possibilities were soon to reveal themselves.
Thus after a detailed six-month feasibility study, 
focusing on the technical, financial and legal dimensions 
of a potential investment, in 1973 the Corporation 
established a subsidiary in Rio de Janeiro, the Anglo 
American Corporation do Brasil - Administragao, 
Participagao e Comercio em Empreendimentos Mineiros - 
Limitada, known familiarly as Ambras. This was to become 
the holding group for most of the Anglo group's Brazilian 
assets.
Anglo sought to gain maximum advantage from the Brazilian 
government's partiality to denationalising the country's 
mining sector. It also took advantage of the fact that 
Portuguese nationals were allowed the same rights as 
Brazilian citizens to act commercially, and placed Dr 
Mario Ferreira, a Portuguese citizen, in the chairmanship 
of Ambras. Ferreira had previously headed Anglo's 
operations in colonial Mozambique, when the Corporation 
formed part of an international consortium to construct 
the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi river in the late
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1960s.67 At the time the project was criticised for 
forming part of a strategic settlement scheme promoted by 
the Portuguese colonial government to attract white 
immigrants. Ferreira was also reputed to have close links 
with Jorge Jardim, a Portuguese businessman involved in 
breaking oil sanctions against the Smith government and 
who later helped finance the radio station of the 
anti-Frelimo MNR movement.
Preoccupied with gold and diamonds, Ambras showed an 
interest in prospection and the acquisition of mining 
investments. At the time, Brazil's goldmining industry 
was in the doldrums. The major mine, Morro Velho, located 
about 325 km due north of Rio at Nova Lima, close to the 
city of Belo Horizonte, had experienced a turbulent 
history under British control between 1830 and I960.68
In 1960, it was acquired by three Brazilians for the 
token sum of one dollar. The key figure in this 
acquisition was Walter Moreira Salles, owner of Uniao dos 
Bancos (now Unibanco), ex-ambassador and cabinet 
minister.
Moreira Salles and his partners faced enormous problems 
with their investment. Despite government subsidies, the 
constant gold price of the 1960s made substantial
67 Keith Middlemas, Cabora Bassa: engineering and 
politics in Southern Africa, London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1975.
68 On the history of Morro Velho, see Marshall Eakin, 
Nova Lima: life labour and technology in an 
Anglo-Brazilian mining community, 1882-1934, PhD, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1982; Douglas C 
Libby, 0 trabalho escravo na mina de Morro Velho, tese de 
mestrado, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo 
Horizonte, 1979; and the excellent account of worker 
organisation researched under conditions of great danger: 
Yonne de Souza Grossi, Mina de Morro Velho: a extragao do 
homem, uma historia de experiSncia operaria, Rio de 
Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1981.
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investment in the mine prohibitive for the Brazilian 
owners. Productivity declined rapidly, the technology was 
backward, and the local press exposed the dangerous and 
unhealthy working conditions.
By 1968 a former Morro Velho superintendent declared that 
"in the four years necessary for its reconstruction, the 
mine has virtually been paralysed economically and it is 
humanly impossible to continue to work it".69
Therefore Moreira Salles and his partners hit on the idea 
of inviting Anglo to purchase a 49% minority holding.
Here was a chance to utilise Anglo's economic expertise, 
vast access to capital and anxiousness to diversify 
geographically out of South Africa. Morro Velho, the 
deepest mine in all of Latin America (2450 m), might 
benefit from Anglo's considerable deep-level experience 
on the Witwatersrand.
Despite the backing of Mario Henrique Simonsen, Brazil's 
finance minister, who later became Anglo's major 
Brazilian partner, government enthusiasm towards Anglo's 
entry into Brazil was tempered with apprehension on the 
part of a number of politicians.
Two relevant parliamentary commissions of enquiry were 
established in the Chamber of Deputies at this time. One 
sought to examine Brazil's minerals policy and the other 
the role of foreign capital in the country.70 Each had
69 Guido Jacques Penido addressing the XXth Week of 
Mining and Metallurgy Studies, September 1968, quoted in 
Sergio Danilo, "A venda da mina de Morro Velho", Opiniao, 
11 April 1975, p. 9.
70 Brazil, Congresso, Cdmara dos Deputados, Comissao 
Parlamentar de Inquerito para investigar o comportamento 
e as influencias das impresas multinacionais e do capital 
estrangeiro no Brasil (CPI/Multinacionais), Relatorio e 
conclusoes, Diario do Congresso Nacional, (Segao I - 
Suplemento), 1 July 1976; and Comissao Parlamentar de
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the competence to examine the Morro Velho deal, and the 
commission on minerals summoned one of its former 
Brazilian owners to give evidence. Unfortunately for the 
historian, the key parts of his deposition which dealt 
specifically with the deal have been excised from the 
final published report, perhaps in error.71 No serious 
critique of the deal resulted, despite the intentions of 
some of the commission's more nationalist deputies to 
limit foreign acquisition of Brazilian mineral resources.
In a similar manner, despite close questioning of
witnesses, the commission on multinationals failed to
tackle fully the question of the entry of South African
capital into Brazil. The Minister of Mines and Energy,
Shigeaki Ueki, was cross-examined on the deal, putting
forward the technological imperative as an argument for
accepting the new South African presence:
It's really only Anglo American which has the 
best knowhow for exploiting gold at this 
depth...so this national group thought that 
this association was convenient. We hope that 
with this association gold production will 
increase. The deal was signed a year ago (in 
1975). I believe that the Brazilian group made 
the deal on excellent terms, because gold has 
since dropped in price from 200 to 130 
dollars.72
Ueki's evidence, instead of being challenged, was entered 
piecemeal into the final report of the commission as part 
of the chairperson's summary, as if it were the 
considered opinion of the entire commission.73 No
Inquerito destinada a evaluar a politica mineral 
brasileira (CPI/Mineragao), ibid., 7 March 1978.
71 CPI/Mineragao, pp. 703 ff.
72 CPI/Multinacionais, pp. 989-990.
73 CPI/Multinacionais, p. 6.
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restrictions were placed on Anglo's investments.
Why was this the case? Firstly, substantial ignorance 
existed in Brazil at the time about the nature of Anglo 
American and its role in the South African and other 
national economies. Deputies, although critical, deferred 
easily to the technological pretext for approving the 
admission of Anglo into the most promising areas of 
Brazilian mining, failing to consider the political 
implications.
Secondly, Anglo's public relations machine had excelled 
itself. A team of top executives visited Brazil, meeting 
senior cabinet ministers such as Simonsen, Delfim Neto, 
and Dias Leite. The editors of the influencial Rio-based 
newspapers Jornal do Brasil and O Globo (the latter being 
connected to the largest television network in the 
country) were entertained. Anglo's diamond partner, 
Antunes, had been helpful in smoothing the way so that 
overt opposition to Anglo's entry was not met.
However, the coup de grace was Harry Oppenheimer's 
reception by President Ernesto Geisel.74 Oppenheimer 
timed his visit to Brazil to coincide with the 
deliberations of the commission on multinationals. In the 
context of an authoritarian military state, the audience 
with Geisel spelt automatic official acceptance of the 
Morro Velho deal. Ironically, whilst Oppenheimer, a 
direct representative of South African monopoly capital, 
was able to gain access to the president, it is doubtful 
whether Geisel would have received any senior apartheid 
politician in view of the efforts to nurture relations 
with other African countries.
"We feel", said Oppenheimer, "that this investment will
74 Sergio Danilo, "A venda", p.9; Sunday Times 
(Johannesburg), 30 March 1975.
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provide an important base for the group's activities in 
Brazil, and that we shall be able to make a significant 
contribution to the company's operations through our 
experience and knowledge of deep-level gold mining.” 75
The Morro Velho deal was to form the springboard for 
further Anglo investments in Brazil.76 Anglo also 
acquired a vast expanse of land in the interior of the 
north-eastern state of Bahia, close to the town of 
Jacobina, 1300 km from Rio. This holding, rich in gold, 
was later consolidated into the Morro Velho company. 
Capital has been thrust into both mining investments, 
amounting to a total of US$306.8 million, by the end of 
1988. Of this figure $70 million had been spent on the 
Jacobina mine by 1983, and $197.5 million was earmarked 
for the extention of the Morro Velho project to the 
nearby Cuiaba-Raposos mines. These figures were announced 
by Morro Velho's superintendent at a mining industry 
conference in May 1983.77
All sorts of complicated shareholdings have been arranged 
to disguise the full extent of Anglo's minority ownership 
of Morro Velho, yet the company is operated by Anglo 
personnel to all intents and purposes.
Anglo's partner in Morro Velho is no longer the original 
Moreira Salles group, but has been replaced by the Bozano 
Simonsen group led by Mario Henrique Simonsen.
75 "The Latin American connection", Sechaba (Lusaka) 
11, 3, 1977, p. 57.
76 The initial ownership structures are outlined in 
Appendix 2, diagram 1.
77 Juvenil Tiburcio Felix, "Ouro - urn bem mineral que 
se confunde com a historia do Brasil. Os 150 anos da 
Mineragao Morro Velho: est&gio atual e programa de 
expansao em curso", Lecture given to the National Meeting 
on Mining and Brazil 83, Instituto Brasileiro de 
Mineragao, 17 May 1983 (mimeo).
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TABLE 6.1
EXPANSION PLANS OF MORRO VELHO EXPRESSED IN
INVESTMENTS
Project/Area
Investments
millions
1978-82
in US$mn 
1983-85
A. Geological research project 4.9 6.3
B. Re-equipment and modernisation
B.l. Mining 6.2 1.6
B.2. Metallurgy 2.3 0.6
B .3. Engineering 4.0 1.7
B .4. Administration 2.9 1.1
C. Ecological defence project 5.9
D. Property and housing projects 0.8 0.3
E. Jacobina project (Bahia)(1980-2) 70.0
F. Cuiaba-Raposos project
F.l. Process engineering &
viability study (1981-2) 1.2
F.2. Implementation - stage 1 124.5
F.3. Implementation - stage 2 (1985-8) 73.0
Totals 98.2 208.6
GRAND TOTAL US$306. 8mn
Source: Juvenil T Felix, "Ouro", 17 May 1983.
The relationship between Anglo and the Bozano Simonsen 
group has proved important to the Corporation. The link 
arises from the close friendship between Ambr^s (and 
later Amsa) president Mario Ferreira and Julio Bozano. 
Bozano's partner, Mario Henrique Simonsen, a former 
finance and planning minister, received a glowing tribute 
in Anglo's house journal78 while Bozano himself earned a 
seat on the Board of Directors of Anglo's 
Luxembourg-based arm, Minorco. The Corporation began to 
announce in its annual reports an increasing shareholding 
in the Bozano Simonsen bank as well as its holding group. 
Dividends received from the Bozano Simonsen group grew 
from US$0.7 million (March 1982) to $6.1 million (March
78 "Mario Henrique Simonsen", Optima (Johannesburg) 
30, 1, July 1981, p. 54-5.
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1984) .79
Ambras also acquired 49 per cent of Companhia Siderurgica 
Hime SA, a steel company belonging to the Bozano Simonsen 
group, in March 1980. The ostensible aim of this 
acquisition was to extend Anglo's investments into the 
metalworking field and to have a research base for 
prospecting non-ferrous metals. But Hime also possessed 1 
per cent of Morro Velho and, in the same year, bought out 
Moreira Salles's Cia Valenga de Participates, which 
possessed the remaining 50 per cent of Morro Velho.
The new ownership pattern reinforced Anglo's control over 
Morro Velho, with a direct holding of 49% and a further 
indirect holding of 25% (49% of 51%). The Bozano Simonsen 
group's holding was reduced to 26% (51% of 51%). Valenga 
was subsequently absorbed and ceased to exist.
Practical objections to Anglo's effective 74 per cent 
holding of Morro Velho, amounting to full 
denationalisation, have forced the Bozano Simonsen-Anglo 
partnership to disguise the nature of ownership even 
further. In November 1982 it was reported that the Morro 
Velho company was seeking finance covering 60 per cent of 
its expenditure in basic engineering, technology, and 
equipment purchases from the BDMG (Minas Gerais State 
Development Bank), FINAME (an agency of BNDES, the 
National Bank for Social and Economic Development), and 
FINEP (Finance for Studies and Projects, part of the 
planning ministry).80 The announcement was swiftly denied 
by FINEP, which claimed that in October 1982 it had 
unanimously rejected the company's application because
79 Anglo American Corporation of South Africa 
Limited, Annual Reports 65 (1982) - 67 (1984), 
Johannesburg: The Corporation, 1982-4, 1983, pp. 11-12.
80 Relatorio Reservado (Rio de Janeiro) 836, 22 
November 1982, p. 3.
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BDMG had pointed out that, although 51 per cent of Morro 
Velho's capital was owned by Brazilian nationals, 
nevertheless effective control of the company was in the 
hands of a foreign corporation. On these grounds Morro 
Velho was refused official financing.81
In the early 1980s the company's ownership structure was 
changed in order for it to appear, on paper, more 
obviously under national control. Ambras's role was 
ostensibly reduced, but cross-holdings amount to a paper 
percentage of 45.4%. This left out of account the fact 
that Minorco, Anglo's foreign investment arm, through 
other subsidiaries in Liberia, owned significant and 
growing percentages of the Bozano Simonsen group and 
bank.82
Further inroads into the Brazilian mining industry were 
made in December 1981, when Anglo and its associates 
purchased a 40% interest in Empresas Sudamericanas 
Consolidadas SA, the holding company for all the South 
American assets of the Panama-based Hochschild group. 
Hochschild had been one of the Bolivian tin barons whose 
assets inside Bolivia were nationalised after the 1952 
revolution. His assets outside Bolivia were organised 
into the Panama-based holding company.
Through this deal Anglo extended its Latin American 
holdings to Peru, Chile and Argentina and set up its own 
subsidiary companies in Buenos Aires and Santiago de 
Chile.
In November 1984, the remaining 60% interest was 
purchased from Hochschild. Anglo and its associates 
placed its Brazilian subsidiary, Ambras, under the
81 Relatorio Reservado 837, 29 November 1982, p. 3.
82 See Appendix 2, diagram 2.
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control of the fully acquired company. Within a year the 
name of the holding company was changed from Empresas 
Consolidadas to the Anglo American Corporation of South 
America Limited (AMSA). Apart from Anglo's existing 
mining, finance and agro-industrial assets in Brazil,
AMSA now included substantial interests in and 
shareholding control of the Codemin ferro-nickel mine, 
the Copebras-Fosfago carbon black, phosphate and 
fertiliser group and the Catalao columbium mine.
In 1986, the group also acquired a share in the Crix&s 
gold mine in the central state of Goi&s, which Anglo 
planned to develop by the early 1990s.
Anglo's associate company De Beers, has had a distinct 
presence in Brazil since the 1970s. It has embarked, 
through Sopemi, on a substantial prospecting operation, 
based on its numerous claims, and running training 
courses in Belo Horizonte and Brasilia. De Beers is 
interested in exploiting the kimberlite pipes similar to 
those found in South Africa, and part of the same 
historic geological formation dating back to the time 
when the two continents were a single one, Gondwanaland.
In November 1983, De Beers do Brasil started operating 
its Brazilian industrial diamonds division in Sao Paulo, 
with the object of marketing its product in the country's 
industrial heartland. It intends, according to the 
chairman Jorge Saloma Minguell, to market a million 
carats and do a turnover of $2 million per year. De Beers 
soon acquired a market share of 50 per cent.83
Working conditions on Anglo-run mines have come under 
great criticism in Brazil. In Jacobina, the miners 
complain about dangerous working conditions, bad 
transport and inadequate food. There is no danger pay or
83 Istoe, 1 February 1984, p. 57.
229
social security supplement. Wages are low and with 
overtime (normal shifts last 10 hours) the 800 workers 
receive just over the minimum wage of around $50 per 
month. The company, according to testimonies of workers, 
has attempted to cover up the cause of a worker's death 
in a mining accident in order to avoid having to 
compensate the family. The company has also threatened 
workers with dismissal for attempting to form an 
association.84 Strikes over poor conditions in the late 
1980s attracted the support of Luis In&cio da Silva,
Lula, then president of the Partido dos Trabalhadores v
(Workers' Party) and the country's most famous trade 
unionist. Lula visited Nova Lima and joined the picket 
lines, encouraging the miners to unionise under the 
banner of the recently-legalised CUT trade union 
federation.
At Morro Velho average wages are between two and three 
minimum salaries (between $90 and $140 per month) 
depending on overtime worked. Because of the deep level 
of the oldest part of the mine, there are substantial 
refrigeration problems. Very high temperatures force the 
miners to v/ork in shorts and sandals and with scarves 
over their faces instead of protective headgear. Because 
of the drilling, fine silicon dust enters both through 
the respiratory system and through the unclad pores of 
the skin. The high incidence of silicosis (one in three 
workers are affected according to union officials) 
testifies to the poor working conditions. The company has 
closed down its hospital and workers depend on their 
union and inadequate state provision for medical 
services. Although a company town, the mayor, himself a 
doctor, claims that the company has failed to assist the 
municipality with any social service payments. He alleged 
that none of the taxes paid by the company reach the
84 Prof Mauricio Tragtenberg, writing in Notlcias 
Populares (Sao Paulo), 8 September 1982.
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municipality.85
Social responsibility for the poverty of the community of 
Nova Lima, dependent on mine incomes since the last 
century, must lie to a large extent with the company.
From official statistics it is evident that, in the early 
1980s, the Morro Velho group was by far the most 
important source of underground gold in Brazil, providing 
97% of total underground production in 1981. Until 1979, 
underground production was far greater than opencast and 
alluvial production, but this pattern has changed 
substantially since then.
Nevertheless whilst Morro Velho has declined in relative 
importance, the question of gold has become strategically 
crucial to the Brazilian economy, whose national debt 
exceeds US $110 billion. The escalation of gold 
production is a key element in paying off the debt. Eager 
to acquire as much gold as possible, the Brazilian 
government is offering producers a higher price than is 
obtainable on the world market. There is also substantial 
interest in the establishment of a national gold 
regulating authority and growing criticism of any foreign 
participation and control over gold production.86
85 Interviews conducted in Nova Lima, 24 June 1983.
86 Senador Gabriel Hermes, "Uma politica e um 
programa de ouro para o Brasil”, speech to the Federal 
Senate, Brasilia (mimeo.), n.d.[1983?]; Aloysio Biondi, 
"Ouro do Brasil para as multinacionais", Folha de S. 
Paulo, 15 May 1983; Edison Suszczynski, "A importcincia 
atual e futura do ouro no Brasil, Jornal do ComGrcio, 21 
March 1983.
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TABLE 6.2
BRAZILIAN GOLD PRODUCTION, 1978-1992 (metric tonnes)
Year Total Morro Velho Ooencast/Alluvial
1978 8.6 3.8 4.5
1979 4.3 3.1 0.9
1980 13 .8 4.0 9.6
1981 24.1 4.2 19.7
1982 33.8 4.2 29. 3
1983 53.7 5.0 48.5
1984 61.5 5.8 32.0
1985 72.3 5.6 23.0
1987 103 . 3 67.5
1988 123.0 100.0
1989 135. 0 7.3# 110.0
1990 120.0 11.0 90.0
1991 12.5*
1992 14.0*
Source: Brazil, Ministerio de Minas e Energia,
Departamento Nacional de Produgao Mineral, Anu&rio
Mineral ; Anglo American Corporation, Annual Reports;
British Geological Survey, World Metal Statistics 1983-7;
Economist Intelligence Unit, Brazil country profile and
Brazil country report; David Cleary, Anatomy of the
Amazon gold rush, p. 4 •
# Equal to 32% of all corporately mined gold
* Projected output
During the debates in the Brazilian Constituent Assembly, 
charged with the writing of the constitution for the nova 
republics, the left parties argued for the 
nationalisation of the mines owned by transnationals. 
However, the left was outmanoeuvred by the centre bloc 
and the transnationals were permitted to retain their 
investments. Anglo breathed a sigh of relief, and 
announced to its shareholders that "it is not foreseen 
from available information published in Brazil that 
AMSA's Brazilian investments will be affected."87
Because of this, Anglo has tended to spread its
87 Anglo American Corporation of South Africa 
Limited, Annual Report 1988, Johannesburg, p. 7.
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investments into other areas of mining and industry, as 
well as the banking field mentioned earlier.
One of its main acquisitions has been a significant 
holding in the explosives sector in Brazil, one crucially 
related to mining. It is worth outlining this in some 
detail.
The profile of the Brazilian explosives sector at the end 
of the 1960s, according to market shares, was the 
following:
Brazilian military industry (IMBEL) 30%
DuPont and other foreign interests over 40%
Brazilian private companies under 30%
The private Brazilian firms were coming under increasing 
strain due to outdated technology, difficulties in access 
to finance, and severe price competition from DuPont and 
the military. In addition the military was keen to 
capture more control over explosives production and could 
sanction any new entries into the market through a 
licencing system. These strains caused a number of 
nationally-owned explosives companies to sell out to 
bidders, or to sell off explosives interests so as to 
finance diversification into other forms of chemical 
production.
One of the key purchasers was the Sociedade Financeira 
Portuguesa (SOFIN), headed by Professor Texeira Pinto, a 
former finance minister in Salazarist Portugal, and 
responsible for advising the Champalimaud family (a key 
group of Portuguese industrialists) on their investments 
in Mozambique. Through Empar, its Brazilian subsidiary, 
SOFIN acquired numerous ailing Brazilian companies, 
including three explosives firms: Cobrex, Rupturita, and 
Broca Meirelles, all previously owned by Brazilians and 
were run down or in financial difficulties.
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Another important private explosives company, IndCistria 
Quimica Mantiqueira (IQM), was also seeking forms of 
foreign participation in an effort to survive stiff 
competition from DuPont and Imbel. In 1973 it approached 
ICI America, the US subsidiary of Imperial Chemical 
Industries Limited (ICI-UK), the largest public company 
in the United Kingdom. ICI America, however, was then 
facing its own problems in coping with its investments in 
the US, Mexico and Brazil.
The British parent company had for many years been 
engaged in a joint venture with De Beers of South Africa, 
owning equal shared (4 3% each) in the monopoly 
explosives company, AECI Ltd, formerly the African 
Explosives and Chemical Industries Limited. AECI produces 
explosives for the entire South African mining industry, 
is the largest commercial explosives producer in the 
world, and an important contributor to the profits of 
ICI-UK. As such, when Oppenheimer heard of the 
prospective deal between ICI America and IQM, he 
pressurised ICI-UK into allowing AECI to replace the role 
of ICI America in the deal.
But links also existed between the Oppenheimer empire and 
SOFIN, dating from their mutual association in the Cahora 
Bassa consortium. At the time they had agreed informally, 
that any joint venture between the two corporations would 
be held on a 50/50 basis. Anglo, through AECI, felt it 
could gain entry into the Brazilian explosives sector by 
extending its association with SOFIN. Thus AECI entered 
into a joint venture with Empar. Their joint company, 
Explo, purchased IQM in March 1974, and consolidated it 
with the other explosives companies which Empar had 
acquired earlier. AECI's share was initially limited to 
3 0 per cent, and it was not until May 1979 when Empar 
honoured the 50/50 arrangement, reputedly selling the 
additional 20 per cent to AECI for US$5 million.
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Meanwhile the Portuguese revolution of 25 April 1974 
created a threat to Texeira Pinto. Before the new 
government could nationalise SOFIN, he relocated its 
operations in Luxembourg and Switzerland. Empar 
ostensibly passed into the control of its Brazilian 
directors, but still has an important and mysterious 
Swiss backer in the form of a company known as Dex 
Holdings, which experts believe is a cover for Texeira 
Pinto's operations.
Empar's directors include Gustavo Capanema (lawyer to 
Texeira Pinto and son of a former Brazilian minister of 
education) and Franco Torresi (an Italian-American 
enjoying close connections with Oppenheimer through 
association in a cellulose company in Angola, Celangol).
The Portuguese government subsequently sued Texeira Pinto 
for selling SOFIN's interest in Empar at far below market 
value. In a number of interviews, researchers and 
entrepreneurs expressed the view that neither Capanema 
nor Torresi possessed sufficient capital to make their 
numerous financial deals, and felt that they were likely 
to continue to act for Texeira Pinto. This view was 
echoed by the Brazilian government, which refused to 
sell, during a phase of denationalisation, its Federal de 
Seguros insurance company to the Capanema interests on 
the grounds of him being compromised with foreign 
backers. Once Capanema had made a number of readjustments 
to eliminate the appearance of foreign backing, his 
company Carmo (which owns 21 per cent of Empar) succeeded 
in a second bid for Federal de Seguros.
Anglo's bedfellows in the explosives sector were 
therefore regarded with substantial suspicion by sections 
of the Brazilian commercial community, as well as by the 
Portuguese government. Neither Anglo nor AECI has ever 
made mention of their association with Empar in any
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corporate annual reports, and shareholders are kept 
ignorant of the workings of the joint enterprise Ibex 
Participates SA, initiated with a capital of Cr$1.5 
million.88
One of the explosives factories owned by the joint 
venture is called Companhia de Explosivos Valparaiba - 
CEV. According to the Brazilian specialist defence press, 
CEV, based at Lorena in the state of Sao Paulo, supplies 
the Brazilian armed forces and numerous export customers 
with "various types of hand grenades, smoke grenades, 
smoke markers, smoke gas grenades for anti-riot use, 
fuses for various types of heavy ammunition, rockets for 
bazooka-type launchers, aircraft rockets of different 
types" as well as the Ml sub-machine gun.89 CEV uses the 
logic of "security reasons" to avoid divulging the names 
of countries to whom it sells its products.
Anglo's involvement in the lucrative Brazilian arms 
export industry raises numerous sensitive questions about 
the Corportion's image and activities.
9. EVALUATION
Anglo is keen to maintain and extend its Brazilian and 
Latin American involvement. In a short period of time it 
has developed into one of the key mining groups in 
Brazil, with substantial holdings and diversified 
interests. By 1982 it had become the largest foreign 
holder of prospecting rights in Brazil, preceded only by
88 See Ibex Participates SA, Ata de asembl&ia geral 
extraordinario em 23 de dezembro de 1.982 na sede social, 
Praia da Flamengo 200-202 andar, 22210 Rio de Janeiro, 
1982 .
89 Tecnologia e Defesa (Sao Paulo) 3, May 1983, p. 
15-17.
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the two large state-owned mining companies.90 It has 
provided technical inputs, rescuing the moribund gold 
mines of Morro Velho, bringing them back to former high 
levels of production, and investing in the opening of 
various new mines. It has linked its operations to the 
powerful Bozano Simonsen group and other multinationals 
such as Schenk and Banque de l'Indochine. It has 
supplanted the considerable Hochschild interests. By 
doing all this it has secured a permanent and strategic 
role for itself in the Brazilian economy, and ensured the 
durability of South Africa's economic connections with 
Brazil.
In the field of underground gold mining, other South 
African corporations have begun to regard Brazil as a 
potential source of profits. Anglo's rivals, General 
Mining and Goldfields of South Africa, have invested 
substantially in prospecting and mining in Minas Gerais 
and Bahia. This is partly due to the relative ease with 
which technology, already in use in South Africa, is 
adaptable to Brazilian usage. Another favourable factor 
is the premium offered for gold by the monopsonistic 
Brazilian government above the world market price. 
Although it may be difficult to remit dividends at first, 
high Brazilian interest rates, a product of inflation and 
economic crisis, may help to raise the level of 
accumulation for the foreign firms. This would assist 
them if they chose to diversify their investments using 
gold as a base.
In pioneering larger-scale South African investment in 
Brazil, the Anglo American Corporation has always 
received support and encouragement from successive 
Brazilian governments. Yet Itamaraty, sensitive to 
Brazil's important export prospects in other African
90 DFFM/PROSIG, Tabela 5, Grupos empresariais que 
detem maior no de diplomas legais, 10 August 1982.
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countries, has sought to distance itself from close 
relations with Pretoria. Diplomatic relations have been 
scaled down to a charge d ’affaires in Pretoria; Brazil's 
representation in Cape Town, the legislative capital, has 
ceased. And in 1985 the new civilian president, Jose 
Sarney, in reaction to the numerous police massacres in 
South African townships and the wave of repression 
unleashed after the declaration of a State of Emergency 
by President P W Botha, declared limited sanctions 
against the apartheid regime.
These sanctions reiterated what had become de facto 
policy towards South Africa: bans on arms sales, cultural 
and sports exchanges, and oil exports. Foreign Minister 
Olavo Setubal announced the presidential sanctions decree 
which saw apartheid as "a flagrant opposition to 
democratic principles ... against the conscience and 
human dignity." It condemned the South African government 
for having "unleashed violent repression against the 
black population".91
Despite the implementation of these sanctions, diplomatic 
and non-arms, non-oil trade relations remained intact. A 
combination of factors - recession, disinvestment, civil 
unrest, the collapse of the rand, and the debt crisis - 
forced the reintroduction of some foreign exchange 
control measures by the South African treasury. At the 
same time Brazil was experiencing hyperinflation, an 
enormous debt crisis and continued high levels of 
industrial protectionism. Trade and tourism fell off to 
the extent that, at one point, South African Airways 
contemplated the termination of its flights to Brazil.92
91 Cape Times, 10 August 1985.
92 Interview, South African Airways pilot, 6 February
1986.
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Anglo has utilised its Brazilian experience to expand its 
holdings in other Latin American countries. Through the 
purchase of the Hochschild company, Empresas 
Sudamericanas Consolidadas, it has acquired substantial 
investments in Argentina, Chile, Peru and Panama. Anglo 
has opened corporate offices in Buenos Aires and Santiago 
de Chile. The death in a fatal air crash of one of the 
company's senior geologists, prospecting in the Chilean 
Andes, was reported in late 1984. Gavin Relly, who took 
over as the corporation's chief executive when Harry 
Oppenheimer retired, paid a visit to various Latin 
American countries to inspect Anglo's operations in 1985, 
the first visit of an Anglo chairman since Oppenheimer's 
visit to President Geisel.
In assessing the impact of the Anglo investment on 
Brazilian-South African relations, it should be 
recognised that it forms the lynchpin of the whole 
relationship. Brazil at no stage included withdrawal of 
South African capital in its sanctions package. It was 
too seriously committed to the expansion of the gold 
mining industry, and reliant technologically on the South 
African companies for the extraction of gold found at 
deep levels.
The relationship has endured through a period in which 
the constituent assembly, set up to write the 
constitution of the nova republics from 1986. In the 
assembly there was much talk of nationalising mineral 
resources, and to curbing the power of foreign 
transnationals in the minerals sector. These debates made 
the South African corporations nervous, but ultimately 
the conservative political settlement upheld the status 
quo.
For its part, Anglo pre-empted the possibility of 
including mining in Brazil's anti-apartheid sanctions by
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ensuring that the holding companies of its investments in 
Brazil are technically registered in Luxembourg and 
Liberia, countries against which Brazil would not 
contemplate economic sanctions.
Itamaraty's "responsible pragmatism" helped justify the 
continued tolerance of the presence of South African 
capital in its mining industry, whilst applying rather 
ineffectual and rhetorical sanctions at the same time. 
Official invitations were extended to black South African 
leaders, first Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and, eighteen 
months after his February 1990 release, Nelson Mandela. 
Both the Sarney and Collor governments used these visits 
to attempt to curry favour with the huge Brazilian black 
community. Yet the visitors' schedules were hedged in 
with red tape, and very little contact was allowed to 
occur with popular organisations or black community 
activists. The government intended the visitors to be 
impressed by Brazil's superficial racial harmony; instead 
their presence drew attention to the question of racial 
disadvantage and the near-genocide of indigenous 
Brazilians. Soon after Mandela's visit, the Collor 
government acted in concert with the US, Japan and 
Western Europe to do away with sanctions against the de 
Klerk government, despite Mandela's earlier pleas that 
they be maintained until the introduction of a democratic 
constitution.
Brazil's political flexibility meant that the Anglo 
investment was never likely to be in jeopardy for 
political reasons. To maintain this status quo it became 
important for the Corporation to play down its national 
origins. Nevertheless it was not entirely able to 
distance itself from its South African profile. A level 
of collusion with South African diplomats certainly
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existed.93
Foreign direct investment, more than trade, ephemeral 
military links, or settlement of communities, has proved 
the most important element of South Africa's relationship 
with Latin America in the contemporary period. This 
proposition will be demonstrated in the ensuing chapters.
93 For example, the Corporation admitted to the 
author that an early draft of this chapter, obtained 
clandestinely by the South African consulate-general in 
Rio de Janeiro, had been passed on to the Corporation's 
head office in Johannesburg.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SOUTH AFRICA'S RELATIONS WITH CHILE
The political ambiguity which afflicted the Brazilian 
generals and politicians was not for long a factor 
troubling the Chilean junta after it came to power. 
Although there was some initial wrestling with the idea 
of strengthening ties with the Afro-Asian bloc, the 
Chilean government soon decided on an open relationship 
with its South African counterparts. The generals on both 
sides understood the same language, shared similar 
training and ideological formation, and a common 
ruthlessness with respect to political opposition and 
human rights. These considerations seemed to predominate 
in South Africa's links with Chile between 1973 and 1990. 
Unlike Brazil, where South Africa was tolerated for 
economic reasons, in Chile the political and ideological 
considerations cemented the relationship, and economic 
ties were an acceptable spinoff.
This chapter provides some background on the junta's 
revision of Chile's traditional foreign policy consensus, 
the process of its political institutionalisation, its 
experimentation with neo-liberal economic strategies, and 
its increasing international isolation. These factors 
permitted the possibility of a growing relationship with 
Pretoria, which was itself undergoing the militarisation 
of its political structures. The two regimes began to 
collaborate on a series of military and police exchanges,
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the concealment of international outlaws, the 
implementation of states of emergency, and the 
development of the arms trade. South Africa's armaments 
industry received the contract to build new naval 
facilities in Southern Chile. South African direct 
investment entered Chile's fishing and mining industry. 
Trade grew to some extent, but was a less significant 
element of a highly politicised relationship. Links with 
Chile prompted debate and resistance inside South 
Africa's growing popular movement.
The relationship cannot be seen outside the context of 
political struggle in Chile during the early 1970s. 
Salvador Allende, the world's first democratically 
elected Marxist president, attempted redistributionist 
reforms, but these opened the way to intense social 
division. The middle classes, whose politicians steadily 
lost support in the Allende years, increasingly turned to 
the army to intervene. After staving off a series of 
political crises, Allende incorporated military officers 
into his cabinet, but it was already too late. With US 
support the more extreme officers staged a bloody 
intervention to eradicate Allende, Popular Unity and the 
social movement which had underpinned the government.
1. CONTINUITY IN CHILE'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1973
On coming to power in September 1973, the Chilean 
military junta initiated a significant shift in the 
country's economic and political life. According to 
economist Stephany Griffith-Jones, "a clear break with 
the country's tradition of a 'compromise' democratic 
state was made." 1
1 Stephany Griffith-Jones, Chile to 1991: the end of 
an era?, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987, p.
48.
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In order to demonstrate the extent of this shift, it is 
worth describing some of the contours of Chilean foreign 
policy making since the end of the Second World War.
In the period between 1945 and 1973, there was a degree 
of continuity and overlap between the foreign policies of 
different Chilean administrations irrespective of their 
political complexions. This was partly due to the stable 
constitutional transition from one civilian government to 
another throughout the period, coupled with the 
continuity and professionalism of the foreign policy 
bureaucracy. It was also due to the consensus which 
developed around the growing assertion of Chilean 
territorial and economic sovereignty, and a pragmatic 
attitude towards global realities.
Whilst the country's foreign policy orientation was 
alignment with the West during the years of the Cold War, 
there was also a considerable degree of independent 
action. Against Washington's will, Chile doggedly 
defended its Antarctic claims, its right to a 200-mile 
stretch of territorial waters, and the renegotiation of 
its agreement with the United States-owned copper 
companies.2
Under the conservative administration of Jorge Alessandri 
(1958-64), autonomy from the United States on the 
question of Cuba was maintained. Chile did not support 
moves initiated by the United States in the Organisation 
of American States (OAS) to condemn, exclude and apply 
sanctions against the Castro government. At the 1962 OAS 
meeting at Punta del Este in Uruguay, Chile abstained on 
the vote to exclude Cuba; it also abstained on the
2 Manfred Wilhelmy, "Hacia un analisis de la politica 
exterior chilena contemporanea", Estudos Internacionales 
48, October-December 1979, pp. 457-58.
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sanctions vote in 1964. When the decisions went in favour 
of sanctions, Chile reluctantly complied with the OAS 
position.3
Within the international framework of detente, Eduardo 
Frei's Christian Democrat administration (1964-70) re­
established diplomatic and trade links with the Soviet 
Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and 
Rumania. Relations improved to the point where in 1968 
the Soviet Union provided Chile with loans to the value 
of US$42 million for industrial development, and export 
credits to finance purchases of Soviet machine tools.4
At this time also, despite his reputation as the 
archetypal Latin American partner in the Kennedy- 
sponsored Alliance for Progress, Frei "Chileanised" the 
largest American-controlled copper mining companies, 
bringing them under majority (51%) ownership by the 
Chilean parastatal mining company.5 Chile*s position as 
a key copper exporter led it to play an active part in 
CIPEC, the Inter-governmental Council of Copper Exporting 
Countries. This brought it into closer relationships with 
the other copper-producing countries of the Third World, 
especially with Peru, Zambia and Zaire. Chile thus began 
to develop an identity as a country with interests in 
common with others in Latin America, Africa and Asia. It 
strengthened its participation in regional and global
3 Otto Boye Soto, "Chile y el interamericanismo en 
las ultimas decadas", Mensaje 20, September-October 1971, 
pp. 494-501.
4 See Manfred Wilhelmy, Chilean foreign policy: 
the Frei government, 1964-70, Ph D thesis, Princeton 
University, 1973.
5 "The story of copper and imperialism: 'They took 
the copper and left us the holes' ", in NACLA Chile 
Project, New Chile, Berkeley: North American Congress on 
Latin America, 1973, pp. 115-6.
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organisations such as the Andean Pact and the Non-aligned 
Movement. Frei drew Chile closer to other Latin American 
countries in leading a regional move to develop a common 
negotiationg position, the Vina del Mar Consensus, in 
relation to the United States.
Washington's growing disaproval of Frei's foreign policy 
initiatives led to a withdrawal of aid from Chile.
Whereas in 19 65 Chile had accounted for approximately 15% 
of United States economic aid to Latin America, and 5.7% 
of Eximbank credits to the region, by 1970 these shares 
had dropped to 4.3% and 0% respectively.6
Under the administration of Salvador Allende (1970-73), 
Chile's non-aligned profile was extended. Relations with 
the socialist countries were expanded to include new 
diplomatic links with China, the German Democratic 
Republic, North Korea and North Vietnam. The decision was 
taken to reverse compliance with the OAS position on 
Cuba, and so realign Chile with its original desire to 
maintain diplomatic and economic links with Havana.
Castro undertook an extended tour of Chile in November- 
December 197l.7
Allende also nationalised the copper companies by taking 
over the remaining share formerly held by US-based 
companies. This policy was not just that of Popular 
Unity, but had also been contained in the manifesto of 
the unsuccessful Christian Democrat rival for the
6 Heraldo Munoz and Carlos Portales, "The United 
States and Chile" in Robert Wesson & Heraldo Munoz 
(eds.), American views of United States policy, New York: 
Praeger, 1986, pp. 131-133.
7 Carlos Fortin, "Principled pragmatism in the face 
of external pressure: the foreign policy of the Allende 
government", in Ronald G Heilman and H J Rosenbaum 
(eds.), Latin America: the search for a new international 
role, New York: John Wiley, 1975, p. 219.
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presidency in 1970, Radomiro Tomic.8
Thus, prior to military rule, a clear trajectory in 
Chilean foreign policy becomes visible: an independent 
pragmatic assertion of national values and economic 
claims, a heightened identification with regional and 
other Third World ideological and economic positions, and 
a growing commitment to non-alignment.9
In the form elaborated by Allende, the logic of this 
position constituted a perceived threat to the regional 
interests of the United States on the one hand, and to 
certain sections of the Chilean domestic elite on the 
other. It became one of the elements in their mutual 
catalogue of complaints about the Popular Unity 
government. It also constituted part of the argument they 
combined to make in favour of the destabilisation and 
ultimate ousting of Allende.10
On taking power, the junta made a fundamental rupture 
with the post-war trajectory in Chile's foreign 
relations.
It moved away from the pragmatic diplomatic style of its 
predecessors, which had involved strict respect for
8 NACLA Chile Project, New Chile, Berkeley: NACLA, 
1973 edn, p. 4.
9 More conservative scholars, like Pittman, have 
failed to appreciate these continuities and have 
portrayed the Allende government as having engineered a 
break in Chile's traditional foreign policy. See Howard 
Pittman, "Chilean foreign policy: the pragmatic pursuit 
of geopolitical goals", in Jennie K Lincoln and Elizabeth 
G Ferris (eds), The dynamics of Latin American foreign 
policies: challenges for the 1980s, Boulder: Westview, 
1984, pp. 127-30.
10 For an analysis of the role of the United States 
in Allende's downfall, see James F Petras and Morris M 
Morley, How Allende fell: a study in US-Chilean 
relations, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1974, esp. pp. 99-117.
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international law, support for democracy, recognition of 
international power realities, and the management of 
foreign policy by career diplomats.
Instead the military adopted what Munoz has called a 
"praetorian-ideological" style. The latter is 
characterised by a break with past pragmatism, a strong 
emphasis on anti-communist ideology, a rejection of 
compromise and negotiation, a suspicion of career 
diplomats and a preference for using military personnel 
in the conduct of Chilean foreign policy.11
This was accompanied, as in all aspects of Pinochet's 
rule, by a significant concentration of power in the 
executive. Pinochet soon developed the capacity to 
intervene in all significant decisions about the conduct 
of Chile's international relations.
The consequences of the junta's ideological style 
included significant international isolation for the 
regime. This will be examined after looking at the ways 
in which the armed forces consolidated their political 
power and embarked, with the support of technocrats, on a 
major revision of Chile's economic policies.
2. INSTITUTIONALISING THE MILITARY REGIME
The death of Allende in La Moneda, the presidential 
palace, marked the end of Popular Unity and the 
democratic process for a period of sixteen years.
On taking power the junta saw its primary task as
11 Heraldo Munoz, "Chile's external relations under 
the military government", in J Samuel Valenzuela and 
Arturo Valenzuela (eds), Military rule in Chile: 
dictatorship and oppositions, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1986, pp. 310-11.
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eliminating all vestiges of the former governments 
political and economic projects. It aimed to undertake 
this by destroying all forms of popular mobilisation 
favouring worker control over the economy, 
redistribution, nationalisation, radical land reform, and 
the extension of democratic socialism. Since the popular 
movement had succeeded in articulating its demands 
through the traditional democratic political structures, 
the junta felt obliged to dismantle these structures and 
to do away with the forms of democratic representation 
which had been responsive to mass mobilisation. The new 
junta took over the univer-sities, banned Marxist 
political parties while declaring the others in recess, 
restricted collective bargaining, abolished strikes, 
cancelled local elections, and declared a State of Siege 
which did away with the rule of law. By 1977 it had also 
closed down the Chilean Congress.
Simultaneously with taking power it embarked on the 
brutal persecution of the most prominent supporters of 
Popular Unity. In a reign of terror, tens of thousands 
were openly murdered, caused to "disappear" without 
trace, detained indefinitely, tortured, or forced into 
internal or foreign exile. These actions aimed at 
eliminating all traces of Popular Unity politics, and 
breaking the strength of those trade unions and community 
organisations which had provided it with support.
Although it possessed no discernable economic project at 
the outset, the junta was easily persuaded by a group of 
Chicago-trained economists to implement a new economic 
model for Chile. These "Chicago boys" were strongly 
influenced by the ideas of Professor Milton Friedman, who 
favoured an end to the state sector and strict control of 
the money supple. The junta gave the "Chicago boys" carte 
blanche to redesign the economy radically. They set about 
reversing the land reform, deregulating economic
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activities, privatising the nationalised firms and 
parastatal services, and eliminating protectionism.
The junta came to see implementation of the new economic 
model as a corollary of what it perceived to be its 
political tasks.
The physical decimation and political destruction of 
opponents enabled the military to consolidate its power 
and to introduce such sweeping economic and social 
changes without encountering any major domestic political 
challenge.
Garreton has referred to these changes as a coherent "new 
historical project" n, akin to but slightly predating 
the economic project of the Thatcher government in 
Britain. It was a project that appealed stongly to the 
right-wing sectors which had dominated Chilean society 
prior to 1964, but which had lost their social and 
political hegemony in the Frei and increasingly in the 
Allende years. The project was designed to restore their 
power by demobilising the popular movement decisively.
3. ECONOMIC POLICIES
The implementation of the principles of Milton Friedman 
had a devastating effect on the Chilean economy.
Inflation, bankruptcies and unemployment rose to heights 
which far surpassed the much-criticised economic record 
of the Popular Unity administration. Deregulation,
12 Manuel Antonio Garreton , "The political evolution 
of the Chilean military regime and problems in the 
transition to democracy", in O'Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead (eds), Transitions from authoritarian rule: 
Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986, p. 98.
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privatisation and denationalisation led to an 
unprecedented concentration of capital in the hands of 
the larger Chilean corporations, which were the only 
firms of sufficient strength to survive and benefit from 
the changes.
The junta's economists opened the economy to full 
international competition, and did away with the last 
vestiges of the import subtitution industrialisation 
model. As a result, Chile's secondary industry withered 
away, and stress was once again placed on the export of 
raw materials. Cellulose and paper, fruit and wine, sea 
products and minerals became the largest foreign exchange 
earners. As the largest employer, the state sector, was 
slowly dismantled, thousands of manual and clerical jobs 
were shed. Pension schemes and social services were 
privatised, and many of the private firms were unable to 
run them on an unsubsidised basis, resulting in their 
collapse and the subsequent loss and erosion of hard- 
earned but badly invested individual benefits.
Although Chile came to be regarded by the early 1990s as 
a paragon of structural adjustment programmes by the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
indicating these institutions' political support for the 
former junta's "new historical model", the 
intensification of poverty, unemployment, inequality of 
incomes and wealth, class polarisation, deterioration of 
social services, and curtailment of civil liberties have 
been a high price borne by the Chilean people.
Escalating poverty, job insecurity, privatisation, 
punitive new labour laws and systematic repression all 
combined to weaken popular mobilisation. In the place of 
high levels of mobilisation of the late 1960s and early 
1970s, these processes engendered social atomisation, 
depoliticisation and the widespread resort to individual
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survival strategies. This clearly served the junta's "new 
historical project", producing a superficially quiescent 
working class.
This factor, together with the ending of high external 
tariffs, and the payment of compensation to the copper 
companies and other firms expropriated by Allende, paved 
the way for renewed direct and indirect foreign 
investment in the Chilean economy.
TABLE 7.1
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE, 1976-88 (in US $ million)
1976 150
1977 535
1978 1 293
1979 1 719
1980 233
1981 2 490
1982 525
1983 328
1984 80
1985 421
1986 263
1987 563
1988 1 950
Sources: Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated states, Johannesburg: 
Jonathan Ball, 1990, table 11.2, p. 379, based on 
Statistical synthesis of Chile, 1976-80, Santiago:
Central Bank of Chile, September 1981, p. 25; Statistical 
synthesis of Chile, 1981-85, Santiago: Central Bank of 
Chile, July 1986, p. 42; Chile: Foreign Investment Report 
4, March-April 1988, p. 2; Chile Economic Report 204,
July 1988, p. 3; and ibid. 210, January 1989, p. 4.
Although the period 197 6-88 saw considerable fluctuations 
(see Table 7.1), Chile received foreign investments 
totalling US$ 10.5 billion over 13 years and averaging at 
US$ 811.5 million per year. Lows in the mid-1980s 
occurred when investor confidence began to fall off due 
to renewed mass mobilisation against the junta. Former 
high levels of foreign investment only resumed in the 
late 1980s once the transition to a more stable democracy 
seemed to be under way.
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However the total amount has, relatively speaking, been 
low and foreign investment has been restricted mostly to 
the mining sector and to the purchase of local 
enterprises, the latter adding little to the economy's 
productive capacity.
4. INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN 
POLICY UNDER THE MILITARY
The new injections of foreign investment and the opening 
of the Chilean economy both contrasted with the 
increasing diplomatic and political isolation which the 
junta encountered on the world stage.
The gross violation by the Chilean armed forces of the 
human rights of its citizens and many foreign nationals 
was the main cause for the junta being ostracised.
Forty thousand Chilean political exiles found homes in 
countries all over Europe as well as in North America, 
Australia and Latin America. There they formed strong 
lobbies which acted with local support to draw attention 
to the junta's crimes and to press for its isolation.
Supporters of liberal, social democratic and socialist 
parties outside Chile were outraged that the junta had 
overthrown a democratically elected president and 
congress in a country in which peaceful democratic 
changes of regime had been the political norm.
These pressures were intensified when foreign nationals 
became victims of the junta and its secret police. The 
revelation of the torturing of British national Dr Sheila 
Cassidy led to a rupture in relations with the British 
government. Similarly both France and Sweden responded to 
the death at the hands of a Chilean naval officer of a 
young woman who held citizenship of both countries.
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At first the United States gave full support to the 
junta. Nixon and, after his resignation, Ford backed the 
rescheduling of Chilean debt in the Paris Club, and 
encouraged the international financial institutions to 
provide the junta with large amounts of aid.13
But the incoming Carter administration was more sensitive 
to human rights violations, and Washington began to 
reconsider its support for the junta.
In response to the 1976 assassination in Washington of a 
former finance minister of Chile, Orlando Letelier, and 
his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, the United States 
suspended diplomatic links, and amongst other measures, 
dropped all export credits to Chile.14
Australia, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Zambia also 
suspended or downgraded their representation in Santiago 
on the grounds of human rights violations, while 
Argentina, Peru and Bolivia temporarily severed or 
reduced links due to longstanding territorial disputes.
Representatives of Cuba were expelled from Chile and 
diplomatic relations with the countries of Eastern 
Europe, the Soviet Union, North Korea and North Vietnam 
were terminated. China, which at that stage identified 
the Soviet Union as its chief enemy, retained and 
extended its relationship with the junta.
In the General Assembly of the United Nations, the 
junta's human rights record was systematically denounced
13 Heraldo Munoz, "Autoritarismo y politica exterior: 
el caso chileno, 1973-81" (mimeo.), Santiago de Chile: 
Universidad de Chile Instituto de Relaciones 
Internacionales, May 1981, p. 9.
14 These sanctions were all reversed in January 1982, 
after Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency of the United 
States.
255
from the twenty-ninth session (1974-5) onwards, 
particularly in a resolution in December 1977 condemning 
continuing violations.15 A special rapporteur on Chile 
was appointed to the UN Commission on Human Rights. In 
General Assemblies of the Organisation of American States 
(OAS), similar denunciations occurred, and Chile also 
became a focus of attention of the OAS-sponsored Inter- 
American Human Rights Commission. The International 
Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International were both 
responsible for alerting the world to the continued 
violations of human rights in Chile.
The junta was placed on the offensive. Initially it 
became concerned to restore its tarnished reputation in 
the international community. It spent millions of dollars 
on a press and publicity campaign abroad justifying its 
seizure and continued exercise of power. Known as 
"Operacion Verdad" - Operation Truth 16, this propaganda 
offensive targeted those it considered its enemies with a 
crudeness which ignored the international mood of detente 
and respect for human rights. The campaign only 
emphasised the junta's record, and served to antagonise 
world opinion even further.
After the initial condemnation by the General Assembly in 
December 1974, the Chilean foreign ministry submitted a 
confidential memorandum to Pinochet designing a strategy 
for improving the junta's image abroad and ending its 
isolation. To win allies in the international arena, it 
argued, Chile would have to return to a situation where 
career diplomats and trained civilians are added to the
15 See Table 9.1, UN Voting Record on Condemnation of 
the Chilean Human Rights Situation, in Munoz, "Chile's 
external relations under the military government", 1986, 
p. 319, which shows that between 1975 and 1980, over two- 
thirds of member-states consistently voted to condemn 
Chile in the General Assembly.
16 Munoz, "Chile's external relations", p. 314.
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roster of ambassadors and diplomatic representatives. The 
foreign ministry also argued for attempts to develop 
closer ties with Third World countries, especially those 
in Africa and the Middle East.17
General Pinochet showed little interest in listening to 
the voice of the career diplomats of the foreign 
ministry, and chose to pursue the "praetorian- 
ideological" path which suited the nature of his regime. 
Whilst economic relations with most countries were 
retained, their political friendship was sacrificed on 
the altar of institutionalising the regime in Chile.
Since international political alliances with major 
trading partners were impossible, Chile turned towards 
those countries which were similarly isolated for their 
hardline opposition to Soviet communism, democracy, human 
rights, and domestic redistribution of resources.
5. ESTABLISHING STRONGER LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa seemed a perfect example of a regime in a 
similar ideological position. Yet the foreign ministry 
memorandum favoured escalation of relations with sub- 
Saharan African countries critical of Pretoria. Chile 
stood a chance of forfeiting the trust of other African 
countries, especially of fellow copper producer nations 
like Zambia, through the improvement of links with 
Pretoria.
In an extract subsequently leaked to a Mexican newspaper,
17 Chile Democratico, Pretoria-Santiago: a chronology 
of collusion, New York: Chile Democratico, May 1976, p.
2.
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the memorandum had advised that:
We ought to guard against public demonstration 
of our links with this country because of the 
degree of its international isolation.18 
This indicated no intention to curb the existing links; 
instead the aim was to disguise them.
Nevertheless the junta responded with muted enthusiasm to 
overtures from Pretoria for closer economic, cultural, 
diplomatic and military relations.
In May 1975, Pretoria sent ambassador Hendrik Geldenhuys, 
accredited to Argentina, on a mission to Chile. After 
meeting with top officials of the junta, it was agreed 
that Geldenhuys would also be accredited to Chile, whilst 
continuing to be based in Buenos Aires. This was to be an 
interim measure until embassies could be established in 
each other's capitals. It marked the upgrading of 
diplomatic relations from the level of honorary 
consulships to full, but non-resident, ambassadorial 
links.
Not wishing to jeopardise prospective relationships with 
other African countries, Chile at first insisted that 
relations with South Africa be maintained at a low 
profile. South Africa quietly opened an embassy in 
Santiago. It provided Chile with a loan of US$ 450 
million in exchange for Chile formalising its diplomatic 
relations by opening an official legation in Pretoria. 
Chile's previous reticence about opening the embassy was 
reputed to be due to the continued influence of the 
career diplomats and the 1974 secret memorandum.19
18 Excelsior (Mexico City), 21 May 1977. Own 
translation.
19 Chile Democratico, Pretoria-Santiago, p. 6.
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Chile's surprising but more or less consistent voting in 
support of resolutions which condemned apartheid and 
South African occupation of Namibia in the General 
Assembly of the United Nations was also a legacy of this 
trend towards conciliating international, and especially 
Third World opinion.20
Yet, after the persistent condemnations of the junta's 
human rights record in the UN General Assembly, Chile put 
aside any attempts at political posturing. The realities 
of isolation meant that the junta was unlikely to win 
support from countries other than those already notorious 
for human rights abuses. It drew closer to those 
countries like South Africa whose friendships offered 
respite against isolation and embattlement in a 
relatively hostile international system.
For example, Chile refused to attend a UN conference in 
support of Namibian and Zimbabwean independence held in 
Maputo, the capital of Mozambique, in May 1977. Its 
rationale for non-attendance was ostensibly the 
"offensive terms" used by Mozambican President Samora 
Machel in referring to the Chilean government as "the 
bloody Pinochet regime" in a joint communique published 
with Cuba during the previous March.21 In reality,
Chile's growing rapport with South Africa would have made 
it difficult to attend the Maputo conference without 
incurring substantial anger from the Frontline states in 
particular towards Chile's treatment of South Africa.
By October 1978, Chile was playing host to South Africa's 
Deputy Minister for the Interior, Louis le Grange. During 
a goodwill visit, le Grange was exposed to counterparts
20 Deon Geldenhuys, Isolated states: a comparative 
analysis, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1990, p. 261.
21 Associated Press wire published in The Argus, 10 
May 1977.
in government, as well as industrialists in the state and 
private sectors of the economy, and experts in 
constitutional reform.
Le Grange declared his interest "especially in all those 
areas to do with the reconstruction of the country after 
the experience of the previous government" and drew 
attention to "the strategic importance of South Africa 
considering the dangers posed by those who threaten 
Western democracy." 22
6. MILITARY DIPLOMACY
In the course of evolving their relationship, the two 
regimes at first provided mutual support for each other's 
ideological positions. Later this support was to mature 
into a strong military collaboration, something which 
both regimes found useful in the face of arms boycotts 
and sales embargos. Both countries sought to assist one 
another in the procurement, manufacturing and 
distribution of weaponry.
It was also in the realm of counter-insurgency where the 
two regimes had the potential to exchange useful 
information and personnel. Claims were made by SWAPO and 
Chilean exiles23 that Chilean mercenaries were fighting 
alongside South African troops against SWAPO forces in 
Namibia.24
22 Inter-Press Service wire, "Chile: subsecretario 
del interior de Sudafrica en visita de 'buena voluntad'", 
20 October 1978. Own translation.
23 Inter Press Service wire, Maputo, 20 May 1977; The 
Times, 18 January 1978; The Star (international airmail 
edn), 4 February 1978.
24 Previous reports in New Nigerian, March 1976, 
Noticias, December 1976, Algerie Actualite, April 1977, 
and Soviet news agency reports claimed that Chilean 
troops, trained in the Panama Canal Zone by US forces,
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Diplomatic representation came increasingly to be shaped 
around the militarised nature of the relationship. For 
example, the first posting of Chile's most senior 
representative in South Africa, its consul-general, was 
filled by a naval officer, Captain Carlos Ashton, in 
January 1976.
Ashton was not only a direct representative of the 
military junta but had also been a key spokesperson of 
the traditional ruling oligarchy in Chile. As a right- 
wing nationalist he had supported the presidential 
campaign of Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the 
National Party, in 1970. During the Allende years, he had 
been manager of Radio Agricultura, which had been 
instrumental in organising the oligarchy's political 
response to Allende and consolidating its links with 
politically ambitious military officers.
Radio Agricultura became the mouthpiece for those forces 
later taking part in the overthrow of Allende, and as 
manager of the station, Ashton participated in setting up 
radio equipment in the Ministry of Defence which was used 
on the day of the coup and in succeeding months to 
broadcast the orders of the junta.
Under the new regime, Ashton was rewarded with a position 
in the foreign ministry, that of head of the Department 
of Foreign Publicity. His skills as a propagandist for 
the dictatorship abroad were acknowledged by the 
ministry, which felt that he would obtain useful 
experience in observing Pretoria's own propaganda 
efforts.25
were sent to Northern Namibia and Southern Angola at the 
start of 1976. They were identified by their black 
berets.
25 Chile-Democratico, Pretoria-Santiago, p. 7.
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At this time South Africa's ambassador to Chile was non­
resident, being based in Buenos Aires. Instead the 
embassy was filled with a career charge d 1affairs and 
military attaches for each of the armed services. On 7 
August 1975 a round of talks was initiated by the South 
African army attache in Santiago, Colonel John Edward 
Lello, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Chilean 
Air Force, General Jose Berdichewsky. Lello was 
accompanied by naval attache John Charles Ferris, and air 
force attache Pierre Frangois Gouws. Agendas being 
impossible to obtain, it can only be surmised that these 
discussions mapped out future military collaboration 
between the two countries.26
By March 1978 Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, one of the
four original members of the junta, was playing host to
South African Air Force Commander General Robert Rogers.
At a ceremony to mark the 48th anniversary of the Chilean
Air Force, General Leigh decorated General Roberts with
the Chilean Grand Star of Military Merit. In responding
to this honour, Roberts stated:
Chile and South Africa face the same problem - 
the attack of international communism. You have 
achieved a great victory over it, and we can 
learn much from your experience because we have 
decided to prevent the infiltration of 
international communism.27
During September 1979, it was the turn of General Magnus 
Malan, then Chief of the South African Defence Force, to 
pay an official visit to Chile, via Paraguay.28
Son of a former National Party member of parliament and
26 ibid., p. 11.
27 Daily Dispatch, 22 March 1978. As a result of 
losing a power struggle with Pinochet, Leigh was sacked 
on 24 July 1978. See Florencia Varas, Gustavo Leigh: el 
general disidente, Santiago de Chile: Aconcagua, 1980.
28 Die Transvaler, 17 September 1979.
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scientist, it is significant that Malan is one of the few 
South African to have graduated from an officer training 
programme at Fort Leavenworth in the United States. The 
fact that Fort Leavenworth has produced many of the 
officers involved in the series of coups in Latin America 
during the 1960s and 1970s has bearing on the increased 
political role of the South African Defence Force. The US 
training emphasised the combating of communism in Latin 
America and Indo-China, as well as civic and political 
action by the military as a counter-revolutionary 
technique.29
General Magnus Malan was also the closest military 
associate of P W Botha, who was chosen as prime minister 
in 1978. Botha retained his longstanding portfolio of 
defence, but two years later appointed Malan to succeed 
him as defence minister. As the key author of the 
ideology of the "total strategy", given authority in the 
1977 Defence White Paper, Malan politicised the role of 
the South African armed forces in line with his ideology. 
He reorganised and co-ordinated the military bureaucracy, 
built strong links between the military and the cabinet, 
as well as between the military and the private sector 
(epitomised in the growth of the para-statal arms 
manufacturers 30) and was responsible for supporting
29 Philip H Frankel, Pretoria's praetorians: civil- 
military relations in South Africa, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, p. 65.
30 On Armscor see Philip Frankel, Pretoria's 
praetorians, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, 
pp. 84-90; Gavin Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war 
machine, London: IDAF, 1986; William Cobbett,
"Apartheid's army and the arms embargo", pp. 232-43 in 
Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan (eds), War and society: 
the militarisation of South Africa, Cape Town: David 
Philip, 1989; Graeme Simpson, "The politics and economics 
of the armaments industry in South Africa", pp. 217-31 in 
Cock and Nathan (eds), op. cit.; James McWilliams, 
Armscor: South Africa's arms merchants, London:
Brassey's, 1989.
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numerous cross-border operations and counter­
revolutionary movements.
Malan's visit was therefore regarded as an escalation of 
the military diplomacy being conducted with Chile. It 
laid the ground for top level discussions about how 
Armscor and allied South African arms companies could 
breach the embargoes placed on weapons sales to Chile by 
the USA, Britain, France and other advanced producer 
countries.
Malan's visit was reciprocated in April 1981 by a two- 
week trip to South Africa by Admiral Jose Merino, Chief 
of the Chilean Navy and effectively second only to 
Pinochet in the junta. Merino was accompanied by his own 
second-in-command, Rear Admiral Francisco Ghisolfo and 
three other officers. Merino and his party were treated 
to extensive access to South African naval facilities.31
In 1981 Pretoria took the decision to appoint a resident 
ambassador to Chile. It is significant that its first 
choice for ambassador was not, as would otherwise be 
usual, a career diplomat. Instead Pretoria dispatched one 
of its top military men, Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton,
to the new posting. 32
General Dutton had previously been Chief of Staff 
(Operations), the number two position in the South 
African Defence Force. Like his superior, Magnus Malan, 
he had also been an early exponent of the ideology which
became known as the "total strategy", the South African
31 "Links between the RSA and Chile strengthened", 
Paratus 32, 5, May 1981, pp. 24-5.
32 David Fig, "Chile gets the full treatment", Third 
World Review, The Guardian, 17 June 1981.
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variant of the ideology of national security. 33
Within South Africa, his appointment to Santiago was 
regarded as something of a sideways promotion, to 
eliminate him from any further rise to power at military 
headquarters. This was apparently a common way of dealing 
with ambitious Anglophones. Outside South Africa, the 
appointment drew attention to the close military links 
between the two states.
Dutton's role was not simply that of diplomatic 
representa-tive, but his brief included the active 
promotion of strong military collaboration. Having first­
hand familiarity with the needs and capabilities of the 
South African Defence Force as well as state arms 
manufacturers Armscor, Dutton was well placed to utilise 
the Chilean connection to acquire, sell and broker arms.
At his first press conference in Chile, Dutton 
highlighted the fact that relations between the two 
countries, "the main anti-Marxist stalwarts", were very 
cordial; bilateral trade had grown by 400% in recent 
years, surpassing US$ 400 million in 1980. The Ambassador 
claimed he was particularly interested in promoting 
political exchanges, but denied that there was any secret 
military pact between Pretoria and Santiago.34
33 Lieutenant-General Jack Dutton, "The military 
aspects of national security", in Michael H H Louw (ed.), 
National security: a modern approach, Papers presented at 
the Symposium on National Security, Pretoria, 31 March - 
1 April 1977, Pretoria: University of Pretoria Institute 
of Strategic Studies, 1978, pp. 100-121. Frankel claims 
that the ideology "appears to have very little 
intellectual content independent of (the writings of 
French general and strategist Andre Beaufre)". See his 
Pretoria1s praetorians, p. 46, and Beaufre's An 
introduction to strategy, London: Faber & Faber, 1963.
34 Santiago radio, monitored on 15 July 1981. BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 July 1981.
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According to the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, the first major deal occurred when South Africa 
sold Chile 12 Cactus surface-to-air missiles, equivalent 
to the French Crotale system produced locally under 
licence.35
Argentine suspicions of the arms trade between Chile and 
South Africa were raised in the disputed Beagle Channel 
area, when Argentine gunboats intercepted a Greek 
freighter at the entrance to the Straits of Magellan. 
Thought to be delivering a shipment of weapons from 
Durban to Valparaiso, the ship had docked earlier at the 
Chilean port of Punta Arenas, and no arms were discovered 
by the Argentine navy.36
Close naval links were manifested in the visits of the 
four-masted barquentine B.E. Esmeralda, normally used as 
a training ship.37 Immediately after the 1973 coup, this 
vessel had been used for the internment and alleged 
torture of sailors loyal to the Popular Unity 
government.38 From the mid-1970s, a South African naval 
officer has been included in the training exercises 
undertaken by the Esmeralda, Official visits to South 
Africa took place in 1977, 1981, 1985 and 1988.
35 International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
Military balance, 1981-82, London: IISS, 1982, p. 94.
36 El Mercurio, 16 July 1980; Die Beeld, 11 July
1980.
37 See the brochure produced by Chile's Naval 
Publications Centre, Chile: B,E, Esmeralda Chilean Navy 
Training Cruise, Santiago, n.d. (c. 1975).
38 In a 1976 report, Amnesty International stated: 
"On the boat Esmeralda, anchored off the shore of 
Valparaiso, prisoners were allegedly left naked and tied 
to the masts of the boat. At times prisoners were forced 
to witness the torture and death of others.." Amnesty 
International, Report on torture, London: Duckworth, 
revised edn., 1976, p. 207.
266
In 1981 its visit coincided with the twentieth 
anniversary of the foundation of the apartheid Republic. 
Chilean sailors and midshipmen goose-stepped through the 
streets of Durban in the official military parade, and 
visitors to the ship included Mrs Elize Botha, the prime 
minister's wife, who was "visibly moved" when the crew 
sang the Republic's anthem, "Die Stem", in Afrikaans.39
Later the same year, General Cesar Mendoza, another 
member of the junta and director-general of the 
carabineros (police) visited South Africa for two weeks 
on the official invitation of the Pretoria government. On 
his return to Chile he announced that relations between 
the two countries were "getting better every day and we 
will improve them even more."40
By February 1982, relations had warmed to such an extent 
that both governments agreed to the appointment of the 
first Chilean ambassador to South Africa, Major-General L 
J Ramirez.41 One of Ramirez's first tasks was to arrange 
the visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the South African 
Air Force to Chile. Lieutenant-General Anthony "Mike" 
Muller met Pinochet on 22 March to discuss military co­
operation.42
The significant number of diplomatic exchanges between 
Chile and South Africa were dominated by military
39 Armed Forces, June 1981, pp. 17-21.
40 Santiago home service, 16h3 0 GMT, 31 October 1981, 
monitored in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 November
1981.
41 Monitored from South African Broadcasting 
Corporation, Johannesburg, 1 February 1982, BBC Summary 
of World Broadcasts, 3 February 1982.
42 Monitored from Santiago home service, 0001 GMT, 23 
March 1982, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/6987, 25 
March 1982, p. B/7.
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personnel. This was an outcome of the extensive 
militarisation of both societies from the mid-1970s, as 
well as their increasing ideological congruence. The 
shift which had occurred since then was one from low- 
level and low profile contact, with limited diplomatic 
relations, to a situation of open and broad-ranging 
contact, and full residential ambassadorial exchanges. 
Partly as a result of mutual international isolation, and 
partly because of the possibility of substantial benefits 
in the relationship, Chile no longer felt the need to 
disguise or play down the extent of its wholehearted 
collaboration with South Africa.
7. STRATEGIC COLLABORATION
Within a fortnight of Lieutenant-General Muller's visit 
to Chile, Argentine forces staged an invasion of the 
British-held Falkland/Malvinas islands and their 
dependencies. Britain prepared for war. To dislodge the 
occupying force required a naval operation aimed at 
ferrying combat troops and weapons. The logistical 
problems were immense. Britain was faced with long lines 
of communication and supply, with its base on Ascension 
Island in the mid-Atlantic being the only staging post on 
British territory. For backup, Britain found itself with 
no option but to turn to Brazil (then still under 
military rule) , to South Africa43, and particularly to 
Chile.
Britain had been politically equidistant from Argentina 
and Chile, enjoying strong historical links with both 
countries. Together they had turned to Britain as a 
neutral arbitrator in the territorial dispute over
43 South Africa's role during the war will be 
examined in a later section.
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islands in the Beagle Channel.44 Although Britain had 
implemented an arms embargo on the Chilean junta between 
197 6-80, it continued to arm Argentina until the 
unexpected invasion.
The war itself lasted between April and June 1982, after 
which Britain garrisoned the islands to preclude any 
future invasions. The war had also drawn attention to the 
strategic nature of the South Atlantic/Antarctic region. 
The presence of off-shore petroleum deposits, rich 
fishing grounds, and the potential mineral wealth of 
Antarctica raised the political stakes in the region. The 
growing tensions between the Panamanian government and 
that of the United States also posed questions about 
future use of the canal zone, reviving the prospect of 
increased traffic through the Straits of Magellan.
From being a marginalised and neglected corner of the 
world, the South Atlantic began to feature seriously in 
the calculations of a number of actors. For the Falklands 
to remain under British control, the islands not only had 
to be militarised, but would also need to develop 
economic viability. The oil and fishing industries needed 
to be attracted to the islands; supplying the needs of 
the garrison and a small number of tourists would also 
bring some revenue. Without Argentina as a supply point, 
the focus on neighbouring Uruguay and Chile as 
alternatives in this process grew.
44 See Artemio Luis Melo, La cuestion internacional 
del Canal de Beagle, Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1979; 
Guillermo J Fogg, Soberania argentina en el area austral, 
Buenos Aires: Pleamar, 1983. Britain was unable to 
resolve the conflict, and the parties turned to the 
Vatican to mediate it. In 1984 the Vatican finally 
awarded the islands to Chile, but Argentina was allowed 
to retain exclusive rights to Atlantic waters. Chile's 
ambition to become an Atlantic power was thwarted, and 
the two countries confirmed the verdict in the Treaty of 
Montevideo signed in April 1987.
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The nearest large non-Argentine harbours with 
shipbuilding and repair facilities, Montevideo in Uruguay 
and Talcahuano in Chile, were each more than 1500 km 
distant. Chile realised that there would be substantial 
advantage in the development of harbour, shipbuilding and 
repair facilities at the port of Punta Arenas in the 
Straits of Magellan. The new facilities would serve 
shipping in the notoriously rough Cape Horn area, 
providing a repair service which would save shipowners 
the costs of ferrying damaged ships to long distant 
ports. The facilities would be placed at the disposal of 
the British garrison on the Falklands, as well as of the 
growing off-shore oil and local fishing industries. There 
would be the added advantage of extra business if the
Panama canal was ever closed. Chile's presence in the
Straits would be secured, giving extra leverage against 
Argentine territorial counterclaims in the Beagle Channel 
islands and Antarctica.
The Chilean government-owned company Astillero y 
Maestranzas de la Armada (ASMAR), which specialised in 
naval dockyards and commercial construction, was charged 
with selecting a partner specialised in shipbuilding 
engineering. The aim was to award 50% of the equity in
the shipyard to the most suitable candidate.
After two years of negotiations to find a partner, the 
contract to build these new shipyard facilities at 
Catalina Bay, 4.5 km north of Punta Arenas, was 
eventually awarded to Sandock-Austral Limited, a South 
African corporation which has enjoyed strong links with 
Armscor. A subsidiary of the important mining finance 
house, Gencor, the company has its headquarters in 
Randburg, north-east of Johannesburg. Sandock-Austral 
describes itself as "a leading South African company 
involved in the design, development and manufacture of
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military hardware." 45 Its offer to ASMAR became the most 
competitive of the available options due to loans offered 
by South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation, 
with export credit cover guaranteed by the parastatal 
Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation.46
The close relationship between South Africa and Chile was 
also a factor in the choice. Commenting on having secured 
the contract, Sandock's managing director Pierre de 
Villiers said: "Our good relations with Chile helped us 
as well as our relatively close position (in tendering).'1 
The project, worth R13.9 million, was scheduled for a 
fifteen-month construction period. Three-quarters of the 
materials required for construction were sourced in South 
Africa. The steel for the project was fabricated at 
Sandock's Durban shipyard. 48
To operate the shipyard, Sandock and ASMAR together 
formed a new company in which they held equal shares. The 
Strait of Magellan Shipyard Ltd (SAEM) had Pierre de 
Villiers as its chair and Chile's Rear Admiral Harald 
Rosenqvist as its vice-chair.
Later in 1984, Lieut-General Jack Dutton retired from his 
job as South Africa's ambassador to Chile, as well as 
from the South African Defence Force after a 35-year 
military career.49 His replacement turned out to be the 
retired Chief of the Air Force, Lieutenant-General "Mike"
45 Sunday Times (Johannesburg) , Business Times 
supplement, 21 February 1988, p. 26.
46 South African Industrial Week, 8 May 1984.
47 Rand Daily Mail, 3 May 1984.
48 Gencorama 4, 5, June 1985, p. 9; Financial Mail, 
20 March 1987, p. 87.
49 Paratus, October 1984, p. 23.
Muller, who had met with Pinochet two years earlier.50
On his return to South Africa, Dutton's considerable 
Chilean experience, and corporate links with the military 
led Sandock-Austral to appoint him as its executive 
director for exports. Dutton was charged with overseeing 
the construction of the shipyard and liaison with the 
Chileans involved in the project. He took up this job on 
1 October 1984.
In an interview conducted in mid-1985 by Sandock parent
company Gencor's in-house magazine, Gencorama, Dutton
made the following observations:
Chile is very pro-South Africa and considers us 
a very good friend. We have good relations both 
politically and economically and trade between 
the two countries has grown considerably over 
the last five years. Chile is one of the least 
volatile countries in South America and one of 
the most stable. Although it has a non- 
democratic government, it is well run and has 
an economy which is much sounder than many of 
the other countries in South America.
Dutton went on to outline the economic leverage that 
Sandock-Austral might gain from participation in the 
project: supplying the copper industry, the direct 
involvement of Gencor in copper mining, a share in future 
shipbuilding contracts. He also hinted that there was a 
"strong possibility" that Sandock might manufacture arms 
in Chile, noting that exports of armaments from South 
Africa were controlled by Armscor.51
Clearly, although Sandock's involvement in the Punta 
Arenas'dockyard was a purely commercial project, the 
military spinoffs for both countries were important. For 
the first time there was direct involvement of the South 
African military-industrial complex with the Chilean navy
50 South African Digest, 9 March 1984.
51 Gencorama 4, 5, June 1985, p. 23.
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over an extensive period. The use of senior military men 
from both sides opened the way for future collaboration 
around other projects. Both countries needed one another 
to offset the most difficult effects of political and 
military isolation.
At the shipyard's opening ceremony, Rear Admiral
Rosenqvist emphasised the "dramatic rise" in shipping in
the area had made the ship repair facility an absolute
necessity. Admiral Jose Merino spoke of
the vital necessity of the West to control the 
seas in the southern hemisphere. The three legs 
of the tripod on which this control rested were 
South Africa, Chile and New Zealand. Friendly 
ties between these countries are thus vital to 
all the countries of the West.52
8. A PLACE OF REFUGE
The West, and particularly the United States, may not 
have looked upon these friendly ties as being as vital to 
its interests as Merino was claiming. During 1985 a 
fugitive from United States justice, Colonel Pedro 
Espinoza, joined the Chilean embassy in Pretoria as an 
administrative counsellor. Both Espinoza and his former 
chief, General Manuel Contreras who headed DINA, the 
Chilean secret police, had been indicted and found guilty 
by an American court in 1978 for the car-bomb murderers 
of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffit in Washington.
52 Third World 8, May-June 1987, p. 23. Although the 
glaring omission of Argentina from the list is something 
one might expect the admiral to do, it is difficult to 
know why he privileged New Zealand above the more 
important contributions Australia and Brazil could have 
made. Perhaps it demonstrated his approval of the series 
of right-wing National Party administrations in New 
Zealand.
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The United States had sought the extradition of Espinoza 
and Contreras from Chile. The response of the Chilean 
authorities was to transfer Espinoza away from 
temptations to give evidence to the US courts. South 
Africa seemed a country well disposed towards the Chilean 
junta and its needs, and also faced the prospect of 
sanctions applied by Washington. Hence there would be no 
natural desire by Pretoria to satisfy the process of 
justice in the US courts.
When US embassy officials in Pretoria discovered the 
presence of Espinoza in South Africa, there was little it 
could do to extradite him because of the diplomatic 
immunity which protected him.
Officials of the South African Department of Foreign 
Affairs were non-committal. They claimed that South 
Africa had no good reason to question the good faith of 
the Chilean embassy when it employed the officer. In any 
case, the staffing of relatively junior posts such as 
that occupied by Espinoza were considered "normal embassy 
staff" whose credentials were never questioned by the 
Department.53
Colonel Espinoza returned to Chile suddenly in May 1987, 
under escort by a special security detail when President 
Pinochet began to fear that he would surrender to United 
States authorities. The US State Department believed that 
he was under protective custody in Chile to prevent him 
from giving evidence linking Pinochet directly to the 
Letelier assassination.54
By August 1991, a Chilean supreme court judge, Adolfo 
Banados, banned Espinoza, Contreras and a third accused
53 The Argus, 18 December 1987.
54 Cape Times, 17 December 1987.
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in the Letelier case from leaving Chile pending a full 
investigation of the assassination. Pinochet, still 
commander-in-chief of the army, was reported as being 
fearful of confessions linking this and other 
assassination bids to the former military head of 
state.55
Espinoza's diplomatic career in South Africa was not the 
only such example. Another Chilean officer suspected of 
political murder found refuge temporarily in the Chilean 
embassy in Pretoria. He was air force Squadron Leader 
Roberto Fuentes, alleged to have been responsible for the 
disappearance of 14 Chilean opposition political 
activists. Fuentes spent between March 1985 and August 
1986 in South Africa.
Chile officially denied that it had shielded alleged 
murderers by transferring them to its Pretoria embassy. 
The embassy itself claimed that the cases against Colonel 
Espinoza and Squadron Leader Fuentes had been dropped by 
an official Chilean court of enquiry in Santiago in the 
late 1970s.56
South Africa's willingness to harbour a top level Chilean 
intelligence officer implicated in assassination and an 
air force officer suspected of multiple murder as 
diplomats illustrated how close the relationship with 
Chile had become. Shielding wanted fugitives from justice 
and thereby protecting top echelons of the junta from 
revelations about their role in these crimes was a useful 
favour Pretoria could offer.
9. STATES OF EMERGENCY
55 The Guardian, 2 4 August 1991.
56 Cape Times, 18 December 1987.
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Both countries at this time were labouring under States 
of Emergency imposed by their respective governments in 
response to a co-incidental upsurge in popular 
oppositional political activity. The acceptance of wanted 
murderers and violators of human rights by Pretoria 
should be seen in the context of its own programme of 
repression.
During 1984, white voters in South Africa approved a new 
constitution which aimed to perpetuate white control, but 
extended the electorate to people classified Coloured and 
Indian. These two groups would only be able to vote for 
their own parliaments, which constitutionally would be 
weaker than the existing white one. Africans were 
completely excluded from the electoral rolls, and fobbed 
off with the explanation that they had electoral rights 
in fictive independent homelands. The previously separate 
offices of prime minister and head of state were to be 
unified into an executive presidency which the incumbent 
prime minister P W Botha was to occupy.
The introduction of the new constitution, along with a 
severe recession and attempts to ease the state's fiscal 
crisis by demanding payment of high township rentals, all 
provoked a wave of opposition to the government and its 
policies.
The invasion of Transvaal African townships by the South 
African military in September 1984 was designed to stamp 
out all manifestations of opposition. Instead the 
response was increased popular resistance to the military 
repression. Anti-apartheid organisation escalated across 
the country despite the constant military presence.
Inside government, the role of the State Security Council 
and its committees, effectively led by senior military 
and police personnel, meant that the security forces were 
drawn into political decision making at all levels.
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Externally, the armed forces were engaged in a war in 
Namibia, which constantly spilled over into Angola. Armed 
raids into neighbouring countries became common. The SADF 
helped spread terror inside Mozambique through its 
support for the rebel Renamo movement.
In June 1985, the government declared a state of 
emergency in many districts of the country. This was 
extended in October, and by June 198 6, was applied to the 
entire country. Organised opposition was repressed, 
popular movements effectively outlawed, and over ten 
thousand people jailed. Several hundred citizens were 
killed by the armed forces and vigilante organisations 
sponsored by the state. Numerous assassinations of 
prominent opposition activists occurred. For many it 
seemed like the repression had reached a scale similar to 
that experienced in countries of Latin America under the 
heel of military dictatorships.
In Chile at this time Amnesty International reported
Many violations of human rights took place in 
the context of states of exception. During the 
first half of 1985 there were three different 
states of exception in force, namely the 'state 
of emergency', the 'state of danger of 
disturbance to internal peace', and the 'state 
of siege', all of them provided for in the 
Constitution introduced in 1981.57
The extended powers which the armed forces and 
carabineros enjoyed under the states of exception were 
extra cover for the widespread political repression which 
subsequently occurred.
Chile was the only Latin American country which offered 
direct collaboration with the South African Police. This 
was particularly useful to the SAP during the state of 
emergency. General Hendrik de Witt, its Commissioner, was
57 Amnesty International, Annual Report, London, 
1986, p. 133.
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anxious to maintain top level liaison with the 
carabineros. In late March 1988 he welcomed his Chilean 
counterpart, General Rodolfo Stange Oelckers, a member of 
the junta, along with a police delegation, to South 
Africa. The media were informed that the Chilean police 
presence was a "two-week pleasure visit at General de 
Witt's invitation".58
10. THE ARMS TRADE
During the South African states of emergency, which 
lasted until June 1989, the official relationship with 
the Chilean military dictatorship expanded.
Expelled from the international arms industry exhibition 
in Athens in 1983, South Africa's Armscor was invited to 
participate in the third International Fair of 
Aeronautical Defence (FIDA) in Santiago. FIDA had been 
established in 1980 as a biennial fair in defiance of the 
arms embargo imposed by the US government on Chile.
Occurring in March 1984, the fair became a major 
opportunity for Armscor to market its products 
internationally.59 In extending an invitation to Armscor, 
Chile was conniving in the open defiance of the United 
Nations' mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.
With an eye on the markets of Latin America, Armscor's 
chair and delegation leader, Commandant P G Marais, 
promoted the slogan "Third World weapons for Third World 
countries" .60
58 Cape Times, 3 0 March 1988.
59 Armed Forces, April 1984.
60 Cape Times, 3 March 1984.
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Armscor's representative at the fair, John Adler, 
declared the corportation's exhibit a resounding success 
in the major export drive to secure sales between RIOOm 
and R150m. "Our reception here has been excellent," he 
claimed. "The Kukri air-to-air missile has been a 
favourite, as has Armscor's new frequency-hopping 
radios." 61
One of Armscor's major claims was that its weaponry had 
been "battle-tested". The weapons had been used in 
northern Namibia and southern Angola in the war against 
SWAPO, the Angolan government and its Cuban allies. To 
interest prospective purchasers, and to gain their 
understanding and empathy, the South African Defence 
Force invited selected guests to tour the militarised 
zone on the northern Namibian border. These tours had 
regularly been laid on for local defence correspondents 
and white MPs, as well as for foreign politicians like 
Franz Josef Strauss of Bavaria. In October 1985, it was 
the turn of Chile's minister of defence, Vice-Admiral 
Patricio Carvajal.
Carvajal's nine-day visit was by special invitation of 
General Magnus Malan, the South African minister of 
defence. Carvajal was treated to a tour of the SADF's 
military installations in northern Namibia as well as its 
civic action programmes. SWAPO enjoyed strong support in 
the fertile north of Namibia, whose large population had 
been a source of colonial migrant labour. In its attempts 
to pacify the area, the SADF initiated a "hearts and 
minds" programme, attempting to provide housing, 
nutrition, and education programmes for people in the 
operational area.
Speaking at a press conference on his departure for
61 South African Digest, 9 March 1984.
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Chile, Carvajal praised the "marvellous work which the 
SADF was doing in support of the local community of South 
West Africa". The SADF had struck him as a "very good 
fighting machine" and the training and spirit of the 
armed forces were impressive.62
Carvajal was also exposed to the propaganda of the South 
African government, whose attempts to explain the mass 
resistance campaigns were swallowed wholesale. On his 
return to Chile he conveyed the South African 
authorities' case to the press. It had a familiar ring in 
Chile:
South Africa suffers from a lack of 
understanding on the part of Western countires 
and the UN, something very similar to the 
Chilean experience. The problems of both 
countries are similar, and Soviet imperialism 
is responsible for the exaggerations and lies 
about the South African reality, aiming to 
destabilise the situation. The images of social 
unrest which reach the world by satellite are 
often fabricated by camera crews which pay 
people to start riots. In South Africa black 
people live well, better than in other African 
countries and in some cases, better than in 
certain cities of the USA.63
Carvajal, conscious of the international embargo, also 
took the opportunity whilst in South Africa to invite 
Armscor to participate in the forthcoming FIDA-86, which 
would be enlarged to incorporate all defence equipment, 
instead of being confined to air defence.
The March 1986 arms fair was attended by Adriaan Vlok, 
then deputy minister of defence and of law and order, who 
was later promoted to head the latter portfolio. Vlok, as 
a guest of the Chilean government, met with a number of 
Chilean officials and praised the relationship between
62 The Citizen, 26 October 1985; "Chilean delegation 
visits Ops area", Paratus 36, 12, December 1985, p. 59.
63 Press release, 8 November 1985.
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the two countries.64 There was also a chance to inspect 
the military hardware produced by over 100 exhibitors 
from 15 countries.
The Armscor exhibit demonstrated "battle-tested" 
innovations produced by 12 South African companies. 
Special interest was aroused in the Alpha ZH1 combat 
helicopter and the CB 470 cluster bomb. Armscor claimed 
that many military correspondents had come to Chile 
"specifically to see what South Africa had to offer." 65
Two years later, Armscor was back at FIDA-88. Santiago 
had become its major international weapons showcase. FIDA 
provided an opportunity for purchasers to compare its 
arms with those on offer by the industries in Israel, 
Argentina and Brazil, amongst others. This time, Armscor 
had so many vehicles and weapons on display, that the 
South African Navy was employed to deliver them. The SAS 
Drakensberg carried the weapons, being accompanied by 
strike craft SAS Frans Erasmus. This was the first case 
of South African naval vessels visiting Chile. Arriving 
on 4 March in Valparaiso harbour, commanding officers met 
the commander of Chile's first naval zone, and together 
laid wreaths at the Iquique monument to Chilean naval 
heroes. Official collaboration was obtained in 
transferring the Armscor weapons to the El Bosque air 
base outside Santiago.66
Opened by General Pinochet, the fair was attended by 
South Africa's veteran foreign minister, R F "Pik" Botha, 
on a private visit to Chile, during which he held talks
64 The Argus, 12 March 198 6; Lt-Genl Jack Dutton, 
"FIDA-86: the international air show in Santiago, Chile", 
UNISA Latin American Report (Pretoria) 2, 2, September 
1986, p. 77.
65 The Star, 15 March 1986.
66 Cape Times, 5 March, 7 March and 18 April 1988.
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with local embassy staff. By this time, Lieut-General 
Muller had been replaced as South African ambassador to 
Chile. The new incumbent was the former secretary of the 
powerful State Security Council, Lieutenant-General 
Pieter van der Westhuizen.
To some extent this represented a shift in the 
relationship with Chile envisioned by the armed forces. 
Clearly the Santiago embassy was now a sinecure for 
senior military officers. The added dimension of internal 
security was clearly a matter for increased 
collaboration. Van der Westhuizen had been instrumental 
in the establishment inside South Africa of the National 
Security Management System. This was a series of 
regional, district, municipal and area committees chaired 
by the security forces, but which combined civil servants 
from various departments of state, as well as prominent 
business figures and farmers sympathetic to the purposes 
of the State Security Council.67
The formation of these Joint Management Committees had 
been aimed at information gathering on opposition forces 
and the implementation of counter-revolutionary 
strategies at local level. The National Security 
Management System survived beyond the change of 
presidency in 1989, despite the declarations of F W de 
Klerk that politics would be demilitarised. Meanwhile one 
purpose of van der Westhuizen's ambassadorship was to 
improve lines of commifhication with Chile on the question 
of internal repression.
Arms sales and procurement were also part of his brief, 
and he attended FIDA-88 accompanied by Armscor chief,
67 See James Selfe, "South Africa's National 
Management System", pp. 149-158 in Jacklyn Cock and 
Laurie Nathan (eds), War and society: the militarisation 
of South Africa, Cape Town: David Philip, 1989.
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Johan van Vuuren. Since FIDA had become the premier arms 
fair for Latin America, seen as an extremely lucrative 
market (US$2 billion sales per annum), both the United 
States and China had for the first time staged exhibits. 
For the United States' part, it was keen to rebuild links 
with the Chilean armed forces, to encourage them to 
vacate the political arena and return to barracks.
Despite the calls by the United Nations Committee on 
Apartheid for an international boycott of FIDA in view of 
South Africa's presence, Armscor insisted on its 
participation. The South African exhibits was said to 
have dominated the fair. Three of Armscor's new products 
included the Darter V3C new generation air-to-air 
missile; a remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft, the 
Seeker, which has a 200km range; and the Krimpvark 
(hedgehog), an armoured passenger vehicle for "people 
working in high-risk situations". 68
Armscor's piece-de-resistance was the formidable 
computer-controlled G6 mobile artillery system, 
considered by many military writers to be the best in its 
class in the world. Once again, SADF experience in Angola 
permitted Armscor to claim that the system was "battle- 
tested" and found to be effective at accurately shelling 
targets 4 5km away.
Although not new, the G6 155mm howitzer was being shown 
internationally for the first time at FIDA-88. The 
biggest vehicle at the fair, its presence was only 
possible because of the navy's involvement in 
transporting it to Chile.
Despite claims that it was entirely developed by Armscor,
68 The Argus, 9 March, 14 March 1988; Cape Times, 12 
March, 16 March 1988; South African Digest, 18 March 
1988.
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the G6 and its predecessor, the G5 system, were instead 
developed by the State Research Corporation. This company 
operated from an estate located on the US-Canadian 
border, straddling the province of Quebec and the state 
of Vermont. The brainchild of Dr Gerald Bull, who headed 
State Research, the system was smuggled to South Africa 
during the course of 1977 via Spain and the Caribbean 
country of Antigua and Barbuda.69
Having been humiliated by superior Cuban artillery during 
the invasion of Angola in 1975/6, South Africa was highly 
motivated to acquire weaponry which could stand up to the 
"Stalin organ" in the course of battle. The chance to 
obtain the 155mm G5 was seized with much enthusiasm. 
Components were provided by State Research as well as by 
a US firm, International Signal & Control (ISC), headed 
by James Guerin, who later merged his operation with and 
defrauded the Ferranti arms component manufacturing 
company in Britain.70
The development and application of Bull's technology gave 
South Africa the upper hand against future artillery 
threats. Armscor's means to offset costs was to make the 
system available for export.
Given the sensitivity of the arms embargo, Armscor found 
the willingness of the Chilean military to overlook 
sanctions extremely useful. It contracted with one of 
Chile's main arms manufacturers, Industrias Cardoen SA, 
to manufacture the G5 and G6 under licence. The company
69 For the role of the Bird government in relation to 
State Research Corporation, see David Fig, "Dossier on 
Antigua and Barbuda prepared for the National Union of 
Mineworkers of South Africa", Cape Town: International 
Labour Research and Information Group, March 1985.
70 Fiametta Rocco and Tom Flannery, "Phantom empire 
of a bomb maker", Independent on Sunday, 16 June 1991, 
pp. 12-14.
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president, Carlos Cardoen, had helped to build up the 
Chilean arms industry during the Pinochet era, when the 
country was faced with an international arms embargo.
In addition to the G5 and G6, the relationship 
established with Armscor facilitated Cardoen's production 
of weapons like the cluster bomb and the battle 
helicopter which had been displayed to the Chileans at 
FIDA-86. This came at a time when Iran and Iraq were 
engaged in an 8-year war. Armscor could not have been 
seen to have made direct sales to either side, both sworn 
enemies of its Israeli collaborators. One option was to 
utilise the link with the Chilean manufacturers.
Cardoen realised the potential of such weapons to the 
Saddam Hussein government in Iraq, which was then also 
the object of an official Western arms embargo. Through a 
Lebanese intermediary called Nasser Beydoun, lines of 
communication were opened with Saddam Hussein. Seeking 
advanced technology at any price, the Iraqis turned to 
Cardoen, grateful for the company's low international 
profile and its discreet approach to its international 
sales.
Industrias Cardoen passed on technology directly to Iraq. 
For example it built for the Iraqis a cluster bomb 
factory outside Baghdad. The company also acted as an 
intermediary in obtaining Armscor technology for Iraq in 
the form of the G5 and G6. Iraq purchased this equipment 
through Cardoen. In payment, Saddam provided oil to South 
Africa.71
71 The Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute claimed that South Africa was also supplying 
the Iranians, with between 300,000 and 400,000 155mm 
artillery shells and spare parts for its F-4 Phantom 
fighter aircraft, in exchange for oil. SIPRI Yearbook 
1987: world armaments and disarmament, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987, p. 199.
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Through a Florida-based property and management group, 
Swissco, which US Customs believe was a front for 
Industrias Cardoen, sensitive military technology was 
provided to the Iraqis. With possible help from Armscor, 
Cardoen had developed a project to produce attack 
helicopters for sale to Iraq. Soon after visiting FIDA- 
90, Jonathan Moyle, a British journalist with defence 
connections who was keen to discover information about 
the helicopter, was found dead in his Santiago hotel 
room.72
Moyle was not the only person connected to the Cardoen 
deals to have died in controversial circumstances. Dr 
Gerry Bull himself was assassinated in Brussels on 22 
March 1990, in the midst of arranging Iraqi acquisition 
of the "supergun" which he was involved in designing and 
installing. On 18 July 1991 months later, former deputy 
prime minister of Belgium Andre Cools was shot and killed 
after investigating a Belgian company's provision of 
propellants necessary for the functioning of the 
"supergun".73 Whether these deaths were connected, 
whether they were perpetrated by Iraqi or Israeli agents 
or others, they remain cause for some speculation.
However the deaths are a clear indication of the enormous 
stakes invested in the underground international arms 
trade connecting Chile and South Africa with Iraq.
Chile has therefore acted as an intermediary in the 
provision of South African armaments to the Iraqi 
government, and perhaps to others. In this way Armscor 
has been able to extend its international dealings to the 
point where it exported, for example, R1.8 billion worth
72 David Akerman, "Lethal weapons", Weekend Guardian, 
3-4 August 1991, p. 5.
73 The Independent, 5 August 1991.
286
of weapons to 23 countries in 1987 alone.74 It claimed 
to be the largest single exporter in South Africa's 
manufacturing industry.75 From its inception in 1977, 
Armscor has grown into one of the world's ten largest 
arms manufacturers. The part played by the relationship 
with the Chilean military and private arms manufacturers 
certainly helped Armscor to achieve this position.
11. THE FISHING INDUSTRY
The entry of the South African fishing industry into 
Chile from the late 1970s arose through a combination of 
circumstances. On the one hand the industry was suffering 
great losses due to the collapse of the formerly 
lucrative Namibian fishing resource in which it had 
invested very heavily. Of necessity it could not afford 
to leave capital tied up in unproductive assets. The 
imperative to relocate was substantial.
On the other hand there were good reasons why it was 
Chile which became the main destination for capital 
exports of the South African fishing industry. The 
Chilean fish resource was reputedly one of the richest in 
the world. The Chilean military regime's recent opening 
of the national economy to unbridled direct foreign 
investment acted as a further incentive. Warm relations 
between the junta and Pretoria meant the likelihood of 
future economic sanctions was remote, and therefore that 
investment in Chile would be a safe option.
a. The South African fishing industry
Fishing is a predatory industry, somewhat akin to
hunting, It is also an industry subject to rapidly
74 Cape Times, 21 January 1988.
75 Business Day, 22 January 1988.
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oscillating business cycles. As such it involves high 
risks and occasionally very high profits. In South Africa 
the industry is highly monopolised, with half a dozen 
major fishing corporations and a small number of more 
modest-sized independent companies. The high capital 
costs and difficulties of competing with the monopolies 
make it financially prohibitive for new companies to 
enter the industry.
Some of the larger fishing groups are subsidiaries of 
even larger, more diversified food sector companies. 
Marine Products, for example, is part of Fedfood, a 
subsdiary of the large mining finance house Gencor.
Others such as Saldanha Bay have their origins in family 
firms and have not yet been acquired by the giant 
corporations. A key firm in this story was that of the 
Ovenstone family, who sold their fishing holdings during 
the 1980s.
The firms compete for a finite fish resource, whose size 
is anticipated by the Department of the Environment's Sea 
Fisheries Division. This same body determines the quotas 
allocated to each firm, usually based on a proportion of 
the previous year's quota. Because of the pre-set quotas, 
the firms do not really compete in South African and 
Namibian waters. They often engage in joint ventures, and 
there is a combined distribution network for marketing 
canned fish and fishmeal products, Federal Marine. Thus 
there is a degree of oligopoly and vertical integration.
The fishing corporations have their headquarters in Cape 
Town. They operate fleets and processing plants mostly 
along the Atlantic coast as far north as Walvis Bay, a 
South African-controlled enclave and the only deep-water 
port on the Namibian coastline.
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b. Namibia's fishing resource.
Prior to the independence of Namibia, South African 
fishing fleets were very active in Namibian waters.
Whilst the territory remained under South African 
control, the companies were able to operate processing 
and canning plants at Walvis Bay and Luderitz. They also 
obtained rights from the South West African authorities 
to quotas controlling the amount of fish caught.
Until the 1980s, the Namibian fishing grounds ranked 
amongst the most lucrative in the world. They attracted 
fleets not only from South Africa, but from Eastern and 
Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Israel, Iraq and 
Cuba. Despite UN declarations on the international 
illegality of exploiting Namibia's natural resources, the 
UN had no power to deal with infringements. The South 
African authorities had no interest in conserving the 
Namibian fishing grounds nor in implementing UN policy.
In 1976 the fishing resource began to collapse, owing to 
overfishing and to the killing off of plankton due to 
unusually cold water temperatures. A reduction in quotas 
was applied to the fishing corporations. By 1981, the 
officially determined quota on pilchards had fallen to 
zero, and the 1982 quota was filled within two months of 
the opening of the pilchard season.
A number of the corporations had to develop strategies of 
survival. They had been left with redundant fleets, 
canneries, processing plants and warehouses in Walvis Bay 
and Luderitz. Some companies joined forces in order to 
rationalise their assets in Walvis Bay, for example 
Ovenstone and General Development Corporation. Other 
solutions were to put factories into mothballs, or to 
transfer plant to other installations. A third solution 
was to find an alternative to the depleted Namibian 
resource by establishing subsidiaries abroad.
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c. The Chilean option
The ideal choice for most companies was Chile. There were 
four main reasons for this: (i) perceptions about the
wealth of Chile's fishing grounds; (ii) the prior 
historical experience of South African investment in the 
Chilean fishing industry; (iii) the favourable investment 
environment which the Pinochet regime offered to foreign 
corporations; and (iv) the warm relationship which the 
junta developed with Pretoria facilitated confidence 
amongst the South African companies in regarding Chile as 
a secure destination for their investments.
c. (i) CHILEAN FISHING WEALTH
A key figure in urging the South African fishing 
companies to invest in Chile was Dr C J ("Peter")
Molteno, a former International Director of the Chilean 
Institute of Fisheries Development. Molteno had initially 
been seconded to Chile by the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation of the United Nations.
His detailed knowledge of the Chilean resource prompted 
an enthusiastic recommendation that South African 
companies should participate in the growing boom in the 
Pacific coastal fisheries. Molteno based his 
recommendation on the rapid increase in the stocks of 
pilchards and mackerel in Chilean and Peruvian waters. 
Although acknowledging the possibilities of fluctuating 
fish population trends, Molteno raised optimism about the 
existence of a combination of conditions in the marine 
environment from 1977 which, if continued for a 
sufficient period, would allow investors in the industry 
to "make a killing".76
As a descendent of a former prime minister of the Cape of
76 Interview with the late Peter Molteno, 15 December 
1983. Also see South African Shipping News and Fishing 
Industry Review, March 1979, p. 35.
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Good Hope, and in his own right a marine biologist of 
international standing, Molteno's credentials were 
unlikely to remain ignored by the industry.
c. (ii) HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
The historical precedent dated from 1961, when the 
Ovenstone group had participated in a joint venture, 
Industone, with a Chilean company. In July 1963 it 
established a factory at Iquique to process 50 tons of 
fish an hour. Most of the machinery and equipment for the 
factory was manufactured in South Africa, and Ovenstone 
supplied the technical staff for its construction and for 
training local workers. South Africans were also brought 
in to run the small fishing fleet.77
Ovenstone was the first foreign company to enter the 
Chilean fishing sector. But timing was bad. Abnormally 
high water temperatures due to the El Nino current78 led 
to a run of disastrous fishing seasons. Another setback 
was the indiscriminate issuing of fishing licences by the 
Chilean government, which hampered the company's 
profitability. Industone was forced to contract its 
operations by the mid-1960s. By 1968, losses of assets 
had amounted to R1.2 million. Ovenstone decided to cut 
its losses and sold its holdings in the Chilean company.
The company's connection with Chile was, however, 
maintained. During the period of Industone's existence,
77 See Finance and Trade Review 5, 2 (Pretoria) , June 
1962; John R Shorten, Cape Town: a record of the mother 
city from the earliest days to the present, Cape Town: 
Shorten, 1963, p. 486.
78 The current causes warm oxygen-deficient water to 
form a blanket over the cooler nutrient-rich waters of 
the upwelling Humboldt current. Its presence off the 
coast of Peru in 1972 brought disaster to that country's 
anchovy-based fish meal and oil industry, whilst 
affecting the Chilean resource to a lesser extent.
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the Ovenstones were appointed honorary consuls for Chile 
in Cape Town. Thus at least one of the major fishing 
companies had experience of the Chilean commercial and 
industrial environment and continuous contact with its 
government institutions.
The coming to power of the Popular Unity government under 
Salvador Allende in 1970 acted as a disincentive for new 
foreign investment in Chile. Popular Unity had a radical 
programme to nationalise large industrial enterprises, 
the most important distributors, and the banking 
sector.79 At first it was only the copper companies which 
were brought under state ownership, a policy which was 
supported by the centre-right opposition, the Christian 
Democrats. But as class conflict intensified, political 
pressures forced Allende to extend state ownership of 
other industrial sectors.
Chilean entrepreneurs responded with a "bosses' strike", 
aimed at weakening Popular Unity control over the economy 
and the government. The strike involved a withdrawal of 
capital and curtailment of production. Under pressure 
from organised workers, the Popular Unity government 
reacted by taking over more companies and putting them 
back to work. By 1972, the government had nationalised 
the former Ovenstone holdings.
Within a year of this, Allende's government had been 
overthrown. The new right-wing military junta embarked on 
a programme to privatise, deregulate, and open the 
Chilean economy to international trade and financial
79 Pilar Vergara, "Changes in the economic functions 
of the Chilean state under the military regime", J Samuel 
Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela (eds), Military rule in 
Chile: dictatorship and oppositions, Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 87.
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flows.8u As part of this programme, exchange controls 
were eliminated and foreign investment openly encouraged.
In its efforts to oversee the denationalisation of the 
fishing industry, the junta looked to foreign companies 
for capital. It invited the Ovenstones to resume their 
fishing activities in Chile and to increase their 
investment if they so wished. The go-between was a 
Chilean national, Mr Jaime Charles, who had fled to South 
Africa after the Popular Unity victory.81 Ovenstones 
took up the junta's offer in 1979, shipping a cannery to 
Chile, part of which was reconstructed in Iquique and 
part in Talcahuano.
Ovenstone also transported a fish meal factory ship 
belonging to an associated company to Calderilla Bay near 
Caldera. It converted the ship into a dumb barge for 
legal and economic reasons. It took up a 49% shareholding 
and a management contract in the operating company, 
Pesquera Playa Blanca. It reserved the right to increase 
its stake in the company to 66%. In mid-1983 it set about 
building a small labour intensive cannery on shore close 
to where the barge was moored.82
With these investments, the company's fortunes in Chile 
had been restored. The other South African fishing 
companies were impressed enough to consider investing in 
Chile themselves.
80 Alexandro Foxley, "The neo-conservative economic 
experiment in Chile", J Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo 
Valenzuela (eds), Military rule in Chile, p. 13.
81 Cape Times, 2 3 February 197 5.
82 The ship, originally named L* Interpeche had at one 
time been owned in conjunction with Slater Walker and 
operated off the coast of Mauretania in West Africa. See 
Financial Mail, 2 0 August 1982; South African Shipping 
News and Fishing Industry Review, January 1983, p. 25.
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c. (iii) STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS
The warm relationship between the Chilean junta and the 
increasingly militarised South African state was another 
factor which persuaded the South African fishing industry 
that any investment it might make in Chile would be 
safeguarded.
The industry calculated that there would be little threat 
of nationalisation under the military, and neither was 
the implementation of UN economic sanctions against 
Pretoria a likely prospect. It was not anticipated that 
Chile would single out South African investment for 
adverse treatment. The authoritarian nature of the 
Chilean state also guaranteed that trade union behaviour 
in the fishing sector was unlikely to become a threat to 
the industry's price structures based on cheap labour.
Thus the fishing companies benefited directly from 
friendly state-to-state relations, and unlike in many 
parts of the world hostile to apartheid, the investments 
could proceed as if both countries were "normal", without 
any stigmas accompanying their pariah status in the 
international community at the time.
In turn, the extent of the South African investment in 
the Chilean fishing industry cemented relations on a 
state-to-state level. Government officials in the Sea 
Fisheries ministries in each country began to collaborate 
on a systematic basis, exchanging visits and research 
results. Chile was particularly interested in official 
resource conservation techniques, in the quality control 
methods of the South African industry, and in the work of 
the South African Bureau of Standards.83
83 The Argus, 29 May 1986.
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c. (iv) FAVOURABLE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 
A fourth incentive for these companies to consider Chile 
was the favourable investment environment which the new 
regime offered.
In evaluating the different possibilities for the 
destination of their investments, fishing executives 
engaged in somewhat homespun risk analysis. Aside from 
Chile there were four other options, but each of these 
was dismissed in turn.
Australia was rejected due to its high-tax regime and, 
from the time of the the Whitlam government, perceived 
hostility to South African investment. Britain was also 
rejected on the strength of perceptions of its trade 
union movement being too militant. Argentina seemed 
unstable and chaotic under the second regime of Juan 
Peron, and that of his third wife and successor, Isabel 
Peron.84 The Willem Barendsz fishing company had 
encountered problems in attempting to sell a fishing 
factory-ship to an Argentine group.85 Peru had decided 
to nationalise its fishing fleet, thus there were no 
openings there for capital investment.
Unlike the other options, Chile's firm military 
government had seen to it that there were no inconvenient 
trade unions demanding high wages or sound working 
conditions. The economic nationalism of the Allende 
period was put aside, and Chile made it easy for foreign 
firms to obtain local investment finance. The tax regime 
was favourable, allowing foreign corporations to choose 
their own level of taxation with only two possibilities
84 Also known as Maria Estela Peron, she became 
president of Argentina after Juan Peron's death in 1974.
85 Rand Daily Mail, 9 October 1973: South African 
Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review, November 1973, 
p. 43.
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for minor upward revision. Chile resigned from the 
protectionist Andean Pact bloc whose Decision 24 had 
restricted the repatriation of profits. This conflicted 
fundamentally with the junta's new Decree Law 600 which 
allowed profits to be repatriated subject to a relatively 
low tax of 30%.86
These incentives caused a number of South African fishing 
corporations to follow the Ovenstone lead into Chile. The 
potential for repatriating profits was particularly 
attractive, although in the initial stages of the 
investments the companies preferred to use any profits 
for loan repayment, reinvestment and offsetting of 
losses. 87
d. Extent of South African investment
Given this context, the South African fishing companies
t
found a warm welcome in Chile.
The return of Ovenstones 1979 prompted other companies to 
consider investments in Chile. A deal was struck between 
Fedfood (the parent company of Marine Products) and 
another fishing group, Kaap-Kunene, whereby R6 million 
would be committed to a joint venture with a Chilean 
fishing company, Empresa Pesquera Tarapaca. Investments 
were made in a cannery at Iquique, Pesquera del Norte, 
and in a fish meal concern, Pesquera Caldera, at Caldera 
itself, which received dismantled reduction plant 
equipment from the General Development Corporation at 
Luderitz. Trawlers were also sent from Namibia to 
supplement the fleet at Caldera.
86 ProChile, Chile for investors, Santiago: ProChile, 
1982, esp. pp. 27-33. ProChile is the export promotion 
agency of the Chilean government.
87 Interview with fishing company accountant, Cape 
Town, 21 December 1983.
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However within three years this investment had run into 
trouble owing to the financial difficulties of the 
Chilean partner and the general conditions of recession 
in Chile. Although the canning plant had entered 
operation, the fish meal project at Caldera had to be 
delayed. R1.4 million had to be set aside in 1982 to 
cover anticipated losses.88
The same Chilean partner, Humberto Camelio, also struck 
up a deal with a consortium known as United Fishing 
Enterprises. This is made up of three shareholders, 
Swafil, Seaswa (Oceana group), and Sarubar (jointly run 
by Sarusas and Willem Barendsz). With the bankruptcy of 
Camelio, Seaswa and Willem Barendsz moved in to acquire 
the Chilean assets, such that the company, Pesquera 
Coquimbo Dos, became wholly South African-owned. The port 
of Coquimbo is the site of a cannery and reduction (fish 
meal and oil processing) plant, shipped from Walvis Bay. 
It was installed during 1980-1, and entered production in 
March 1982. Although Oceana did not anticipate further 
operating losses, it nevertheless set aside R220 000 to 
cover possible exchange losses on its outstanding foreign 
loan. This loan was contracted to assist with the 
purchase of the company's share of Camelio's assets.89 
First profits from the investment came in 1983 to the 
tune of US$1 million.90
The canned fish and fish meal is sold on the world market 
and much of it finds its way to South Africa, such that a 
new shipping line was initiated in March 1981 to cover
88 Die Transvaler, 21 February 1981; South African 
Shipping News and Fishing Industry Review 36, 8, August 
1982, pp. 26-27; The Star, 7 April 1983.
89 South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry 
Review, August 1982, pp. 26-7; Oceana Group, Annual 
Report 1983, p. 7.
90 Financial Mail, 18 May 1984, p. 37.
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the Peru-Chile-South Africa route.91 Peru provided the 
largest quantities, and the canned fish products were 
imported through the industry's sole marketing agency 
Federal Marine, jointly owned by the fishing companies 
themselves. Imports began in 1978 after domestic 
production had fallen below public demand. Federal Marine 
sent quality control personnel to Peru and Chile to 
upgrade production and packing to South Africa standards. 
In Peru this was later formalised when Federal Marine set 
up a company staffed by nationals of Peru; in Chile,
South Africans were placed in supervisory roles.92
By 1985, Ovenstone reported to its shareholders that its 
"international fishing and related activities were the 
largest contributor to profits, although international 
fishmeal prices were at their lowest since 1972". But by 
then the trend in fishmeal prices had begun to reverse. 
Optimism had allowed Ovenstone to modernise its Chilean 
operations in order to reduce production costs.93 
Ovenstone1s combined Chilean operations had developed 
facilities to process 170,000 tons of fish, over seven 
times the capacity of the total quota of 24,000 tons 
allowed in South African-controlled waters.94
The slow rehabilitation of the Namibian fish stocks, 
together with disappointments in the profitability of the 
Chilean operations, led most of the South African 
investors to withdraw from Chile by the late 1980s. With 
the normalisation of the Namibian fishing industry after
91 Financial Mail, 2 October 1981, p. 83.
92 South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry 
Review, March 1981, p. 31.
93 Ovenstone Group Limited, Interim report to 
shareholders for the six months ended 30 September 1985, 
Rondebosch, 8 November 1985.
94 The Argus, 17 July 1986.
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Americas, which enjoyed strong links with the US trade 
union movement, the AFL-CIO, demanded a boycott of all 
Chilean imports and exports. In December 1978 it came to 
the attention of the South African Foreign Trade 
Organisation (SAFTO), the exporters' association, that 
the ORIT boycott would begin the following month.97
SAFTO's Latin American area manager advised all member 
firms that
It seems that all North and South American 
trade unionists are considering a boycott of
Chilean imports and exports... Even the threat
of such action favours moves by South African 
companies to open up market opportunities in 
Chile.98
Part of the trade relationship thenceforth rested on a 
confederacy of sanctions-busters.
Another shorter term cause for the growth of bilateral 
trade was the situation in Argentina, where vice- 
president Isabel Peron had taken power after the death of 
her husband Juan. Inability to control the economy, 
combined with prolonged political tensions within the 
Peronist movement, led to mass strikes, the interruption 
of production, and the eventual military coup in 1976.
The Argentine forces had instituted a Chile-style reign
of terror, the so-called dirty war, principally aimed
against the armed Peronist left, but with more severe 
consequences for other sections of the left, the human 
rights movement, church activists and organised labour.
For some years the political tensions and repression in 
Argentina had affected productivity. Disruption of 
production had curtailed exports and led to the
97 Telex from Richard Kern-Martin, Buenos Aires, to 
SAFTO head office, Johannesburg, 12 December 1978.
98 SAFTO Headline Bulletin 124, 28 December 1978.
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unavailability in Chile of some Argentine supplies, spare 
parts and components for automotive, infrastructural and 
other purposes. This factor, claimed SAFTO, enhanced the 
prospects for South African exporters to the Chilean 
market."
Despite threats of international boycotts, from mid-1979, 
as part of the Chicago boys' effort to open the Chilean 
economy, the treasury began to liberalise tariffs, making 
it easier for foreign manufacturers and traders to 
consider Chile a worthwhile export market. "A major 
development in the region," according to SAFTO chair 
Charles Skeen, "has been the radical change in market 
conditions in Chile, which now offers excellent 
opportunities for South African companies." 100
From 1976, South African exporters had been attending the 
annual international trade fair, FISA, which takes place 
in Santiago each October and November. The 1979 fair was 
attended by the South African secretary for commerce, 
Tjaart van der Walt, and attracted more than a two dozen 
South African exhibitors.
By mid-1980 sufficient trade had been generated to 
establish chambers of commerce in both countries. The 
Chilean-South African Chamber of Commerce was set up in 
Santiago in late June, whilst the Chile section of the 
South Africa-South America Chamber of Economic Relations 
was inaugurated in Johannesburg on 3 July 1980.101 
Consul-general Captain Carlos Ashton addressed the 
founding meeting of the Chile section, informing the
" SAFTO Headline Bulletin 117, 26 September 1978.
100 SAFTO, Annual Report 1978, quoted in Financial 
Mail, 24 November 1978.
101 Rand Daily Mail, 4 July 1980; interview with Bess 
Robertson, secretary of the South Africa-South America 
Chamber of Economic Relations, Johannesburg, 30 May 1985.
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audience about Chile's economy and the opportunities for 
trade and investment.
Analysing the 1979 trade statistics, Ashton remarked on 
the value of the trade for that year being well above US$ 
25 million, a 150% increase on 1978, consisting mostly of 
"rather traditional" products. Chilean imports into South 
Africa were largely herbs, canned fish, molybdenum, wood 
pulp and glassware, whilst South African exports to Chile 
consisted mainly of base metals and minerals, chemicals, 
textiles, plastics and machinery. He commented that there 
was still much room in the South African economy for 
Chilean imports, yet Chile had not yet made a serious 
effort to market its products in South Africa.102
One weakness was the transport system, which could 
scarcely cope with larger volumes of trade. At the time 
there were two regular shipping lines operating directly 
between South African and Chilean ports, whereas no lines 
operated directly on the return journey. Chilean goods 
had to go across the Pacific via Singapore or be 
transshipped at greater cost in Buenos Aires, Montevideo 
or a Brazilian port.103
Ashton also announced that a trade delegation organised 
by the Chilean-South African Chamber in Santiago would be 
visiting South Africa in the latter half of the year. 
Sponsored by GEC Woods Fans, a South African subsidiary 
jointly owned by GEC and Barlow Rand, the delegation 
arrived in late September.1* In an interview with a 
Johannesburg newspaper, a member of the delegation, Mcirio
102 Address by the Consul General of Chile, Mr C 
Ashton, to the South Africa-South America Chamber of 
Economic Relations, Johannesburg, 3 July 1980, pp. 8-9.
103 ibid. , p. 13.
KU Financial Mail, 10 October 1980.
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Rodrigues, reflected on its findings:
the technology the group has seen in South 
Africa appears very well suited to developing 
countries in the sense that it is simple and 
intended for operators with low skills. This 
makes the South African equipment and know-how 
very attractive to us and, in some cases, more 
agreeable than the technology we can purchase 
from the most developed countries.105
The extended contact the delegation had with South 
African industrialists, consulting engineers and export 
managers boosted the potential for higher levels of 
trade.
In line with the upgrading of diplomatic relations, in 
April 1981 South Africa appointed its first trade 
representative in Santiago. This enabled a systematic 
flow of commercial information from Chile to the 
Department of Industries and Commerce in Pretoria to 
occur, destined to inform South African exporters about 
opportunities in the Chilean market.106
As in the case of Brazil, trade not only followed the 
flag, but also investment. The purchase by the Anglo 
American Corporation of a 40% share in the Panama- 
registered mining interests of the Hochschild group, 
Empresas Consolidadas Sudamericanas, in 1981, established 
a South African presence in the private sector of the 
Chilean copper mining industry. Empresas owned a 
controlling 72.6% shareholding in the Mantos Blancos 
copper mine, 45 km north-east of the coastal city of 
Antofagasta.
In Chile, the copper mining industry is divided into 
three sectors by size of operation. The four largest
lu;* The Citizen, 2 October 1980.
106 The Star, 8 June 1981.
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copper mines107 form the "Large Mining Sector" which 
remains under state ownership through the national copper 
corporation, Codelco-Chile. In cases where there had been 
progressive nationalisation within this sector during the 
1967-73 period, expropriation payments were made by the 
military government to former foreign owners. The 
"Medium" and "Small" sectors were denationalised after 
1973 and sold off to private enterprise. The government 
announced that all new mining projects, irrespective of 
size, would fall under private ownership.
The company which Anglo acquired, Empresa Minera de 
Mantos Blancos, had never been nationalised.
TABLE 7.2
CHILE'S MAIN COPPER PRODUCERS BY OUTPUT, 1985-93 
Company Ownership Fine copper ('000 metric tonnes)
1985 1989 1993*
Codelco State-owned 1, 077 1,243 1, 320
Enami State-owned 102 120 120
La Escondida Broken Hill/RTZ 320
Disputada &
El Soldado Exxon Oil 74 120 205
Mantos Blancos Anglo American 70 75 100
Pudahuel Chilean private 37 14 21
La Candelaria Phelps Dodge/Sumitomo 90
Quebrada Blanca Cominco (Canada) 44
La Zaldivar Outokumpu (Finland) 40
El Indio Lac (Canada) 33 35
Others 46 70
Sources: Enrique Valenzuela, "The role of copper in
Chile's economy" , Optima 3 4,4 (December 1986), p. 222;
Economist Intelligence Unit, Chile country report 2,
1990, pp. 15-16.
* Projected output
107 Chiquicamata, Potrerillos/El Salvador (both 
formerly owned by Anaconda), Andina (ex-Cerro 
Corporation), and El Teniente (ex-Kennecott).
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Chile is said to possess 25% of the world's known copper 
reserves, and produces around 15% of the world's copper 
supply. Within the industry, Mantos Blancos accounted for 
a little over 2.2% of Chile's copper output in 1989, and 
despite expansion, this share will only rise slightly as 
other new mines come into being in the immediate future. 
(See Table 7.2) The large La Escondida and other smaller 
projects will raise the private sector's financial share 
of the copper mining industry from 41% in 1991 to almost 
50% by 1994.108
In 1986, the Anglo American Corporation and its 
associated companies, De Beers and Minorco, purchased the 
balance of the Empresas Consolidadas Sudamericanas 
holdings from the Hochschild group. Empresas became the 
holding group for all Anglo interests in Latin America, 
and was renamed the Anglo American Corporation of South 
America Limited (AMSA), with offices in Rio de Janeiro, 
Buenos Aires and Santiago.
AMSA's Chilean operations were devoted to two projects: 
the Mantos Blancos copper mine, and gold prospecting in 
the Andes.
The increasingly buoyant copper prices in the late 1980s, 
combined with substantial new investment in the mine, 
meant that the Mantos Blancos played a significant part 
in developing AMSA's attributable earnings. These rose 
from US$ 29 million in 1986 to US$ 64 million in 1987 and 
further to US$ 130 million in 1988, "principally due to 
the performance of Mantos Blancos which benefitted from 
the strong copper price." 109
108 Economist Intelligence Unit, Chile country profile 
1991/2, London: EIU, 1991, p. 21.
IU9 Minerals and Resources Corporation, Annual report 
1989, Luxembourg, 1989, p. 17.
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AMSA's other Chilean project, the Marte_or Tres Cruces 
gold mine, was another potential money spinner. Although 
the company had placed substantial investment in the 
prospecting and infrastructure, the mine was expected to 
go into operation in late 1989, and to produce 2.9 tonnes 
(equivalent to 90,000 oz) of gold per year from 1990 
onwards.Ilu
However when AMSA's net earnings dipped to US$ 107 
million in 1989, part of the reason given was "the 
commissioning and metallurgical problems at the Tres 
Cruces gold mine in Chile".111 The mine was only 
operating at 28% of its capacity during 1990, because of 
the inability of its systems to process ore at the 
required rate. Anglo agreed with its investment partners, 
Cominco Resources of Canada (25.7%) and Chemical Bank 
(20%), that it would take sole responsibility for further 
operating losses, which might include the costs of 
closure. Cominco was considering legal action against 
Anglo, which had carried out the original exploration and 
feasibility studies, in order to recover its losses.112
Another South African mining company, Gold Fields of 
South Africa, also suffered setbacks in its Chilean 
investments. It sought to develop a large gold deposit, 
regarded as having the potential to be the richest in the 
country. However the company experienced delays due to 
land disputes. Gold Fields suspended its geological 
activities during 1987, but remained interested in the
llu Anglo American Corporation of South Africa 
Limited, Annual report 1988, Johannesburg, 1988, p. 7.
111 Minerals and Resources Corporation, Annual report 
1990, Luxembourg, 1990, p. 20.
112 Economist Intelligence Unit, Chile country profile 
3, 1991, London: EIU, p. 18.
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project.113
Both of Anglo’s mining projects had, however, sourced a 
number of their components from South Africa. Many of the 
South African companies exported to Chile in the wake of 
the AMSA investments, first to satisfy the needs of the 
Mantos Blancos project, but later servicing the Chilean 
mining industry as a whole.
For example, a Johannesburg-based firm, Delkor Technik, 
exported equipment for copper cementation to Mantos 
Blancos from 1981, and later obtained contracts to supply 
horizontal bed filters to the Carolina de Michilla and 
the Exxon-owned La Disputada copper mining complexes.114
South African exporters were also urged to take advantage 
of the high levels of new state investment in the Chilean 
"Large Mining Sector" in the mid-1980s.
In what was hailed as the largest steel shipment from 
South Africa ever, the country's largest private steel 
company, Macsteel International exported 12,000 tons of 
round steel bars to Chile for use in the manufacture of 
grinding balls, an essential item in crushing plants for 
the extraction of copper.115 f
One of South Africa's leading plastics manufacturers, 
Gundle, obtained a number of contracts in Chile. "One of 
these contracts is at the Chiquicamata copper mine - one 
of the largest open-cast operations in the world", 
claimed the company's marketing director. In this case
113 Business Day, 19 November 1987.
114 Mining Magazine, June 1983 ; Sunday Times 
(Johannesburg), 5 August 1984.
115 Robertson1 s Freighting Schedules, 15 March 1982; 
New Frontiers, June 1982, p. 1.
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Gundle had to supply high density polyethylene sheeting 
to be used in the heap leaching process. In tests, the 
University of Santiago had found the Gundle product the 
only one which could withstand high pressure and 
corrosion.116 In addition to the copper industry, Gundle 
also supplied R100,000 worth of plastic film and other 
machinery to Chile.
GEC Woods Fans, the company which had sponsored the visit 
of the Chilean trade delegation in 1980, also gained a 
number of contracts to supply mining ventilation systems 
to the Chilean mining industry. By mid-1981 it was 
reported that "a major mine in Chile had bought several 
multi-stage Aerofoil mine ventilation fans" from the 
company.117
A number of non-mining export contracts derived from 
successful participation in the Santiago trade fairs. In 
particular, there were large contracts for the supply of 
industrial lighting, corrugated cartons for the apple 
industry, wine making equipment, and wool for Chilean 
textiles.lli*
Investments in the mining industry were not the only ones 
to draw South African goods and services to Chile. In the 
wake of South African companies investing in the Chilean 
fishing industry, a number of auxiliary industries were 
also attracted to doing business in Chile.
116 The Citizen, 23 July 1982. Also see The Star, 15 
September 1980; Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 25 October 
1981.
117 Tradelink, September 1981, p. 14.
118 See Construction Week, 13 July 1982; Credit Notes, 
November 1982; Engineering Week, 31 January 1985; and 
Food Review, February-March 1985. The purchase of wine 
making equipment was reported in the South African 
Financial Gazette, 2 April 1976.
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Fishery equipment and technology produced in South Africa 
is fairly advanced. Deck equipment exported to Chile has 
been able to cut purse seining time from 70 to 35 
minutes.
The first of the fishing equipment manufacturers to 
export to Chile was Rock Engineering, whose initial 
consignment of stickwater plants and a dryer went to the 
Ovenstone plant in 1964. True to pattern, other Chilean 
fish processors then bought three more stickwater plants 
and a dryer. In the early 1970s, Rock exported to Ecuador 
and licenced a Peruvian company to build stickwater 
plants according to its own design. Rock also introduced 
automatic fish packing equipment to replace hand-packing 
in Latin American plants. In 1979 Peru purchased all the 
main components from Rock for four large canneries. And 
in 1980, it sold another three stickwater plants to 
Chile.119
Other South African companies sold purse seine nets, net 
handling systems, hydraulics, windlasses, and fish 
offloading equipment.120 In addition, South African 
technology and machinery has been used to expand the can 
manufacturing industry in Chile, especially aimed at fish 
canning. Metal Box South Africa in 1980 purchased 50% of 
a holding company Lota Schwager for US$ 4 million. Metal 
Box supplied the holding company and one of its 
subsidiaries, Fabrica de Envases SA (FESA), with new 
technology canning equipment at Talcahuano and Iquique.
In 1983 it increased its Chilean investments by rescuing 
FESA following huge losses made by the company due to 
unfavourable exchange rates depressing the market for 
exports of Chilean canned fish. The risk taken in
119 South African Shipping News and Fishing Industry 
Review, March 1981, p. 25.
120 ibid., pp. 25, 27, 31; November 1981, p. 19.
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guaranteeing FESA's losses was offset against the fact 
that the peso had since been devalued by 90% in relation 
to the US dollar.121
In early October 1987, Barend du Plessis, the South
African finance minister, paid a three-day visit to
Santiago and predicted that bilateral trade and South
African investments in Chile would continue to grow in
the future. Accompanied by the ministry's director-
general Chris Stals, du Plessis met the ministers of
finance, economy and planning, the central bank
president, and other officials in the finance sector. In
an interview du Plessis stated that
Despite the fact that South Africa is not a 
capital-exporting country, we do permit our 
businesses to invest in other countries under 
the same conditions as ours, and from this 
point of view Chile has great potential.122
Du Plessis was indicating that South Africa regarded 
Chile as a highly favoured destination for its carefully 
regulated capital exports.
Chile's trade, like that of South Africa, is largely 
oriented towards the North. The European Community, the 
United States, Canada and Japan account for the bulk of 
Chile's trade. While South Africa is not one of Chile's 
major trading partners, nevertheless there has been a 
steady increase in commercial relations between the two 
countries. These flourished under conditions of mutual 
isolation and official ideological congruence, and in 
which the military exercised substantial power. The 
lucrative arms trade was given a filip by the close 
military links. Large investments of South African 
capital in mining, construction and fishing attracted
121 Daily News, 28 July 1980; The Star, 28 July 1980, 
and 21 June 1983.
122 The Globe and Mail (Toronto), 5 November 1987.
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13. CHALLENGING THE RELATIONSHIP
Unlike the relationships with other Latin American 
countries, South Africa's links with Chile attracted 
great attention after 1973. This was due largely to the 
openness of the military nature of the relationship, as 
well as to both countries' mutual and extensive 
violations of human rights. The almost congruent 
doctrines of national security, anti-communism, and the 
attempted extermination of all opposition, had caused 
comparisons to be drawn and had earned both regimes a 
position of isolation in the international community.
As opposition to Pinochet mounted inside Chile, 
especially after 1983, militants turned to more active 
tactics: street protests, general strikes, and 
demonstrations of the use of force. Although Pinochet 
survived an assassination attempt, he was deeply shocked 
by the extent of the armed opposition's intelligence and 
logistics.
As part of a show of force, armed sections of the Chilean 
opposition engaged in a bombing campaign in late July 
1985. Although mostly directed against the US consulate 
in Santiago and outlets of US multinationals such as the 
Chase Manhattan Bank and International Telephone & 
Telegraph (ITT), for the first time the bombers also 
targeted the Chilean offices of a South African 
corporation.
Unsurprisingly the target was the Anglo American 
Corporation, engaged in copper mining in Chile. "This was 
the first terrorist attack we have ever suffered in 
Chile," claimed company manager Hector Tortosa.
According to Chilean police, leaflets released by the 
bombs credited the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, a
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guerrilla organisation loyal to the clandestine Communist 
Party of Chile.125
In another wave of bombings in July 1988, the South 
African embassy was targeted, although the bomb was 
mistakenly planted in a nearby schoolyard, and only 
damaged a garage at the rear of the embassy building.126
Opposition to the relationship inside South Africa did 
not take an armed form. Instead it took the form of 
limited public debates about the nature of the two 
regimes.
In response to the 1985 visit of the Esmeralda, an 
extensive correspondence occurred in the letters column 
of the Cape Times debating the claims that the ship was 
used as a torture chamber against naval personnel loyal 
to the constitution after the 1973 coup, as well as the 
Chilean government's human rights record. In the absence 
of organisations like Amnesty International inside South 
Africa, this was the first public challenge to official 
Chilean and South African versions of the situation.127
In September 1986, Chile celebrated its 175th 
Independence Day. To mark the occasion, the Chilean 
embassy persuaded the Roman Catholic archbishop of Cape 
Town to celebrate a special mass at St Mary's cathedral. 
The embassy advertised the mass as part of its official 
programme, and invited government and municipal 
officials, the South African military hierarchy, the 
diplomatic corps and the Chilean community to
125 Cape Times, 26 July 1985.
126 Cape Times, 27 July 1988; The Argus, 27 July 1988.
127 "Letters to the editor", Cape Times, 4 May, 10 
May, 21 May 1985.
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participate. The embassy sponsored "advertorial" 128 
content in the media praising the junta's salvation of 
the country.
The blatant use of the church as part of a pro-junta 
propaganda programme provoked a response on the part of 
progressive church activists, academics and trade 
unionists. This grouping petitioned the church to 
reconsider celebrating the mass in the light of the 
junta's human rights record, and especially in view of 
recent persecution of the Catholic church in Chile.
Archbishop Naidoo, recovering in hospital from back 
surgery, was not in a position to officiate at the mass. 
Instead the petition was received by Father Roger 
Hickley, along with filmed evidence of extensive human 
rights violations in Chile. Although Hickley refused to 
cancel the mass, he courageously rededicated it to the 
junta's victims. Embassy officials and their guests were 
suitably shamed by Hickley's sermon.
The group which had alerted the Catholic church to the 
reality of the Chilean situation remained in existence, 
eventually forming a Latin America solidarity network 
called Lucha, the Spanish word for struggle. The group 
began to meet regularly and organised public information 
meetings on Latin America.
It became increasingly obvious to the network, which soon 
attracted a membership of fifty people, that the themes 
of repression, militarisation and redemocratisation which 
arose from an examination of the Latin American reality 
were of great pertinence to conditions and political 
debates within South Africa.
128 A portmanteau term comprised of the words 
"advertising" and "editorial" in which paid advertising 
is written up to resemble editorial matter.
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Open political organisation of an oppositional nature 
during the state of emergency was curtailed. As part of 
the implementation of the tricameral constitution, local 
elections were scheduled for late September 1988. These 
elections aimed to place government stooges in power in 
the new black municipal authorities. The government 
feared a repeat of the 1984 parliamentary elections in 
which, after strong campaigns undertaken by the popular 
organisations, MPs for the two subordinate houses were 
elected on polls below 20 per cent of the registered 
electorate. The crisis of their legitimacy had affected 
the authority with which the tricameral institutions had 
been regarded. The popular movement felt that 
illegitimate institutions were being foisted on black 
people against their will. Sensing the widespread 
opposition to the elections, and fearing for their 
disruption, the government decreed that it would be 
illegal to campaign against the forthcoming municipal 
elections or to advocate any form of boycott.
By coincidence the plebiscite arranged by Pinochet to 
endorse his retention of the presidency for a further 
term of office had been scheduled for early October 1988. 
The Chilean opposition united to demand the electorate 
register a "no" vote. The consequences of a "no" majority 
would be open national elections in December 1989 in 
preparation for return to civilian rule in March 1990. 
Hence to secure the process of democratisation in Chile, 
a "no" majority in the plebiscite was essential.
Lucha decided to hold a Latin American cultural day on 14 
September to highlight the importance of the plebiscite 
for the Chilean people. Taking over a community art 
centre for a day, the organisation arranged a programme 
of art, music, dance, poetry and food from Latin America 
as a backdrop to debates, lectures, information and film 
on the Chilean situation. An exhibition of Latin American
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poster art was opened, alongside contributions by a 
children's art class of their responses to the plight of 
the Chilean opposition.
A crucial part of the day was a debate on the plebiscite 
and the South African local elections. Over 400 people 
attending the day were availed of a chance to discuss 
publicly the illegitimacy of the South African local 
elections under the guise of discussing the Chilean 
situation. This was a unique experience in a political 
climate which had attempted by all means to suppress 
debate on the local elections. The expression of 
solidarity with the Chilean people in their struggle for 
democracy had refracted in a real sense back onto those 
who were concerned with democracy at home.
A wider debate, conducted in cultural circles, came to a 
head the year before. It concerned whether a group of 
South African artists should exhibit their work at the 
VIII Valparaiso Biennale in 1987 as part of an official 
South African state-sponsored entry. The debate was 
bitter and divided the artistic community around the 
country.
The objectors were fundamentally critical of the military 
nature and human rights record of the Chilean government. 
They felt that participation was a highly charged 
political act, effectively endorsing an event that was 
established by the unelected Valparaiso municipality to 
indicate the "normality" of cultural production under the 
Pinochet government. Participation would weaken the 
cultural isolation of the regime, and become an extended 
expression of the good relations operating at state-to- 
state level.
At the 1979 State of the Arts in South Africa conference 
held at the University of Cape Town, attended by artists
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and cultural workers, a resolution was taken at the
closing session which stated that
It is the responsibility of each artist to work 
as diligently as possible to effect change 
towards a post-apartheid society... to refuse 
participation in state sponsored exhibitions 
until such time as moves are made to implement 
the abovementioned change.129
It was in line with this resolution that a number of 
artists had taken their stand not to participate in the 
competition.
Their critique went on to question official South African 
government involvement, sponsorship and promotion of the 
country's participation in the Biennale since its 
inception. South Africa's ambassadors had been drawn into 
serving on the local comite de honor of the Biennale. 
Government sponsorship of the South African Association 
of Arts, through which individual artists receive 
support, became contingent upon the association's 
participation in the Biennale. In the 1985 Biennale, a 
prize won by the South African exhibit was accepted on 
the artists' behalf by the ambassador.
The critics also objected to the racist management and 
funding of arts in South Africa. Under the 1983 
constitution, arts and culture are considered "own 
affairs" rather than "general affairs" and fall under the 
jurisdiction of the three racially separate parliaments 
and education departments. They felt that state support 
for non-racial participation in international 
competitions was masking the segregated cultural policy 
in force at home.
The remaining participants were also aware of the 
treatment of a fellow South African artist, Paul 
Stopforth, at the 1979 Biennale. He had entitled his
129 Weekly Mail, 12-18 June 1987, p. 23.
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submission Requiem for Allende, mindful of Allende's long 
relationship with the city of Valparaiso where he had 
been a general medical practitioner, and where his 
original political constituency lay. The South African 
government expressed strong objections to his title, 
whereupon the artist renamed the work Biko. The 
government then barred the work entirely from being 
submitted.
Despite this experience the remaining participating
artists issued a declaration stating that they
reject politically oppressive systems wherever 
they occur...we will exhibit as individual 
artists and not as representatives of the 
government...we support the right of all 
artists to make and exhibit art in any country, 
without any form of censorship.130
The overlay of political contacts and official 
stakeholdings in successful participation made it 
extremely difficult for the artists to justify their 
competing as "individuals".
The controversy was raised within the media, within the 
different regions of the South African Association of 
Arts, some of which declined to participate, as well as 
in academic circles.131 The debate was to feed into the 
very vital discussions on the relationship between art 
and politics which has raged on inside South Africa. It 
sensitised many working artists, cultural workers, 
students, curators and art historians to the repressive 
situation in Chile, and drew attention to the nature of
130 ibid.
131 The controversy was raised more fully in an 
unpublished paper, "Feeding the hand that bites", written 
by Colin Richards of the University of the Witwatersrand 
department of art history, Johannesburg, 1987, a copy of 
which was kindly provided by the author. Richards also 
engaged in a newspaper debate on the issue; see for 
example Pretoria News, 5 August 1987.
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its government's links with the apartheid government.
14. ASSESSMENT
Chile under Pinochet was one of the very few regimes in 
the world that entered into an active relationship with 
the apartheid regime. It did so regardless of any 
international standards of morality and political 
behaviour, precisely because it rejected those standards. 
Instead it had its own standards, which were on a par 
with those which had been implemented for two generations 
in South Africa.
The rapid militarisation of the South African political 
process, accelerated during the P W Botha presidency, 
established a greater degree of understanding between the 
two regimes. The interlocaturs between the regimes were 
military men. South Africa gave refuge to Chilean 
officers who were wanted for murder in the United States, 
and who were potentially liable to extradition from Chile 
or elsewhere. The South African military-industrial 
complex received contracts for weapons, sold franchised 
production lines, and became responsible for the 
construction of a strategic naval harbour in the extreme 
south of Chile.
The friendliness of the regimes was certainly a factor in 
the decision of South African companies to consider Chile 
as a country worthy of their investment. The junta's 
attitude to foreign capital, repatriation of profits, 
taxation and trade unions appealed to those South African 
fishing companies keen to relocate their Namibian 
investments.
In the case of Chile, the salience of political and 
ideological factors was a notable feature in the
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relationship with South Africa. Pretoria's military and 
police leaders were seldom persona grata in other 
countries, yet in Chile, the warmth with which they were 
constantly received served to reinforce their self­
esteem. The embraces of the Chilean military endorsed 
their ideology of combatting the "total onslaught" with 
"total war". In turn they could share useful recipes for 
repression with the Chileans, and help set up production 
lines for lethal armaments. Chile could also act as a 
useful conduit for the South African arms industry to 
infiltrate politically sensitive markets,
Therefore the relationship had great utility for South 
Africa. The acceptance of the apartheid government on its 
own terms was of great psychological comfort to the 
military leaders, the politicians and their constituency. 
The ideological preconditions for the flourishing of the 
relationship were in place. Business followed, but aside 
from military business, was not of crucial import to 
either country. Chile's major exports - copper, nitrates, 
fishmeal, fruit, paper, timber, wines - are all, with 
the exception of fishmeal, goods which compete on 
international markets with similar South African 
products. Therefore prospects of trade in non-military 
goods have never been great, and no amount of artificial 
stimulation for political motives can guarantee any 
meaningful escalation.
The centrality of the military in the relationship is 
likely to be regime-specific. Despite conceding the 
presidency to civilian succession, Pinochet made sure 
that this was conditional on his remaining within the 
political wings, continuing to command the Chilean 
military in the short and perhaps medium term. Chile's 
civilian politicians have retained the junta's neo­
liberal economic strategy, which has ensured a smooth 
initial political transition. South Africa is also
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undergoing a process of regime transition. Once both 
transitional periods are over, the relationship is bound 
to be reassessed. The ideological rationale for 
closeness, based on links between generals of a similar 
political inclination, is unlikely to proceed intact into 
the twenty-first century. This indicates the transitory 
nature of relationships in which the political nature of 
the participating regimes is a primary consideration.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE FAILURE TO FORM A SOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between Chile and South Africa was one 
whose binding occurred through a congruence of military- 
ideological values in the period after 1973. Chile was 
essentially a Pacific power, despite harbouring some 
claims to territory which would give it wider access to 
the Atlantic and hence status as a minor Atlantic power.
It was to the other Latin American states which border on 
the Atlantic that South Africa has often looked for 
military partnership. Together with the navies of 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, South Africa saw a role 
for itself policing the South Atlantic against any 
incursions by the Soviet navy. It saw the potential of 
wider military links being able to cement a more solid 
all-round relationship with the key countries of the 
Southern Cone of Latin America.
This chapter examines how South Africa attempted in vain 
to fulfil the aspiration of building a multilateral 
military alliance. At a time when the majority of its 
potential partners were under military rule, an 
increasingly militarised South Africa hoped to achieve a 
degree of integration on the basis of common ideological 
positions in relation to the perceived spread of world
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communism. Although there was a positive response in the 
conservative Latin American press, and on the part of 
some factions within Latin American navies, there were 
too many factors operating to prevent the development of 
a successful multilateral alliance. It will be shown how 
such an arrangement was unable to match the success of 
the bilateral relationship with Chile.
2. THE IDEA OF A SOUTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
The idea of a multilateral military alliance grouping the 
nations of the South Atlantic, in imitation of NATO, was 
something close to the hearts of military strategists on 
both sides of the South Atlantic at various times.
The Argentine navy and the Brazilian military academy, 
the Escola Superior da Guerra (ESG), have both been 
intellectual repositories for the science of geopolitics. 
In the case of Argentina, the navy traditionally regarded 
itself as having particular responsibility for 
safeguarding national claims against potential challenges 
by Brazil, Chile, the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union. Control over the South Atlantic is a key to the 
assertion of these claims.
A key strategist and professor of geopolitics at the ESG 
during the 1950s, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, saw 
South America, Africa and Antarctica as forming a 
strategic triangle in defence of the West, whose most 
vulnerable element was Africa. He regarded the South 
Atlantic, and the Straits of Dakar as vital to Brazil's 
national security.1
1 Golbery do Couto e Silva, Geopolltica do Brasil, 
Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 3rd edn, 1981, p. 191. 
Golbery went on to become head of the Brazilian 
intelligence service SNI and a key member of the cabinet 
during the Geisel and Figueiredo presidencies.
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In the 1950s, South Africa's cabinet ministers saw the 
country's military role as being an auxiliary of the NATO 
alliance, and sought to lead a new regional defence 
alliance based on the African colonies of the NATO 
countries.2 Despite attending numerous conferences on 
maritime security, little was achieved. Once Britain 
announced her decision to withdraw from Simon's Town in 
the late 1960s, South Africa was forced to rethink its 
role.3 In order to combat the country's increasing 
isolation, prime minister Vorster launched a new "outward 
movement" in his foreign policy. It was in this context 
that military links with Latin American countries first 
came under consideration. "We must regard these people as 
our neighbours, they are our neighbours across the South 
Atlantic Ocean," claimed Vorster's foreign minister, Dr 
Hilgard Miiller.4
The strategists saw advantages to the West of the closer 
collaboration of their countries' armed forces, 
especially their navies. Their overriding intention was 
to form a junior partnership with the NATO countries in 
order to patrol the South Atlantic against infiltration 
by the naval forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.
Had the timing been more propitious, for example at the 
height of the Korean war, and had the navies of the South 
Atlantic nations been more mature, the NATO countries 
might have responded positively. However, at that time
2 Jack Spence and Geoff Berridge, "South Africa: the 
roads to Simonstown", in John Young (ed.), The foreign 
policy of Churchill1s peacetime administration,
Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988, p. 193.
3 Christopher Coker, "South Africa and the Western 
alliance, 1949-88", in Stephen Chan (ed.), Exporting 
apartheid: foreign policies in Southern Africa, 1978-88, 
London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 249-54.
4 Gail-Maryse Cockram, Vorster's foreign policy, 
Pretoria: Academica, 1970, p. 82.
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the United States felt that it was able to patrol the 
area from its bases in Panama and Puerto Rico, whilst the 
Royal Navy still enjoyed sovereign base facilities at 
Simon's Town in the Cape Peninsula. NATO countries 
perceived the threat to their sea power being located in 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans rather than in the South 
Atlantic.
A number of factors served to encourage the South African 
proponents of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation as 
time progressed.
The first was the changing military relationship between 
Britain and South Africa since 1945, particularly with 
respect to the Simon's Town Agreement and the arms 
embargo implemented by the Wilson government from 1964. 
Britain's gradual withdrawal from a military role in the 
Indian Ocean led to South African hopes of a role for 
itself in relation to NATO.
The second major reason was the increase in maritime 
traffic around the Cape as a result of the closure of the 
Suez canal during the Six Day War in the Middle East in 
June 1967. The situation was compounded by the oil crisis 
which ensued in the wake of the Middle East war of 
October 1973. The petroleum exporting countries responded 
by quadrupling their oil prices on world markets.
The third factor was the increase in the Soviet and 
allied presence in the South Atlantic, particularly in 
the aftermath of Angolan independence in November 1975.
The fourth was the rise in Latin America from 1964 of a 
series of military governments, whose naval hierarchies 
seemed well disposed towards consideration of a naval 
alliance.
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The fifth reason was the evolution of the Nixon Doctrine 
as a foreign policy principle of the United States, 
whereby important regional powers take on more 
responsibility for policing their region in order to 
spare Washington further disastrous entanglements in 
minor anti-communist wars like the one in Indo-China.
Together, these considerations raised the hopes of the 
South African government and military establishment 
forming a military alliance with transoceanic neighbours. 
This would put an end to the country's isolation and 
regain Western support by constructing a pillar of 
Western strategic defence. These reasons therefore need 
to be examined in greater depth.
3. SOUTH AFRICA'S MARITIME DEFENCE
At the outbreak of the Second World War; the rudimentary 
South African naval force comprised of three officers, 
thirteen men and no ships. At the time the Royal Navy was 
responsible, through sovereign control of the Simon's 
Town naval base, of defending the Cape sea route from 
potential attack.
During the war itself, there was intensive naval activity 
in South African waters, including the presence of some 
sixty anti-submarine vessels, but the Royal Navy was 
unable to prevent the sinking of some 2 38 allied ships. 
South African naval forces had been responsible for 
running only nine ships.
After the war, General Smuts announced that it was 
imperative that the country take responsibility for its 
own naval defence. Yet it took until the mid-1950s before 
the South African Navy could be established on a more 
elaborate footing. Discussions were undertaken with the
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Royal Navy from 1949 onwards about transfer of the 
Simon's Town base. It was only in 1957 that the transfer 
occurred. Britain lost sovereign control over the base. 
Instead it negotiated the Simon's Town Agreement5 whereby 
it retained use of the base, but South Africa took over 
primary naval responsibilities in an area from the north 
of Namibia to the Mozambican border.
South Africa's acquisition of the base was a stimulus to 
the further expansion of its navy, all orders for further 
shipping being processed by the British Admiralty. By 
1959 British shipyards had delivered eight mine-sweepers 
and six seaward defence vessels; the personnel had been 
increased by 1,669 men. A further 20 ships were on order. 
Although by now the South African Navy was seen as a real 
force, it was still envisaged that it would rely 
extensively on the Royal Navy for assistance in all areas 
save inshore defence.
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth and the
declaration of its republican status in 1961 did not seem
to affect the terms of the Simon's Town Agreement. The
South African foreign minister, Eric Louw, justified this
as follows:
as regards defence, a great measure of co­
operation existed in the past between the 
Republic and the United Kingdom. This co­
operation did not stem from the common 
Commonwealth connection, but from mutual 
defence interests. Now that we have left the 
Commonwealth, these needs have in no way 
diminished, and ... there will be no departure 
of any consequence from the existing pattern of
5 United Kingdom, Exchanges of letters on defence 
matters between the governments of the United Kingdom and 
the Union of South Africa (Cmnd. 9520), London: HMSO, 
1955; Tunstall (1959), p. 51; Dugard (1968); Lawrie 
(1968); Christie (1970); Spence and Berridge (1988).
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our defence relations with the United Kingdom.6
In April 1963 Britain delivered the most advanced anti­
submarine vessel in the squadron, the SAS President 
Kruger. Within four months, on 7 August, the United 
Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling for 
an international arms embargo against South Africa.7 As 
South Africa's main arms suppliers, Britain and the 
United States agreed to abide by the embargo, despite 
having abstained in the Security Council vote. Yet they 
continued to honour existing contracts and to supply 
spare parts and components through third parties.
The formal adoption of the arms embargo by the Labour 
government of Harold Wilson in mid-November 1964 provoked 
a reconsideration of the Simon's Town Agreement by the 
Verwoerd government. South Africa was faced with the 
contradictory prospect of its former ally and military 
mentor refusing to sell it arms on the one hand, while 
being an integral part of the defence of the Cape sea 
route on the other.
In any event, the financial crisis in Britain intensified
to the point where drastic cuts were made to its naval
commitments "east of Suez". In September 1966 it became
known that plans were afoot to withdraw the Royal Navy
from its base in Simon's Town. Defence minister P W Botha
reacted by stating that
in the light of the manner in which the British 
government has honoured the spirit of the 
Simon's Town Agreement, a revision of the 
agreement has become essential.8
In new talks on the agreement the following year, the
6 South Africa, Parliament, House of Assembly
Debates, 26 February 1962, col. 1595.
7 Security Council Document S/5386.
8 South Africa, Parliament, House of Assembly
Debates, 29 September 1966, col. 3239-40.
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South African Navy agreed to assume major responsibility 
for the Cape sea route in the event of war. But an 
extensive shopping list for equipment to fulfil this 
obligation was turned down by Britain.
South Africa's response was to turn to the French arms 
industry for supplies of maritime defence equipment. An 
order for three submarines was placed with the French 
ministry of defence. This order was executed over a 
period of three years, during which France provided the 
South African Navy with full operational training on the 
submarines. By 1970 the small modern navy had come into 
its own, having taken full responsibility for its own 
coastal defence.
The naval relationship with Britain grew increasingly 
contradictory, and by 197 5, the Wilson government, back 
in office, had terminated the Simon's Town Agreement. 
South Africa had always felt that NATO as a whole might 
replace Britain's former responsibilities. Yet despite 
some moves in the 1950s to draw South Africa into the 
defence of the Middle East9, NATO had no essential 
interest in developing a full-blown alliance, especially 
given South Africa's increasing pariah status. Any Soviet 
assaults on Western shipping would in any case be 
regarded by both sides as a cause de guerre, and were 
therefore unlikely to occur, more so in the South 
Atlantic, which seemed a very remote and implausible 
theatre of operations. Western shipping could much more 
easily be indicted in the Gulf, South-East Asia, or in 
the North Atlantic. Because of this, NATO's strategic 
emphasis was not placed on the Cape route, and South 
Africa had to forego the alliance with NATO as a serious 
option.
9 See Spence and Berridge, "South Africa: the roads 
to Simonstown", 1988, p. 206.
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Despite the growing impact of the arms embargo, the South 
African Navy was able, through covert acquisition of 
sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, to set 
up a monitoring centre at Silvermine, built into the 
slopes of the Steenberg, between Cape Town and Simon's 
Town. Silvermine is reputed to be able to monitor all air 
and sea movements between the Azores and Bangla Desh, and 
to form part of an international surveillance network 
connecting the British Admirality, US bases in Puerto 
Rico, French bases in Senegal and Madagascar, as well as 
the Portuguese and Argentine navies.10
Silvermine thus gave the South African Navy access to 
NATO codification systems said to have been provided by 
West German suppliers of surveillance equipment, who had 
trained a team from South Africa In May 1974.11 Yet this 
did not mean that the South African defences were 
necessarily integrated into NATO structures or 
operations. The potential alliance with NATO and South 
Africa's convictions about its naval utility to the West 
were regarded by some commentators as illusionary.12
What the installations at Silvermine could not do was to 
bolster the navy's operational forces, severely curbed by 
the arms embargo. Despite the acquisition of Israeli 
Reshef-style gunboats in the late 1970s, the navy was not 
in a position to take on the defence of the Cape sea 
route against a Soviet attack. For such a defence to 
succeed, new naval alliances would need to be forged.
10 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 21 October 1973; 
Gavin Cawthra, Brutal force: the apartheid war machine, 
London: IDAF, 1986, p. 91.
11 Christopher Coker, "South Africa and the Western 
alliance, 1949-88", p. 258.
12 For elaboration of this argument see ibid,, pp. 
249-65.
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4. FIRST NAVAL CONTACTS WITH LATIN AMERICA
Within a month of the bilateral talks held with Britain 
in Cape Town in May 1967 to discuss the future of the 
Simon's Town Agreement, war broke out in the Middle East. 
In six days Israel had expanded its hold over the West 
Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip formerly administered 
by Egypt, and the Syrian Golan Heights. The war came to 
an abrupt end.
As a result of the scuttling of ships in the Suez canal, 
it became impassable, and closed to international trade. 
The alternative route for shipping was around the Cape of 
Good Hope.
During the 1960s the bulk of the oil supplies to Europe 
had come to be derived from the Gulf area, and the Cape 
route suddenly became vitally strategic after the closure 
of the canal. This underlined the importance of the 
Simon's Town base, and the pressure placed on South 
Africa by the gradual reduction of the British commitment 
to sub-continental maritime defence.
South Africa began to seek out new partners in defence of
the South Atlantic. Courtesy visits to Argentina and
Australia were undertaken by the South African Navy from
1967 onwards, to emphasise the possibilities of future
liaison. In October and November 1967 a South African
naval squadron visited Argentina and conducted off shore
exercises.13 Defence minister P W Botha justified the new
contacts with the following logic:
The time has come for the nations of the free 
world to give serious thought to the defence of 
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans... South Africa 
has a role to play in facing future threats to 
the Southern Hemisphere and we shall play this
13 The Star, 13 September 1967; Weekend Star, 16 
September 1967.
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role to the fullest of our ability. We shall 
also seek the active co-operation in every 
military respect, but especially in maritime 
affairs, with the other free nations of the 
Southern Hemisphere.14
At the same time, foreign minister Hilgard Muller was 
engaged in diplomacy associated with Vorster's "outward 
movement". With the inauguration of South African 
Airways1s flight to New York via Rio de Janeiro, Muller 
was received officially by the Brazilians. In Rio he 
warned his Brazilian counterpart Jose de Magalhaes Pinto 
of "the great importance of warding off any possible 
threat in the South Atlantic ... where our interests 
lie." 15 Magalhaes Pinto claimed that Brazil and South 
Africa had discussed the possibility of a defence 
agreement, but that no specific proposal had been made.16 
Reports of these discussions caused considerable 
embarrassment to the Brazilian government, which took 
pains to deny it subsequently in a note to the president 
of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid.17
Muller also paid an official visit to Argentina and 
impressed that country's defence minister and acting 
foreign minister with the same threat of the Soviet fleet 
making potential inroads into the South Atlantic. In 
return, Admiral Pedro Gnavi, the commander-in-chief of 
the Argentine navy, paid an official nine-day visit to 
South Africa during April 1969. He took the opportunity 
of the visit to announce that another round of joint 
manoeuvres of the two countries' naval warships would
14 South African Digest, 22 November 1968, p. 3.
15 The Star, 28 March 1969.
16 Die Volkshlad, 9 April 1969.
17 Wayne A Selcher, The Afro-Asian dimension of 
Brazilian foreign policy, 1956-1972, Gainesville: 
University Presses of Florida, 1974, p. 194.
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occur in the South Atlantic during 1970.18
Argentina had also appointed a naval attache to South 
Africa for the first time. Captain E Galmarini, speaking 
in Cape Town, said that South Africa and Argentina had 
the same problems in the Atlantic and had to share the 
responsibility of guarding these waters.19
The joint exercises spawned further speculation about the 
possible formation of a South Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation.20 As a result of this speculation and 
rumoured defence contracts with South Africa, Argentina 
lost its seat on the governing council of the United 
Nations Development Programme. The angry Afro-Asians 
delegations, alerted to the situation by Cuba, elected 
that country's delegation to replace Argentina's.21
The courtesy visits from Argentina to South Africa 
nevertheless continued. For example, the Argentine 
training vessel ARA Libertad visited Cape Town in 
February 197 0, under the command of Admiral Emilio 
Massera, a future member of the junta which would later 
oust president Maria Estella Peron. Six months later a 
20-member trade mission led by the deputy foreign 
minister arrived in South Africa for a month of talks.
The mission had been set up by the newly appointed 
Argentine ambassador to South Africa, Frederico de Solar
18 The Star, 2 April 1969; Sunday Express 
(Johannesburg), 6 April 1969; Daily Telegraph, 16 May 
1969.
19 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 25 April 1982.
20 See introduction to Jane's fighting ships, 1969- 
JO, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
21 Robert H Eastbrook writing in the Washington Post, 
1 June 1969.
333
Dorrego.22
In 1972 the chief of the South African Defence Force,
Admiral H H Biermann, spoke about the relationship
between South Africa and Argentina:
A certain degree of liaison in the maritime and 
other fields is already operative. The South 
African Navy takes part from time to time in 
limited exercises in which for example the 
British and Argentine navies participate, and 
it pays courtesy calls on countries in the 
region.23
In the following year, Juan Peron was restored to power 
in Buenos Aires. Given Peron's historical predisposition 
towards non-alignment, Argentina began to reorient its 
foreign policy towards playing a part in the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Its foreign minister, Alberto Vignes, attended 
the 197 3 Non-Aligned Conference in Algeria, and returned 
to Buenos Aires with a proposal to cabinet that Argentina 
scale down its relations with South Africa.24 Yet the 
growing Argentine-South African Chamber of Commerce 
lobbied successfully against any such change.
So it was that in May 1973, foreign minister Hilgard
Muller led a mission to make contact with the new
government. At an official dinner to welcome him, the
Peronist vice-president of Argentina, Dr Vicente Solano
Lima, pledged to strengthen ties with South Africa:
We are not interested in how the South African 
government came to power, nor in the social 
situation in the country. We are only 
interested in tightening still further the 
links between us.25
22 Sunday Times (Johannesburg) , 23 August 1970.
23 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 25 April 1982.
24 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 18 December 1973.
25 Die Transvaler, 29 May 1973. Own translation. Also 
see press release issued by Argentine South African 
Chamber of Commerce, Buenos Aires, 19 June 1973.
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It appeared that Argentina was keen to market its 
counter-insurgency aircraft, the Pucara, to South Africa. 
Made up of French, British, Swiss and Belgian components, 
the aircraft was designed in Argentina. Rumours which 
surfaced in the press about such a deal were 
characteristically neither confirmed nor denied by the 
South African Defence Force, but the minister of defence, 
P W Botha, permitted the speculation to be published in 
Johannesburg newspapers.26
5. PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY
Although marginal in their naval power, the countries of 
Paraguay and Uruguay were assiduously cultivated by South 
Africa. These countries were seen as building blocks in 
the construction of a wider alliance.
Contact with Uruguay was first built by the South African 
finance minister Nico Diederichs, who attended the 
Nairobi conference of the International Monetary fund in 
September 1973. The sharp increase in the price of gold 
prompted Diederichs to announce offers of aid to 
underdeveloped countries which would be funded in part by 
the gold revenues. On his return to South Africa he was 
accompanied by the Uruguayan finance minister and the 
chairman of the Central Bank of Uruguay.27
As a result of talks in Pretoria, the ground was laid for 
South African financial assistance to Uruguay, which 
materialised in December 1974, when South Africa 
deposited R13.8 million in the Central Bank of Uruguay 
and bought a further R6.9 million worth of treasury bonds
26 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 25 April 1982.
27 The Argus, 15 September 1973.
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from the bank.28 A month later, president Juan Maria 
Bordaberry signed a decree announcing that Uruguay would 
set up an embassy in South Africa, "because of closer 
ties between the two countries as a result of increased 
trade between them".29 Bordaberry, elected two years 
before the June 1973 military coup, was retained as 
president by the armed forces until being dismissed in 
June 1976.
Paraguay's response was perhaps more significant. In 
August 1973, foreign minister Muller led a delegation to 
attend an inauguration of General Alfredo Stroessner as 
president of Paraguay.30 By the following January it was 
announced that Stroessner would pay an official visit to 
South Africa in April.31 Although his political 
importance in Latin America was small, Stroessner's 
willingness to visit South Africa furnished Pretoria with 
a number of propaganda points. He was, after all, a head 
of state, and only two other heads of state had visited 
South Africa since 1948 (Portugal and Malawi). His 
country played host to the World Anti-Communist Alliance, 
an organisation with strong links with the governments of 
Taiwan and South Korea as well as many influential 
political parties, think tanks and individuals around the 
world. South Africa also saw the visit as a breakthrough 
which might encourage other Latin American and world 
statesmen to emulate Stroessner's behaviour. The 
government also envisaged public processions, streets 
lined with cheering crowds, and the pomp of formal state
28 The Argus, 21 December 1974.
29 Cape Times, 24 January 1974.
30 The Argus, 2 0 August 1974. Stroessner first became 
president after a coup in 1954, and won presidential 
elections regularly with polls of over 90%. At least a 
quarter of the electorate were disenfranchised through 
being in exile.
31 The Star, 8 January 1974.
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ceremonies. A whites-only general election campaign was 
on at the time, and the ruling National Party expected to 
make gains from such a foreign policy coup.32
However, the opposition press failed to peact with 
enthusiasm, and published accounts of the corrupt and 
repressive nature of the Stroessner regime, carefully 
culled from ideologically respectible sources such as the 
Daily Telegraph and the Reader's Digest, both of which 
had published scathing exposes of Stroessner's complicity 
in torture and heroin smuggling.33 Students at the 
University of Cape Town planned to march through the city 
with banners proclaiming "Stroessner go home!", "Release 
all political prisoners!", and "South Africa - don't 
honour fascists!" 34 James Kruger, then deputy minister 
of justice, invoked powers acquired weeks before the 
visit under the Riotous Assemblies Amendment Act 3 0/1974 
to prevent all gatherings in protest against the visitor. 
"If there are people who do not know their manners," 
warned Vorster, "then manners will have to be taught to 
them." 35
Stroessner duly arrived, with an entourage of over a 
hundred, including cabinet ministers, army generals, 
security police officers, business executives and
32 Karel Johannes de Beer, "Betrekkinge tussen Suid- 
Amerika en die Republiek van Suid-Afrika in die tydperk 
van Dr. Hilgard Muller as minister van buitelandse sake, 
1964-77", Joernaal vir Eietydse Geskiedenis (Bloemfon­
tein) 7, 1, July 1982, p. 85.
33 Reader's Digest, South African edition, May 1973; 
Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 31 March 1974. The US 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs confirmed 
the truth of the accounts published by the Reader's 
Digest. See Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 7 April 1974.
34 Cape Times, 8 April 1974.
35 See leader "You will be hospitable", Cape Times, 2 
April 1974.
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journalists. Two treaties, one concerning cultural
exchanges and scientific and technological co-operation,
and the other relating to economic co-operation and
investment, were signed by the countries' foreign
ministers.36 At a state banquet given in his honour in
Pretoria, Stroessner declared that Paraguay practiced
a foreign policy of loyal friendship with those 
nations which share our concepts of freedom, of 
fundamental human rights, of dignity, of the 
value of man, and of the democratic system of 
government.37
During the visit, Stroessner continuously received warm 
official praise for his courage in resisting 
international objections to his friendship with South 
Africa.
The state visit was followed up in January 1975 by a 
mission of top South African civil servants to Paraguay 
and Uruguay, charged with the realisation of certain of 
the measures in the treaties of co-operation with 
Paraguay.38 Agreements were signed whereby South Africa 
would build two sugar plants and a pulp processing plant, 
would invest in the two massive hydro-electric projects 
which Paraguay was building jointly with Brazil (Itaipu) 
and Argentina (Corpus), would provide a R33 million line 
of credit for the purchase of South African equipment and 
services, and would finance the construction of new 
ministries of justice and foreign affairs.39 In Uruguay
36 Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1974; South Africa, 
Parliament, House of Assembly Debates, 11 September 1974, 
col. 2 6 66.
37 The Argus, 5 April 1974.
38 Led by the secretary for foreign affairs, Brand 
Fourie, the mission included the secretaries for finance, 
industry and commerce, and the chair of the Board of 
Trade and Industries.
39 The Argus, 4, 8 and 18 January 1975. In addition a 
total of R13.1 million had been made available in loans, 
according to the minister of finance when questioned in
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discussions centred on tourism and beef exports.
In August 1975, to coincide with the celebration of 
Paraguay's national day, Vorster repaid Stroessner's 
visit of the previous year, receiving a rapturous welcome 
in Asuncion.40 Further loans totalling R6 million were 
arranged, to assist road-building, housing, agriculture 
and the liquidity of a Paraguayan bank.41 The visit was 
also used to co-ordinate South Africa's entire Latin 
American strategy: the heads of all Pretoria's diplomatic 
missions in Latin America and the UN were summoned to 
Asuncion for deliberations. The other heads of mission 
were urged to emulate the success attained in relations 
with Paraguay.42 At this time, South African troops had 
already entered Angola, unbeknown to the South African 
public; it was hoped that Latin American diplomatic 
support would materialise in the event of the issue being 
raised in the UN General Assembly.
Vorster returned home after a stopover in Uruguay, where 
he was received by president Bordaberry.43 His trade and 
finance officials held discussions with their Uruguayan 
counterparts. The Uruguayan Fuel, Alcohol and Cement 
Authority (ANCAP) was offered a US$15 million credit and 
aid facility from South Africa's Industrial Development 
Corporation for the construction of a cement plant in the 
city of Paysandu. Referring to Bordaberry at the end of 
his visit, Vorster said: "We're the same type of men." 44
the House of Assembly. See South Africa, Parliament, 
House of Assembly Debates, 19 February 1976.
40 The Argus, 14 August 1974.
41 Cape Times, 15 August 1974.
42 The Argus, 15 August 1974.
43 The Star, 29 July 1975.
44 Tricontinental 101, November 1976, p. 6.
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Vorster's visit led to further contacts at official and 
private level, and raised the profile of South Africa in 
Uruguay's trade and commercial considerations. The 
mouthpiece of the military dictatorship, El Pais, 
referred to South Africa as "particularly worthy of 
maximum consideration, as one of the most advanced 
nations in the world spiritually, intellectually and 
materially" ,45
The Uruguayan dictatorship's endorsement of apartheid was 
particularly apparent, since it was the only foreign 
government to be represented at the official ceremonies 
marking the independence of the Transkei bantustan from 
South Africa in October 1976. The Transkei was the 
showcase of South Africa's policy of territorial 
apartheid, which attempted to justify the perpetuation of 
the migrant labour system, mass population removals from 
the areas designated for white habitation, and the loss 
of citizenship for millions of black South Africans.
The relative success experienced by South Africa in its 
relations with Paraguay and Uruguay was not, however, 
transmuted into building a successful naval alliance. The 
two countries carried insufficient political weight to 
draw the more significant regional actors into a military 
treaty. Paraguay's naval strength consisted merely of a 
number of patrol boats on the upper reaches of Platine 
estuary. Isolated even by the Nixon administration for 
his role in the drugs trade, Stroessner had been able to 
bask in the considerable respect accorded to him by the 
apartheid government. His visit was laden with ambiguity, 
since Pretoria treated it as a diplomatic coup, and yet 
it drew the world's moral attention to the sins of both 
regimes. Nevertheless, the relationship did afford South 
Africa some confidence in its efforts to build links with
45 El Pais (Montivideo) , 8 April 1976.
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Paraguay's more important neighbours.
6. PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET PRESENCE
The expansion of the Soviet navy into the Indian Ocean in 
the late 1960s, coupled with the global oil crisis of 
1974, were additional factors stressing the strategic 
nature of the Cape sea route. If the Soviet navy were to 
interdict cargoes of petroleum bound for Europe, this 
would intensify the crisis and spark off a global 
conflict. But the Soviet navy had not confined itself to 
the Indian Ocean.
The Portuguese naval attack on Conakry, the capital of 
Guinea, in 197 0, prompted the Sekou Toure government to 
appeal to the Soviet Union for some naval assistance. The 
Soviet Union responded by installing some of its naval 
patrol vessels and a detachment of marines in a permanent 
base in Conakry. The military airfield near Conakry was 
made available to Soviet long-range aircraft for 
surveillance of the Atlantic shipping routes. 46 The 
Soviet-Guinean agreement was used mostly to ensure a 
haven for the Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet, yet, in 
effect it appeared that the Soviet Union had acquired 
naval base facilities in the South Atlantic.
The fear of Soviet intentions escalated considerably, 
however, after the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 
Southern Africa. In Angola, the Soviet Union aided the 
MPLA with arms supplies both before and after the defeat 
of the Portuguese. This support was intensified once it 
was clear that the US was giving covert support to the 
MPLA's enemies, the FLNA and UNITA, and especially after
46 Joseph Whelan, The Soviet Union and the Third 
World: a watershed in great power policy?, Washington: 
Library of Congress, 1977, pp. 90-1.
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South Africa's military intervention on the side of the 
UNITA forces from August 1975.
To add to South Africa's nightmares, Cuba was also drawn 
into supporting the struggles of the MPLA against UNITA 
and its backers.
The naval implications were enormous. In granting naval 
facilities to the Soviet Union, Angola had caused a wave 
of paranoia in the chancelleries concerned with the 
strategic importance of the South Atlantic.
Ironically, whilst there was substantial anti-Soviet 
feeling in the Argentine navy, the overall interests of 
Argentine foreign policy dictated that any anti-Soviet 
pact would adversely affect a significant trade 
relationship. An intensification of grain sales from 
Argentina to the Soviet Union had occurred from the time 
of the securing of a three-year agreement in 1971. With 
the second advent of Peronist power, the relationship 
blossomed, and despite the anti-communist ideology 
espoused by the 1976-83 juntas, it continued to flourish. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union became Argentina's greatest 
customer for grain and meat exports. It assisted 
Argentina in the spheres of fishing, offshore oil 
exploration, and hydro-electricity.47 The Chilean junta's 
affinity with the Chinese also helped to cement Soviet- 
Argentine cordiality.
Caught in the position of wishing to defend an anti­
communist ideology on the one hand, and finding that the 
Soviet Union was a lucrative trading partner on the 
other, Argentina was faced with a dilemma which inhibited 
later moves towards the construction of a South Atlantic 
treaty.
47 Andrew Hurrell, "The politics of South Atlantic 
security", pp. 183-4.
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7. MILITARY RULE IN THE SOUTHERN CONE
By 197 6, the whole of the Southern Cone of Latin America 
was under military rule, including Argentina, which had 
succumbed that year. The Brazilian military by this time 
had the experience of eleven years in power, and the 
Paraguayan armed forces over twenty, whereas the 
Uruguayan and Chilean military regimes had both come to 
power in 1973. The militarisation of the Southern Cone 
was another factor which fostered optimism on the part of 
South African proponents of a South Atlantic alliance, 
since it was perceived that military decision makers 
would be far more amenable to the proposal.
Thus the first revival of the notion of a South Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation came in April 1976 when the outgoing 
US naval commander, Admiral George Ellis, and his 
successor, Admiral James Sagerholm, visited Buenos Aires 
for discussions with their Argentine counterpart, Admiral 
Emilio Massera, as well as the Brazilian naval minister, 
Admiral Geraldo Azevedo Henning. Their purpose was to 
strengthen naval co-ordination in the South Atlantic in 
preparation for the possibility that the Soviet navy 
would be offered bases in Angola.48
Strategically, the recruitment of the navies of the South 
Atlantic fitted in well with the Nixon Doctrine, 
developed during the US interventions in Indo-China. The 
substance of the Doctrine was to minimise the need for US 
intervention in regional conflicts by devolving defence 
and policing responsibilities within the region to 
regimes which the US regarded as both pre-eminent and 
loyal to its interests. For example, both Brazil and 
South Africa were regarded as the most useful surrogates 
within their respective regions.
48 Daniel Waksman Schinca, "El proyecto de la OTAS", 
Nueva Polltica 2, 5-6, April-September 1977, p. 339.
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Thus, at the meeting of the four admirals at Puerto 
Belgrano on 7 April 1976, plans were drafted for the 
creation of an integrated air/sea strike force under a 
single strategic command and with its own bases. Later 
that month a joint naval mission from Argentina and 
Brazil visited the Simon’s Town base to lay the ground 
for future logistic co-operation in the South Atlantic.49
Details of these arrangements were released in the 
Argentine, Chilean and Brazilian press, which cultivated 
and played on fears of the perceived Marxist threat to 
South Atlantic security. Claims that both South Africa 
and Britain were involved in the SATO project led to 
speculation about the possibility of a solution to the 
longstanding Falkland Islands dispute, through their 
conversion into a joint strategic base for SATO.
With the visit of Vice-Admiral James Johnson, the chief 
of the South African Navy, to Buenos Aires during the 
annual joint manoeuvres of the US and Latin American 
navies (UNITAS XVII) in September 1976, it seemed that 
the SATO concept was about to be realised. Hosted by the 
Argentine navy, Johnson was given admittance to the 
Puerto Belgrano naval base whilst the South Atlantic leg 
of UNITAS XVII was being held. Johnson witnessed at first 
hand the exercises that combined the navies of Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and the Puerto 
Rico-based vessels of the US.50
The contact paid some dividends, for the Argentine 
foreign minister, Rear Admiral Cesar Guzzetti, announced 
in a televised interview that he believed a SATO 
involving South Africa would be an efficient means of
49 Sunday News, 8 January 1978; Africa 79, March 
1978, p. 51.
10 Africa Confidential 18, 2, 10 June 1977, p. 2.
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guaranteeing the security of the Cape sea route. And in 
November 197 6, the commander of the Uruguayan navy, 
Admiral Hugo Marquez, strongly advocated "a regional 
force to repulse any possible aggression in the South 
Atlantic".''1 Sections of the Argentine and Uruguayan 
press built on the support for the SATO concept 
manifested by top naval echelons in order to popularise 
it further.
For example the director of the Argentine Military School 
of Strategy, General Alberto Marini stated in October 
1976:
If the West does not support South Africa, this 
country's luck will run out shortly. If we let 
is succumb, without giving our aid, the control 
over the Indian Ocean will inexorably be lost, 
and in less than a decade, Europe will end up 
communist. After that it will undoubtedly be 
our turn in America, and then we will regret 
our past errors, by then too late to mend.52
This attitude earned Marini a trip to South Africa to 
address a seminar of military and foreign affairs 
strategists the following year. He arrived back in Buenos 
Aires declaring that "to serve the security interests of 
the South Atlantic... it is now necessary to firm up 
agreements, pacts, commitments so as to build this new 
strategy." 53
These meetings and pronouncements sparked off a new set 
of rumours. Sources close to British intelligence 
reported that along with Israel, South Africa had reached 
an understanding with Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay on 
mutual security assistance. The Latin Americans would
51 La Nacion, 16 November 1977; Latin America 10, 49, 
17 December 1976.
52 Daniel Waksman Schinca, "Pretoria y sus aliados: 
el idilio de los 'conos sur1", Cuadernos del Tercer 
Mundo, May 1977, p. 53.
53 Siete Dias, 19 October 1977.
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supply counter-insurgency techniques, while Israel and 
South Africa would supply the necessary hardware.54
In October 1977, the Argentine foreign minister, Vice- 
Admiral Oscar Antonio Montes, was reported by the Italian 
ANSA press agency as having said in an interview that 
Argentina and other countries of the Southern Cone were 
holding regular conversations with South Africa on the 
defence of the South Atlantic. Montes had said that no 
concrete steps had yet been taken towards signing a 
treaty, but that there were good intentions of doing so. 
He described Argentina's relationship with South Africa 
as being of real importance for the effective defence of 
the South Atlantic.53
By the following day, ANSA was forced to retract the 
interview and to print an emphatic but rather hollow- 
sounding denial by Admiral Montes.56
8. BRAZIL'S NEGATIVE RESPONSE
The idea of an alliance was, however, roundly rejected by 
the Brazilians, largely because of their burgeoning 
relationship with the countries of West Africa, their oil
54 Africa Confidential, 5 November 1976. The 
Johannesburg Sunday Times at the outbreak of the Malvinas 
war (11 April 1982) cited both South African and 
Argentine government sources claiming the existence since 
1969 of a secret mutual defence pact linking these 
countries and Taiwan, Israel, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. However, the behaviour of these countries during 
the war did not indicate that such a pact was in 
operation.
55 Text of ANSA interview with Argentine foreign 
minister, 3 October 1977, reprinted in BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, 5 October 1977; La Opinion, 4 October 
1977; Clarin, 6 October 1977.
56 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 October 1977.
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reliance on Angola and OPEC countries, and their 
aspirations for a position of Third World leadership in 
GATT, the UN and elsewhere.
The Brazilian foreign minister, Antonio Azeredo da
Silveira, unambiguously proclaimed that
there is not the slightest possibility of a 
system of collective defence in the South 
Atlantic with the uncomfortable and undesirable 
presence of South Africa. The government of 
Pretoria and apartheid are the expression of 
human indignity.57
Navy minister Admiral Geraldo Azevedo Henning also 
discounted any possibility of the alliance taking shape. 
The Soviet presence in Africa, he affirmed, was an 
African problem, and there was no hegemonic role for 
Brazil outside Latin America. In any event, the 
Interamerican Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 
Rio in 1947, demanded the unity of all American countries 
in the event of any external aggression. The Rio treaty 
obviated the need for any new alliances, claimed Henning. 
"The navies throughout the Americas fully understand and 
complement each other as partners", he declared.58
The Brazilian ambassador to the Court of St James,
Roberto Campos, also issued a statement on participation
in a naval treaty involving South Africa:
The Brazilian government has no plans 
whatsoever - nor has it ever had - for any 
strategic or military alliance in the South 
Atlantic involving South Africa. This position 
has been made clear on several occasions.59
57 "Brazil: Opposition to the South Atlantic 
alliance", Inter Press Service wire from Rio de Janeiro, 
23 September 1976; Africa 71, July 1977, pp. 70-71.
58 "Brasil: No hay necessidad de nuevas alianzas en
el Atlantico sur", Inter Press Service wire from Rio de 
Janeiro, 15 October 1976. Own translation.
59 Africa 74, October 1977.
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Campos reiterated that these occasions had included an 
official denial in August 1976, a press release issued by 
the Brazilian mission to the UN in September 1976, in 
addition to Azeredo da Silveira's September 1977 
statement, and that of Admiral Henning in mid-October. He 
pointed out that South Africa had never participated in 
the UNITAS exercises, nor had Brazil ever sent any 
mission nor been part of any joint mission to Simon's 
Town. Furthermore Brazil and Nigeria had issued a joint 
declaration condemning racial discrimination and 
apartheid on the visit of the Nigerian foreign minister 
to Brasilia in May 1977 .60
Despite Brazil's cool attitude, South Africa's Admiral
Johnson was a persistent lobbyist, and was quoted in the
Brazilian press as saying
I would like to collaborate with the Brazilians 
and have them collaborate with us. We cannot 
remain alone. We cannot guard this side of the 
Atlantic on our own. The Brazilian navy is five 
times as big as South Africa's and it could 
give us a hand in controlling the passage 
around the Cape. We have excellent relations 
with the Argentine navy - we exchange 
information and we visit each other 
periodically.61
Nevertheless the Brazilian government remained firm. 
Despite the growing trade and acceptance of South African 
investment, Brazil was not keen that a military alliance 
including South Africa jeopardise its access to petroleum 
and its own growing economic penetration of West African, 
North African and Middle East markets. The year 1976 had 
also seen the murder and maiming of hundreds of 
schoolchildren in the streets of Soweto by the South 
African Police, an event which tragically exceeded even 
the Sharpeville massacre in the annals of apartheid's
60 ibid.
61 The Star, 13 November 197 6, published extracts of 
Johnson's interview with the Jornal do Brasil.
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brutal history. International condemnation of the 
repression made it extremely difficult for Brazil to 
enter into any official military arrangements with South 
Africa. In fact, world revulsion to the events in Soweto, 
the murder of Steve Biko, and the banning of 19 anti­
apartheid organisations contributed to the mandatory arms 
embargo being adopted by the UN Security Council on 4 
November 19 7 7.62
Brazil's speedy recognition of the MPLA government in 
Luanda in November of the previous year made the 
potential joining of a SATO particularly difficult, 
especially as its principal raison d'etre would be to 
prevent the Angolan government from receiving military 
assistance from Warsaw Pact countries and Cuba.
9. LATIN AMERICAN RIVALRIES
Without Brazilian participation, the project was 
unviable, since Brazil possessed both the largest navy 
and the largest coastline of any country bordering the 
South Atlantic.
There were other factors which prevented the success of 
the project.
The first element was the traditional naval and strategic 
rivalries between Argentina and Brazil.63 Each country's 
military establishment regarded the other as more of a 
concrete danger to itself than any hypothetical Soviet 
threat to the South Atlantic. Their mutual mistrust of 
any arms build up by the other made any alliance
62 Security Council Resolution 418, 1977.
63 On this see Waksman Schinca, "El projecto del 
OTAS", pp. 346-9, and Andrew Hurrell, "The politics of 
South Atlantic security", pp. 183-4.
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unlikely. Argentina felt particularly uncomfortable about 
Brazil's aspirations as a nuclear naval power. There were 
also strategic differences and stresses, with Brazil 
being concerned about Africa and the straits between 
Senegal and north-eastern Brazil, whilst Argentina's 
preoccupations were with the future of what it called the 
Malvinas islands, the Beagle Channel islands, and the 
Antarctic, matters of little significance to the 
Brazilians. Other difficulties between the two countries 
stemmed from Brazil's determination to build the Itaipu 
dam on the river Parana, a massive hydro-electrical 
project which Argentina felt would impede its own 
projects further downstream.
Another problem was the rivalry between Argentina and 
Chile, manifested in competing sovereignty claims over 
the Beagle Channel islands and the Antarctic. Argentina 
was keen to exclude Chile from any SATO-type arrangement 
on the grounds of its argument that Chile was a Pacific 
and not an Atlantic power. Despite the possibility of 
Chile being an Atlantic power were its claim to the 
Beagle Channel islands to be legitimised, nevertheless it 
seemed strategically unwise to exclude Chile since she 
jointly controlled access to the South Atlantic from the 
Pacific and ranked third in the Southern Cone in terms of 
naval strength.
A third rivalry involving Argentina was with the United 
Kingdom, which it perceived as illegally occupying the 
Malvinas islands. Instead of drawing the UK into a South 
Atlantic alliance, Argentina's determination to win back 
control over the islands, despite years of diplomatic 
failure, inhibited any collaboration with Britain. In any 
case Britain had gradually scaled down its naval 
commitment to the defence of the Falklands and their 
dependencies, relying on Argentina more and more to 
provision the islands, educate their children, and
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transport their population and wool exports. Yet full 
sovereignty eluded the Argentines, becoming a constant 
source of Anglo-Argentine tension in the South Atlantic.
A further factor was the insubstantial nature of the 
Paraguayan and Uruguayan naval forces in securing the 
South Atlantic against perceived Soviet aggression. Nor 
was there any possibility of the participation of other 
African countries which bordered on the South Atlantic, 
given South Africa's interest in the project.
The discussions with the US admirals at Puerto Belgrano 
in 1976 had taken place during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger 
era. Once Carter reached the White House, the 
participation of the United States in discussions on SATO 
was no longer forthcoming. The US defence secretary, 
Harold Brown, attending NATO ministerial meetings in 
Brussels during Decmber 1977, dampened any speculation 
about a South Atlantic alliance.64
Implementation of the Nixon Doctrine had become unviable 
not only with the election of president Carter, but also 
with the mood of Congress in the wake of the US 
withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. The sober lessons of 
intervention prompted the passage of the Clark Amendment 
through the US Senate, which inhibited the US from 
supporting the Angolan opposition, and consequently led 
to the withdrawal of CIA support for the South African 
invasion of Angola in 1975-6. It seemed unlikely that the 
US Congress would give its backing to a multinational 
naval pact which also aimed to undermine the MPLA regime.
Without the overarching support of NATO or the United 
States in backing SATO, the project remained stillborn.
As has been shown in relation to South Africa's naval
64 The Star, 8 December 1977.
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aspirations, NATO countries, despite their clandestine 
supply of arms, showed no concrete interest in 
establishing any pacts. The US already enjoyed alliances 
with the naval forces of Latin America, through the 
series of annual UNITAS exercises, its presence in 
Panama, Puerto Rico and Guantanamo, its participation in 
the inter-American naval conferences, and as a signatory 
to the Rio Treaty of 1947. It therefore did not need a 
South Atlantic Treaty.
The idea of such a treaty has never died out completely. 
With the return of a Republican president, Ronald Reagan, 
to the White House, new interest in a South Atlantic 
alliance was expressed.
Private research institutes began to draw academics and 
military experts together to discuss future planning of 
South Atlantic defence. For example, a meeting of this 
sort was held in Buenos Aires in late May 1981, with the 
sanction of Reagan and military president General Roberto 
Viola in Argentina. The South African press reported that 
the country would be represented at the conference by 
"mystery men" unknown to both the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and the most likely academic candidates.65 
General Vernon Walters, a former head of US Southern 
Command, and a former deputy director of the CIA was 
expected to attend, indicating some interest on the part 
of his close confidant, General Alexander Haig, then US 
Secretary of State. It seemed that US overt support was 
contingent upon the outcome of a debate in Washington 
between those advocating a pact at all costs and those 
who felt an alliance with such controversial regimes 
would harm the Reagan administration’s relations with the
65 Cape Times, 2 6 May 1981.
352
developing world, and especially with sub-Saharan 
Africa.66
Although the administration was not placing stress on any 
initiatives, it became known that the US assistant 
secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Thomas 
Enders, had pledged himself to the negotiation of a new 
alliance between Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Morocco 
and Senegal.
10. HARBOURING NAVAL OFFICERS
Another source of intense speculation was the appointment 
in June 1979 of Rear Admiral Ruben Chamorro as the senior 
armed forces attache to Pretoria. It was customary for 
Argentina only to appoint those of the rank of captain to 
this post. The only other cases of officers of such high 
rank acting as attaches were those of London, where the 
attache also acts as head of the Naval Commission in 
Europe, and Washington. Argentina had defence attaches in 
15 other countries, all at the rank of captain. On the 
surface, it seemed that Pretoria was being accorded great 
importance in Argentina's international military 
representation.
The truth was that, as in the case of the Chilean naval 
attaches, South Africa was once again being used as a 
diplomatic foxhole for temporary concealment of 
perpetrators of political crimes. Chamorro, nicknamed 
"the Dolphin", had been responsible for running one of 
the most notorious torture centres in Argentina during 
the "Dirty War". This war was initiated by the military 
regime which came to power in 1976 against members of the
66 Hugh 0' Shaughnessy, "SA in a South Atlantic 
Treaty", The Argus, 1 June 1983, transcribed from the 
Financial Times.
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Montoneros, the armed Peronist left wing, their 
supporters, and all those in Argentina with left 
political leanings. Chamorro used the premises of the 
base that he commanded, the Escuela Mecanica de la 
Armada, the naval engineering college, as a series of 
torture chambers for victims of the repression.
In the three years in which he commanded the Escuela 
base, Amnesty International claimed that over 4,700 
prisoners who were held there were never seen again. The 
Escuela had its own kidnap squad, trained to infiltrate 
political and human rights organisations to identify 
potential victims. Leading the squad was Lieutenant 
Alfredo Astiz, nicknamed "the Blond Angel", who by 1979 
was wanted by both Sweden and France for kidnapping, 
torturing and murdering nationals of those countries. Two 
weeks after the appointment of Chamorro to Pretoria, he 
was joined by Astiz, appointed as Argentina's naval 
attache to South Africa.
Chamorro and Astiz were later joined by two other naval 
officers who were also implicated in the torture and 
murder in the Escuela. They were Captain Jorge Perren, 
appointed in October 1979, and Captain Jorge Acosta, a 
former naval intelligence officer, whose date of 
appointment was never disclosed to the Pretoria 
authorities. Both men took up diplomatic posts in the 
armed forces mission at the Argentine embassy.
Acosta's work at the Escuela base was to command task 
group GT3 3/2, responsible to Chamorro, and ultimately to 
the chief of the navy, Admiral Emilio Massera, and 
charged with "the eradication of subversion". As a member 
of the junta, Massera represented the navy, whose power 
had been somewhat neutralised by the alliance between 
army and air force. He nevertheless began to jockey for 
the position of president of Argentina soon after the
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junta came to power in 1976, and occasionally employed 
GT33/2 to launch operations against personnel of the 
other armed services deemed hostile to his political 
aspirations.
The power struggle inside the junta ended abruptly in 
late 1978 when Massera was forcibly retired. In an effort 
to avoid GT33/2 from falling into hostile hands, Acosta 
began to dismantle its operations. The remaining 90 
prisoners were discharged after signing confessions that 
they had been detained voluntarily. Utilising the fact 
that the navy had been given charge of the foreign 
ministry, Acosta was able to arrange diplomatic postings 
for himself, Rear Admiral Chamorro and a number of others 
implicated in the kidnaps, torture and murder in the 
Escuela.
Perren and Astiz were sent to the Argentine embassy in 
Paris where Perren ran the counter-propaganda centre, and 
Astiz attempted to infiltrate exile and solidarity 
groups. Astiz was forced to leave France after former 
victims recognised him and alerted the media. Perren 
followed him to Pretoria after a period of four months.
The presence of the four was revealed in a series of 
disclosures in the Durban Sunday Tribune in October 
1981 .67 Although the revelations caused intense 
embarrassment to Pretoria and Buenos Aires, it was deemed 
unwise that the diplomats be recalled immediately.
Instead Astiz was secretly sent on a course at the Naval 
Staff College attached to Silvermine, while Chamorro and 
the others remained in their posts. Because of the 
potential affront his presence might have caused the
67 William Saunderson-Meyer, "Torture camp envoys in 
Pretoria", 18 October 1981; "More torturers at Pretoria 
embassy", 25 October 1981.
355
Swedish and French governments, Astiz left South Africa 
after the end of his course in December 1981.68
He achieved further notoriety by subsequently being made 
governor of South Georgia when Argentina invaded the 
islands in April 1982. Captured, and held first on 
Ascension Island, and later in Portsmouth, his status as 
a prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions prevented 
Britain from handing him over to France or Sweden for 
trial. After the war, Astiz returned to Argentina, where 
he was found not guilty by a military tribunal on the 
charge of kidnapping and presumably murdering a Swedish 
teenager. Under the law of "due obedience" passed by the 
Argentine congress in June 1987, junior officers were 
absolved for their part in the "Dirty War". Pressurised 
by the navy, president Raul Alfonsin, was obliged to 
promote the exonerated Astiz to the rank of lieutenant- 
commander.69
Chamorro's fate was somewhat different. After his term as 
diplomat expired in February 1983, he secretly remained 
in Pretoria, living with his common law wife, Marta 
Bazan, an ex-Montonero prisoner at the Escuela, with whom 
he had fallen in love. She had been "turned", and after 
denouncing members of her own family, had joined Chamorro 
in torturing other victims of GT3 3/2. Pretoria had kept 
the couple's whereabouts from being leaked to the media. 
It was only on the eve of the opening of Chamorro's trial 
in Argentina on charges of torture and murder that he was 
effectively deported in mid-February 1984.70
68 Sunday Tribune, 6 December 1981.
69 Cape Times, 29 April 1986; The Argus, 25 May 1982, 
6 January 1988; Sunday Tribune, 2 May 1982.
70 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 19, 26 February 
1984; The Citizen, 20 February 1984; Die Burger, 21, 23 
February 1984; Cape Times, 21 February, 3 March 1984.
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In the publicity surrounding the diplomats, and 
especially the granting of a place to Astiz on a training 
course, it became known that South Africa had been 
training other Argentine officers "as part of an exchange 
programme", a fact confirmed by the Argentine charge 
d'affairs in Cape Town.71 The military training occurred 
at the Naval Staff College and at the main military base 
outside Pretoria, Voortrekkerhoogte. Argentine officers 
received instruction in intelligence work, and as naval 
and army commandos. The intelligence training filled a 
gap caused when Argentine officers were expelled from the 
US intelligence training centre in Panama during the 
presidency of Jimmy Carter. Carter was reacting to the 
violations of human rights inside Argentina perpetrated 
by the armed forces.
Less than a year before the outbreak of war with Britain, 
General Mario Benjamin Menendez, the Chief of Army Staff 
Operations, visited South Africa and was escorted around 
Voortrekkerhoogte where an Argentine lieutenant-colonel 
was attending a course. Menendez was later to become 
Argentina's first and thus far only governor of the 
Malvinas.72 There was also some speculation that 
Argentine air force pilots had been trained by the SAAF, 
but SAAF sources in Pretoria denied it was doing so.73
In January 1982, a little under three months before the 
Argentine occupation of the Malvinas, South Africa's 
ambassador to Argentina, David Tothill, published an 
interview in an Argentine magazine. He was quoted as 
saying:
71 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 18 April 1982.
72 Sunday Tribune, 6 June 1982.
73 Daily Telegraph, 1 May 1982; Cape Times, 27 May
1982.
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Our countries belong to the free world and we 
are dedicated to the preservation of its 
values. A South Atlantic controlled by a power 
inimical to those values would pose a grave 
threat to our survival.74
In the same interview, Tothill denied the existence of 
formal treaties or understandings, but could not rule out 
the need for them in the future. He quoted the foreign 
minister, R F ("Pik") Botha as having stated that growing 
commercial ties would favour "more formal South Atlantic 
co-operation".75
11. ANGLO-ARGENTINE WAR IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC
From these statements, if taken at face value, it would
seem that, immediately prior to the outbreak of the war,
treaty relations with Argentina were more of an
aspiration than a reality.
However, the war, which lasted from April to June 1982, 
put paid to any possibility of any alliance being 
secured. The hostilities over the Falklands raised a 
number of questions with respect to South Africa's 
potential role. Both Britain and Argentina had a stake in 
ensuring South African support. Each side scrutinised 
South Africa's behaviour for signs of any breach in the 
officially professed policy of neutrality.
The British press highlighted South Africa's previous 
military links with Argentina, interpreting them as a 
natural result of British folly at having unilaterally 
abrogated the Simon's Town Agreement, but nevertheless 
renewing speculation about the existence of secret South 
Atlantic treaties.
74 Natal Witness, 19 January 1982.
75 ibid.
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Both South Africa and Argentina denied participation in a 
naval pact. The South African director-general of foreign 
affairs, Brand Fourie, assiduously claimed no knowledge 
of a South Atlantic treaty, whilst the Argentine foreign 
ministry also denied the existence of any secret defence 
arrangement, claiming that reports to this effect were 
without foundation.76
For its part, Argentina was surprised by the extent of 
residual support for Britain expressed in South Africa 
through the local English-language press, which backed 
the idea of offering Simon's Town to the Royal Navy. The 
press echoed similar sentiments of the official white 
liberal opposition Progressive Federal Party.77 Argentine 
charge d'affairs Alfredo Oliva Day, whose first statement 
on the South African government reaction to Argentina's 
occupation of the Falklands was that he was "heartened by 
its response", was obliged to retract it after the storm 
of protest it had engendered in white opposition 
circles.78 The Afrikaans press denounced the opposition 
for its slavish pro-British attitude, emphasised the 
perfidious British adherence to the UN arms embargo, and 
upheld the government's neutral line.79
The Progressive Federal Party was determined that the 
government should declare whether it was furnishing 
Argentina with any military assistance. In the House of 
Assembly, it forced an uncharacteristic statement out of
76 Cape Times, 12 April 1982; SABC broadcast, 1500 
GMT, 13 April 1982, monitored in BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 15 April 1982.
77 Statement by Dr F van Zyl Slabbert, MP, Leader of 
the Opposition, issued as a press release by the 
Progressive Federal Party, Cape Town, 24 May 1982.
78 Cape Times, 8 May 1982.
79 Die Beeld, 25 May 1982; Die Burger, 26 May 1982; 
Die Transvaler, 26 May 1982; Die Volksblad, 25 May 1982.
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the minister of defence, General Magnus Malan, who 
deviated from the usual policy of not revealing details 
of arms deals, lest they compromise sanctions busters, 
and stated that "South Africa has not supplied or sold 
Argentina any missiles or any Mirage spare parts before 
or since the Falklands dispute." 80
The British reaction to Malan's statement was one of 
thinly veiled scepticism. The Thatcher government 
regarded Malan's denial of arms deals with Argentina as 
not being categorical enough. An embassy press officer 
stated that "Her Majesty's Government has noted the 
limited scope of that denial and the fact that it 
concerns only the past and not the present or future." 81 
At the same time, the British were aware of evidence that 
South Africa had facilitated arms transfers from Israel 
to Argentina during the early stages of the war. A DC-8 
cargo aircraft of the Luxembourg-registered airline 
Cargolux, which had been chartered to the Uruguayan Air 
Force, was observed transshipping crates marked "tractor 
spares" at the D F Malan airport in Cape Town. These 
crates were of a type usually used for transporting the 
very aircraft parts and missiles which were later 
mentioned in defence minister Malan's parliamentary 
statement.82
British and US intelligence made full use of this 
evidence to fuel white opposition outrage, and to ensure 
a level of scrutiny which inhibited further breaches of 
official neutrality. Exposure of the transshipment 
guaranteed that South Africa would face difficulties in 
giving further succour to the Argentine war effort.
Israel had to choose a more circuitous route, through the
80 New York Times, 2 5 May 1982.
81 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 30 May 1982.
82 The Observer, 30 May 1982.
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Canary Islands and Peru, in provisioning Argentina.83
Britain's new ambassador to South Africa, Ewen Fergusson,
issued a stern warning to Pretoria:
If South African arms are to be used by 
Argentina at a time when British lives are at 
risk there would be an unavoidable impact on 
British public opinion and the government's 
attitude toward South Africa.84
Argentina reserved much of its anger for the United 
States. It was aggrieved by the support which the US had 
provided Britain, especially after it had taken trouble 
to cultivate Argentina's assistance in counter-insurgency 
in Central America, and because its secretary of state, 
Alexander Haig, had adopted a posture of neutrality and 
played the role of mediator in the early stages of the 
war. As a consequence Argentina sought new allies outside 
the western bloc. Its foreign minister, Nicanor Costa 
Mendez, attended the Non-Aligned Movement's conference in 
Havana, accompanied to the conference hall by Fidel 
Castro himself. There Costa Mendez announced that a 
secret treaty covering the South Atlantic indeed existed, 
but that the partners included Britain, the United States 
and South Africa.85 The post-1976 military regime was 
not previously noted for its participation in the Non- 
Aligned Movement nor its friendship with Havana, yet 
Argentina was anxious to use the conference to gain 
support for its anti-imperialist position in the context 
of the war.
South Africa later confessed that it had helped the 
British effort to the extent of informing Britain of
83 Die Burger, 2 4 April 1982; Financial Times, 10
June 1982; Daily Mail, 9 July 1982.
84 Daily Dispatch, 2 June 1982.
85 Daily Dispatch, 5 June 1982; Morning Star, 5 June
1982 .
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Soviet aircraft movements in Angola. These aircraft were 
said to be gathering intelligence on shipping movements 
in the South Atlantic, and passing this on to the 
Argentines.
Argentina also criticised South Africa for allowing 
British firms to use its facilities after the war as a 
staging post for the construction of a new airfield on 
the disputed Falkland Islands. A consortium of British 
construction companies used the Cape Town harbour and 
airport to transport personnel and equipment to the 
Falklands. In a stern note of complaint to the UN 
secretary-general Javier Perez de Cuellar, Argentina 
derided Britain's unilateral attempt to change the status 
quo on the islands, and condemned "other governments" for 
helping Britain to do so. This could only have been a 
reference to South Africa.86
In the aftermath of the war, however, the disgraced 
Argentine navy abandoned any promotion of its 
participation in a South Atlantic pact. After the war the 
extent of naval collaboration in the South Atlantic was 
so minimal that all forms of speculation appeared to dry 
up.
12. REDEMOCTRATISATION
The failure of South Africa to defeat Cuban troops in 
southern Angola in late 1988 led to a round of 
discussions which ensured Namibian independence under 
Resolution 435, linked to immediate South African and 
gradual Cuban withdrawal from Angola. Simultaneously the 
maturation of the politics of glasnost and perestroika in 
the Soviet Union led to a revision of that country's
86 Natal Mercury, 31 July 1983; Finacial Mail, 9 
December 1983.
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attitude towards intervention in Third World conflicts. 
Moscow began to remove troops and advisors from countries 
like Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola. This drastically 
reduced perceptions of the Soviet threat to the South 
Atlantic.
Another coincidental phenomenon was, from 1984 onwards, 
the redemocratisation of most of the countries with the 
potential to participate in a South Atlantic alliance. 
Apart from Paraguay, where Stroessner was ousted in a 
palace coup in which democracy was not fully restored, 
all the other countries of the Southern Cone reverted to 
civilian rule under democratic constitutions and held 
popular elections by 1989.87
Argentina's new civilian administration, led by the 
Radicals under Raul Alfonsin, came under pressure from 
potential African trading partners to distance his policy 
on South Africa from those of his predecessors. Argentine 
participation in a meeting in Geneva of the Committee to 
Eliminate Racial Discrimination on 13 August 1984 
resulted in a pledge to reassess the situation. After a 
meeting with the president, foreign minister Dante 
Caputo, the Argentine representative was informed that 
relations could not be severed with South Africa unless 
there was due cause. Radical Party MP Federico Storani 
drew up a bill calling for the relationship to be broken 
off. On 7 September Caputo addressed the Non-Aligned 
Movement's annual conference in Luanda, Angola, where he
87 Stroessner's successor, General Rodriguez, a firm 
friend of Pretoria, subsequently made efforts to 
legitimise his regime and restore the country to 
democracy. Paraguay's adherence to the Mercosur is one of 
the key factors in decisions to unmuzzle the media, 
release political prisoners, and hold free elections for 
a constituent assembly charged with rewriting the 
constitution. In elections for the latter on 1 December 
1990, the ruling Colorado party received a 47% majority. 
See The Guardian, 3 0 November and 2 December 1991.
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denounced South Africa's continued violation of human 
rights. He also demanded the further isolation of 
Pretoria.88
Due cause materialised on 19 May 1986, when the South 
African armed forces launched attacks on Botswana, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. The attacks were designed not only against 
the presence of the African National Congress in those 
countries, but also to disrupt the work of the 
Commonwealth Eminent Persons' Group who were on a fact­
finding and bridge building mission in South Africa at 
the time. The transborder raids put an end to the 
mission. They also became the excuse for Argentina to 
break off diplomatic relations with South Africa three 
days later, when president Alfonsin signed decree 768.89
The official statement condemned the raids claiming that
these deeds are the direct consequence of a 
regime which has institutionalised racial 
discrimination rejected as unacceptable by 
everyone in the contemporary international 
community.90
The South African representative was given nine days in 
which to leave Argentina. Henceforth only consular 
relations were permitted. Argentina's charge d'affairs 
had been recalled from Cape Town and never returned. In 
his stead an inexperienced consular official with two 
years' prior service in Chile became the new head of 
mission.
Just over two years later, in August 1988, Argentina
88 La Nacion, 24 May 1986.
89 La Nacion, 23 , 24 May 1986; AfricAsia no. 31, July 
1986, pp. 56-7.
90 Communique issued by the Argentine foreign office 
to the South African charge d'affairs, Peter Wolvaardt, 
and subsequently released to the Buenos Aires press, 22 
May 1986. Own translation.
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expelled the South African consul and three other South 
Africans. Consul Dirk de Wet had organised a public 
seminar at which the other three South Africans - Gerrit 
Olivier of the foreign office, "Miley" Richards, a 
parliamentary member of the collaborationist Labour 
Party, and Bennet Ndlazi, the government-appointed 
"mayor" of Mamelodi township near Pretoria - spoke. In 
the course of the seminar, the Argentine government was 
roundly criticised for having broken diplomatic links. It 
was this that had angered the Argentine government. It 
accused de Wet of having exceeded his consular brief, and 
indulged in propaganda activities in the consulate. In 
turn South Africa threatened the Argentine consul with 
deportation, and blamed that country's actions on foreign 
minister Caputo's desire to curry favour with African 
diplomats in order to secure his election to the post of 
president of the UN general assembly.91
In early February 1990, as a result of massive 
international pressure, as well as an internal defiance 
campaign, the new South African president F W de Klerk 
released ANC leader Nelson Mandela and unbanned the 
liberation movements, as initial gestures on the path to 
a more democratic future.
Within eighteen months, despite a slow pace of change, 
the sanctions campaign began to erode, and in September 
1991, Argentina decided to restore diplomatic relations 
with South Africa. The new ambassador was Hugo Porta, 
Argentina's legendary fly-half and past captain of the 
national rugby team, the Pumas, who in the past had 
toured South Africa. This choice of a non-career 
diplomat, whose previous links were with a sport whose 
supporters epitomised the white racist establishment,
91 The Argus, 12 August 1988; Cape Times, 13, 15 
August 1988; Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 14 August 1988; 
Die Transvaler, 15 August 1988.
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does not augur well if Argentina has any hope of building 
bridges with the wider South African community.
13. PROSPECTS
Despite changes of regime, redemocratisation, and closer 
economic relations in the form of the Mercosur, there 
seems no reason to anticipate military unity between the 
countries of the Southern Cone in defence of the South 
Atlantic. There seems even less reason to predict a 
military alliance with a redemocratised South Africa. In 
the past there was little agreement amongst the Latin 
American countries on whether the Soviet presence in West 
Africa constituted a threat; even if such a consensus had 
materialised, the Soviet presence is no longer manifest. 
It is highly unlikely that this situation will alter in 
the medium term, and hence there little serious potential 
for the resuscitation of schemes to develop a South 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Instead security issues on 
each side of the Atlantic are likely to be resolved 
within regional rather than transatlantic frameworks.
The dream of the pro-SATO strategists has never come to 
fruition. Instead the status quo of the 1980s, bilateral 
military relations based on the pragmatic requirements of 
each partner, seem likely to continue as before. These 
requirements may themselves change. In a redemocratised 
South Africa the social dividend will have to be funded 
by substantial demilitarisation. The end of hostilities 
in Angola, the end of the armed occupation of Namibia, 
and the simultaneous slashing of the domestic military 
budget, have had drastic consequences for Armscor. The 
corporation has had to cut back on production and 
employment, with a multiplier effect on its many sub­
contractors. Social and political pressure on any new 
government will demand diversion of military spending to
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correcting past racial imbalances in housing, education, 
health and welfare provision. In this political climate, 
the prospect of developing new naval alliances will 
disappear.
Was such an alliance ever a viable option? Clearly, at 
various times, the political will existed in naval and 
wider military circles, but there was never enough at 
stake to generalise this as a central political demand of 
the different armed forces. No particular group took 
responsibility for co-ordinating such a project, although 
there was some evidence of Pentagon interest in the 
issue. It was unclear how the operational side of such an 
alliance, presumably with a NATO-style secretariat, would 
be funded. The rifts between the Latin American countries 
and between the rival armed forces in individual 
countries diminished the odds of the proposal's success.
The key flaw was the failure to win over the Brazilians 
to the proposal. Itamaraty's multilateral and Third World 
diplomacy - carefully connected to the acquisition of 
petroleum resources in the nervous 1970s - was given 
priority under presidents Geisel and Figueiredo. In 
Brazil, this was well understood as a more effective 
guarantee of national security than any naval alliance in 
the South Atlantic. Without Brazilian participation, the 
proposal was effectively doomed.
Its failure indicated South Africa's inability to 
mobilise sufficiently wide support in Latin America for 
such a scheme. It demonstrated considerable insensitivity 
on Pretoria's part to political rivalries and differences 
in the region, and a crude presumption of congruence 
between the interests of governments and those of the 
armed forces in control of them.
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The issue of the failure of the alliance was an important 
barometer of the political limits of the relations 
between South Africa and the states of the Southern Cone.
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CHAPTER NINE
PLANS TO COLONISE EASTERN BOLIVIA
The Afrikaner settlers in Patagonia failed to make an 
impact on relations between South Africa and Argentina in 
the early part of the century. However, a generation 
later, a new opportunity for a wave of emigration to 
Latin America presented itself. Would this have any 
greater impact in cementing the relations with South 
Africa? To what extent would settlers opposed to 
democracy and majority rule have a cultural impact on 
race relations in Latin America?
Certain Latin American states, keen to stimulate 
settlement in underpopulated parts of their territories, 
looked to Southern Africa as a source of immigrants in 
the late 1970s. At that time the level of emigration of 
whites from the region was growing rapidly, due to 
escalating guerrilla wars, economic recession and the 
unwillingness of hardline white racists to accommodate 
any notion of future majority rule.
Prior to his South African visit in 1974, General 
Stroessner said in a press interview, "South Africans 
would be most welcome to settle in Paraguay, especially 
those with a sound knowledge of sugar, citrus and cattle
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farming." 1 In late 1976, the former Rhodesia was 
visited by a Uruguayan lawyer authorised to sell land; in 
March 1977, the representative of a Paraguayan investment 
company visited Rhodesia to publicise farming 
opportunities in his country; in the same month, a group . 
of 4 0 Rhodesian tobacco farmers visited Argentina to 
assess the possibilities of resettling there, after it 
was reported that thousands of hectares were being 
prepared for the settlement of 100 white Rhodesian 
families in the province of Salta 1000 miles north of 
Buenos Aires.2
This chapter will examine the proposals to attract white 
colonists from Southern Africa to Latin America. 
Principally it looks at the attempts by the Banzer 
dictatorship in Bolivia (1971-78) to accept large groups 
of immigrants to develop the low lying eastern areas of 
the country whose infrastructure was traditionally weak.
The Bolivians were keen to take advantage of the wave of 
emigrants which was anticipated on the eve of Zimbabwean 
and Namibian independence. This was at a time when 
Britain, the United States and the Federal Republic of 
Germany were thinking through schemes to offer financial 
inducement and assistance to the emigrants to facilitate 
a smooth transition to independence and majority rule.
The Bolivians realised that their acceptance of the 
emigrants would cost the country very little. The context 
in which the proposal was put forward, however, had 
racial overtones, and it was this element that caused the 
undoing of the scheme. Local and international reactions 
to the proposal were so fierce that even the Banzer 
government was forced to retract it.
1 Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 31 March 1974. 
Interview by Diana Powell in Asuncion.
2 The Argus, 10 March and 2 6 April 1977.
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The failure of the proposal to be realised in 1977 does 
not rule out the possibility of a similar proposal coming 
to fruition in the future. Therefore the Bolivian scheme 
requires some analysis because of its potential impact.
The influx of a community of an estimated 30,000 white 
Southern African farming families into Bolivia would have 
created bonds between Bolivia and Southern Africa of a 
type far more enduring that those between the Afrikaners 
of Patagonia and their erstwhile motherland. These would 
resemble the bonds forged between other strong groups of 
migrants and their countries of origin, like the Germans 
of Paraguay, Bolivia or Argentina; the Welsh of 
Patagonia; or the Italians of the state of Sao Paulo in 
Brazil. Potentially revanchist in relation to change in 
the Southern African region, and enjoying strong links 
with reactionary forces in Bolivia, the community would 
have a similar political relationship to Southern Africa 
that the Cuban community in Florida has in relation to 
its country of origin.
But, more than this, the white Southern Africans would 
have solidified the racial hierarchy within Bolivia, 
whereby the 15 per cent of the population of European 
descent dominate the majority. Their numbers would have 
enhanced the existing "European" population of Bolivia by 
10 per cent. It appeared that the Banzer government 
preferred to use those leaving Southern Africa to 
reproduce the existing patterns of social and economic 
relations in the country, rather than empower the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia with land and the skills to 
use it productively,
How did Bolivia's colonisation plans evolve, and how did 
they become destined to fail?
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1. PORTUGUESE EMIGRATION
With the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the former 
African colonies in Mozambique and Angola chose 
independence dates in June and November 1975 
respectively. As colonial control wound down, the 
Portuguese settlers in these territories, organised into 
right wing parties, spread scare stories about post­
independence victimisation and confiscation of jobs and 
housing. They feared the prospect of living under 
Marxist-oriented liberation movements, and the real 
prospect of civil war. In their millions they streamed 
out of the colonies, sabotaging remaining assets and 
refusing to remain and help construct new societies.
Many of them made new homes in South Africa, whose 
government was only too pleased to accept politically 
supportive immigrants, and swelled the existing 
Portuguese community there to a population of over a 
million. A further half-million were airlifted to 
Portugal, where they were housed by social security 
officials in the hotels that had been abandoned by the 
tourists who feared vacations in newly revolutionary 
Portugal. Housing and caring for the needs of the 
retornados, or "returnees11, took its toll on the 
precarious, war-weakened Portuguese economy, and exposed 
the fragility of the Portuguese revolution. The 
retornados had the capacity to form a bloc with the 
potential to swing the Portuguese revolution rightwards.
The corollary of their departure from Mozambique and 
Angola was the massive export of technical and 
bureaucratic skills which destabilised the functioning of 
the newly independent countries.
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2. ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS
Mindful of this example, those external powers involved 
in attempting to settle the question of Zimbabwean 
independence decided that their proposals should include 
a fund to compensate the country's white community for 
any losses it might suffer after independence.
On 18 June 1976, exactly two days after the Soweto 
uprising, the US secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, met 
prime minister B J Vorster in West Germany. Aside from 
discussions on the policy of apartheid, the agenda was 
devoted to dealing with South African attitudes to 
independence settlements in Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Kissinger was aware of Vorster's weak position in the 
wake of the collapse of Portuguese power in Southern 
Africa, the rise of Marxist regimes in its stead, and the 
forced withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. On 
the other hand he recognised the key role South Africa 
had played in sustaining Smith's illegal regime. Playing 
on these elements, he managed to secure Vorster's 
agreement to end military support for Smith and back to 
US plans for a negotiated settlement involving 
conservative black politicians.
With Vorster recruited to place pressure on Smith, 
Kissinger also mobilised the British government to back 
his diplomatic initiatives. He drew on British proposals 
as a basis for negotiations. One element of these was a 
plan initially drawn up by three Rhodesian business 
executives in consultation with nationalist Joshua Nkomo 
and two other members of his party. The plan was for 
Britain and the US to establish a fund which would 
compensate white Rhodesians with cash payments if they 
decided to leave the country. Payments would be on a 
sliding scale, increasing with the amount of years spent 
in the country after independence. The fund was designed
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to encourage whites to stay and contribute to the 
country's post-independence economy, with the guarantee 
of compensation for any losses of assets, pensions or 
jobs.3 It was aimed at providing whites with a financial 
security net to avoid the prospects of another 
Portuguese-type mass exodus, a debacle which Britain was 
unwilling to emulate.
The Anglo-American fund, Kissinger told US senators, had 
to be worth US$1 billion (£588 million at the time), of 
which the US should be prepared to provide between 40 and 
50 per cent. Britain would be expected to provide a 
substantial amount of the balance.4 Britain's approaches 
to other Commonwealth countries yielded offers, for 
example, from the Australian government to bankroll the 
fund to the extent of Australian $1 million.5
It was in the context of funds being mooted for the 
resettlement of white Rhodesians that the Bolivian 
official most concerned with migration began to pay 
attention.
3. GERMAN NERVOUSNESS
A futher incentive came as a result of the attitude of 
the Federal German government towards the repatriation of 
ethnic Germans in Eastern Europe. Bonn had over the years 
developed a policy of providing financial assistance to 
these migrants, which it classified as refugees, to 
assist their resettlement in West Germany.
The prospect of independence for Namibia raised the
3 Sunday Mail (Bulawayo), 25 July 1976.
4 The Times, 21 September 1976.
5 Rhodesia Herald, 17 October 1976.
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question of what the Bonn government would do about the 
resettlement of its many nationals in Southern Africa, 
especially those in its former colony of Namibia. There 
were estimated to be 30,000 Namibians of German origin, 
of which at least 5,000 held West German nationality. 
There was also a large community of expatriate Germans in 
South Africa, perhaps numbering 100,000.
With the advent of the idea of the Anglo-American fund to 
support expatriate Rhodesian whites, the pressure on Bonn 
to resolve its own version of a similar problem 
intensified. Given its past sponsorship of the return of 
ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, it would be difficult 
to turn its back on the repatriation of ethnic Germans 
from Southern Africa.
In October 1976, according to an official of the
development aid ministry,
our minister of foreign aid declared that the
30,000 whites of German origin from Namibia 
ought to receive the same status of political 
refugees as the Germans who are now emigrating 
from the socialist countries. This means that 
every family should receive DM50,000 and all 
kinds of other help.6
However, the prospect of repeating Portugal's solution 
was not at all appealing to the Bonn government. The 
problem of reintegrating the Namibian Germans, of whom at 
least a third were supporters of the former Third Reich, 
and another third regarded themeselves as Kaisertreue, or 
devoted to the return of the former Prussian emperors to 
power in Germany 7, seemed an unpalatable prospect. 
Judging from past expenditure on the Eastern European 
Germans, the funds for absorption of German emigrants
6 Interview with Herr Vogt conducted by Jan van 
Wieringen and Max van Weezel, Vrij Nederland, 3 0 April 
1977.
7 New African 127, March 1978, p. 74.
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from Southern Africa would amount to US$150 million. Yet 
there was no reason why the funds had to be spent on 
reabsorbing the Namibian Germans into the Federal 
Republic, especially if there was a chance of other 
options presenting themselves.
4. BOLIVIAN COLONISATION PLANS
The Banzer government in 197 6 passed a decree called the 
Migration Law, which was regarded by the authorities as 
"an instrument of the country's new policy on 
population".8
Twice the size of Spain, Bolivia's population in the late 
1970s was estimated at 5 million. The vast majority 
consisted of poor peasants and landless labourers of 
indigenous and mixed descent, living in the semi-barren 
high plateau, the altiplano and a number of upland 
valleys. The large fertile sub-tropical lowland eastern 
half of the country is relatively unpopulated, but in 
fact is home to 41 Indian tribes, numbering a total of
120,000 people.
Statistically, Bolivia was beginning to register an 
overall demographic deficit, or a steady reduction in 
population, as later confirmed by the census of September 
1976. Figures projected to the year 2000, according to 
the National Council for Immigration, claimed that whilst 
Bolivia's population would double to 10 million, 
surrounding countries would have reached a combined
8 Bolivia Peace Committee, Swedish section, "We must 
prevent a racialist colonisation in Bolivia", Stockholm, 
April 1977, p. 25 in Group for Dependency Research et 
al., Documents on colonialist export from South Africa to 
Latin America, Uppsala: Uppsala University, Department of 
Peace and Conflict Research, June 1977.
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population figure of 297 million.9 The demographic crisis 
would lead to the internal market being insufficient to 
sustain consumption of goods produced by Bolivia's 
national industries, and a potential loss of sovereignty 
over peripheral areas of the country, as neighbouring 
countries with expanding populations cast their eyes on 
eastern Bolivia. These anxieties need to be seen in the 
context of Bolivian history, since the country has, in 
the past lost control of portions of its territory. For 
example, its vital access to the Pacific was lost to 
Chile as a result of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884); 
the territory of Acre went to Brazil in the early years 
of this century; and three-quarters of the Chaco were 
lost to Paraguay in the war of 1932-5.
Bolivia's poverty has engendered not only a brain drain, 
whereby professional cadres, including those with 
technological skills, have sought employment in countries 
like the United States and elsewhere, but also economic 
emigration by manual workers. Half a million Bolivians 
have emigrated to Argentina in search of basic 
employment. Under Banzer's dictatorship, a further 
category of political exiles, numbering over 5,000 
people, had to leave the country. Socially progressive 
birth control programmes, although opposed by the 
Bolivian Catholic Bishops' Conference, also contributed 
to the demographic deficit.
The 1976 Migration Law created a National Council on 
Immigration, chaired by the undersecretary for migration 
in the ministry of planning, Dr Guido Strauss Ivanovic. A 
member of the extreme-right Bolivian Socialist Falange10, 
Strauss was a member of the influential community of 
German descent in Bolivia, as was the president, General
9 Presencia, 10 May 1977.
IU El Diario (Mexico City), 8 May 1977.
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Banzer. Strauss drew up elaborate plans for the 
repopulation of key centres in eastern Bolivia, where at 
least two new cities were planned, and roads and rail 
links initiated. A credit of US$1 million had been 
solicited from Venezuela to complete the feasibility 
studies.11 It was hoped to settle around 100,000 people 
in each of the two new developments.
The Bolivian state, primarily responsive to the 5% of the 
population claiming pure European descent, has throughout 
this century sought the colonisation of the fertile 
eastern part of the country which lacks the 
infrastructure for development.12
Traditionally it had tried to attract the white migrants 
from the United States and elsewhere, in the hope that 
they would, with their skills and capital, help to build 
the infrastructure necessary for the development of the 
eastern half of the country.
5. THE ROLE OF THE ICEM
On 5 November 1976, Costa Rica hosted the 4th Latin 
American seminar of the UN Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration (ICEM), on the topic of the 
transfer of technology through migration.
ICEM is an inter-governmental organisation established 
after the Second World War in order to supervise the 
resettlement of European refugees and skilled workers in 
countries which would accept such immigrants. The post­
war population movements enabled many Europeans to settle
11 Presencia, 20 June 1977.
12 For earlier attempts at stimulating colonisation 
in this area, see Margaret A Marsh, The bankers of 
Bolivia: a study in American foreign investment, New 
York: Vanguard Press, 1928, pp. 14-15 and nn.
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in countries like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South 
Africa and the countries of Latin America. Up to the late 
197 0s, ICEM had been involved in the resettlement of 
632,210 European migrants and 152,010 refugees in South 
Africa, which joined the organisation in 1956, took an 
active part in its workings, and contributed 4.6 per cent 
to its budget. Of the special ICEM Latin America 
programme, South Africa contributed $36,330 in 1973, 
equal to 1.7% of the costs.13
The Costa Rica seminar itself was attended by officials 
from the US, Italy, Spain and the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in addition to a number of Latin American 
countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Uruguay and Venezuela.
Although the agenda contained no reference to any schemes 
to transfer white Southern Africans to Latin America, the 
occasion was exploited by the West Germans to sound out 
their Latin American counterparts.
At informal "coffee break" talks during the seminar, West 
German delegates discussed their concerns about the 
resettlement of German Namibians with the delegates from 
the Latin American countries. Herr Jelden, a 
representative of the Bonn ministry of foreign aid, 
mentioned the possibility of a West German government 
offer of US$150 million to Latin American governments to 
accept up to 30,000 white families of German extraction 
from South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia.
Jelden explained that many of the German settlers in 
Southern Africa had retained their nationality, and the
13 ICEM Document MC/1062 dated November 1973, cited 
in anonymous monograph entitled "Comite
Intergobernamental para las Migraciones Europeas", pp. 5 
6 .
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West Germans feared at the time that a flood of 
immigration to the homeland might create enormous social 
and economic problems. If Latin America offered farming 
land, West Germany would finance the migration with the 
backing of ICEM and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
The West German government later denied that it had made 
any such offers.14
Of all the Latin American delegations present at the 
Costa Rica seminar, only the Bolivian delegate accepted 
the German proposal in full. The proposal clearly co­
incided well with the planning already under way in 
Bolivia to settle the eastern areas. Bolivia was also 
responding eagerly to the possibility of the immigrants 
being funded by the West Germans. Bolivia already had 
half an eye on the Zimbabwe development fund which 
Kissinger had attempted to establish under the auspices 
of the World Bank.
The director of ICEM later strenuously denied that the
organisation was to play a part in the scheme:
a group of delegates spoke about the 
possibility of an exodus of whites from 
Southern Africa in the same manner as there had 
been an out-movement of whites from Mozambique 
and Angola, and there was an indication on the 
part of at least one delegate that his country 
might be assisted in its development in the 
agricultural area if some of the skilled 
agriculturists [sic] who might like to leave 
Southern Africa at some later date could select 
his country. This was an informal "corridor" 
discussion that played no part in the work of 
the ICEM seminar.15
ICEM was sceptical of World Bank and Federal German funds
14 Paese Sera, 2 6 March 1977, and Silddeutsche-Zeitung 
108, 11 May 1977, on the role of the Federal Republic of 
Germany; The Argus, 26 April 1977 on ICEM.
15 Correspondence between John F Thomas, director of 
ICEM, to Baldwin Sjollema, director of World Council of 
Churches, 24 June 1977, p. 1.
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being made available. It reported that in its own Council 
and Executive Committee, the plan to resettle Southern 
Africans was not discussed.
Yet despite distancing itself from the plan, the 
organisation was attempting to monitor the situation. The 
visit of Rhodesian tobacco farmers to Argentina in 1977 
was of great interest to the local ICEM representative. 
Despite official denials 16, ICEM was said to have 
sponsored the Rhodesian visit.
Normally a low-key organisation, the ICEM found its 
activities under the spotlight of the international press 
rather gruelling. Since its task was that of resettlement 
of migrants, it had both facilitated the formulation of 
Bolivia's scheme, and played a part in monitoring events. 
Lack of familiarity with its work contributed to 
extensive criticism of the organisation's role. The 
criticism was probably unnecessarily harsh.
6. STRAUSS FORMULATES A PLAN
Bolivia's proposal to accept 150,000 white migrants from 
Southern Africa was first publicised in January 1977, in 
the pages of the La Paz daily, Presencia, which published 
a report written by the under-secretary for immigration, 
Dr Guido Strauss Ivanovic on the achievements of his work 
during 1976. In the report the scheme was given top
16 Correspondence from Roger Walon, ICEM chief of 
press and information services, to Ms Dorothy Reeves of 
the Bolivia Committee in the UK, 9 February 1978, para 3: 
"The visit ... was the result of a private initiative ... 
and was not organised by the ICEM. The ICEM mission in 
Buenos Aires was invited by the Argentine authorities 
responsible for this visit, to attend the meetings. Since 
then ICEM has not been informed of any development."
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priority in the migration policy of the government.17
In March, the paper published a leaked memorandum dated 
November 1976. It was written by Strauss and addressed to 
General Juan Lechin Suarez, the minister of planning and 
co-ordination, who had been responsible for liberalising 
the migration law the previous year. In his memorandum, 
Strauss declared his intention to encourage the entry 
into the country of the 30,000 families of white 
immigrants of German and Dutch origin, especially from 
Namibia, Rhodesia and South Africa. Strauss was keen to 
solicit essential support from the German and Dutch 
governments, as well as the ICEM. The settlers would be 
allocated 80,000 hectares in the area of Rurenabaque and 
the province of Ballivian. This land would be alienated 
from competing claims, and no distribution to "third 
parties" (indigenous Bolivians) was foreseen. The 
estimated cost of over US$87 million to cover the 
migration and US$50 million to pay for a permanent road 
to the area would have to be borne by other states or 
international organisations, since Bolivia would be 
unable to bear financial responsibility for the 
settlement.18
Depending on obtaining the finance, Bolivia announced 
that it would be ready to receive the first 5,000 
families in May 1977. In his memorandum Strauss had 
argued that the increasing spread of black majority rule 
in Southern Africa would lead to a "hecatomb", and that 
remaining whites would fear being isolated and 
discriminated against by black governments. He claimed 
that the UN Commissioner for Namibia, Sean McBride,
17 "Regulacion de la polltica migratoria fue el logro 
mas importante de 1976", Presencia, 9 January 1977.
18 Presencia, 2 6 March 1977; Informatiecentrum 
Bolivia, Newsletter (Wijlrijk, Belgium), 11 March 1977;
Le Monde, 31 May 1977.
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advocated that all whites should leave the sub­
continent19, an assertion which was a gross untruth. 
Strauss was attempting to emphasise the plight of the 
immigrants in order to provide some humanitarian cover 
for the scheme.
What emerged some years later was the fact that Strauss 
had offered the job of liaison between the Bolivian 
government and the white immigrants to a Senor Klaus 
Altmann, a German-speaking citizen of Bolivia who had 
been in business in the country since his arrival in 
1951. Altmann was a leading light in the local German 
community and had strong links with the military faction 
which came to power under the leadership of Banzer in 
1971, and a great admirer of the Bolivian Socialist 
Falange, Strauss's party. Altmann had often been used as 
a security consultant by right-wing regimes in Bolivia, 
and was involved in the questioning and physical abuse of 
political prisoners.
In 198 3 Altmann was extradited to France, where he later 
stood trial for crimes against humanity. His identity was 
revealed as former SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Klaus Barbie, also 
known as the "Butcher of Lyons".20
A Port Elizabeth factory manager admitted that he had met 
Barbie, introduced to him as Altmann, in La Paz in 
January 1978, during a reconnaisance trip to view the 
land under offer. Gustavo Sanchez, the official who 
arranged Barbie's extradition to France, admitted during 
his trial that Barbie's motive for attracting the 
settlers was that they would "work hard and improve the
19 ibid.
20 Ladislas de Hoyos, Klaus Barbie: the untold story, 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985, p. 224.
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race." 21
In an interview with Strauss, author Norman Lewis 
ascertained that the immigrants would be allocated 50 
hectares of first class agricultural land as well as 
social, technical and economic assistance. Cattle 
ranchers would be granted "very much more" in the way of 
resources, and ample low-cost labour. "They will 
certainly find our Indians no more stupid or lazy than 
their own blacks," Strauss candidly confessed. When 
pressed on the question of how the migration would affect 
the 41 tribes living in the area, Strauss referred Lewis 
to the notorious Summer Institute of Linguistics, a 
missionary organisation renowned for its near-enslavement 
of indigenous communities and its support for right-wing 
dictatorships in Latin America.22
7. THE RESPONSE
In Bolivia, the response on the part of the peasants, 
workers and the church was a vigorous one. Emphasis was 
placed on the racial nature of the scheme, and the 
political consequences of the immigrants reinforcing the 
longevity of the Banzer dictatorship. A strong political 
campaign was mounted, backed by the church, the left 
political party MIR, the Comite Boliviano contra el 
Apartheid, and the Permanent Assembly of Human Rights in 
Bolivia to repudiate the importation of racism into the
21 Weekend Argus, 16 May 1987.
22 Norman Lewis, "Eastern Bolivia: the white promised 
land", The Observer, 5 March 1978; also reprinted in 
booklet form by the International Working Group on 
Indigenous Affairs, Copenhagen, 1978.
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country.23 Protests by the Bolivian Indigenous Indian 
Association occurred24, and the Bolivian trade union 
federation, Central Obrera Boliviana, signed a joint 
communique with the Organisation of African Trade Union 
Unity condemning the scheme.25 Dignitaries like the 
author Augusto Cespedes and ex-president Luis Adolfo 
Siles Salinas made public objection to "the massive 
import of 150,000 persons of the purest white in this 
country founded upon a majority of Indians, campesinos 
and mestizos'1.26
Internationally the proposal created a huge furore in the 
press27, and amongst the many Bolivian solidarity 
committees set up by exiles and supporters in Argentina, 
Mexico, Belgium, Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
The World Council of Churches and the Christian Institute 
of Southern Africa also took up the issue. Pressure was 
placed on the British, Dutch, German and even the Swedish
23 See for example Direccion Nacional Clandestino del 
Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, "La conjura de 
Banzer y del racismo internacional contra el pueblo 
Boliviano" (mimeo.), Bolivia, April 1977; Esau du 
Plessis, Lo que el pueblo Boliviano debe conocer, La Paz: 
Comite Boliviano contra el Apartheid, 30 August 1978.
24 Presencia, 18 February, 21 March, 14 and 16 June 
1977; Daily News, 1 July 1977.
25 Joint communique of the OATUU and the Central 
Obrera Boliviana, Geneva, 4 June 1977,
26 Cespedes in his daily column in the morning 
newspaper Hoy, quoted in Group for Dependency Research et 
al., Documents on colonialist export, p. 41.
27 Die Transvaler, 25 July 1977. See, amongst others, 
reactions in Belgium (Newsletter, supra.); Sweden (Comite 
Boliviano de la Paz, La humanidad debe impedir la 
colonizacion racista de Bolivia, Stockholm, March 1977) ; 
Peru (Granma, English edition, 8 May 1977); Mexico (Inter 
Press Service wire, Mexico City, 11 May 1977); and 
Bolivia itself (Presencia, 14 June 1977). Also see World 
Council of Churches, Central Committee, Resolution on 
Southern Africa: final text (Document 34a), Geneva, 26 
July to 6 August 1977.
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governments to express their opposition to the scheme.
This backlash caused the Banzer government to play down 
the matter. The arrival of the first 50 families, due in 
February 1978, was "indefinitely postponed11.28 Those who 
subsequently arrived were described as the result of 
"spontaneous migration" and had nothing to do with the 
ICEM scheme.29
Yet for some time the detailed plans for the settlement 
of whites from Southern Africa in the departments of Beni 
and Santa Cruz persisted. Dr Romano Caputi, the Bolivian 
charge d'affairs in South Africa, claimed that over 300 
applications for resettlement had been processed, and 
that Pretoria engineering firms had submitted tenders for 
the construction of two new urban centres in the areas 
earmarked for settlement. Bolivia has also set up a wider 
network of representatives in six Southern African 
cities, and offered to host South African journalists who 
wished to report on the prospects awaiting potential 
immigrants.
The former Bolivian vice-consul in Cape Town claimed that 
he had been contacted by "hundreds of farmers who wished 
to go to Bolivia, all of them Afrikaans-speaking and 
mainly prosperous well-established farmers".30
In March 1978, a delegation of the extreme-right 
Herstigte Nasionale Party visited Bolivia and reported 
back that
like us, they practice discrimination. The
whole economy is ruled by a small minority of
28 Financial Times, 13 December 1977.
29 Norman Lewis, "The white promised land", p. 32.
30 Weekend Argus, 17 December 1977. Also see Die 
Beeld, 28 July 1977, for an earlier interview with the 
honorary consul for Bolivia in Johannesburg.
386
white immigrants from Europe who keep the 
Spaniards and local Indians well and truly in 
their place ... white South Africans will feel 
very much at home there. The Indians have an 
intelligence level on a par with South African 
blacks and could be taught to do manual labour 
without any problems.31
This report typified the problem which the indigenous 
communities of Latin America feared. The prospect of 
white settlement in rural areas of Latin America carried 
with it the threat of South African forms of social 
relations being exported.
However, a year later, the vice-consul in Cape Town
claimed that
the number of departures for Bolivia has been 
somewhat exaggerated in the press ... and I do 
not believe that enquiries for emigration are 
being received from any class other than the 
farming community. There are no official 
statements that I know of by either government 
and this could well be an indication of the 
relative minitude of the matter.32
These remarks indicate an attempt to play down the issue. 
White emigration - not however in the direction of 
Bolivia - was then occurring at an unprecedented rate, 
and since it was officially discouraged, overt 
organisation of such schemes within South Africa would 
have been regarded as impolitic.
In the end the mass migration failed to take place. This 
was partly due to the failure of Strauss to deliver the 
financial support of the Germans and Dutch, who had been 
embarrassed by the public revelations of the proposal.
The local and international campaigns had a major impact 
in publicising and squashing the proposal. The campaign 
inside Bolivia became a rallying point for many different
31 Sunday Times, 12 March 1978.
32 Personal communication from Vice-consul for 
Bolivia K G Druker, 30 January 1978, p. 2.
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social forces in their opposition to the Banzer 
dictatorship, spawning the creating of, for example the 
peasant union CSUTCB founded in June 1979. Ironically, 
despite some interest shown by whites in Southern Africa, 
most of those who visited Bolivia were unimpressed, 
largely due to the lack of infrastructure in the areas in 
which they were offered land.
The proposal died after the restoration of democracy for 
a brief period in 1978, and decisively after 1982.33 
Whites from Southern Africa had largely been suburbanised 
for a generation and no longer fitted the profile of 
hardy pioneers; they preferred to emigrate to equivalent 
suburbias in the fleshpots of Western Europe, North 
America, and Australasia.
The psychology of prejudice against majority rule may
nevertheless affect a minority of whites to the extent of
their wishing to emigrate. The example of Patagonia
awaits emulation. .Perhaps Strauss still believes the
words he spoke to Norman Lewis in optimism:
the trickle (of white immigrants) will soon 
become a flood, an inundation which could be 
expected as soon as black majority rule becomes 
a fact.34
Strauss did not anticipate that Bolivia would return to 
democratic rule decisively in 1982. The invitation is 
unlikely to be extended again to whites from Southern 
Africa to colonise eastern Bolivia.
Immigrant communities are able to bridge two cultures. 
Often host communities fear that the new arrivals are 
bearers of alien values which will damage the pre­
existing social fabric. This fear may be exploited by
33 "Un an apres le retablissement de la democratie en 
Bolivie", Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1983, p. 20.
34 Norman Lewis, "The white promised land", p. 32.
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racist politicians as a way to mobilise support. In the 
case of Bolivia, the host community was resistant to the 
arrival of white Southern Africans precisely because it 
feared they would be bearers of racist culture and that 
this would have a negative impact in Bolivia, already a 
racially charged society.
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSION
The economic dynamism displayed by certain newly 
industrialised countries of the South from the late 
19 60s, coincided with the demise of the Bretton Woods 
system of international political economy. The old system 
gave way to what was seen as a new international division 
of labour in which the NICs were prominent actors. The 
newly assertive bourgeoisies of the South argued for a 
new international economic order in which the North would 
concede them a place.
In the attempt to develop this position, international 
collaboration across national lines in the South was seen 
as a potential political instrument. One model for this 
was the commodity cartel (e.g. OPEC), another was 
regional co-operation (e.g. ASEAN), and a third was a 
form of regional "proto-imperialism" (e.g. India). Yet to 
test whether South-South collaboration was a viable 
project, it was essential to question whether it existed 
outside these models. Could the South, and the NICs in 
particular, collaborate on a global or trans-regional 
basis?
In the case of South Africa and Latin America there 
seemed grounds for optimism that the ingredients existed 
for their economic and political relations to develop 
significantly from the late 1960s. Both had produced
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evidence of economic growth, including the growth of 
locally based transnational corporations acting on a 
global scale. There were similar ideological regimes in 
power, elements favouring a common defence strategy, and 
the possibilities of population migration to cement the 
links.
From the evidence presented here, we can begin to draw 
some conclusions. It is clear that relations between 
South Africa and Latin America failed to become very 
important to either side. Trade levels were only an 
insubstantial part of each side's global trade. Capital 
investment was one-sided, flowing from South African- 
based transnationals into Latin America, and related more 
to the private agendas of the firms concerned than the 
fulfilment of any national interest.
Political relations were abnormal due to South Africa's 
apartheid policies, and the need for key countries like 
Brazil to distance themselves from the apartheid regime 
partly in order to cultivate African oil producers and 
markets. This forced South Africa into a low political 
profile in Brazil, leaving the bargaining with the 
Brazilian government directly in the hands of its 
international firms. Argentina and Brazil both had 
volatile diplomatic relations with Pretoria. At times, 
however, the right-wing political character of the 
regimes in the Southern Cone, particularly those of 
Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s, 
erased the stigma of apartheid as a factor in their 
relationships.
The presence of South African firms in Latin America 
rested to some extent on the political groundwork 
achieved by the Pretoria government, which carefully set 
an infrastructure in place to smooth the way for further 
trade and investment. Therefore the interface between
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political and economic relations between the countries 
was more dynamic than might have been conceded by the 
firms involved. The firms, however, operated in terms of 
their own agendas - their needs to seek new sources of 
raw materials, spread political risk through 
international diversification, develop economies of 
scale, and increase their global market shares in 
particular commodities. In most cases, South African 
corporate investment in Latin America went into the 
extraction of primary products (and the ancillary 
industries to this process) for the world and not the 
South African market. Their agendas were set at the level 
of global supply and demand and not national interest.
On the military front, proposals for the establishment of 
a naval alliance, the South Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
were destined to fail. The reasons included Brazil*s 
reluctance to get involved because of implications for 
her relations with the rest of Africa, maritime conflicts 
between Argentina and Chile, and, ultimately, South 
Africa's ambiguous loyalties during the Falklands war. 
Despite this failure at multilateral level, there was 
some success at bilateral level, particularly with Chile 
under the Pinochet junta. The close ideological ties with 
Chile gave South Africa's new arms industry a global 
market place. Diplomatic relations between the two 
countries remained in military hands. There was extensive 
collaboration between the armed forces of the two states. 
Yet, while they enjoyed excellent relations, it cannot be 
claimed that there were high levels of trade between the 
countries, nor that close military ties will long outlast 
the democratisation processes under way in both 
countries.
Social and cultural ties between the two regions also 
failed to develop significantly. The attempt by the 
Banzer dictatorship in Bolivia to settle migrants came to
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nought, largely due to indigenous resistance and the 
mobilisation of international opinion against the scheme. 
In cases where cultural ties with the Latin American 
dictatorships were officially promoted, there was 
extensive resistance in South Africa, particularly in 
religious, academic, artistic and political circles.
Why did this relationship fail to mature?
Part of the answer lies in the legacy of history. During 
the nineteenth century, Britain, despite its hegemonic 
economic and military position on both sides of the 
Atlantic, failed to integrate the two regions into one 
symbiotic economic market. Its principal needs were 
related to imperial security and the extraction of 
primary commodities rather than the overall economic 
development of the regions. There was no incentive, 
except during wartime, for Britain to have stimulated or 
nurtured transatlantic trade. On each side, the economies 
were structured along North-South rather than South-South 
lines.
The emigrants to Patagonia might have made a difference 
in firming up Argentina's relations with what became the 
Union of South Africa. But they were disaffected and 
looked only to their homeland as a potential source of 
religious, cultural and educational resources. The 
community had no aim to encourage the deepening of 
political or economic relations between the two states.
It was, in any case, too fragmented, maleducated and 
indigent to form a coherent, articulate political lobby. 
As a community it was ultimately virtually extinguished 
through repatriation and assimilation. At the symbolic 
level, however, its mythologised history offered evidence 
of links between Afrikaners and Latin America.
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Therefore the historical evidence counted against the 
future flourishing of relations.
The failure of trade can be attributed to three factors: 
high levels of protectionism in import-substituting 
economies; production of similar kinds of commodities and 
manufactures; and a preference for developing markets in 
the North. Import resistance, bureaucratic controls, 
language, credit and delivery problems all complicated 
trade arrangements. A lack of risk taking, a mentality of 
being besieged by sanctions, and a parochial bias 
characterised the behaviour of South African 
entrepreneurs, who tended to focus on the familiar North 
and the expanding East.
With regard to investment, some advances were made from 
the mid-1970s, particularly of South African capital in 
the mining and fishing sectors of Latin America. The 
details in the case studies illuminated how the Anglo 
American Corporation came to be the largest gold mining 
company in Brazil, producing 38% of the country's 
industrial output of gold by 1990. The capital 
transferred to Chile by the fishing industry did so 
largely due to the collapse of the Namibian fish 
resource. Investment can be characterised as 
unidirectional, resource based, and producing goods 
destined for the world market. One therefore needs to 
look in detail at the specific needs of the firms 
concerned.
The interface between South African corporations and the 
apartheid state is certainly a factor in the ways in 
which investment occurs. Whether the corporation 
conceals, flaunts or is indifferent towards its national 
identity depends largely on the political relationship 
between South Africa and the host country to the new 
investment. Firms stay flexible; they have the ability to
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invoke any single strategy where required. For example 
the output of the South African fishing companies in 
Chile is marketed abroad in cans of "Pacific pilchards" 
with only a Jersey address to indicate its origins. AMSA, 
Anglo's South American arm, is operated as a subsidiary 
of Minorco, whose headquarters are nominally in 
Luxembourg, via a holding company registered in Liberia. 
On a visit to the company town of Nova Lima, the site of 
the Morro Velho mine in 1983, it was evident to me that 
the miners, the local mayor and the goldminers' union had 
only the vaguest notion that the company that worked the 
mine was South African-owned. In a world where sanctions 
began to be an important factor, South African firms 
learnt to be as invisible as possible. In countries like 
Chile, they could breathe more easily, and take advantage 
of the good state-to-state relations where feasible. 
Nothing demonstrates this more than the freedom of action 
given in Chile to Armscor, the South African state- 
supported armaments manufacturing company, one of few 
countries to do so openly in defiance of international 
arms boycotts.
The nature of the South African investments was not akin 
to those in manufacturing industries. In general these 
occur when they give firms a comparative advantage in 
production costs (usually related to the cost of labour 
or transport or energy), or in access to the host's 
market place. To date, South African capital has not 
entered this terrain in Latin America. Its comparative 
advantage has lain in its unique technical capacity (e.g. 
in relation to deep level mining) to obtain a particular 
resource. On a global scale, it possesses a very limited 
number of comparative advantages, being an example of 
dependent development in relation to the North.
With democratisation, the abnormalities of the 
relationship will fall away, and ideology will become
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less of a factor in the calculations of decision makers. 
The transition phases have been marked, in both cases, by 
severe domestic economic crises, which are being played 
out against a background of increasing international 
recession. Without the ideological common ground, 
economic considerations in the relationship will regain 
their primary position. The existing investments, if 
profitable, will remain in Latin America, but there is 
unlikely to be a major expansion of trade or further 
investment. Military links are also bound to diminish, 
which will have an impact on further large contracts 
going to Armscor and related firms.
Given the verdict that the relationship between South 
Africa and Latin America has failed to deepen, can we 
claim that this is symptomatic of the general failure of 
South-South relations to mature?
Clearly, many of the factors identified as "constraints” 
on South-South relations apply in this case: the historic 
legacy of the predominance of North-South linkages; the 
economic competition for global markets; increasingly 
being hostage to debt crises and hyperinflation, which 
further divert resources Northwards.
The optimism expressed in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
about South-South linkages occurred at a time when the 
emergent NICs had access to cheap oil, cheap credit, and 
cheap labour. Since then the picture has drastically 
changed, to the point where one Brazilian economist, 
quoted in the text claimed that his country's former 
Southward orientation was now regarded as unsustainable 
and even detrimental to its best interests. The trend has 
shifted decisively towards dealing with the North. The 
countries of Latin America, headed by Mexico, with Chile 
hot on its heels, are vying to enter into free trade 
relationships with the United States. The collapse of the
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Soviet Union further impels Latin America away from a 
non-aligned posture, and towards the wholesale adoption 
of neo-liberal policies endorsed by Washington.
Ironically this may open the formerly closed Latin 
American economies to more trade and investment with the 
South; however international recession, and trade 
preferences (e.g. within Mercosur) may rule out this 
happening in practice. At any rate, during the latest 
international division of labour, being called the New 
World Order, we are likely to see the abandonment of the 
proposal for closer South-South links in favour of close 
regional and closer North-South economic collaboration.
This thesis contributes to the debate on South-South 
relations in a rapidly changing world order. It aimed to 
show, through an appraisal of an original case study, 
that South-South relations have had a disappointing 
history, and in the future are likely to be stressed even 
less as an instrument for development in the South.
Through the case study it sheds new light on the 
insertion of South Africa and Latin America into the 
world economy. It does so periodising the relationship 
into two key phases: the potentially formative nineteenth 
century, and the post-1945 phases. This allows for deeper 
comparative analysis, and avoids some of the problems 
often encountered in analyses of single trends in 
international political economy which have not been 
placed in their historic contexts.
It also breaks some new ground in looking at corporate 
behaviour of South-based transnational firms, especially 
in their dealings with host and home governments. Often 
the investments they make enable them to deal with host 
governments in ways which the home government might find 
more difficult. This implies either a divergence of views
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of foreign, and in the case of South Africa, domestic 
policy, or it implies that firms are able to engage in 
sophisticated subterfuge to distance their image from 
that of the home government even when theT& is 
substantial congruence in their positions. The case study 
demonstrates how firms are flexible and pragmatic in the 
face of these questions. It opens the door to similar 
comparative studies of South-based transnational firms as 
actors in the relationships being forged between states.
The case study looked in vain for evidence that minority 
communities linked to both states had an important 
function in cementing political and economic links. 
Nevertheless, although the Afrikaners in Argentina lacked 
a project of this kind, and the emigration to Bolivia in 
the late 1970s was blocked, the question is still an open 
and legitimate one when applied to similar cases. The 
relationship between Korea or South Asia and the Gulf are 
amongst examples that spring to mind.
Analysts of trends in international political economy are 
increasingly emulating the well established practice in 
other social sciences of drawing on associated 
disciplines in order to unravel problems. The multi­
disciplinary approach has helped to illuminate key issues 
which would otherwise not have been evident. In this work 
I aimed to generate a more integrated understanding of 
the strategic decisions that countries of the South have 
made in their international economic relations.
398
Appendix l . ±
South African Exports to the Americas
(million rand]*
1966 1970 1972 1973 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980
Brazil 0.36 0.78 4.64 9.0 15.90 26.9 77.8 111.8 133.0
Argentina 0.67 1.84 2.33 2.85 2.98 7.82 15.2 25.2 41.8
Chile 1.94 0.32 0.66 4.51 2.90 1.19 4.72 14.1 21.2
Uruguay 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.35 3.30 2.17 6.74 3.78
Paraguay n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.03 1.75 .26 .67 .27
Latin America 
& Caribbean 6.78 18.8 16.33 47.09 72.93 120.0 147.7 251.9 294.0
United States — 129.0 — — — 459.7 1,349.9 1,410.2 1,648.0
Canada — 28.2 — — — 124.8 113.4 171.9 205.0
Total
South African 
Exports 1,543 4,542 7,270 14339 19,922
South African
1966 1970 1972
Imports from
[million rand]* 
1973 1975
the Americas
1976 1978 1979 1980
Brazil 8.66 12.20 22.18 25.29 26.09 32.4 31.8 48.6 77.5
Argentina 3.32 2.90 3.21 6.88 6.58 4.1 9.8 9.68 12.2
Chile 0.05 0.87 0.35 0.07 1.41 0.62 4.92 5.27 7.77
Uruguay 0.73 1.36 0.52 1.19 2.70 2.32 1.63 2.65 8.0
Paraguay 0.17 .004 0.10 0.37 0.26 1.1 1.06 1.8 1.42
Latin America 
& Caribbean 21.6 47.1 61. 81.6 1323
United States — 424 — — — 1,267 986 1,239 1,952
Canada — 70.4 — — — 85.9 83 95.4 138.8
Total
South African 
Imports 2,547 5,876 6,274 9,926 14,396
*1980: 1 rand = SU.S. 1.40; 1970: 1 rand = $U S. 1.30 (the rand fluctuates greatly year to year due to changing gold prices). 
Figures before 1980 do not include military items. Figures from 1974-1979 do not include petroleum  products. Figures for 1980 in­
clude both military item s and petroleum  products.
Sources: Figures for 1970,1976-1980 com piled by Jim C ason using South Africa Departm ent of Custom s and Excise, M onthly 
Abstract of Trade Statistics, January  1976 through D ecem ber 1980. Figures for 1966-1975 excluding 1970, Irom David Fig, "The 
South Atlantic Connection," Britain and  Latin Am erica, pp. 121-122, using South Africa M onthly Abstract.
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Appendix 1.2
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO THE AMERICAS (million rand)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Brazil 61.1 84 .8 17.8 51.8 35.1
Argentina 28.5 23.8 14.7 19.0 20.8
Chile 27.0 12.8 17.7 27.2 48.3
Uruguay 3.7 2 . 6 5.0 3.6 3.9
Paraguay 0.3 0.9 1.9 2.1 2.3
Latin America
& Caribbean 256.6 264 . 0 136.2 178.4 177.7
USA 1519.8 1322 . 8 1753.8 2126.3 3029.7
Canada 204.8 137.2 119.1 182.5 204.3
World 18014.1 19343.5 20672.0 25584.5 36410.4
SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS TO THE AMERICAS (million rand)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Brazil 115.0 121.7 164.9 201.5 125.5
Argentina 15.7 21.1 191.1 168. 3 197.2
Chile 17,5 26.6 23.5 49.1 69.8
Uruguay 10. 1 8.4 6.0 13.0 13.7
Paraguay 0.7 2.2 4.8 3.6 1.5
Latin America
& Caribbean 217.1 426.9 429.0 473.3 460.0
USA 2655.3 2467.0 2467.0 3401.7 3159.5
Canada 216.4 194.4 155. 0 245.6 266.6
World 18511.2 18418.3 16252.7 21804.4 22731.9
Sources: South Africa, Department of Customs and Excise, 
Monthly Abstract of Trade Statistics, January 1980- 
December 1985.
Since 1986 South Africa has not published its trade 
statistics by country.
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Sources:
i Corporate annual reports:
AECI Limited (1977 );
Anglo-American Corporation o f  South Africa Limited (1 9 7 6 ,1 9 7 8 );
Charter Consolidated Limited (1978);
Elastic Rail Spike Company Limited (1978).
ii Investment handbooks:
Bem et, Jean. 1971, 1974 edns. Guia Interinvest o Brasil e o capital internacional. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Interinvest. 
Skinner, Walter. 1978 edn. Mining International Year Book. London: Financial Times.
iii Press reports:
The Argus: 7 April 1975, 29 March 1976, 13 July 1976.
Die Be eld: 23 August 1975.
Rand Daily Mail: 27 July 1973, 22 April 1975, 14 July 1976.
South African Financial G azette: 3 August 1973.
The Star: 4 June 1975, 9 December 1976.
Sunday Times (Johannesburg): 19 August 1 9 7 3 ,3 0  March 1 9 7 5 ,6  April 1 9 7 5 ,2 7  April 1975.
Die Transvaler: 27 April 1976.
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The corporate structure of Ambras, 1984
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Source: Based on the organogram found in Franciso A. Chaves (coord), Os 
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(Brasilia: Conselho da Pesquisa, 1982), 505, and updated by reference to 
corporate annual reports.
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South African diplomatic representatives accredited to Latin American states
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Argentina: Buenos Aires X X X X X X X S
Argentina: C. Rivadavia V
Bolivia: La Paz B X B B B B B S
Brazil: Brasilia X X X
Brazil: Rio de Janeiro X X X X X
Brazil: Sao Paulo X X X
Brazil: Belem X
Chile: Santiago B X X X X B B B X
Costa Rica: San Jose E X N R
El Salvador: S. Salvador X X X N R
Guatemala: Guate. City E X N R
Nicaragua: Managua E X N R
Panama: Panama City I X N R
Paraguay: Asuncion X X X X B B B S
Peru: Lima X* X X S
Uruguay: Montevideo X X X B B B B s
Key
X = stationed locally 
B = stationed in Buenos Aires 
E = stationed in San Salvador 
I = stationed in Rome 
R = stationed in Rio de Janeiro 
S = stationed in Santiago de Chile 
V = post vacant 
* = with ambassadorial rank 
N = operates from New Orleans
Source: South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, List, Dec. 1975.
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